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Abstract 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of state responsibility, United Nations’ responsibility 
and individual criminal responsibility of peacekeepers for the crimes committed during Peace 
Support Operations (“PSOs”). It looks into the way public international law, international 
criminal, humanitarian and human rights law applies in the context of PSOs. The purpose of 
the thesis is to show that the UN, troop-contributing states and individual peacekeepers share 
international responsibility for the violations of international law committed during PSOs.  
 
This thesis proves that the conduct of peacekeepers is attributed not only to the UN, but also 
to troop-contributing states and depends on effective control exercised in fact by the UN 
Force Commander and national contingent commanders over particular conduct. Both 
international humanitarian law and human rights law are applicable to PSOs and can be 
breached by the UN and render it international responsible. Despite immunities and exclusion 
of the host state jurisdiction, peacekeepers cannot avoid international criminal responsibility 
in domestic courts and International Criminal Court. Applying the system of international 
responsibility to the case-studies, the thesis concludes that the UN, states and individuals 
cannot escape international responsibility by relying on international status and mandate of 
PSOs. 
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I. Introduction 
 
1. Statement of the problem 
 
It may sound like a paradox, but those who are sent by the United Nations (“UN”) to 
keep the peace and protect local population from atrocities, commit crimes themselves. It is 
not an unfounded criticism or a mere theoretical possibility – it is a reality of peace support 
operations (“PSOs”) led by the UN. Some operations became infamous for the violations of 
international law committed by peacekeepers and their merits and achievements in saving 
lives of hundreds of people remained in shadow of the crimes they have committed against 
the same local population. 1  The distrust of the population provoked by these crimes 
contributed to the failures of the missions to protect peace and security in those countries. The 
public image of the UN has also been damaged by sending human rights violators to protect 
peace, hence violating the very values it is called promote.  
This raises the question of peacekeepers’ accountability, namely who will be 
responsible for violations of international law committed during UN PSOs? Unfortunately 
there is no precise response to this question. Due to their unique nature and surrounding 
immunities, those who could be responsible for the crimes committed by peacekeepers found 
a loophole to avoid their responsibility. They often play on the unique nature of PSOs to 
claim that various norms of international law are inapplicable to PSOs or must apply 
differently. This situation is unfortunate for the victims of those violations who are not able to 
find those responsible and that can lead to complete impunity.  
                                               
1 The most indicative examples of UNOSOM and MONUC missions. See chapter VI for the case-studies of 
these missions. 
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Those who may be responsible for the violations by PSOs are: the UN, on whose 
behalf the peacekeepers act; troop-contributing countries (“TCCs”) who lend their troops to 
the UN; and peacekeepers themselves, can bear individual criminal responsibility. However, 
all of them may avoid the responsibility because of different gaps in law applicable to PSOs. 
The TCCs can argue that their troops become a subsidiary organ of the UN and therefore it is 
for the UN to bear responsibility for them. Even though they remain in national service 
participating in PSOs, they are formally under the UN command and control and the UN 
should be responsible for their conduct. The UN, although sometimes recognising its 
responsibility and making some reparations, has immunity in national courts and therefore, 
whenever it decides not to make reparations, victims cannot sue it in national courts. 
Moreover, certain crimes committed by peacekeepers during PSOs may not be recognised by 
the UN as its own acts.2 Consequently, no entity will be responsible for crimes committed by 
peacekeepers. Peacekeepers themselves may not be found responsible either. The UN 
concludes Status-of-Force Agreements (“SOFAs”) with host states where peacekeepers are 
deployed and those SOFAs exempt peacekeepers from criminal jurisdiction of host states.3 
Many TCCs for various reasons decide not to prosecute peacekeepers for crimes committed 
during PSOs. The UN does not have capacity to prosecute them. Accordingly, peacekeepers 
may avoid any responsibility for the crimes and this generates a sense of impunity among 
them and contributes to the likelihood of commission of further violations against local 
population.  
 
 
                                               
2 It especially concerns certain ultra vires acts that lay in-between official acts and private acts and may not be 
considered within the overall functions of the organisation. See discussion in Chapter II on ultra vires acts. 
3 This refers to the military contingents of the PSOs. However, the civilian personnel of PSOs have their own 
privileges and immunities provided not only in SOFAs, but in other conventions. See Chapter V for further 
discussion. 
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2. Objective of the research 
 
The aim of this thesis is to show that there is no impunity for violations of 
international law committed during PSOs and the responsibility is shared between the UN, 
TCCs and individuals. The thesis looks into the responsibility of states, international 
organisations (“IOs”) and individuals and adapts and applies the existing norms of 
international law to the unique phenomenon of PSOs, filling-in any gaps in law governing 
international responsibility by referring to other areas of law.  
The thesis is primarily based on the analysis of public international law (“PIL”), 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”), international human rights law (“IHRL”) and 
international criminal law (“ICL”). The first four chapters deal with each of these areas of law 
and address the phenomenon of PSOs from the position and principles of each area of 
international law. Although some areas do not have norms applicable specifically to PSOs, 
the thesis looks for ways to adapt existing norms to the unique nature of PSOs. The work 
builds up the system of international responsibility for PSOs. This system is further applied to 
two case-studies: the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Nations 
Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Accordingly, the 
thesis proves the proposed system of international responsibility can work in practice. 
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3. Methodology 
 
A) Doctrinal approach 
This thesis takes a doctrinal approach to the problem identified because the 
phenomenon of PSOs is relatively recent and the legal framework applicable to the situation 
of PSOs is still unsettled. It is necessary initially to provide a legal basis for the further 
development of the theory and this is what this thesis aims for. 
Applying doctrinal approach, this thesis not only tries to systematise and settle the 
legal framework surrounding PSOs but also to fill-in the gaps in the existing law and its 
application to PSOs. This thesis also purports to discuss complex legal issues relevant to 
PSOs and apply them to the situations of PSO.  
The analysis in the thesis takes an objective approach to law surrounding PSOs and 
does not argue for special treatment for them in the law of international responsibility. The 
rationale for that is to show that the law can give an adequate response to the crimes 
committed during PSOs, if it is applied objectively, disregarding political and moral 
arguments justifying special treatment of peacekeepers, and this response will contribute to 
the accountability of PSOs rather than become an obstacle to achieving it.  
 
B) Originality 
The originality of this work is twofold. Its first element lies in the general approach of 
the thesis to the material available regarding the PSOs’ responsibility. The thesis does not 
specifically concentrate on the UN statements or policy on application of certain international 
law norms to PSOs. Instead, it focuses on the legal framework of international law 
surrounding PSOs. It does not examine the question of the possibility of emerging of separate 
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international law from state or IOs’ practice regarding PSOs, but addresses the existing 
framework of international law norms and applies them to the situation of PSOs, analysing 
how four areas of international law would respond to the problem of PSOs’ international 
responsibility. Thus, it does not make exceptions from the existing international law norms 
for the unique mandate and nature of PSOs, but applies the norms in the form they exist. In 
this way it builds up the system of international responsibility based on three constituent 
elements: states’ responsibility, IOs’ responsibility and individual criminal responsibility.  
The second element of originality lies in the way how the thesis deals with specific 
issues and fills-in the gaps in the existing law. This becomes possible because the thesis not 
only applies international law to PSOs in theory but also addresses the application of those 
norms in practice, analysing situations when particular international law norms apply to PSOs. 
As most of them do not address the phenomenon of PSOs directly, this thesis proposes 
different legal tests to verify the application of international law norms in particular 
circumstances.  
For instance, it introduces the “material ability to prevent particular conduct” test as a 
description of “effective control” test applicable in relation to attributability of PSOs conduct 
to the UN or TCCs. It also introduces “intention to cause harm to the adverse party to the 
conflict” as a test to find whether the peacekeepers using force in particular situation are 
“participating in hostilities” and therefore IHL becomes applicable to them. Those tests are 
not new; they were taken from different areas of law and were logically adapted to the 
situation of PSOs. This permitted to apply the overall system of international responsibility to 
the case-studies of PSOs in the last chapter of the thesis. In such a way the analysis of the 
thesis is capable to have its practical application and not only to exist in theory. 
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C) Justification for this approach to law 
Although this thesis extensively uses and relies upon various UN documents in 
different chapters,4 not all the views of the UN Secretariat are adopted here as reflecting the 
existing law. Unlike other research previously undertaken on this subject, this thesis does not 
focus primarily or exclusively on the UN practice in this area and does not argue that what the 
UN says necessarily reflects the law as it stands now. The aim of the research is to analyse the 
law objectively and free from political motivations which sometimes underpin the UN 
Secretariat’s opinions on some controversial issues in this area.  
UN’s arguments are not taken for granted as representing the current law, but rather 
tested in the framework of sources, such as International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)’s decisions, 
commentaries of the ILC, etc., as well as other surrounding rules of different areas of law. 
The analysis in the thesis starts from the perspective of already established relevant legal 
norms and principles, existing independently from PSOs, and then applies them using 
objective approach to the phenomenon of PSOs, rather than arguing how the law should be 
adjusted to PSOs or whether the exemptions should be introduced following moral and 
political considerations. In such a way, if the UN Secretariat’s opinions fail the legal test, the 
thesis says so. This approach is justified for the following reasons. 
Firstly, such an approach ensures independent and objective interpretation of legal 
norm without political bias of international actors who may try to pursue their aims without 
thinking how such attitude would affect other situations.5 
Secondly, one dissenting opinion of an international actor does not form practice and 
this actor must be bound by the law as it is established.6 A dissenting state would normally be 
                                               
4 Among them, various Secretary-General’s (“S-G”) reports, reports of other UN organs and bodies, Security 
Council and General Assembly Resolutions, S-G’s Bulletin, International Law Commission (“ILC”) reports, UN 
Secretariat’s opinions, etc. 
5 See Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a source of international law,” 47 British Yearbook of International Law 1 
(1975), at 21-22 for the overview of this argument. 
 7 
expected to dissent from the beginning and constantly follow this approach.7 If it does not do 
that, it will be sill bound by the formed custom.8 In order to dissent from the existing legal 
framework the UN should have expressly dissented before not only with regard to the 
application of law to PSOs, but also with regard to the initial formation of the now established 
legal norms, independently from the phenomenon of PSOs rather than suddenly starting to 
object and express different opinions following political motivations.  
Thirdly, the status of the UN Secretariat’s practice is in any event doubtful. It is more 
likely that the practice of the UN organs that are composed of the representatives of states will 
be considered as practice forming the custom due to the fact that these are the states that make 
the pronouncements in the UN fora9 rather than when the UN Secretariat does that, being 
composed not of the representatives of states, but the UN officials acting independently of 
states.10 
Fourthly, even if the practice of the UN Secretariat is taken into account, it must be 
supported by other state or IOs’ practice and without such support, it is unlikely the 
customary rule will be formed.11 This thesis also proceeds with the assumption that it is yet 
premature now to argue in favour of the existence of separate customary law of PSOs and the 
UN practice alone cannot be the only basis for its formation. 
                                                                                                                                                   
6 See Michael Akehurst (1975), at 23-24. 
7 Ibid, at 24, 53 
8 Ibid. 
9  See International Law Commission, “Second report on identification of customary international law,” by 
Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/672, 22 May 2014, at 29, para. 43, stating that “a distinction should, 
moreover, be made between products of the secretariats of international organizations and products of the 
intergovernmental organs of international organizations. While both can provide materials that can be consulted 
the greater weight is to be given to the products of the latter, whose authors are also the primary authors of state 
practice. […] Considerable caution is required in assessing their practice.” 
10 See ILC’s Second report on identification of customary international law, at 28, para. 43. 
11 See, for example, Michael Akehurst, (1975), at 16, arguing that “a rule of customary law is established if it is 
accepted by the international community, and that the number of states taking part in a practice is more 
important criterion of acceptance than the number of acts of which the practice is composed.” He also states that 
the “development of a new rule cannot be achieved unilaterally but requires the participation of other states.” (at 
24). 
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Finally, the aim of this thesis is not to discuss the existence or formation of a separate 
law for PSOs. It rather aims to apply the existing legal norms (independently from PSOs) to 
the relatively new phenomenon of PSOs and to show how more traditional areas of law 
respond to peacekeepers committing crimes and this approach forms part of the overall 
originality of the thesis. 
 
D) Accountability versus responsibility of PSOs 
As evident from the title, this thesis focuses on responsibility rather than on general 
accountability of PSOs. This is done for the following reasons. 
Firstly, it can be argued that the responsibility provides more direct and easy access to 
justice for victims of the crimes committed during PSO. If the victims can sue states in their 
national courts and if state’s responsibility for the crimes committed by peacekeepers is found 
by a national court, the damages can be awarded to the victims. Recent decisions in Dutch 
courts support this conclusion. 12  Moreover, if peacekeepers who perpetrated the crimes 
against victims are found individually criminally responsible, that would also serve justice to 
the victims. The UN itself may accept responsibility in certain circumstances and make 
reparations to the victims which would allow justice to the victims as well. By that the victims 
get not only moral but financial satisfaction in the outcome. 
Secondly, although it is accepted that responsibility is only an element or form of 
accountability regime,13 it also serves as a potential path through which accountability can be 
                                               
12 These decisions will be discussed in Chapter II, Section IV of the thesis. See Netherlands v Hasan Nuhanović 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 6 September 2013), 12/03324 LZ/TT; Netherlands v Mustafić et al 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 6 September 2013), 12/03329 LZ/TT; Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v 
Netherlands and the United Nations (The Hague District Court, 16 July 2014), C/09/295247 / HA ZA 07-2973. 
13 See, also, Jutta Brunnée, “International legal accountability through the lens of the law of state responsibility,” 
36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 (2005), at 4, who argues that “the concept of international legal 
‘responsibility’ denotes a particular form of legal accountability, focused upon the legal consequences of breach 
of international law that are attributable to an international actor.” See further discussion on the relationship 
between responsibility and accountability in the article, at 5, 7, 10, 35.  
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achieved.14 It provides the most direct redress to the victims of the crimes and without legal 
responsibility it is difficult to envisage full accountability of all actors who can be blamed for 
the commission of the crimes during PSOs. If legal responsibility is weak, the other elements 
constituting accountability must be much stronger to ensure sufficient accountability. 
Conversely, the stronger the foundations for legal responsibility for all actors involved, the 
stronger accountability of them and the easier access to justice becomes for the victims. 
As the aim of this thesis is to fill-in the gaps in the responsibility regime of all the 
actors involved, and to show that their responsibility is full and shared, that finding would 
strengthen accountability of the actors and provide a valid basis for the victims’ access to 
justice. Moreover, this thesis also shows (through the case-law and case-studies) that the 
system of international responsibility is capable of working in practice and can be involved by 
victims seeking redress in national courts, therefore contributing to their access to justice. 
It is recognised that further analysis of all the elements constituting accountability of 
PSOs will be highly beneficial, but this would be a topic of separate study. Recognising 
certain limitations, this thesis focuses primarily on responsibility as an inherent part of 
accountability and shows that the law of international responsibility, which exists not only on 
international level but also transpires into national law of states, is not an obstacle to 
accountability but its crucial element. 
 
E) System of international responsibility for PSOs 
This thesis purports to consolidate a legal framework for the system of international 
responsibility of PSOs. This system comprises three pillars: states’ responsibility, IO’s 
                                               
14 See, for example, Deirdre Curtin and André Nollkaemper, “Conceptualising accountability in international and 
European law,” 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 (2005), at 5 stating that “the dominant form of 
‘accountability’ in international law has traditionally been the mechanisms of (state) responsibility and (state) 
liability” and call the traditional concept of responsibility of states or IOS as the primary accountability 
mechanism in international law (at 9). 
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responsibility and individual criminal responsibility. All three elements are important and 
there will be no full system of international responsibility and no accountability of PSOs if 
one of the elements is missing. This is because of special nature of PSOs and potential 
involvement of three actors in the commission of violations depending on the factual 
circumstances: UN, TCCs and individual peacekeepers.  
The system comprises the responsibility of the UN and TCCs because members of 
PSOs are organs of TCCs placed at the disposal of the UN for the period of PSO’s 
deployment. As discussed further in the thesis, this situation means that both the UN and 
TCCs may become responsible for their conduct depending on whether one of them or both of 
them exercise effective control.  
The responsibility of one of these entities cannot be dissociated from the other one and 
such a limited discussion would create an incomplete picture of involvement of other actors in 
the process. For example, if only the UN’s responsibility is analysed and the conclusion is 
that it is not responsible, it does not mean that no one else is responsible for the crime 
committed: TCCs’ may be still responsible for the crimes committed during PSOs.  
In fact, given unique structure of PSOs, where national contingent commanders have 
some powers over military members of PSOs (e.g. disciplinary) and UN Force Commander 
(“UNFC”) have other powers over PSOs (e.g. directing PSOs to participate in particular 
operation), both the UN and TCCs can be equally responsible for the conduct in question, as 
argued in the thesis, depending on the effective control and their ability to prevent the 
wrongful conduct. Therefore it is not possible to talk about the UN’s or TCCs’ responsibility 
separately. 
The thesis concludes that for most wrongful acts committed during PSOs either the 
UN or TCCs or both of them can be held responsible and therefore the responsibility is shared 
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between them. It is important because the TCCs often try to shift the blame for the wrongful 
acts to the UN. The UN for political reasons sometimes accepts responsibility while claiming 
immunities from legal suits in domestic courts.  
This thesis shows that even if the UN is responsible, it does not mean that the TCCs 
are exempt from the responsibility and simultaneous responsibility is indeed possible. This 
conclusion is most important for the victims of the crime who try to find redress in national 
courts and claim damages against the TCCs. 
The complete system of international responsibility is not possible without the 
existence of individual criminal responsibility of peacekeepers.15 Whatever the responsibility 
of their states or the UN is, a prospective of prosecution and subsequent punishment of actual 
perpetrators for the wrongful conduct can be an effective deterrent from committing crimes. 
This is especially so when the crimes are committed wholly or partially for private reasons 
rather than directed by the TCCs/UN. In many situations there can be three actors responsible 
for the crimes committed during PSOs: the UN for the failure to adopt proper orders and more 
robust policy against perpetrators committing crimes; the TCCs for failure to exercise proper 
disciplinary powers over peacekeepers; and individual peacekeepers for actually committing 
the crimes in question.  
If the perpetrators of the crimes are prosecuted and punished, this would also bring 
justice for the victims. However, the main problem is that due to the exclusion of host state 
criminal jurisdiction over the peacekeepers and reluctance of the TCCs to prosecute them, the 
sense of immunity is spread between them. This thesis shows that despite the exclusion of 
                                               
15  See also André Nollkaemper, Dov Jacobs, “Shared responsibility in international law: a conceptual 
framework,” 34 Michigan Journal of International Law 359 (2013) at 363, 375, suggesting that the 
responsibility of non-state actors, including individuals, “is an issue integral to a clear understanding of shared 
responsibility even though it may sometimes fly below the radar of international law.” 
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host states jurisdiction and UN immunities, the peacekeepers may not be able to avoid 
prosecution for international and transnational crimes.  
In this way, the thesis builds the system of international responsibility for the crimes 
committed during PSOs. It shows the ways how the obstacles to holding the UN, TCCs and 
individuals can be overcome and fills-in any gaps in the existing legal framework to draw a 
complete picture of the system of international responsibility. It further tests it on the real 
examples of two PSOs: UNOSOM and MONIC/MONUSCO.  
 
4. Scope and outline of the thesis 
 
A) Terminology 
The subject matter of the thesis is responsibility of PSOs. The choice of this author is 
to use an all-encompassing notion of “peace support operations” to ensure the correct 
reflection of the scope of the thesis. The thesis does not limit itself to the traditional 
peacekeeping operations based on three pillars: non-use of force, impartiality and consent of 
host state16 but incorporates all generations of peacekeeping and discusses all together so-
called “peacemaking”, “peacebuilding” and “peace-enforcement operations,” where either or 
all the distinctive features of traditional peacekeeping may be absent.  
These three pillars are not always maintained in modern PSOs and their presence in 
PSOs may be only indicative and not conclusive for application of international law to PSOs. 
It is more important what the PSO does in fact on the ground, and not what claims to be doing. 
                                               
16 See, for instance, Brahimi report (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations  General Assembly, 
Security Council, Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, 
A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000), paras. 48-49 onward; United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 
“Capstone Doctrine” (2008), at 31. See, also for discussion, Nicholas Tsagourias, “Consent, 
neutrality/impartiality and the use of force in peacekeeping: their constitutional dimension”, 11 Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law 465 (2006), at 465. 
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It is not the aim of the thesis to consider differences between different types of operations and 
there are plenty of academic works published on this topic.  
The term of “peace support operations” may be seen as slightly artificial, although the 
UN is not consistent in its terminology either.17  For the purposes of this thesis it is not 
possible to discuss only “peacekeeping operations” because this term does not include “peace-
enforcement operations”,18 the operations where the force was used to more or less greater 
extent. This thesis addresses both situations: when the force is used (whether or not in self-
defence) and when the force is not used.  
It is especially important to maintain the integrity of the subject matter (namely the all 
encompassing term “peace support operations”), when dealing with the application of IHL to 
those operations, as the use of force is directly relevant here. To limit the subject matter to 
only “peacekeeping operations” means limiting discussion of application of IHL only to those 
operations which do not use force beyond self-defence. It also means to go into deeper 
analysis of the distinction between “peacekeeping” and “peace-enforcement”, which is not the 
purpose of this thesis. Therefore there is a need for such a broad term as “peace support 
                                               
17 The United Nations itself uses different terminology. For example in the Agenda for Peace (Report of the 
Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, pursuant to 
the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111, 
17 June 1992), the Secretary-General clearly distinguishes between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-
building operations (paras. 20-21), as well as between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement (para. 44). He does 
not, however, provide all-encompassing term for all of those operations. However, what is clear is that 
“peacekeeping” does not including either peace-enforcement or peacemaking/peace-building operations and 
further more general term need to be used here. See also Brahimi report, paras. 10-13, which distinguishes 
between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building operations, calling them “United Nations operations” 
but does not talk about peace-enforcement operations. “Capstone doctrine” uses three different terms: traditional 
peacekeeping operations”, “multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations”, “robust peacekeeping”, “peace 
operations”, and “peace enforcement” at 24, 97-98 to include the subject matter of this thesis. 
18  “United Nations operations” term used in the Brahimi report (ibid), does not seem to include peace-
enforcement operations, which are also a subject matter of this study, the same may be true for “multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operations” and “peace operations” used in the “Capstone doctrine”. The term used in 
the S-G’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law (ST/SGB/1999/13, 
6 August 1999) was the “UN forces”, which is slightly different from the once used before.  
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operations.” In fact, this term is not fully artificial. The UN uses it in some of the documents 
to include “peacekeeping” and “peace-enforcement operations.”19  
This thesis understands the term “peace support operations” to include all operations 
under the UN command and control, irrespective of their status, their legal basis, their purpose 
of deployment and their mandate. This is to distinguish the UN operations from other 
enforcement actions controlled/commanded by other states or coalitions of states. If, however, 
the UN controlled/commanded operation uses force (like UNOSOM II), it is still included in 
the scope of this thesis. This objective criterion (under UN command/control) would allow to 
dispense with an analysis of what type of PSO it was (peacekeeping or peace-enforcement) 
and to focus on more important issues for the purpose of this thesis, e.g. whether and in what 
circumstances IHL applies to PSOs, when its conduct is attributed to the UN/TCCs, etc. 
Although the thesis adopts the term of PSOs everywhere in the thesis, other terms are 
used interchangeably: “peace support forces” (“PSFs”) and “peacekeepers”. PSFs are 
understood in the thesis to be military members of PSOs combined together, whereas the term 
PSO is used to define a place or an overall situation. Separate members of PSFs are also 
called “peacekeepers” elsewhere in the thesis, without prejudice to the fact that they are 
members of PSOs rather than peacekeeping operations, because there is no term of “peace-
                                               
19 See for instance, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Administration of Justice, 
Rule of Law and Democracy, “Scope of the activities and the accountability of armed forces, United Nations 
civilian police, international civil servants and experts taking part in peace support operations (i.e. all operations 
of a peacekeeping or peace enforcement nature under a United Nations mandate)”, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/L.9, 7 
August 2002; Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Working Paper of the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Administration of Justice: The accountability of 
armed forces, United Nations civilian police, international civil servants and experts taking part in peace support 
operations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/WP.1, 13 August 2001; Security Council resolution 1547, S/RES/1547 (2004), 
para.1; Report of the Secretary-General, “Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and 
other political initiatives, authorised by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council,” A/59/534, 27 
October 2004, para. 6, etc; General Assembly Resolution 61/89, Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing 
common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, A/RES/61/89, 18 
December 2006, preamble.  
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supporter” yet existing in the literature. Therefore “peacekeepers” should be understood in 
this thesis as military members of PSOs.  
 
B) Scope of the analysis 
Given the large number of issues for analysis regarding PSOs, it is necessary to 
introduce certain limitations for the purposes of this study.  
The first limitation is that the “UN PSOs” are understood here only as operations 
under UN command and control. Although some of them are briefly addressed, the operations 
only authorised by the Security Council (“UNSC”) and led by a member state (“MS”) or 
coalition of states or other IOs are not included in the scope of this research. 
The second limitation is that it analyses only international responsibility of national 
contingents of PSOs, who remain in national military service of TCCs and who were 
seconded to the UN for participation in PSOs. The research does not address the 
responsibility of military observers, civilian police, UN officials, UN volunteers, international 
and local contractors, etc. All of them have different statuses, especially with regard to the 
applicable immunities.  
The present research mainly focuses on serious violations of IHL, IHRL and ICL 
committed during PSOs. Violations of domestic criminal law are only mentioned with regard 
to jurisdictional issues and not addressed fully (as requiring separate analysis of TCCs’ penal 
systems).  
Similarly, the thesis concerns only violations committed by PSFs, and not other 
persons or entities (like armed groups operating in host states, any other private individuals or 
public officials). Therefore it does not address the question of responsibility of the UN and 
TCCs for failure to prevent atrocities committed by other actors. Although positive 
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obligations are mentioned in the thesis, their analysis is limited. The thesis does not address 
the responsibility of IOs, the UN MSs for the actions of the UN as its members or other 
persons, deserving a separate study.  
 
C) Outline of the thesis 
The first three chapters of the thesis are devoted to the analysis of responsibility of the 
UN and TCCs. Given that the responsibility of states and IOs arises when particular conduct 
is 1) attributed to them under international law and 2) constitutes a breach of their 
international obligations. The first chapter discusses the circumstances under which 
peacekeepers’ conduct can be attributed to the UN or TCCs, the second and third chapters 
proceed with the discussion of the second limb of this test. 
The first chapter analyses current law on state responsibility under the International 
Law Commission (“ILC”) Draft Articles on state responsibility (“ASR”) and responsibility of 
IOs under ILC Draft Articles on responsibility of international organisations (“ARIO”) and 
proposes a new way of their application to the phenomenon of PSOs through “effective 
control” test. 
The analysis in third and fourth chapters does not deal with the breach of international 
obligations per se (as it is based on case-by-case approach), but discusses international law 
obligations that can be breached by the states and the UN, if PSFs commit crimes.  
The third chapter discusses the applicability of IHL to PSOs, exploring binding nature 
of IHL obligations for the UN/TCCs, under what circumstances they become a party to an 
armed conflict through PSOs’ participation in hostilities, analyses the status of PSOs in the 
conflict, the nature of the conflict and the application of the law of occupation to PSOs.  
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The fourth chapter analyses human rights law obligations of TCCs and the UN, 
through the discussion of extraterritorial obligations of states and explores the question of the 
concurrent application of IHL and IHRL.  
The fifth chapter shifts the analysis to the issues of individual criminal responsibility. 
It discusses the jurisdiction and immunities in national courts and in International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) over crimes committed by peacekeepers in the host states. 
The sixth chapter applies the system of international responsibility discussed in 
previous chapters to case-studies of PSOs: UNOSOM and MONUC. These missions were 
selected because of widespread nature of crimes allegedly committed there.  
The thesis shows that there is no impunity for crimes committed by peacekeepers, and 
individuals, states and the UN must share international responsibility for violation of 
international law committed during PSOs. 
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II. Attribution of conduct of PSOs to the United Nations and troop-
contributing states in general international law  
 
The present chapter addresses the question of attribution of conduct of PSOs to the UN 
and/or TCCs. The chapter primarily focuses on the discussion of “attribution” provisions of 
the ILC ASR and ARIO and concerns only the first limb of international responsibility – 
attribution of conduct – and not the second – breach of international obligations. For the sake 
of analysis, it is provisionally presumed that the second limb is fulfilled. Therefore, when the 
“responsibility” of states and the UN is mentioned in this chapter, it is assumed the “breach” 
of international obligations has already been found. It is without prejudice to the complex 
issue of breach of the UN’s and TCCs’ obligations discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
The structure of the chapter aims firstly to analyse the law of attribution of conduct to 
states (Section 1) and to international organisations (Section 2) and whether they can be 
concurrently responsible for conduct (Section 3). The last section of the chapter (Section 4) 
will apply the discussed law to PSOs. The sections (except Section 3) firstly discuss the 
attribution of conduct of organs and agents of states/organisations, secondly, whether conduct 
can be attributed by virtue of “effective control” exercised by states/organisations over that 
conduct, and thirdly, whether ultra vires acts can also be attributed to states/organisations. 
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1. Attribution of conduct to states on the basis of different degrees of control 
 
A) Attribution of conduct of de jure and de facto state organs 
Under certain circumstances states may be responsible for the conduct of individuals 
and entities. Their wrongful acts can be attributed to states under different rules of state 
responsibility. The ILC’s work on ASR provides a consolidation of such rules in ASR 
Chapter II. While ASR are not a treaty and the UN General Assembly (“UNGA”) only “took 
note” of the half century work of the ILC in 20011 and still invited government to submit their 
comments and information on state practice,2 some of their provisions reflect CIL (“CIL”).3  
The ICJ has repeatedly held that the conduct of any state organ must be regarded as an 
act of that state and this rule is well-established under CIL.4 The rule of attribution of conduct 
of state organ is provided in ASR Article 4. The wording of the article is primary focused on 
the definition of a state organ and simply states the customary rule. The ASR Commentary 
also defines state organs as “individual or collective entities which make up the organisation 
of the State and act on its behalf”.5 There are two main characteristics of a state organ: (1) it 
makes up the organisation of the state and (2) acts on its behalf.6 It should be further analysed 
whether these characteristics are essential for the attribution of conduct of a person or entity to 
states. 
                                               
1  General Assembly Resolution (“GAR”), “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, 28 
January 2002, A/RES/56/83. 
2 GAR, “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, 11 January 2011, A/RES/65/19. 
3 See discussion below with regard to certain provisions 
4 Difference relating to immunity from legal process of a special rapporteur of the commission on human rights, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 29 April 1999 (“Special Rapporteur”) case, para. 62, Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia), 
Judgement, ICJ Reports, 26 February 2007 (“Genocide case”), para. 385, Armed activities on the territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgement, ICJ, 19 December 2005 (“Congo case”), para. 
213. 
5 ASR Commentary to Art. 4, para. 1.  
6 See also Genocide case, para. 388. 
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The first element will depend on the functions of the entity as a part of state apparatus 
that the state’s internal law allots to it. While this element is primarily based on the state’s 
internal law7 and is more formal in nature, the second element is a factual requirement.8 The 
second element (“acting on behalf of state”) was crucial in disqualification of the VRS 
officers and “Scorpions” from being de jure organs of the FRY in the Genocide case. The ICJ 
considered that since the VRS officers’ functions were to act on behalf of the Republika 
Srpska and not on behalf of the FRY, they exercised elements of public authority of 
Republika Srpska and did not consider them to be state organs.9 The Court further noted that 
“the act of an organ placed by a state at the disposal of another public authority shall not be 
considered an act of that state if the organ was acting on behalf of the public authority at 
whose disposal it had been placed.”10 The result is the same if the receiving public authority is 
another state.11 
Accordingly, even if a person is a state organ, such status will not be conclusive for 
determination of state responsibility, although it will create prima facie evidence of its 
responsibility.12 This presumption is rebutted, when the organ acts not on behalf of its own 
state, but on behalf of another state. The conduct of the first state’ organ may be attributed to 
the second state if that organ was “effectively” put at the disposal of the second state under 
ASR Article 6.13 The organ must act “exclusively” for purposes and “on behalf” of the second 
state in order to attribute its conduct to the second state alone.14 It is the same if the state 
                                               
7 See the wording of ASR Article 4 (2), which specifies that an entity or person will be considered as a state 
organ by its status under the internal law. 
8 Brownlie, for example, states that a state will not be responsible for its official who was proved to have been 
acting on the orders of another state. See Ian Brownlie, State responsibility (Clarendon, 1983), at 135. 
9 Genocide case, para. 388. 
10 Ibid, para. 389. 
11 See ASR Article 6. 
12 See Ian Brownlie (1983), at 135. This derives from the mere principle of Article 4 ASR providing for the 
unconditional responsibility of states for their organs.   
13 See also ASR Commentary to Article 6, para. 1. 
14 Ibid. 
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organ is put at the disposal of another public authority (or entity) and acts solely on its 
behalf.15  
The ECtHR case of Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain serves as an example. It 
concerned the responsibility of the respondent states for their judges who sat as members of 
Andorran courts. The ECtHR considered that the French and Spanish judges did not sit in 
Andorran courts in their national capacity and exercised their functions in an autonomous 
manner.16 The French and Spanish authorities did not attempt to interfere in their work at the 
applicants’ trial and did not supervise their judgements.17 The Court found that it had no 
jurisdiction ratione personae in that case (as Andorra was not a party to the Convention). 
Clearly, the state organ was under the authority of another state and acted solely on behalf of 
the host state and the responsibility of lending states was excluded. 
The ASR Commentary also suggests that the organ must act for the benefit and under 
the authority of the second state.18 It provides that the organ must act in conjunction with the 
state’s machinery and under its exclusive direction and control rather than on instructions 
from the sending state.19 Thus, the sending state will not have powers of control over the sent 
organ. The organ becomes an organ of the receiving state.  
The ASR Commentary provides two examples which should be distinguished from the 
aforementioned description. One concerns the situation where the armed forces of the first 
state were sent to assist the second state but remained under the authority of the first state and 
therefore exercised governmental authority of the first state. Similarly, a state organ can be 
sent to another state for shared purposes but retains its own autonomy and status.20 The 
                                               
15 Genocide case, para. 389. 
16 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, Application No. 12747/87, 26 June 1992, para. 96. 
17 Ibid, para. 96. 
18 ASR Commentary to Article 6, paras. 1-2. 
19 Ibid, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
20 Ibid, para. 4. 
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conduct of this organ will still be attributed to the first state and will not be covered by Article 
6. 21  This example can be relevant to enforcement actions, where forces act under their 
national command but are authorised by the UNSC. 
The other situation, different from pure Article 6 cases, is where an organ of the first 
state acts on joint instructions of its own and a second state. In this case the conduct of the 
organ is attributable to both states under other articles of ASR Chapter II on attribution of 
conduct to a state.22 The Commentary in the footnote mentions only Article 47 related to the 
plurality of responsible states which is provided in absolutely different Chapter of ASR, and 
does not specify under which Article of Chapter II it may be attributed to both states.  
The question is what provisions of Chapter II may in theory be applicable to the cases 
of attribution of conduct of an organ acting on joint instructions of its own state and another 
state. The former state would be still responsible for the conduct of its organ even though the 
organ also acts on instructions of the other state, whereas the latter state may be held 
responsible for the conduct performed by an entity under its instructions under Article 8. Even 
if the first state did not issue specific instruction to its organ and the organ acted on the 
instructions of the other state, in some situations the first state may still be responsible for its 
organ’s conduct under Article 7 where the organ acted in the scope of apparent authority.23  
The conduct of the state organ might also be attributable to both states under Article 4 
if that organ is considered a joint organ of both states and they actually issued joint 
instructions for that organ. This provision may be relevant by analogy for the attribution of 
conduct of PSO which receive instructions both from the UN and from their national state (or 
even several other states) remaining their national state’s organ.  
                                               
21 Ibid, para. 3. 
22 Ibid, para. 4. 
23 See, for example, ASR Commentary to Article 7, fn. 150, where the ILC provides an example of a state 
bribing the organ of another state. 
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Thus, the requirement that the organ acts on behalf of state is crucial for the attribution 
of its conduct and cannot be waived. However there may be situations where an entity acts on 
behalf of a state (i.e. fulfils the second element of being a state organ) but does not form part 
of the state structure under internal law. The question is whether the conduct of such entity 
may be attributed to the state by the same rules under Article 4. 
The ASR Commentary seems to allow such possibility, providing that although the 
internal law is relevant in the entity’s classification as a state’s “organ”, it is not conclusive, 
because the state’s internal law may not classify, which entities have the status of state organs. 
24 Authors also suggest that although the determination of an entity as a state organ is primary 
done by internal law, for international law the question whether or not it is a state organ is of 
factual nature.25  Importantly, the state cannot avoid responsibility for the conduct of its de 
facto organ even if this body does not have a formal status of “organ” under its internal law.26 
It is part of the principle that state’s internal law does not affect the characterisation of an act 
as unlawful under international law.27 Therefore a body is still regarded as a state organ even 
if it is not recognised as such under state’s internal law. 
The ICJ Genocide and Nicaragua cases provide such examples. According to the ICJ, 
the conduct of persons or entities may still be attributed to a state, even though “they do not 
have a legal status of state organs, but in fact act under such strict control by the state that 
they must be treated as its organs” for the purposes of attribution of their conduct to the 
state.28 The state needs to exercise such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating an 
                                               
24 ASR Commentary to Article 4, para. 11.  
25 See Christine Chinkin, “A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension”, 10 European Journal of International 
Law 387 (1999), at 388; Ian Brownlie (1983), at 136. 
26 See ASR Commentary to Article 4, para. 11. 
27 See ASR Article 3. 
28 Genocide case, paras. 391-392. 
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entity as acting on its behalf.29 In such a case the entity may still be considered de facto state 
organ for the attribution of its conduct under international law, even where internal law does 
not provide for such status. Such emphasis of the Court on the requirement to act on behalf of 
the state shows its importance and determinative nature for the attribution principles. 
The Court further explained what degree of control the state needs to have for it to 
become a de facto state organ. It stated that the relationship between the entity and state needs 
to be “so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be 
right to equate [the entity], for legal purposes, with an organ of [the state].”30 It must act in 
“complete dependence” of the state, being merely a state’s “instrument” or nothing more than 
its “agent” and lack “any real autonomy”.31 The ICJ held in the Nicaragua case that the fact 
that the United States (“US”) financed, trained, equipped, armed and organised contras, is not 
sufficient to find such “complete dependence”.32 The “strict control” test is very difficult to 
fulfill.  
Thus, the degree of control that the state must have over an entity, formally not having 
a “state organ” status, is the same as the state has over its de jure organs, namely “complete 
dependence”.33 There seems to be no reason why the degree of control should be different. 
The test already provides a very high threshold and if the test is fulfilled, the state will fully 
                                               
29  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Judgement, ICJ Reports, 27 June 1986 (“Nicaragua case”), para. 109; Genocide case, para. 391. 
30 Nicaragua case, para. 109.  
31 Genocide case, paras. 392-394; Nicaragua case, para. 110. 
32 Nicaragua case, paras. 108-110.  
33 See Stefan Talmon, “The Responsibility of Outside Powers for Acts of Secessionist Entities”, 58 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 493 (2009), at 517, who submits that the degree and type of such control “must 
qualitatively be the same as the control a state exercises over its own de jure organs, a requirement fulfilled only 
by ICJ’s ‘strict control’ test.” See also Marko Milanović, “State responsibility for Genocide”, 17 European 
Journal of International Law 553 (2006), at 577, 587 who explains that if an entity is controlled in such a way as 
to find it in “complete dependence” on the state, it may be considered as a de facto state organ, because the only 
thing missing for it to actually be considered a proper state organ would be the internal law assignment of such 
status to that entity. Davis Tyner, “Internationalisation of war crimes prosecutions: correcting the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the for Yugoslavia’s folly in Tadić”, 18 Florida Journal of International Law 843 (2006), 
at 874-875 also submits that as the state normally exercises a very high control over its de jure organs (and 
therefore could be held responsible for them) the same degree of control needs to be exercised by the state over 
the entities which could be considered as de facto organs. 
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control the body and therefore must be responsible for its conduct. Accordingly, the only 
difference between a de jure and de facto state organ is the recognition of the former in the 
state’s internal law, which per se does not affect the state responsibility under international 
law.  
A further question is whether the conduct of de facto organs fulfilling “strict control” 
test is attributable to the state under Article 4 like the conduct of de jure organs. The ASR 
Commentary to Article 4 does not contain any reference to the de facto state organs. 
Academic opinion differs on this issue.34 However, the ICJ’s reasoning shows that persons 
who are in a relationship of “complete dependence” on the state “cannot be considered 
otherwise than as organs of the state, so that all their actions performed in such capacity 
would be attributable to the state for purposes of international responsibility.”35 Therefore 
they are organs of state for the purposes of attribution and all their acts are attributable to the 
state. The only ASR’s article that deals with this situation is Article 4.  
The ASR Commentary to Article 4 does envisage such broader interpretation. It states 
that “a state cannot avoid responsibility for the conduct of a body which does in truth act as 
one of its organs merely by denying it that status under its own law.”36 To accommodate a 
possibility of attribution of the conduct of entities that “in truth” or “in fact” act as state 
organs without being recognised as such under internal law, Article 4 contains the word 
                                               
34 For instance, De Frouville argues that the ICJ considered de facto organ under Article 4 and the “effective 
control” under Article 8 and that such approach “mixes two distinct cases of attribution, the one being based on 
legal or institutional links, and the other on factual links” (see Olivier De Frouville, “Attribution of conduct to 
the state; private individuals”, in Crawford, James, The law of international responsibility (Oxford University 
Press, 2010), at 268-269). However, Milanović considers that the Nicaragua “complete control” test as one of 
two tests (one of being “effective control” test and the other “complete control” test), was missed by the ILC in 
its work on state responsibility (see Marko Milanović, “State responsibility for acts of non-state actors: a 
comment on Griebel and Plucken”, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 307 (2009), at 318-319). 
35 Genocide case, para. 397 (emphasis added). 
36 ASR Commentary to Article 4, para. 11 (emphasis added). 
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“includes” in paragraph 2.37 However the Commentaries do not seem to provide clear criteria 
for determining such entities as state organs.38  
 
B) Attribution of the conduct directed or controlled by the state. 
The responsibility of a state for conduct of private persons was envisaged under ASR 
Article 8. As the ICJ stated in the Genocide case, this provision reflects CIL.39 The idea of 
this provision is that a state may choose to act through private individuals, rather than through 
its organs and that no legal or de jure link can be established between a state and such private 
persons before attribution can take place. 40 According the Genocide case, if a “complete 
dependence” of the entity is not established and it is not a de facto state organ, the 
responsibility for its conduct may still arise, if particular acts were perpetrated by this entity 
under instructions of or under direction or control of the state.41 Such control needs to be 
“effective”.42 The Court, however, does not use “effective control” test to qualify a particular 
person as a de facto state organ.43  
The rationale behind such attribution of private persons’ conduct is that the state bears 
responsibility for the conduct of its own organs that gave such instructions or exercised 
control that resulted in the commission of wrongful acts and became a cause of commission of 
those acts.44 As the ASR Commentary provides, under Article 8 the state is responsible for the 
                                               
37 See ASR Commentary to Article 4, para. 11. See also Andre De Hoogh, “Article 4 and 8 of the 2001 ILC 
articles on state responsibility, the Tadić case and attribution of acts of Bosnian Serb authorities to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia”, 72 British Yearbook of International Law 255 (2001), at 268, pointing out that “it 
seems right therefore to reserve the phrase ‘de facto organ’ for an organ considered as such by virtue of the 
supplementary role of international law under Article 4, paragraph 2.” 
38 Andre de Hoogh (2001), at 266. 
39 Genocide case, paras. 401, 406, 407. 
40 Andre de Hoogh (2001), at 277.  
41 Genocide case, para. 397. 
42 Ibid, para. 400; Nicaragua case, para. 115. 
43 Stefan Talmon (2009), at 502, who also notes that this test is used for the cases when an entity is only 
“partially” (not completely) dependent on a state and such a limited degree of state control does not permit to 
treat this entity as a de facto state organ. 
44 Genocide case, paras. 397, 406. 
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conduct directly or indirectly authorised by an organ of that state.45 It must also be shown that 
the state had issued particular instructions or exercised “effective control” in respect to each 
particular operation in which the wrongful acts were committed.46 The state must be able to 
control the beginning of the operation, the way it was carried out and the end of particular 
operation.47 Thus, the entity itself would not have discretion to achieve its aim by committing 
wrongful acts or by lawful means. To be attributable to the state any wrongful conduct must 
become an integral part of the operation under state control, and not incidentally or 
peripherally associated with it.48  
While the ICJ and the ILC seem to agree on “effective control” test for the attribution 
of conduct of private individuals to a state, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadić 
case partially disapproved this test, considering that the state practice supports the application 
of “effective control” test with regard to individuals and unorganised groups, but a different 
test should be applied for organised military and paramilitary groups. 49  Accordingly, to 
attribute acts of the organised group to the state, it must be proved that the state possessed 
“overall control” over the group.50 Such control is exercised if the state not only equipped, 
financed, trained and provided operational support to the group but also coordinated, 
organised or helped in general planning of its military activities.51  
It seems, however, that the Tadić Appeals Chamber confuses the application of 
“overall control” test to purely private persons with two different types of situations: 1. when 
a person exercises elements of governmental authority (under Articles 5/9); 2. when a state 
                                               
45 ASR Commentary to Article 4, para. 2. 
46 Genocide case, para. 400; Nicaragua case, p. 65, para. 115; ASR Commentaries to Article 8, para. 7.  
47 Stefan Talmon (2009), at 503. 
48 ASR Commentary to Article 8, para. 3. However, the “effective control” test and its application were criticised 
for imposing too strict rule for attribution of conduct of private individuals to states making such situation no 
more than a theoretical possibility (see, for instance, Tal Becker, Terrorism and the state: rethinking the rules of 
state responsibility (Hart, 2006), at 69). 
49 Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999 (“Tadić Appeal Judgement”), para. 124. 
50 Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 131. 
51 Ibid, paras. 131, 137. 
 28 
exercises control over territory of another state and is obliged to secure human rights there 
(so-called “positive obligations”).52 In the Yeager case, which it referred to,53 the conduct of 
the Revolutionary Guards was attributed to Iran because they exercised elements of 
governmental authority in the absence of official authorities.54 The ASR Commentary even 
mentions this case under Article 9.55 As such a situation can be analysed only under Article 9 
rather than Article 8 and there is no evidence to suggest that the test under Article 9 should be 
the same as the test applied under Article 8, this case cannot be used to support the “overall 
control” test against “effective control” applicable to private organised groups under ASR 
Article 8. Both articles are conceptually different. The situation is different when the Appeals 
Chamber refers to ECtHR jurisprudence, particularly Loizidou v Turkey.56 In this case the 
ECtHR uses the “effective overall control” test,57 but it concerns the state control over the 
territory, which is not the same as the control over an organised group itself.58 “Effective 
overall control” used by the ECtHR is a completely different concept which, as explained in 
Chapter IV, deals with a question of states’ jurisdiction over persons under human rights 
treaties and does not directly affect the question of attribution of conduct to a state. 59 
Therefore the Tadić Appeals Chamber’s application of the “effective overall control” test 
from Loizidou to the question of attribution is flawed. 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber concluded that the acts of the group under “overall 
control” of the state may be considered to be acts of a de facto state organ regardless of the 
                                               
52 See Marko Milanović (2006), at 586. 
53 Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ICTY, 15 July 1999 (“Tadić Appeal Judgement”), paras. 
126-127. 
54 Kenneth P. Yeager v Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, 1987, vol. IV, paras. 43, 
45. 
55 ASR Commentary to Article 9, para. 2. 
56 Loizidou v Turkey, ECtHR Judgement, 18 December 1996. See Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 128. 
57 Ibid, paras. 49, 56. 
58 See Stefan Talmon (2009), at 511. 
59 See also Marko Milanović (2006), at 586. 
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state’s instructions on each particular act. 60  The Appeals Chamber applied the “overall 
control” test not to particular operations or acts of a group but to the state’s control over the 
group itself. In this sense the “overall control” test is not used instead of the “effective 
control” test which applies to particular conduct of an entity, but instead of the “complete 
dependence”, or “strict control” test which covers the group as a whole and equates it to a 
state organ. 61  The threshold of the “overall control” is lower than that of “complete 
dependence” or “effective control” test. 62  They differ in the intensity of the connection 
required between a state and an entity.63 
This interpretation of state responsibility in Tadić received a lot of criticism, including 
from the ICJ. In the Genocide case the ICJ disapproved Tadić “overall control” test by 
distinguishing the issue of degree and nature of state involvement in an armed conflict (which 
the Appeals Chamber was concerned with) and the attribution of particular acts to states for 
the purposes of state responsibility.64 The ICJ found that the “overall control” test cannot be 
applied for the latter purpose, because it broadens the scope of state responsibility: the state is 
only responsible for the conduct of its own organs, i.e. persons acting on its behalf, those who 
are under “complete dependence” of the state; or in the situations under the rule of CIL 
reflected in Article 8, when a state organ issued instructions or exercised effective control 
over the actions of private individuals.65 Unfortunately, the ICJ did not provide state practice 
to support its conclusion. 66  Accordingly, the states are responsible only for actions or 
                                               
60 Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 137. 
61 Stefan Talmon (2009), at 506; see also Marko Milanović (2009), at 316-317. 
62 Ibid (2009), at 506;  
63 Marko Milanović (2009), at 316. 
64 Genocide case, para. 405. 
65 Ibid, para. 406. 
66 As Cassese submits, “the Court’s basic assumption that Article 8 reflects customary law is undemonstrated, 
being simply predicated on the authority of the Court itself (the Nicaragua precedent), as well as authority of the 
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omissions of its organs, where they failed to act while exercising proper effective control over 
private individuals or when instructed or directed them for wrongful conduct. 
 
C) Attribution of ultra vires acts of its organs 
The distinction between Article 4 and Article 8 is important for the application of 
Article 7 to the different categories of persons: officials (state organs) and private individuals. 
A state will be responsible for the ultra vires acts of its organs but not of private individuals. 
The same rules apply to de facto state organs as to de jure state organs due to their complete 
dependency on the state.67  
However, Article 7 conceptually cannot apply to private individuals covered by 
Article 8, where a positive proof of a state control or instructions is required for attribution.68 
The ILC ASR Commentary states that Article 7 applies only to the cases of attribution of 
conduct under Articles 4, 5 and 6, but not Article 8. 69 The state will be responsible for 
unauthorised conduct of its de jure/de facto organs but not of individuals who acted under its 
instructions, directions or effective control.  
In contrast, Cassese considers that Article 7 should apply not only to “state organs”, 
but also to other similar situations, for example, to private individuals entrusted by a state to 
perform a lawful task and by doing so, breached international obligations of the state.70 That 
would mean the individuals under Article 8 (who received the instruction from the state) 
ought to be covered by Article 7. It was not, however, the intention of the drafters. The article 
was supposed to cover state organs and organ-like entities.71 It also includes in its text only 
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69 ASR Commentary to Article 7, para. 9, see also Andre de Hoogh (2001), at 281. 
70 Antonio Cassese (2007), at 654-655. 
71 Article 7 only refers to organs and entities covered by Articles 4, 5 and 6 without making any distinction 
among them. See ASR Commentary to Article 7, para. 9. 
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state organs or those who are empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority 
and not private persons instructed by states. Moreover, if a person “contravenes the 
instructions” of the state under Article 7, he cannot be said to “in fact acting on the 
instructions” of the state under Article 8 and therefore this article does not apply.  
A state will be responsible for the conduct of its organ acting in official capacity in 
excess of authority or contrary to instructions.72 This rule is firmly established in international 
jurisprudence, state practice and writings of jurists,73 and therefore can be considered to have 
customary law status. The ASR Commentary explains that a state will be responsible when its 
organ has “overtly committed unlawful acts under the cover of its official status or has 
manifestly exceeded its competence.”74 The main criterion of attribution of unauthorised acts 
is whether the state organ acted in its official capacity.75 If the conduct of a state official is so 
remote from its official functions that it is assimilated to that of private individuals, it is not 
attributed to the state.76  However in practice the distinction between private and official 
conduct is a difficult one.  
The ASR Commentary explains that the actions/omissions of state organs will be 
official acts if the organs “purportedly” or “apparently” carry out their official functions, 
whereas the private actions/omissions of individuals who “happened to be” the organs of the 
state, will not be “official” for the purpose of their attribution to that state.77 The conduct is 
official when a state official is acting within “apparent authority”, or “general scope of 
authority.78 When the organ acts within its apparent authority, the state is responsible for its 
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wrongful acts even if the organ exceeded its competence and such rule has customary status.79 
It does not matter for the attribution of conduct whether the actions of the organ were 
maliciously motivated or were bona fide errors of judgment, the state will still be 
responsible.80 If a police officer acts in revenge by arresting somebody, but seems to act in the 
role of the police officer to an average observer, these acts will be within his apparent 
authority.81  
The problem of the “apparent authority” test is that its scope is not clear enough. 
Moreover, it mostly focuses on the evaluation of victims or an “average observer”, but not on 
the gravity state organ’s acts or the means that it uses to commit such acts. For example, if a 
police officer, encharged to protect a victim, instead kills him with a weapon acting on private 
motives, it would be clear for an average observer that the police officer acted without any 
authority. At the same time the police officer used means or powers given him by the state for 
his wrongful conduct. In this regard, Meron suggests that there is another criterion to be used 
to attribute the ultra vires conduct to the state: the state will be responsible for its organ’s acts 
though committed outside its apparent authority, but by using means put at the organ’s 
disposal by the state, calling it “abuse of governmental means.82 For instance, in the Caire 
case the Mixed French-Mexican Claims Commission held that in order to hold the state 
responsible for its officials’ ultra vires acts, they either must act at least apparently as state 
officials, or by committing the acts they used powers or means peculiar to their official 
capacity.83 It further found the state responsible for the conduct of two officers who acted 
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under cover of their official status and used means placed at their disposal by that state.84 
Therefore the state is still responsible for the acts of its organs, when it vested powers or 
means to the organ and the organ committed wrongful acts by using these means.  
The ASR Commentary, however, does not mention this test as a separate one from the 
“apparent authority” requirement, although it cites the case itself. What is possible is that the 
understanding of the “apparent authority” is broader and the use of means and powers is 
included in this criterion. Moreover, the ILC refers to this criterion as the organs must act 
“with” apparent authority, as opposed to “within” the scope of apparent or general authority 
mentioned by Meron.85 
The distinction between private and official conduct is appropriate for attribution of 
state organs’ conduct, recognised under ASR Article 4. Under Article 7, only if an organ acts 
against specific instructions, is its conduct attributable to the state.86 This is because private 
entities or persons under Article 8 simply do not have an official capacity.87 If a state is to be 
responsible for the conduct of the persons acted beyond its authorisation under ASR Article 8, 
according to the ASR Commentary, the question needs to be asked whether unauthorised 
conduct was really incidental to the mission entrusted to him, or clearly went beyond it.88  
This is coherent with the rationale behind the attribution to a state of the conduct of 
private individuals, to whom state organs entrusted a particular mission. In this sense the 
Commentary suggests that if a state gave lawful instructions to private individuals, it will not 
assume the risk that those instructions will be carried out in an unlawful way.89 However de 
Hoogh criticises that stating that, by denying the application of Article 7 to the persons 
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covered by Article 8, the Commentary fails to take into account the underlying purpose of 
Article 8, which is to provide for attribution of conduct of persons through which the state 
chooses to act rather than acting through its organs.90 He points out that the choice of such 
person by the state ought to entail its responsibility for the acts which went beyond 
instructions the state should either recall its authorisation or use its power of direction or 
control to require such person change his behaviour.91 However, such position assumes that 
the state not only gives the instructions to the private person, but also exercises direction or 
control over them. Article 8 uses instructions, directions and control disjunctively, and the 
state giving the instructions does not necessarily exercise control over a particular person.  
Indeed, if the control is exercised, the state may not avoid such responsibility. The 
Commentary provides that if a person ignores instructions and acts under the effective control 
of the state, such acts will still be attributable to the state.92 Therefore, in the case of private 
individuals, the question is whether their conduct went beyond the effective control of the 
state, unlike for the state organs’ acts (whether they acted in official or private capacity). It 
sounds logically correct because private persons do not have any official capacity.  
With regard to the responsibility for ultra vires acts under Article 7, it seems that a 
state may be responsible for the acts of private persons who contravene state’s particular 
instructions if their conduct is within its effective control. However the state will not be 
responsible for the conduct of private persons in excess of their authority or without its 
effective control.  
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2. Attribution of conduct to international organisations 
 
A) Attribution of conduct of organs and agents of international organisations 
It is widely accepted that the principles of state responsibility are applicable, with 
some variation, by analogy, to the responsibility of IOs.93 The same may be said about the 
ILC ASR and ARIO, given that the latter uses the former as a model of drafting. However, 
there are clear differences between them. Unlike the ASR, in many cases reflecting customary 
rules, the ARIO cannot be supported by solid practice and their status in international law is 
somewhat unclear. In lack of IOs’ practice and jurisprudence the Drafting Committee had to 
transfer the provisions on state responsibility to the ARIO,94 introducing some changes to 
reflect specific character of IOs. While the ARIO codifies some principles of IOs’ 
responsibility considered to have customary status, they contain many more novel 
principles.95 IOs invited to comment on the draft articles disagreed with some provisions as 
not reflecting their own practice.96 Each ARIO provision will be examined separately to see 
whether it is in accordance with IOs’ comments and practice. 
By analogy with ASR, ARIO Article 6 provides for IOs’ responsibility for the conduct 
of its organs and agents. The ICJ held that the UN may be required to bear responsibility for 
the damage arising from acts performed in the official capacity by the UN or its agents.97 The 
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International Law Association (“ILA”) also provides for such a principle.98 It may therefore 
be considered authoritative. 
This Article attributes the conduct of both organs and agents of IOs. The definitions of 
“organs” and “agents” are provided in ARIO Article 2. The definition of IOs’ “organ” is 
similar to the definition of state organ given in ASR Article 4(2). However the definition of a 
state organ is open-ended, because it contains word “includes”, while the IOs’ organs are 
defined precisely, by including the word “means” (although in the previous draft such 
definition was open-ended).99 As the Drafting Committee pointed out, it was done to align 
with the definition for “agents” and by this individuals or entities not captured by the 
definition of organ may still be considered “agents” in terms of Article 2(d).100  
Accordingly, even if an entity or a person does not have a status of an “organ” under 
the IO rules, this IO may still be responsible for them. Under Article 2(d) an “agent” is 
defined as “an official or other person or entity, other than an organ, who is charged by the 
organisation with carrying out or helping to carry out, one of its functions, and thus through 
whom the organisation acts”. This definition was taken from the Reparations case.101  
For the definition of IO “agents”, the official status of a person is not relevant – what 
is important is the fact that a person had been conferred the functions by the IO organ.102 The 
ARIO Drafting Committee considered that the definition of “agent” would embrace by 
analogy not only situations covered by ASR Article 4 (de jure and de facto state organs), but 
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also Article 5 (“conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental 
authority”).103  
Accordingly, for the attribution of conduct of a person to the IO, proof of their 
“complete dependence” is not needed. Neither is it relevant which status they have according 
to the rules of the organisation. There is no requirement spelled out in the Commentary that a 
person acts solely “on behalf” of the IO which was paramount to the attribution of conduct of 
de jure/de facto state organs or entities exercising governmental authority under Articles 4-6 
ASR.104  
The “functional” test is clearly less stringent, as a person carrying out IO functions 
may still act on behalf of or under the instructions of a state or other IO. Such broad 
interpretation of “agents” is also confirmed by the Commentary which states that if a person 
acts under the instructions, or direction or control, of an IO in the meaning of ASR Article 8, 
they may be regarded as “agents” by the definition under ARIO Article 2.105 The fact of 
performance of IO’s functions is still relevant. However, a person may be entrusted with the 
IO functions even if it was not pursuant to the IO rules.106 The UN Secretariat expressed some 
concerns about a broad definition of agents, which could expose IOs to “unreasonable 
responsibility”.107 It stated that in some contexts persons performing IO functions may not be 
regarded “agents”, but rather “partners” assisting the IO in achieving a common goal.108 
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Anyway, it is still relevant and important for the attribution of the conduct of “agents” under 
ARIO Article 6 that they act in the performance of these functions.109  
The category of “agents” unduly broadens the operation of ARIO Article 6 by 
including the situations covered by ASR Articles 4, 5 and 8. This raises a question of 
application of ARIO Article 8 for ultra vires acts, because as stated previously, the conduct of 
persons covered under ASR Article 8 was not covered by similar ASR Article 7 on ultra vires 
acts of state organs. Moreover, ASR Article 8 covers particular conduct of private persons 
which is performed under direction, instructions or effective control of a state. The 
“functional” test, by contrast, is generally applicable to persons exercising overall functions of 
the IO. Given no distinction exists between IO “organs” and “agents” for the attribution of 
their conduct under ARIO Article 6,110 the degree of attribution of international responsibility 
of IOs under ARIO is higher than for the states.  
  
B) Attribution of conduct of state organs to IOs 
ARIO Article 7 deals with situations where IOs may be responsible for the conduct of 
a state organ placed at its disposal. However, the ARIO Commentary refers only to the cases 
of peacekeeping operations and provides almost no other example of the IOs’ practice. Like 
ILC, the ILA also discusses the principle of attribution of state organs’ conduct to IOs 
referring to PSOs. It states that this attribution depends on effective control (operational 
command and control) that either IO or states exercise in a particular operation.111 Some 
authors are of the opinion that the principle of attribution of conduct to either entity on the 
basis of “effective control” constitutes a customary rule.112  
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Although the UN Secretariat confirms the existence of practice of applicability of 
“effective control” test to the allocation of responsibility for the conduct of PSOs, it disagrees 
with the ILC Drafting Committee on the content of this control. It stated that in the UN 
practice the “effective command and control” test is applied “horizontally” to distinguish 
between the UN-commanded and controlled operations and UN-authorised operations under 
national command, whereas the ILC suggested the application of “effective control” test 
“vertically” to condition the responsibility on the possession of factual control by either of the 
entities.113 The UN Secretariat further stated that in practice the PSFs are UN subsidiary organ 
and therefore their conduct is attributable to the UN, although ARIO Article 7 may be 
applicable in connection with the UN activities in other contexts.114 Although the approach 
regarding the interpretation of “effective control” may differ, ILC members, UN practice and 
the commentators agree that IOs may be responsible for the conduct of state organs at their 
disposal. 
The conduct of state organs may be attributed to the IO under ARIO Article 7, if (1) it 
was placed “at the disposal of” this organisation; and (2) the IO exercised “effective control” 
over that conduct. These two elements need to be fulfilled to attract IOs’ responsibility. 
However these elements differ from those to be satisfied for the attribution of the conduct to a 
state under similar ASR Article 6. 
The first requirement (to be placed at the disposal of IO) was taken from the text of 
ASR Article 6. However the content of this element is different from the one of ARIO Article 
7. As already mentioned, a state organ placed at the disposal of another state under ASR 
Article 6 will act for the benefit of the second state, under its authority, excusive direction and 
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control, for its purposes and therefore only on its behalf.115 If it acts on the joint instructions, 
its conduct is attributable to both states under other ASR articles.116 However the ARIO 
Commentary expresses different position regarding ARIO. It states that if an organ is “fully 
seconded” to the IO, its conduct would be solely attributable to that IO, but under the general 
rule set up under Article 6 dealing with the attribution of conduct of IO’s organs and agents 
(not of state organs at the disposal of the IO).117 Article 7 according to the ARIO Commentary 
concerns different situations when a lent organ “still acts to a certain extent as organ of the 
seconding state.118  
Therefore although both Articles (of ASR and ARIO) seem to be similar from the first 
view, they appear to be qualitatively different in their essence. While ASR understands 
“placed at the disposal of” requirement as an existence of “exclusive direction and control” of 
receiving entity, ARIO excludes from its cover “fully seconded” organs, and by contrast 
includes those on which the control is joint or shared by entities (which are in turn excluded 
by ASR Article 6).119  
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As discussed, according to the construction of ARIO Article 7, even if a state organ 
was placed at the disposal of the IO, it does not mean that its conduct is attributed to the IO. 
This conduct must also be under “effective control” of the IO. In cases where a state organ 
was placed at the disposal of the UN and the UN claims to have an exclusive control over its 
operation, there is a presumption that the UN should have responsibility (and therefore 
“effective control”) over the conduct of the organ forming part of the operation under the UN 
exclusive control. The UN responsibility for the conduct of a state organ outside the operation 
should not be presumed. 
The “effective control” test does not apply generally to all acts of the lent organ, and 
in each case it should be examined whether a specific wrongful act was performed under 
control of the state or IO.120 This is also different from the requirement of ASR Article 6 for 
an organ to exercise “elements of the governmental authority”. This definition is closer to 
exercise of “functions” of the IO which make a person under ARIO Article 2 an IO’s “agent” 
and in the same way the conduct can be attributed to it under ARIO Article 6.  
However the ARIO Commentary states that ASR Article 6 takes “similar approach” to 
ARIO Article 7, which requires the “factual control” to be exercised “over specific conduct” 
taken by the state organ.121 The ARIO Commentary further refers to the requirement of ASR 
Article 6 for the receiving state to have an “exclusive direction and control” over the organ, 
but states that the criteria of “exercise of elements of governmental authority” is “unsuitable” 
to IOs.122 It seems as if the ARIO Commentary considered the “factual” or “effective control” 
over particular conduct is the same as “exclusive direction and control” over the organ itself. 
But under ASR these criteria are qualitatively different: the ASR Commentary clearly 
distinguishes between requirements of Articles 4-6 and Articles 8-11, at least for the purposes 
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of Article 7.123 Moreover, “effective control” over particular conduct does not mean that other 
conduct of this organ will be also controlled by the receiving organisations, as it is so if a 
receiving state exercises “exclusive direction and control” under ASR Article 6. In sum, ASR 
Article 6 and ARIO Article 7 are very different despite similar approach to the issue of 
seconded organs. 
The criterion of “effective control” seems to be taken from ASR Article 8.124 However, 
as it stated by Special Rapporteur Gaja, unlike ASR Article 8, ARIO Article 7 does not 
concern the conduct of private persons, but the conduct of organs and agents placed at the 
disposal of the IO.125 In this regard the ARIO Commentary states that effective control plays a 
different role: “it does not concern the issue whether a certain conduct is attributable at all to a 
state or an international organisation, but rather to which entity – the contributing state […] or 
the receiving organisation – conduct is attributable”.126 The Commentary further provides an 
example of UN PSFs over which TCCs retain control in disciplinary and criminal matters.127 
If a PSFs’ wrongful act was under control retained by the TCC, the attribution of conduct to 
the TCC will be “clearly linked” to the retention of such control by the state. 128  The 
attribution is based on a “factual criterion”.129 
It follows that unlike under ASR Article 8 (where the conduct of private persons either 
attributable to the state or not), the conduct of lent organ will be attributed to either entity 
anyway. As Leck points out, if a wrongful act was made on the instructions of the lending 
state, the conduct is attributed to that state, but if it was carried out on the direction and 
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control of the IO, it is imputed to the IO.130 Everything depends on the factual effective 
control or powers of a state or IO over particular conduct even in the situations where the 
organ is generally under operational control of the organisation.131 It is because the main 
criterion is “effective control” and not the status of the organ or operational control for the 
attribution of conduct under ARIO Article 7. Effective control determines whether the 
conduct can be attributed to the IO to which the organ is lent or if not, to the state whose 
organ it is under ordinary rules of state responsibility (i.e. under ASR Article 4).  
Effective control may be exercised by a particular state organ/official. As the ICJ 
stated in the Genocide case, the state would incur the responsibility because of the conduct of 
those of its own organs which actually issued instructions or exercised effective control over 
non-state organs. 132  By this the conduct of state organs, having been the cause of the 
commission of wrongful acts, would constitute a violation of international obligations of the 
state. What needs to be proved is that a state organ/official - a military commander or a 
superior - exercised effective control over particular individuals.  
In order to prove that a military commander exercised effective control over particular 
individuals, it is possible to refer to the “effective control” test applied by international courts 
when they deal with individual criminal responsibility of commanders or superiors. The proof 
of effective control will be based on the material ability of the commander to prevent or 
punish the commission of crimes committed by his subordinates that may be reflected, for 
instance, in issuing orders, taking disciplinary actions or submitting reports to the competent 
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authorities for proper measures to be taken.133 If the commander failed to take such measure 
in his disposal, the state may be held responsible for the omissions of its official to exercise 
effective control, and not directly for the acts of the private individuals who actually 
committed them.134  
Similarly, the scope of effective control depends on the ability of states to prevent the 
occurrence or stop the perpetration of wrongful acts by private individuals. Effective control 
may be reflected in the effective command or supervision of particular individuals. The state 
has necessary powers or disciplinary measures over the individual to be able to prevent him 
from committing wrongful acts or punish him for the wrongful acts already committed, 
including by discharging him from the previously entrusted task. Such construction of 
“effective control” would be of a similar degree of state’s involvement as the other criteria of 
Article 8 (namely, an individual being instructed or directed by the state).   
For instance, the emphasis on state’s retention of disciplinary powers and control in 
criminal matters means that ultimately the responsibility depends on who had particular 
means to prevent the commission of wrongful acts.135 If a state provided a badly disciplined 
and untrained contingent, it may be held responsible for particular acts which were a 
consequence of bad training and discipline. If the organisation had its own means (and 
effective control) to prevent such acts or its direction led to the commission of wrongful acts, 
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acted differently in a way that would have prevented the impugned conduct?” 
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it should bear the responsibility for them.136 It may become a matter of factual evidence and 
proof in each situation which entity is responsible and not a matter of general attribution of all 
acts committed during an operation.  
 
C) Attribution of ultra vires acts of its organs and agents 
 
i) Scope of ultra vires acts 
ARIO Article 8 provides for the responsibility of IOs for the conduct of its organs and 
agents exceeding their authority or contravening instructions. The ICJ indirectly confirmed 
this principle in Certain Expenses and Special Rapporteur cases. 137  The same rule was 
asserted by the ILA.138 Some authors also consider that such principle exists in international 
law and is widely accepted.139 The UN Secretariat, however, stated that there is only scant 
practice on this issue and such practice requires a strong link between the impugned act and 
official functions of the organ/agent: if an organ/agent acts in its official capacity and within 
the IO’s overall functions, but outside the scope of its authorisation, such act may be 
considered the IO’s act.140  
In many cases IOs’ agents are in a similar position to the officials141 and for the 
purposes of ARIO Article 8 there is no distinction between the conduct of organs/officials of 
                                               
136 The IO may be responsible for employing an agent who commits international wrongful act or for entrusting 
him with the authority or the material power that he in fact abused (see Pierre Klein, “The attribution of acts to 
international organisations”, in Crawford, James, The law of international responsibility (Oxford University 
Press, 2010), at 305). 
137 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports, 20 July 1962 (“Certain Expenses case”), at 168; Special Rapporteur case, para. 66, where the Court 
stated that “it need hardly be said that all agents of the United Nations, in whatever official capacity they act, 
must take care not to exceed the scope of their functions, and should so comport themselves as to avoid claims 
against the United Nations.” 
138 ILA Report (2004), at 28-29. 
139 See, for instance, Pierre Klein (2010), at 305. Moshe Hirsch (1995), at 94. 
140 UN Secretariat submission (2011), at 15, para. 2.  
141 ILA Report (2004), at 29. 
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the organisation and its agents.142 Taking into account the fact that the ARIO Commentary 
included in the “agents” category those who are normally covered by ASR Article 8 (those 
whose particular conduct was carried out on the instructions, direction or control of the 
state/organisation), the cover of the ultra vires conduct under ARIO Article 8 is broader than 
under ASR Article 7. In this sense, the UN Secretariat stated that an agent may have a more 
remote institutional link to the organisation than an organ and suggested to the ILC to 
reconsider the question of whether the standard for attribution of acts should be the same for 
agents and the organs.143 The ARIO Commentary states that apart from the exceptional cases 
(where the “agents” acted on the IOs’ instructions or control), the rules of organisation will 
govern the issue whether an organ/agent has authority to undertake certain conduct.144 The 
Commentary does not specify further what rules will govern or how ARIO Article 8 will be 
applicable to those “agents” who acted in contravention of instructions given by the IO for 
particular conduct, or who acted in the excess of their authority when such conduct was under 
direction or control of the organisation, especially when such functions were not entrusted to 
them under the IOs’ rules.145  
The IO will be responsible for the ultra vires acts of its organs/agents under ARIO 
Article 8 only if they act in the official capacity. Therefore there must be a “close link” 
between the ultra vires conduct and their official functions.146 It does not matter whether an 
ultra vires act is valid or not under the IO’s rules – the IO may still entail responsibility 
because, if the attribution of conduct were denied on this ground, it would deprive third 
                                               
142 ARIO Commentary to Article 8, para. 7. 
143 UN Secretariat submission (2011), at 15-16. 
144 ARIO Commentary to Article 8, para. 2. 
145 See ibid, Article 6, para. 11. 
146 Ibid, Article 8, paras. 4, 9. See also Pierre Klein (2010), at 306, pointing out that when “the act in question 
fails to present any connection with the exercise of official functions and therefore may not be linked back to the 
organisation”, it is not attributable to the organisation, because “such acts could just as easily have been 
committed by any private person, with no connection to an international organisation.” 
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parties of all redress, unless the conduct could be attributed to a state. 147  The ARIO 
Commentary also provides that Article 8 covers situations when the conduct of its 
organ/agent exceeds the competence of the IO, because “it will also exceed the authority of 
the organ[/]agent who performed it.”148  
During the second reading of the ARIO, another criterion was added to the text of 
Article 8 – an organ/IO’s agent must act not only in its official capacity but also “within the 
overall functions of that organisation”. The incorporation of the latter element is controversial. 
The ARIO Drafting Committee itself expressed some concerns that the inclusion of this 
criterion would unnecessarily limit the ability of victims to seek recourse against IOs.149 The 
Committee further considered that the question of IO’s wrongful conduct for failure to control 
its organs/agents was a matter for Article 6.150 However ARIO Article 6, by contrast, deals 
with intra vires acts (as opposed to ultra vires) of the IO organs/agents. If some conduct fell 
outside Article 8, it would go beyond Article 6 too and an organ/agent will not be considered 
as acting “in the performance of its functions” for the conduct to be attributed to the IO.  
Another controversy with the new criterion is its correlation with another term - 
“competence” - used in the commentary. Both of them taken together mean that an 
organ/agent must act “within the overall functions of organisation” but may exceed the IO’s 
competence for the ultra vires acts to be attributed to the IO. The question lies in the 
distinction between both of the terms. IOs’ functions reflect its responsibility to fulfil the 
assigned task and may sometimes in constituent instruments of IOs be referred as “tasks”, 
“purposes”, “objects” or “aims”.151  The term competence sometimes is used interchangeably, 
                                               
147 ARIO Commentary to Article 8, paras. 5, 6. 
148 Ibid, para. 1. 
149 Chairman’s statement (2011), at 11. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Kirsten Schmalenbach, “International Organizations or Institutions, Supervision and Sanctions”, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2006), para. 39. 
 48 
sometimes as a synonym of IOs’ “powers” 152  but more frequently to denote the IO’s 
jurisdiction, i.e. its authority to deal with a certain matter. 153  Accordingly, one potential 
approach to the definition of ultra vires acts can include “acts beyond the ascribed powers and 
competences but within the attributed functions.”154  
Applying this approach, conduct of an organ/agent may exceed not only its authority, 
but also authority (competence) of the IO to act but must still fall within the IO’s functions. 
However, this would limit the application of Article 8 to a great extent. For example, if an 
IO’s “agent” inhumanly treats detainees to find out necessary information to support 
benevolent activities of the IO, the question is whether it is an ultra vires act exceeding the 
IO’s competence of and its authority, or it also exceed its overall functions and therefore 
cannot be covered by ARIO Article 8. It would be covered by ASR Article 7, if it was an 
organ of state and acted in official capacity. However, an IO normally cannot have overall 
functions to treat people inhumanly, and therefore such acts may fall outside ARIO Article 8 
and not attributed to the IO.  
 
ii) Interpretation of “within overall functions”  
Instead, another interpretation of the controversial criterion of “within overall 
functions” is possible. There is another definition of ultra vires acts defined as “acts taken 
outside or beyond the constitutionally ascribed functions.”155 In support to this approach, the 
ICJ’s judgement in Certain Expenses suggests that in the situations where an act appropriate 
for the fulfilment of an IO’s function, the presumption is that this act is not ultra vires.156 This 
                                               
152 Functions and powers are two different concepts: IOs’ powers reflect their capacity to act in certain ways, 
with certain means and with certain legal effects. See ibid, para. 40. 
153 Ibid, para. 41. 
154 Ibid, para. 51. 
155 Ibid, para. 51. 
156 Certain Expenses case, at 168. See also ibid, para. 51. 
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does not however mean that those acts going beyond the IO’s functions will be necessarily 
attributed to the IO.  
The second approach can be supported by the construction of ARIO Article 8 itself, 
which mentions two different notions: the conduct of the organ which may or may not be 
attributed to the IO (and which may amount to the wrongful act) and organ’s acting in official 
capacity during that conduct. The criterion “within the overall functions of that organisation” 
refers to organ’s “acting” in an official capacity and not to the conduct at issue. Therefore this 
criterion qualifies “acting in an official capacity” requirement but not the attributable 
“conduct”. It is so important because the conduct may well exceed the authority of the organ 
or may even not reflect the functions of the organisation, as long as the organ at that moment 
is acting in its official capacity and within IO’s functions.  
The following example can illustrate that. A peacekeeper killing a civilian during 
authorised and mandated PSO may be acting in official capacity as a peacekeeper and within 
overall function of maintaining international peace and security, but his conduct (killing of 
civilian) is in excess of his authority (assuming that it is not in Rules of Engagement to kill 
civilians). If “overall functions” criterion was attached to the conduct instead, killing a 
civilian could not be considered as an IO’s function.  
This approach if accepted would not result in application of ARIO Article 8 limited to 
the extreme and would adequately reflect its wording and purpose. What is controversial in 
such interpretation is that the “overall functions” criterion is unnecessary as “acting in official 
capacity” presupposes acting within IO’s functions. It is difficult to imagine examples where 
the former requirement is fulfilled but not the latter. It is only possible if a peacekeeper 
performs its conduct (kills a civilian) following the order of UNFC, being outside official 
functions of IO but following that order still acts in its official capacity. Then the 
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responsibility of IO can still be triggered for the conduct of the UNFC, who when acting as a 
Commander (acting within functions of IO), ordered killing (already conduct attributable to 
IO but still ultra vires). 
Although the second approach is preferable, it will be seen how the “overall functions” 
notion is to be interpreted. Given ambiguity of interpretation, one would expect the ARIO 
Commentary to address this question. However, the Commentary omits to discuss this 
criterion and only mentions it in conjunction with the “official capacity” requirement, 157 
which implicitly supports the second approach to interpretation.  
The origin of the criterion is not evident either. “Within overall functions” was added 
only in the last draft of the ARIO.158 It was included in Article 8 upon the insistence of the 
UN Secretariat.159 Although the Special Rapporteur noted that the UN did not provide any 
examples from the practice even though claiming that such practice exists, he simply agreed 
to add such reference following the UN’s suggestion.160 Surprisingly, given possible negative 
consequences of inclusion of such limitation into Article 8, this criterion was not much 
debated in the ILC and received an approval (although with some concerns expressed as to 
limitation of redress for the victims).161  
Lack of much debate in the ILC regarding this requirement does not permit to make a 
definite conclusion which approach to follow. The ARIO Commentary does not discuss it 
either. Interestingly, the ARIO Commentary does not refer to the suggestion by the UN as to 
include the “overall functions” criterion, but instead states that it was advocated by one 
                                               
157 See ARIO Commentary to Article 8, para. 4. 
158 See, for instance previous version of the ARIO in the United Nations, Report of the International Law 
Commission, Sixty-first session (4 May-5 June and 6 July-7 August 2009) (2009), A/64/10, at 21.  
159 See UN Secretariat’s suggestion in UN Secretariat submission (2011), at 15, para. 5. 
160 See Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, Eighth report on responsibility of international organizations (2011), 
A/CN.4/640, at 37, para. 14.  
161 Summary record of the ILC 3097th meeting, 3 June 2011, A/CN.4/SR.3097, at 21. 
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academic author (J.M. Cortés Martín) and provides the only reference (to his book).162 In his 
book, Cortés Martín argued that only ultra vires acts related to the IO’s functions can be 
attributed to the IO due to the principle of speciality which applies to them (unlike states 
which possess a general competence).163 According to him, as IOs can exercise their rights 
only within their competences, they cannot be responsible for the acts committed manifestly 
outside their sphere of competences.164 He also deduced this principle from Article 46(2) of 
the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties 1986 (VCLT 1986).165  
This reasoning cannot be accepted as giving correct explanation to the “within overall 
functions” notion in the framework of the ARIO and its Commentary. Firstly, the difference 
between IOs’ and states’ competences lying in the essence of the argument for special 
treatment of IOs’ ultra vires acts as opposed to the states’ ultra vires acts is not demonstrated 
by Article 46 VCLT 1986, as argued by the author.166 Article 46 provides for the same rule 
for IOs in para.2 and for states in para.1.167 Therefore this cannot serve as evidence of the 
need to define ultra vires acts for IOs and states differently.  
                                               
162 See ARIO Commentary to Article 8, para. 4, fn. 136, which mentions the work of J.M. Cortés Martín, Las 
Organizaciones Internacionales: Codificación y Desarrollo Progresivo de su Responsabilidad Internacional 
(Instituto Andaluz de Administración Pública: Sevilla, 2008), at 211–223. 
163 Cortés Martín (2008), at 223. With regard to this difference between States and IOs, see Legality of the threat 
of use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 8 July 1996 (requested by WHO) (“Nuclear 
Weapons case (WHO)”), at 78-79. 
164 Cortés Martín (2008), at 214. 
165 VCLT, Article 46(2) provides: “An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization regarding competence to 
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of 
fundamental importance.” Cortés Martín concluded from this that “international wrongful acts committed by 
organs or agents ultra vires (beyond the competences/powers of the organisation) do not lead to its international 
responsibility, if the violation of the mandate could be qualified as objectively evident to any third party 
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal practice of States and in good faith. This means 
that ultra vires acts will be attributed to the organisations, whenever their objective is included in the normative 
objectives of the organisation.” See Cortés Martín (2008), at 215. 
166 See Cortés Martín (2008), at 215. 
167 Article 46(1) VCLT 1986 provides similar wording but in relation to states: “A State may not invoke the fact 
that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a 
rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.” 
 52 
Secondly, Article 46 VCLT 1986 provides for the invalidation of the consent of IOs to 
conclude a treaty only in the circumstances of manifest violation of IOs’ competences, but 
does not say anything that violation should go beyond the IOs’ functions to be considered 
“manifest”. Thirdly, a reverse application of the principle of invalidity of IOs’ consent vis-à-
vis rights of parties to the treaty may not necessarily be equated with IOs’ international 
responsibility for ultra vires acts. Finally, the Commentary makes a distinction between ultra 
vires acts exceeding the IOs’ competences for which the IOs can be held responsible and ultra 
vires acts being beyond overall functions that cannot attract the IOs’ responsibility. This 
distinction between competences and functions is not provided either in Article 46 VCLT 
1986, or in the book itself.168  
Therefore the conclusions contained in the book (being the only source of reference 
provided by the ILC in the Commentary to explain “within overall functions” test) cannot 
serve as interpretative guidelines for the “within overall functions” notion included in Article 
8 ARIO. As suggested before, the wording of ARIO Article 8 provides for a different 
conclusion, namely that “within overall functions” is attached to the “official capacity” 
requirement and not as a limitation for the ultra vires conduct itself. As there is no suggestion 
to the contrary in the Commentary, this approach is to be preferred. 
 
iii) Attribution of ultra vires acts and effective control test 
Another question is whether ARIO Article 8 is applicable to the situations covered by 
ARIO Article 7, i.e. when it exercises effective control over conduct of an organ placed on its 
disposal by the state. Neither Commentary, nor the article itself mentions that it is applicable 
                                               
168 See for instance Cortés Martín (2008), at 214, where the author is talking about competences rather than 
functions. 
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to such situations. 169  The reference to ASR Article 6 is not helpful either because, as 
mentioned before, ASR Article 6 and ARIO Article 7 are different in their cover, even though 
their construction is similar.170 The lack of any reference to ARIO Article 7 in ARIO Article 8 
may mean that the ultra vires acts of the organ at the disposal of the organisation will not be 
attributed to that organisation. The question is whether they are attributable to the seconding 
state. If not the case, the whole purpose of the draft articles on responsibility of IOs and states 
may be defeated.  
Logically, the ultra vires act of such an organ needs to be attributable to the seconding 
state at least because it is ultimately its organ and therefore ASR Article 7 should be 
applicable. It should apply whether or not the state exercises effective control over particular 
conduct, because of the requirements of ASR Article 7 itself (the fact that an entity is a state 
organ is already enough). Under ARIO Article 7, the fact that a state organ was placed at the 
disposal of the IO does not mean that it loses its identity as a state organ. Only if it is fully 
seconded to the organisation, it may do so.171 Therefore the state responsibility for its own 
organ may still be invoked for any ultra vires conduct of its organ. 
Another matter for consideration is whether by exercising effective control over 
particular conduct of the organ at its disposal, the organisation is also responsible for organ’s 
ultra vires acts. By that, the IO “places” such organ in the position of its “agent” due to the 
broad definition of the notion of “agent” in the ARIO and its cover of the situations, mutatis 
mutandis, under ASR Article 8, i.e. persons carrying out particular conduct under effective 
control of the state. If the IO exercises effective control over the state organ’s conduct at its 
                                               
169 See also ARIO Commentary to Article 8, para. 3, which states that this article only needs to be aligned with 
Article 6, without any mentioning of article 7. 
170 The organs under ASR Article 6 are indeed covered by ASR Article 7.  
171 See for instance ARIO Commentary to Article 7, para. 1, which states that if an organ is “fully seconded” to 
the organisation, its conduct would clearly be attributable only to that organisation. 
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disposal, this organ may be considered its “agent” for the purposes of attribution of ultra vires 
acts (only those under its effective control) to the organisation under ARIO Article 8.  
A further issue is whether the state remains responsible for the ultra vires acts of its 
organ if the IO is already found to be responsible for that conduct due to its effective control. 
It would be strange to argue that it is possible to apply simultaneously ARIO Article 8 (due to 
the IO effective control over the conduct) and ASR Article 7 (due to the identity of that entity 
as a state organ). One may possibly argue that, in this case, the conduct would be performed 
by the organ not in official capacity of state organ, but in official capacity of the IO’s agent. 
However, the primary responsibility would still lie on the IO for the conduct under its 
effective control, whereas a state may be responsible under other articles (e.g. as aiding or 
assisting for a wrongful conduct). The IO and state may also be jointly responsible if they 
both exercise effective control (see next section).  
 
3. Concurrent responsibility of states and international organisations 
 
A) Possibility of simultaneous attribution of conduct to states and international 
organisations  
The possibility of multiple attribution of conduct to states and IOs was expressed in 
the ARIO Commentaries:  
 
Although it may not frequently occur in practice, dual or even multiple attribution of conduct 
cannot be excluded. Thus, attribution of a certain conduct to an [IO] does not imply that the 
same conduct cannot be attributed to a State, nor vice versa does attribution of conduct to a 
State rule out attribution of the same conduct to an [IO].172 
                                               
172 ARIO Commentary to Chapter II, para. 4. 
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Special Rapporteur Gaja mentioned in his seventh report to the ILC that in many cases 
the application of “effective control” criterion may lead to the conclusion that the conduct at 
issue has to be attributed to both the state and the IO.173 However, the Special Rapporteur 
does not provide any example of dual attribution. 174  ARIO Chapter II concerning the 
attribution of conduct does not contain any provision on shared responsibility between a state 
and an IO.175  
In theory, in order to make a dual attribution to the state and IO possible, the 
requirements of both ASR and ARIO articles on attribution of conduct need to be fulfilled. A 
notion of “organ”/“agent” under the rules of one entity needs to be combined with “control” 
over particular conduct by the other entity. By that, general rules of attribution of conduct for 
organs/agents will be concurrently applicable with rules on “control” over particular conduct. 
Two situations may be envisaged. One is when an IO’s agent/organ acts under 
instructions, directions or effective control of the state in carrying out a particular conduct. 
Then ARIO Article 6 in combination with ASR Article 8 can be invoked. The other situation 
is when a state organ’s conduct was done under effective control of an IO. In this case, ASR 
Article 4 may be combined with ARIO Article 7. It is also possible that effective control over 
an organ is shared between the state and IO (when command and control are joined) and 
therefore both entities assume joint legal responsibility for the wrongful act by that organ.176 
In the first case, an IO’s official/agent may commit wrongful acts acting under 
instructions or directions of a state (and/or being under its control). Supposedly, a state issued 
instructions unlawful under international law for the IO’s agent/official to detain an individual. 
                                               
173  Giorgio Gaja, Seventh report on responsibility of international organisations, ILC, 27 March 2009, 
A/CN.4/610. 
174  Pieter Jan Kuijper (2010), “Amsterdam Center for International law: introduction to the Symposium on 
Responsibility of International Organizations and of (Member) States: attributed or direct responsibility or 
both?” 7 International Organizations Law Review 9, at 30. 
175 Ibid, at 25. 
176 Moshe Hirsch (1995), at 65. 
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It was in excess of their authority given by the IO and is considered ultra vires act. It may be 
attributed to the IO under ARIO Article 8 or Article 6 (as intra vires but still wrongful). 
However, for the purposes of ARIO Article 8, such official/agent is not acting in their 
“official capacity” and therefore their ultra vires acts are not attributable to the IO, but may 
still be attributable to the state under ASR Article 8.  
A difficulty is that ASR Article 8 was not supposed to include persons being IO’s 
organs/agents and was drafted only to include private individuals acting without any official 
capacity. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the text of the article to exclude such 
officials/agents from its scope. Moreover, if it can be applied to the members of non-state (e.g. 
secessionist) entities, it may also apply to the IO agents. Therefore dual attribution of conduct 
is possible. 
The second case, where a state organ acts under the instructions or control of the IO, 
may be more common due to the specific construction of ARIO Article 7. This organ does not 
lose its identity of a “state organ”; and therefore its conduct is still attributable to the state 
under ASR Article 4. If the requirement of effective control over particular conduct is fulfilled, 
the IO can also be responsible under ARIO Article 7. Although the state may have lost its 
effective control over its organ’s conduct, the organ does not lose its definition as a state 
organ for ASR Article 4. ARIO Article 7 is broad enough to encompass dual attribution of 
conduct to the state and IO.177  
The ARIO Commentary states that, as the state retains some control over disciplinary 
and criminal matters over its national contingent placed at the IO’s disposal for peacekeeping 
purposes, it may affect the attribution of conduct,178 meaning that dual attribution is not 
                                               
177 See also Caitlin Bell (2010), at 510, who points out that Article 7 leaves open the possibility of attribution of 
a single wrongful act to more than one state or IO. 
178 ARIO Commentary to Article 7, para. 7. 
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excluded.179 Moreover, the point made in the ARIO Commentary to Article 7 that if an organ 
is fully seconded to the organisation, its conduct would be attributable only to that IO, means, 
a contrario, that dual or multiple attribution is possible with organs placed at the IO’s 
disposal and not “fully seconded” to it.180 Even if the IO has effective control over a state 
organ, the actions taken by this organ within state control might breach international 
obligations of the state itself and constitute its wrongful act.181 
Due to the broad definition of “agent” (including situations covered by ASR Article 8), 
such a person acting under IO’s instructions/control may become an “agent” of this 
organisation and his conduct may be attributable to the organisation under ARIO Article 6 as 
conduct of that organisation (although it may then lose its identity as a state organ). Such 
extension of the notion “agent” may lead to confusion in the attribution of conduct under both 
Articles (ARIO Article 6 and Article 7) as both of them would concern the situations when 
particular conduct is under IO’s “effective control” (the notion originating from ASR Article 
8). Anyway, dual attribution of conduct of state organ to the state itself (under ASR Article 4) 
and to the IO at least under ARIO Article 7 is possible.  
 
B) Possibility of simultaneous responsibility of states and international organisations  
The ARIO Commentary distinguishes between attribution of conduct and attribution 
(or distribution) of responsibility. It notes that ARIO Articles 6-9 like ASR Articles 4-11 deal 
with attribution of conduct, not with attribution of responsibility, whereas practice often 
                                               
179 See also Pierre Klein (2010), at 307, suggesting that if activities were carried out jointly by an IO and a state 
which gave rise to international law violations, the IO and the state would be co-authors of the wrongful act and 
that act could be attributed to the state and IO jointly. 
180  Pierre Bodeau-Livinec, Gionata P. Buzzini, and Santiago Villalpando, “Behrami & Behrami v. France; 
Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway”, 102 American Journal of International Law 323 (2008), at 329. 
181 Caitlin Bell (2010), at 517. 
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focuses on attribution of responsibility rather than on attribution of conduct.182 One of the 
examples of such practice is the model contribution agreement between the UN and TCC, and 
as stated in the Commentary, it appears to deal only with distribution of responsibility and not 
attribution of conduct.183  
Since the attribution of responsibility differs from the attribution of conduct, the 
question is whether states and IOs may assume simultaneous responsibility for the conduct of 
the same organ/agent. In its report on accountability of IOs the ILA provides that “the 
responsibility of an [IO] does not preclude any separate or concurrent responsibility of a state 
[…] which participated in the performance of the wrongful act or which has failed to comply 
with its own obligations concerning the prevention of that wrongful act.”184 In this sense, 
ARIO Article 48 and its analogous ASR Article 47 provide for such simultaneous 
responsibility. ARIO Article 48 primarily deals with the situations covered by ARIO Articles 
14-18, 58-62 which concern “joint responsibility” of an IO with one/more states.185 These 
articles provide for responsibility for aid and assistance, direction and control, by one entity 
over/for another in commission of wrongful act. Apart from that the ARIO Commentary 
merely deals with the example of so-called mixed agreements concluded by the EU with its 
MSs.186 
However the ASR Commentary to Article 47 seems to envisage more situations. It 
provides both for responsibility for direction/control and for such responsibility where 
two/more states (it concerns only states, not IOs) act jointly or through a common organ 
carrying out the conduct (e.g. a joint authority responsible for the management of a boundary 
                                               
182 ARIO Commentary to Chapter II, para. 4. 
183 Ibid, Article 7, para. 3. 
184 ILA Report (2004), at 28. 
185 ARIO Commentary to Article 48, para. 1. 
186 See ibid, para. 1. 
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river).187 In this way, both states may be responsible for the conduct of the common organ. If 
it is not possible to separate the responsibility of each state for any particular act and the 
contribution of each state in creation and managing the organ was the same, the responsibility 
for a wrongful act of that joint organ will be also the same for each contributing state. 
However, if it is possible to attribute each act to one of them (e.g. a wrongful act was 
committed by the officials of one state, and not the other), the “effective control” may be the 
right test to apply for attribution of the act. 
In the situation of joint organs the responsibility is attributed to each state on equal 
footing (in some cases depending on the “effective control”), but not only where one state 
directs or assists the other in committing the act. Moreover, the ASR Commentary states that 
Article 47 specifically addresses the situations where “a single course of conduct is 
[simultaneously] attributable to several states and is internationally wrongful for each of 
them.”188 The ASR Commentary seems to mean the attribution of conduct to several states, 
not only the attribution of responsibility under Article 47. The ARIO Commentary does not 
provide such possibility for the respective Article 48.  
The ASR Commentary mentions the Nauru case concerning the administration of the 
Nauru trust territory shared by Australia and two other states under the Trusteeship 
Agreement. The ICJ held that the claim brought only against one state – Australia – is 
admissible despite the Australia’s argument that the claim should be brought jointly against 
all the states sharing the responsibility for breach of obligations.189 The Court distinguished 
the issue of reparations for damages (whether it can be liable for damages in full or in part) 
                                               
187 Ibid, Article 47, para. 2. 
188 Ibid, para. 3. 
189 Certain phosphate lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgement, ICJ Reports, 26 
June 1992 (“Nauru case”), para. 48. 
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and the question of the breach of obligations by Australia.190 The former question concerns 
the distribution of responsibility among several states responsible for the consequences of the 
wrongful conduct, whereas the latter concerns the attribution of conduct to several states, 
when each of them is individually responsible for the conduct.  
Under ASR Article 47, the states may also be responsible for separate wrongful acts 
caused damages and, in such a case, the responsibility of each state is determined individually, 
on the basis of its own conduct.191 The Corfu Channel case is an example of such a situation. 
In this case, the ICJ found Albania responsible for failure to warn about and prevent the 
damage caused by the explosions of the mines laid by Yugoslavia, about which it knew or 
should have known, although it appears that Yugoslavia would have been responsible for that 
damage. 192  Accordingly, the attribution of conduct to one state did not preclude the 
responsibility of another state for its own wrongful conduct resulted in damages.  
Another possibility for simultaneous responsibility of states and/or IOs is when one of 
them commits a wrongful act and the other aids, assists, controls and directs. Such scenarios 
are provided by ARIO Articles 19, 63 and the analogous ASR Article 19.  
While the situations when an entity assists the other in commission of an act may be 
more common, the cases of direction and control of the entity by the other will be quite rare. 
The ARIO Commentary to Article 14 provides only one situation from the practice where an 
IO could be regarded as assisting in the commission of the wrongful act. This concerned the 
support given by MONUC to FARDC which may have committed violations of international 
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law.193 MONUC would have to discontinue its support to the forces if it had reasons to 
believe that these forces were violating international law.194 
As for the direction and control of the state by the IO under ARIO Article 15, the 
Commentary provides the argument of French Government in Legality of Use of Force 
(Yugoslavia v France) case before the ICJ that “NATO is responsible for the ‘direction’ of 
KFOR and the [UN] for ‘control’ of it”.195 The UN Secretariat noted that this statement is 
controversial because it was not judicially determined and suggests that in Kosovo the UN 
exercised control over KFOR, which was not the case.196 France in that case argued that it 
will not be responsible for its contingent, if both organisations exercised the direction and 
control.197 This argument would be contrary to the nature of Article 15, which does not 
exclude the responsibility of the state for the commission of a wrongful act, even if the 
organisation directed and controlled it.198   
The UN Secretariat expressed doubts about the necessity of ARIO Article 15 and 
possible existence of any practical situations when the IO can control and direct the state, as it 
does not have means available to the states to do so.199 Regarding aid and assistance of the IO 
to the states, the UN Secretariat also gave an example of MONUC assistance to the 
governmental forces. 
Under ARIO Article 58, a state may assist an IO by providing an incompetent, 
undisciplined or untrained organ for its disposal and this organ commits wrongful acts under 
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effective control of the IO. The conduct will be attributed to the IO and responsibility would 
be shared between the IO for the act itself and the state for its assistance, if it knew about the 
circumstances of the wrongful act (e.g. that such organ may commit wrongful acts being 
undisciplined). As in case of responsibility for aid and assistance, the state will be responsible 
only as accomplice,200 it will be responsible not for the consequences of the IO’s wrongful 
acts but for its participation in that act.201  
The ICJ dealt with the question of state complicity in the Genocide case. Although the 
case was decided on the basis of the provisions of the Genocide Convention,202 the Court took 
ASR Article 16 as a point for departure in its analysis.203 Having found that ASR Article 16 
reflects CIL, the Court made no distinction between the notions of “aid and assistance” under 
ASR Article 16 and “complicity in genocide” in the meaning of Article III(e) Genocide 
Convention.204 The Court distinguished this form of responsibility from those envisaged by 
ASR Article 8 stating that if it was established that the act had been committed on the 
instruction or under the direction/effective control of a state, the conclusion would be that this 
act was attributable to the state and the state would be directly responsible for it, which would 
extend the effects of responsibility beyond complicity.205 In case of state responsibility as an 
accomplice, the state organs or persons acting on its instructions or under its 
direction/effective control, furnish “aid or assistance” in the commission of the wrongful acts 
in the sense of providing means to enable or facilitate the commission of the acts and not 
committing wrongful acts by themselves.206  
                                               
200  Jean D’Aspremont, “The limits to the exclusive responsibility of international organisations”, 1 Human 
Rights & International Legal Discourse 217 (2007), at 221. 
201 Philippe Sands, Pierre Klein, Bowett’s law of international institutions (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed., 2001), at 
525. 
202 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. 
203 Genocide case, para. 420. 
204 Ibid, para. 420. 
205 Ibid, paras. 419, 420 (emphasis added).  
206 Ibid, paras. 419, 420. 
 63 
Other provisions of the ARIO to be distinguished from the direct commission of the 
wrongful acts are ARIO Articles 15, 59. The stringent criteria of the ARIO Articles 15, 59, 
provided in the ASR Commentary to Article 17 (to which ARIO Commentary refers),207 are 
difficult to fulfil as the cumulative criteria of “control” as “domination over the commission 
of wrongful conduct” and “actual direction of an operative kind” are required.208  
An example will be if an IO’s agent/official directs the state organ to commit a 
particular act, simultaneously exercising actual and operative control over it, then the 
organisation may be considered as directing and controlling the commission of act. However, 
it is much easier to attribute the wrongful act of the state organ to the IO if it simply exercises 
effective control over the conduct of that organ under ARIO Article 7. In fact, in practice it 
will be difficult to differentiate between “effective control” and “direction and control”. 
Unfortunately the commentary does not provide a more straightforward distinction for these 
notions.  
The combination of different articles on state responsibility and responsibility of IOs 
makes it possible to hold responsible either the IO or the state or both, for a wrongful conduct 
of a state organ, such as national contingent. The identity of the organ, its position in the IO, 
the degree of control exercised over its conduct by the state and IO, the degree of involvement 
of the state and IO in the commission of the wrongful act should be taken into account in the 
analysis on case-by-case basis of whether a particular conduct is attributed to a state or an IO.  
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4. Attribution of conduct of PSOs to the UN and troop-contributing states 
 
A) Should the peacekeepers be considered a state organ or an organ of the UN? 
ARIO Article 6 provides for the responsibility of IOs for the conduct of its organs and 
agents. Similarly ASR Article 4 attributes the conduct of state organs to the state. It has been 
repeatedly stated that the PSOs under UN command and control are subsidiary organs of the 
UN.209 Consequently, the UN can be responsible for the peacekeepers’ conduct as for the 
conduct of its organ. 210  Nevertheless, unlike civilian personnel of the PSOs (normally 
individually recruited by the UN), members of military forces remain in national service and 
continue to be an organ of their national state. Unlike military observers and civilian 
personnel, serving in a personal capacity, military members are provided by TCCs in a 
contingent and are not selected on an individual basis. 211  The national contingents are 
provided as separate units with internal command structures, whereas the authority over the 
internal chain of command remains within the contingent itself. 212  For example, the 
responsibility for payment for members of contingent and their promotions in rank rests with 
their national government.213 
A transfer of the unit to UN operational control and its subsequent transformation into 
a UN subsidiary organ does not completely sever legal and institutional relationship between 
national contingents and the TCC retaining some important powers such as discipline and 
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criminal jurisdiction.214 National contingents occupy dual legal position acting in international 
capacity in the UN institutional structure participating in the operation, and in national 
capacity remaining an organ of their TCC.215 They can be considered equally an organ of state 
and a subsidiary organ of the UN.  
The domestic courts of some TCCs have already tried to find a solution to this 
dichotomy of PSFs’ legal status.216 In the United Kingdom (“UK”), the House of Lords in the 
Nissan case217 considered whether the government may be responsible for the acts of national 
forces forming part of the UN PSFs in Cyprus. The court attached more importance to the fact 
that the national contingent remains in national service than to the UN operational command 
over it. Lord Morris, for example, stated that although national contingents were under the 
UN authority and subject to its instructions, the troops as members of the force remained in 
their national service and they were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their national states 
in respect of any criminal offences committed by them in Cyprus.218 Lord Pearce also pointed 
out that while the functions of PSF as a whole are international, “its individual component 
forces have their own national duty and discipline and remain in their own national 
service.”219 However, the House of Lords did not deny the UN’s responsibility but did not 
deal with it, as in such circumstances concurrent responsibility between two entities may be 
possible.220  
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Dutch courts also considered the issue in the H.N.221 and Mustafic222 cases, deciding 
whether the state was responsible for the conduct of its national contingent serving in 
UNPROFOR in Srebrenica. Although initially Dutch District Court held in that since the 
contingent was placed to the UN operational command and control, its actions are attributed 
exclusively to the UN and found against the claimants, 223 on the appeal224 the Dutch Court of 
Appeal quashed the District Court’s decisions finding the Dutch government responsible. The 
Court of Appeal considered that the “effective control” test serves as a criterion to attribute 
the conduct of troops to either the IO or to state.225 The court reasoned that it was not only 
important whether particular conduct constituted the execution of specific instructions from 
either entity, but also whether in the absence of such instructions the UN or the state had the 
power to prevent the conduct concerned.226 The court stated that more than one entity may 
exercise “effective control” and thus the attribution of conduct to both entities is possible.227 
The court further analysed evidence and came to the conclusion that the state had “effective 
control” over the alleged conduct of Dutchbat and that this conduct is attributed to the state.228 
The court based its finding of “effective control” on the analysis of the factual situation rather 
than attributing all the conduct of particular mission to the UN.  
The Dutch Court of Appeal rulings were affirmed by the Dutch Supreme Court,229 
Which confirmed the Court of Appeal’s choice of legal basis – Article 7 ARIO rather than 
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Article 6 ARIO for the attribution of the PSFs’ conduct to the TCC due to the fact that TCC 
retained disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over its contingent.230 It also confirmed 
the Court of Appeal’s finding that under international law on the possibility of dual attribution 
of the conduct and left open the possibility UN also having effective control.231 The Supreme 
Court also affirmed the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that effective control is a factual control 
over specific conduct232 and its finding that Netherlands exercised such control and therefore 
responsible for the conduct of Dutchbat.233 The Hague District Court adopted the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning and factual nature of “effective control” in the famous Mothers of 
Srebrenica case, although finding Netherlands’ effective control over its peacekeepers only in 
some instances.234  
The situation of PSOs is not clear-cut. A national contingent is considered 
international personnel and is under operational control of the UNFC, who is a clearly a UN 
official and a member of the Secretariat.235 Conversely, unlike other UN officials/agents, 
members of PSFs do not lose an affiliation with their national state because they remain in the 
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state’s national service and function as a unit and not individually. They can be considered 
representatives of their national state.236  
Although such status of national contingents seems to be unique, it is possible to find 
an analogy in the UN system. The majority of the UN organs are in fact composed of MSs’ 
representatives of member states. Being provided by their national state they represent it in 
the UN organs and acting jointly they compose the UN’s organs. Their joint decision/action is 
considered as an UN’s decision/action. They are not individually recruited by the UN (as e.g. 
UN staff members of the Secretariat). Representatives of the states act on behalf of their states 
and jointly on behalf of the organ which they compose. National contingents are supposed to 
act on behalf of the UN alone, but being selected and provided by sending states to carry out 
particular mandate they in fact represent their national states which still participate as a TCC 
in the discussions of the PSO’s mandate and details of deployment. The fact that the TCCs 
reserve their powers on discipline, jurisdiction, promotion and payment for the members of 
their national contingents (see next subsection for details), confirms the suggestion that their 
status is more similar to the status of representatives of MSs than to the UN officials.  
The UN is responsible for the conduct of its organs, including those composed by 
member states representatives. It will be responsible for the decisions/actions, taken jointly by 
the states representatives, rather than for the actions or words of each representative (unlike 
for the individual acts of its officials). The same is true for the PSOs. The UN is responsible 
for the actions of the PSFs in general, for their particular operation or any directions issued by 
the UNFC in carrying out this mandate. However, all the acts of each member of national 
contingent cannot be indiscriminately attributed to the UN based on the sole claim that PSOs 
are a subsidiary organ of the UN.  
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Even if the members of national contingents cannot be individually “organs” of the 
UN (and only jointly, acting as a PSO), they may still fall under the definition of “agents” of 
the organisation and their individual acts will be attributable to the UN under ARIO Article 6 
in the same way as acts of “organs” of the UN.237 The members of national contingent may be 
considered persons who are “charged by the organisation with carrying out or helping to carry 
out, one of its functions.”238 As the ARIO Commentary to Article 6 specifically included in 
this category persons who act under the instructions/direction/control of the IO, members of 
PSFs acting under the instruction/directions of the UNFC can satisfy this criterion. There is 
also no requirement that “agents” must act solely on behalf of the organisation carrying out its 
functions. By that members of PSFs could be included in the category of UN’s “agents”.  
The only characteristic that may distinguish them from this broad and all-
encompassing category of IO’s “agents” is their continuous institutional link with their 
national state. As they are organs of their sending states and acting to some extent on their 
behalf, their acts may not be simply attributed to the UN under the rules of ARIO Article 6. It 
is so because the conduct of members of national contingents remaining organs of states can 
still be attributed to the state too and therefore states responsibility under ASR Article 4 can 
be invoked.239 Therefore either entity can be responsible not on the basis of attribution of 
overall conduct of members of national contingents, but on the basis of each particular act 
over which the state or the UN exercised actual control. For this purpose the attribution of 
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conduct of members of national contingents is assessed under ARIO Article 7 and not ARIO 
Article 6,240 as it was proposed by the UN Secretariat led by mostly political reasons.241  
 
B) Which entity has effective control over the acts of PSOs? 
ARIO Article 7 deals with situations where a state organ placed at the disposal of the 
IO, and attributes the conduct to the IO if it exercises effective control over particular acts of 
that organ. As the ARIO Commentary explains, this article does not concern the issue whether 
certain conduct is attributable at all to a state or IO, but rather to which entity it is 
attributable.242 A special status of PSFs in the UN system fits to such kind of situation. Their 
conduct will be attributable to either entity (state/UN) anyway, because they are a state organ 
and at the disposal of the IO (thus, having institutional links with both entities), however the 
main issue is to which entity the conduct is attributable and the effective control will play a 
principal role in this regard, 243  because the lent organ (national contingent) is not fully 
seconded to the UN and still acts to a certain extent as a state organ.244  
 
i) Variations of “effective control” test 
The UN accepts that the TCCs retain disciplinary powers and exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction over the members of national contingents, 245  considering them as under the 
“residual control” of TCCs, and claims that it still has “exclusive command and control” over 
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PSOs.246 It also undertakes to be liable towards third parties for the conduct of peacekeepers, 
but if the damage was caused by gross negligence or wilful misconduct of peacekeepers, 
TCCs will be liable.247 However, the agreements between the UN and TCCs providing such 
provisions are considered by the ARIO Drafting Committee dealing with the distribution of 
responsibility, which is separate issue from the attribution of conduct to either entity under 
ARIO Article 7.248  
The UN Secretariat understands “effective control” as tied to the notion of 
“operational control”. The UN assumes responsibility over the conduct of forces in the 
operations where it exercises effective command and control and it insists to have such 
control over PSOs.249 When it does not have operational control (e.g. over UNSC-authorised 
operations under national or regional command and control), it does not take responsibility for 
the conduct of the forces.250 Some commentators consider that the amount of operational 
control exercised by the UN is the better criterion to determine the responsibility of entities 
for the conduct of UN PSOs and the UN is responsible if it in fact possesses such control.251  
However, such interpretation of the “control” test for the attribution of conduct of 
PSOs is not the only one. The ECtHR, for example, proposed different test of control, namely 
“ultimate authority and control” in Behrami and Saramati case.252  The Court considered 
whether the TCCs may be responsible for the acts (unlawful detention) and omissions (failure 
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to clear unexploded bombs) of UNMIK and KFOR. The Court held that these acts and 
omissions are in principle attributable to the UN. Coming to this conclusion, the Court 
introduced a new test of attribution. It stated that “the key question is whether the UNSC 
retained ultimate authority and control so that operational command only was delegated.”253 
The Court accordingly found that the UNSC delegated to NATO the power to establish and 
the operational control of KFOR, retaining ultimate authority and control over it.254 As for 
UNMIK, the Court found that it was a “subsidiary organ of the UN, institutionally directly 
and fully answerable to the UNSC” and therefore its “inaction was, in principle, ‘attributable’ 
to the UN in the same sense.”255  
Firstly, it should be noted that “ultimate authority and control” is completely different 
from “effective control”, as it is linked neither to direct control over a specific act, nor to 
operational command and control.256 What is striking in the ECtHR decision is that the Court 
completely ignored that effective control and command may play any role in the attribution of 
conduct to an entity. It found that NATO had effective command of the relevant operational 
matters over the KFOR.257 However, it attributed the conduct to the UN on the basis of the 
“ultimate authority and control” test that appeared to be more important than even “effective 
command”, as the Court did not mention that the conduct might be attributable to NATO.258 
The Court constructed this test on the basis that the UNSC delegated its powers to the MSs 
and relevant IOs and it received the reports from KFOR.259  
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However, the question of attribution of conduct is not a question of institutional law of 
the UN, but of law of international responsibility.260 More direct links of the KFOR command 
with the MSs and relevant IOs were not even considered by the Court.261 The possibility of 
dual attribution of the conduct to the UN and NATO was not considered either.262 The Court 
did not take into account that the KFOR troops were directly answerable to their national 
commanders and fell under their national state exclusive disciplinary, civil and criminal 
jurisdiction.263 The exchange of the “effective control” test with the “ultimate authority and 
control” test would expand UN responsibility to a wide range of conduct which even slightly 
associated with its organs and spread impunity for the conduct of states under the cover of the 
UN immunities.264  
An example of the possible implications and development of the Behrami approach 
was demonstrated in the Al-Jedda case, where the House of Lords had to decide, inter alia, on 
the validity of the Secretary of State’s argument that by analogy with the attribution of the 
conduct of KFOR to the UN in the Behrami case, the actions of multinational forces in Iraq 
should be attributed to the UN and not to the UK. The House of Lords, however, did not find 
the Behrami case applicable to the situation in Iraq. Lord Bingham, in his lead opinion, 
considered that in UNSC resolution 1511 on Iraq “the [UNSC] was not delegating its power 
by empowering the UK to exercise its functions but was authorising the UK to carry out 
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functions it could not perform itself.”265 The only similarity between two situations was a 
duty to report to the UNSC, but to the Lord Bingham’s opinion, this cannot lead to the 
conclusion that the UN exercised effective command and control over multinational forces.266 
Without challenging the validity of the ECtHR’s reasoning in the Behrami case, the House of 
Lords distinguished the Behrami case from the Al-Jedda situation and did not spread the 
Behrami “immunity” any further.267  
This case was further considered by the ECtHR in Al-Jedda v UK. Firstly, the Court 
recognised that where the conduct is attributed to the UN, it does not mean that it will not be 
attributed to the state, as this attribution in such situations is not excluded. 268  It is very 
significant because the Court literally accepted the existence of dual or multiple attribution of 
the same conduct of the forces both to the UN and the state.269  
The Court also confirmed the House of Lords’ findings concerning the attribution of 
the conduct to the UK government and also distinguished Al-Jedda from Behrami.270 It found 
that the UNSC had “neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts 
and omissions of troops within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant’s detention 
was not, therefore, attributable to the [UN].”271 The Court concluded that as the detention took 
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place within a detention facility, controlled exclusively by British forces, and therefore within 
the authority and control of the UK, the applicant’s internment was attributable to the UK.272 
Although the ECtHR denoted the limits of the “ultimate authority and control” test, 
envisaged in Behrami, such an interpretation of the “control” test diverges from the UN 
position and practice not to assume responsibility for the operations over which it does not 
have any operational control.273 While the “ultimate authority and control” test clearly extends 
the responsibility of the UN too far over the conduct of operations it can hardly influence, it is 
not so evident whether the “effective command and control” test proposed by the UN 
Secretariat and distinguishing only between the UN-led and UN-authorised operations would 
fairly reflect its real control over the conduct of PSFs.274  
 
ii) Essence of “effective control” test 
It often happens that the national contingent commanders seek advice and instructions 
from their TCCs and may disobey the orders of the UNFC.275 The TCCs sometimes try to 
interfere with the control by the UN Commander which results in the lack of effective 
command authority over the national contingents.276 In such a case it is difficult to talk about 
exclusive command and control or effective operational control of the UN over such PSO, 
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even though it was formally led by the UN.277 In this case the national contingent may in fact 
act on behalf of the national state, which leads to the attribution of the PSO’s conduct to the 
TCC on the basis of ASR Article 4.278 Depending on the role left to the UN in the exercise or 
supervision of that conduct, the degree of control of TCCs over a national contingents, it is 
possible to envisage dual or joint control of the UN and TCC and attribution of PSO’s 
conduct to both.279  
Given differences between the UN and TCC’s degree of potential control over PSOs, 
the ARIO Commentary, considers that “while it is understandable that, for the sake of 
efficiency of military operations, the [UN] insists on claiming exclusive command and control 
over peacekeeping forces, attribution of conduct should also in this regard be based on a 
factual criterion.”280 Therefore the analysis of factual situations where the UN has in fact 
exercised operational control over particular part of the operation and whether the UNFC’s 
orders were obeyed by the national contingents is consider to be a better indicator as to 
whether the UN for the purposes of international responsibility can claim that it exercised 
effective control and responsible for the conduct of particular operation.  
Even if the UN exercised effective operational control over PSFs, it does not mean 
that it had effective control over particular conduct of individual members of forces. It is also 
accepted by some academics that it is necessary to adopt case-by-case approach and each 
                                               
277 See also Cortés Martín (2008), at 198. 
278 Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 128. 
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individual case must be examined separately to identify whether specific wrongful act was 
performed under the control of the IO or the TCC.281 
Although the UN normally claims to have “operational control” over national 
contingents, it does not have “full command and control” over the troops,282 which rests in the 
hands of TCCs according to the national law governing armed forces of the state.283 The UN, 
exercising operational control, has the authority to issue operational directives within specific 
mandate, time and location, deploy units concerned, retains tactical control, but the powers in 
discipline and promotion of members of national contingents rest with TCCs. 284  Full 
command involves military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to 
subordinates, covering every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only 
within national services.285 Usually, in multinational operations, the TCCs are represented by 
a national commander who is responsible for ensuring that full command is exercised and the 
national laws and policies are observed.286  
The UNFC, exercising “operational control” over the PSFs, is responsible for the 
conduct of the operation, but not for the conduct of individual members of national 
contingents. He lacks the most effective means to enforce his orders – disciplinary powers and 
prosecution, which rests with TCCs.287  The TCCs acting through the national contingent 
commanders are responsible for the executions of the UNFC’s orders, for administration of 
                                               
281 Moshe Hirsch (1995), at 65. 
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national contingents,288 discipline of troops, for their payment and promotion and exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction over the acts committed by members of national contingents. The factual 
control over troops may be divided between the UNFC and national commanders.289 This 
situation may contribute to inability of the UN to exercise effective control over the troops 
and ensure that the law is respected by them because of the UN’s lack of direct control over 
discipline and execution of orders by members of national contingent.290 The question is 
whether the UNFC’s operational control is sufficient to represent “effective control” for the 
purposes of attribution under ARIO Article 7. 
The ARIO Commentary to Article 7 provides some clues in this regard. The 
Commentary veiledly submits that the control the contributing state retains over disciplinary 
and criminal matters may have consequences for attribution of conduct.291 It further continues 
with more certainty that “[a]ttribution of conduct to the [TCC] is clearly linked with the 
retention of some powers by that state over its national contingent and thus on the control that 
the state possesses in the relevant respect.”292 The Commentary does not say that the TCC 
will definitely have effective control over conduct of its national contingent, but leaves this 
matter to the factual situation.293  
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It is crucial that TCCs retain disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction over their 
national contingents. More so when TCCs fail to prosecute offenders or discipline them.294 
Consequently, the peacekeepers get sense of impunity for any crimes committed during 
PSOs.295 These powers serve as the means that the entities normally use to prevent wrongful 
acts.296 All these powers are in the hands of states and national contingent commanders but 
not of the UNFC, who is only able to report about any misconduct to the UN Headquarters 
and take only administrative measures (to repatriate the wrongdoer), but any disciplinary and 
prosecutorial measure rest solely with TCCs.297  
However the UNFC will be able to prevent wrongful acts committed as part of an 
operation by issuing the correct orders and directions to the forces under his operational 
command. Depending on wrongful acts committed by members of national contingents and 
the circumstances of their commission, the UNFC and national contingent commanders may 
have material ability to prevent such wrongful acts from occurring and therefore may exercise 
effective control over the conduct of members of forces. In this way the UN and TCCs may 
be able to exercise effective control over particular acts through their organs and officials 
(UNFC, national contingent commanders).298  
Accordingly, one should distinguish between effective control over particular 
operation and effective control over particular conduct. Special Rapporteur Gaja suggests that 
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“while in principle the conduct of the [UN peacekeeping] force should be attributed to the 
[UN], effective control of a particular conduct may belong to the [TCC] rather than to the 
[UN].”299 The ILC Commentary can also be interpreted as making the “effective control” test 
applicable not to overall conduct of PSF but to each wrongful act for its attribution to IO or 
the state.300 
The UN’s claim that it exercises effective command and control over particular 
operation may be perfectly true and relevant, but it does not mean that it will exercise 
effective control over particular conduct and that conduct is attributed to it by the reason of 
effective operational control. What is important is whether particular wrongful act is inherent 
to or constitutes integral part of the PSO. If it is, the UNSC, the UN Secretary-General (“S-G”) 
or the UNFC in the field had material ability to prevent it and failed. Similarly to the 
attribution of conduct of private individuals to a state, envisaged by the ICJ in the Genocide 
case,301 the attribution of the conduct to the UN is based on the wrongful actions/omissions of 
the UN organs or officials (wrongful instructions, orders or failure to issue them, or even 
specific nature of the PSO’s mandate).  
However, if the nature of operation, instructions and orders given by the UN organs 
and operational control exercised by the UNFC were irrelevant to the acts committed by a 
member of national contingent, the question is whether the national contingent commander or 
other organs of the TCC had material ability to prevent such act, by better training of the 
national contingent, better controlling discipline or prosecuting for any criminal act 
committed by forces. If so, the TCC exercised effective control over particular wrongful act 
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and is responsible for it. Actions and omission of TCC’s organs will be similarly relevant to 
establish such effective control and responsibility. The concurrent responsibility of the TCC 
and the UN is not excluded, if they both had ability to prevent the wrongful acts.  
The UN, while insisting on having exclusive operational control over peacekeeping 
operations and accepting responsibility for its conduct as its subsidiary organ, does not want 
the TCCs to avoid their accountability for the misconduct of national contingents by shifting 
all responsibility to the UN. In order to address the paradoxical situation, the amendments to 
the Model Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UN and TCC were introduced. 
These amendments included several provisions clearly stipulating the responsibility of the 
TCCs to carry out the retained powers for the prevention of misconduct of their troops.  
The amended MoU provides that the TCCs are responsible to ensure that all members 
of national contingent comply with the UN standards of conduct, 302  that the national 
contingent commander receives adequate and effective predeployment training,303 that TCCs 
are primary responsible for investigating any acts of misconduct by members of national 
contingents,304 that TCCs must exercise jurisdiction in respect of any crimes or offences that 
might be committed by national contingents305  and exercise disciplinary jurisdiction with 
respect of all other acts of misconduct committed by the members.306  
The amendments to the MoU provide for special responsibilities of the national 
contingent commanders. They are responsible for the discipline and good order of all 
members of contingents and must have authority and take necessary measures and to inform 
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the UNFC about any misconduct in his contingent.307 The amendments to the MoU envisaged 
the responsibility of the national contingent commanders for the failure to cooperate with a 
UN investigation of misconduct, for the failure to report to appropriate authorities or take 
action in respect of allegations of misconduct and failure to exercise effective command and 
control.308 Despite that, the revised MoU does not provide any clear enforcement tools for 
accountability of the contingent commanders and lacks adequate sanctions for TCCs or 
individual members.309 Even without providing such sanctions, the revised MoU may serve as 
basis for holding TCCs responsible, if they fail to prosecute or discipline members of their 
contingents.310 
Interestingly, the UN included in the revised MoU the responsibility of national 
contingent commanders to exercise effective command and control over their contingent.311 
This provision confirms that the state through its contingent commander exercises effective 
command and control over members of national contingents, while the UN itself claims to 
have exclusive operational control over PSOs.312 The distinction that the UN draws between 
the acts of members of national contingents involving gross negligence and wilful misconduct 
and other acts of mere negligence for the purposes of distribution of responsibility also shows 
that TCCs are responsible for the acts which they were able to prevent by exercising exclusive 
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over their national contingent.313  
The approach distinguishing between the acts inherent to the particular operation over 
which the UN exercises effective control and other acts that can fall under state’s effective 
command and control coincides with the UN practice in this regard. It is also in line with the 
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overall position expressed in the ARIO Commentary insisting on factual criterion of effective 
control and giving more consideration to the TCCs’ powers of discipline and jurisdiction over 
members of national contingent. It remains to be seen which particular acts may be attributed 
to the state under its effective control or to the UN under its effective operational control. 
 
C) Which entity is can become responsible for ultra vires acts of the PSO? 
ASR Article 7 attributes ultra vires conduct of state organs to states. Similarly ARIO 
Article 8 refers to the IOs’ responsibility for ultra vires conduct of their organs/agents if they 
act within overall functions of the IO. The dual institutional link of PSOs with the UN and 
TCCs poses a problem of attribution of their ultra vires acts to either entity. 
As discussed before, PSOs as a whole are considered UN organs for the purposes of 
ARIO Article 6 and ARIO Article 8. Its ultra vires conduct is attributable to the UN. However 
the conduct of individual national contingent and its members is governed by ARIO Article 7, 
to which ARIO Article 8 does not refer.314 The question is under which circumstances ultra 
vires acts of PSOs may be attributed to the UN or TCCs. 
Several situations can be considered. The first situation may exist where a PSO acts as 
a whole beyond its mandate. This may involve ultra vires or unclear instructions/orders of the 
UNFC or UNSC or S-G. For example, the instructions to detain all suspicious people resulted 
in unlawful detention of civilians, or the UNFC failed to issue specific order/directions to the 
PSFs and they acts according their own understanding of the mandate. The ultra vires acts of 
the PSO will be attributable to the UN as ultra vires acts of either organ of the UN (UNFC’s 
acts or the PSO’s acts).315 
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The second situation may exist where the orders of the UNFC were lawful and 
according to the mandate, but their implementation by some national contingents involved 
ultra vires wrongful acts. For example, an order to find out specific information from a 
particular person resulted in maltreatment of this person during the interrogation. If the acts 
are form an integral part of the operation, the situation falls within ARIO Article 7 and the 
notion of effective control becomes crucial. If the UNFC exercises effective operational 
control and is able to prevent wrongful acts, such ultra vires acts are attributable to the UN. 
However it cannot automatically exclude the state responsibility for those acts, because the 
national contingent still remains a state organ and therefore ASR Article 7 may be applicable.  
The issue of concurrent state responsibility for ultra vires acts of its national 
contingent still arises especially if it had powers to prevent the wrongful acts from 
occurring.316 This possibility was also considered by the Dutch District Court in the Mothers 
of Srebreniča case, which held that because TCCs retain disciplinary and training powers over 
their contingents, ultra vires acts beyond their UN mandate can be attributed to them as they 
can take measures to counter ultra vires acts317 (i.e. they can prevent those acts). If the state 
had just some powers to prevent such act (e.g. provide better trained forces), it may be 
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responsible for its aid and assistance to the IO in the wrongful act under ARIO Article 58 
(upon the fulfilment of other requirements).318  
The third situation is where the wrongful acts of national contingents cannot be 
considered as integral part of a particular operation, nevertheless they happened during PSO. 
For example, if looting of civilian houses or unlawful killings by a contingent was done 
during PSO, the question is whether they can be considered ultra vires acts for the purposes 
of either ARIO Article 8 or ASR Article 7 and if so, which entity is responsible for this 
conduct.  
A requirement of both articles is that an organ/agent acts in its official capacity. As 
previously discussed, an organ must act within its apparent authority or use powers or means 
placed by the entity at its disposal and “within the overall functions of the organisation”. 319  
If the members of national contingent commit looting or unlawful killings, it is 
difficult to consider them acting within the UN’s apparent authority or their TCC. However 
they may use the powers or means given by the TCC and/or the UN by conducting these acts: 
they may use arms and their power as a military force to carry out such acts. As for 
considering such conduct as ultra vires acts of the UN, it is very doubtful that unlawful 
killings or looting may be regarded “within the overall functions” of the UN. While clearly, 
the latter criterion may prevent the attribution of acts to the UN, these acts may also go 
beyond effective operational control of the UN over the PSO. The UNFC (or other UN organs) 
may not have any means to prevent such conduct. Any measures that can be employed are 
held by the TCCs and national contingent commanders, namely, any disciplinary sanctions, 
criminal jurisdiction and prosecution, adequate training. Therefore the TCCs would exercise 
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effective control over such conduct of its national contingent and the conduct may be 
attributed to them, but everything depends on particular facts of each case.320 
The forth scenario that may exist is where the members of national contingents 
commit wrongful acts outside the operation itself, whilst off-duty. There were many 
allegations of rape or other sexual crimes committed by peacekeepers. The main problem of 
attribution of these acts is that they may not be considered to be done by peacekeepers in their 
official capacity. While the UN may not have any effective control over such acts,321 the 
states may have some. The ability to prevent by taking necessary sanctions is still relevant. 
Due to the specific command-subordinate structure of military forces, the national contingent 
commanders may have material ability to prevent such wrongful acts. The state may be 
considered responsible for even off-duty acts of the members of armed forces. This is 
especially true for the situation where a PSO participates in the armed conflict and IHL 
applies to them. Both Article 91 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (API) 
and Article 3 of Hague Convention IV provide that a party to the conflict “shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” Under this 
provision the state may be responsible for all acts of its armed forces committed both in 
official and in private capacity and this rule can constitute a lex specialis to the general rule 
under ARS Article 7 (covering only official acts).322 This is because the state exercises much 
stricter control over its soldiers than over other officials and during the wartime the soldiers 
are always on duty and never act in a purely private capacity (because as private persons, they 
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would never have entered into contact with enemy nationals or acted on enemy territory).323 
The same is true for the peacekeepers.  
Even if IHL does not apply to them because they do not participate in hostilities, the 
same principle may be applicable given that being on mission, they cannot be considered as 
acting in a purely private capacity. They are entrusted a mission to protect the civilian 
population or provide humanitarian support. If they commit a crime, they are still considered 
on mission and having a duty to fulfil their humanitarian role. But for being on mission, they 
would not come across with the local population in the role of protectors. Therefore their 
conduct at the PSO, even private, may be attributed to their TCCs. 
Contrary to that, Zwanenburg argues that although the structure of armed forces 
provides better opportunity to prevent violations of international law than the structure of 
other state organs, this does not apply to PSOs because the UNFC the same disciplinary 
powers as national commanders.324 While it may be true that the UN lacking disciplinary 
powers should not be liable for off-duty acts of members of national contingents, it does not 
mean that their TCCs would not be liable either, as they have such powers and are in a better 
position to prevent wrongful acts through the military structure of their contingent still 
preserved after its integration in the UN forces. Moreover, the ASR Commentary to Article 7 
states that the distinction between official and private conduct may be avoided if “the conduct 
complained of is systematic or recurrent, such that the state knew or ought to have known of it 
and should have taken steps to prevent it.”325 This may be exactly such a situation. The state 
through its national contingent commanders ought to have known about these crimes taking 
place and had ability to prevent it by taking disciplinary or criminal sanctions and providing 
adequate training.  
                                               
323 Marco Sassòli (2002), at 406. 
324 Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 106-107. 
325 ASR Commentary to Article 7, para. 8. 
 88 
Conclusion 
The present chapter has demonstrated that members of national contingents may be 
considered simultaneously as organs of their TCCs and the UN agents. Consequently, for the 
purposes of attribution their conduct will be covered by Article 7 ARIO. The criterion to 
identify whether the UN or TCCs must be responsible for the conduct in question is “effective 
control” over that conduct. The existence of “effective control” cannot be presumed by 
general “operational control” exercised by the UN over PSOs. The finding of this control 
must be done on factual basis. In each case, one needs to examine whether the UN or TCCs 
had “effective control” over particular conduct, which constitutes a breach of the UN or 
TCCs’ obligations. Both of them can also have effective control over the conduct. The 
determination of “effective control” depends on material ability of the UN or TCCs to prevent 
that conduct. This must be done on case-by-case basis. This “material ability to prevent” 
derives from the material ability of military commanders to prevent crimes committed by their 
subordinates. If the UNFC had such ability to prevent, the conduct must be attributed to the 
UN. If the national contingents’ commanders it, the conduct must be attributed to the TCC. If 
they both had it, the conduct can be attributed to both of them.  
In majority of cases the TCCs have the ability to prevent wrongful acts and therefore 
exercise effective control over such conduct of their national forces. The UN, however, may 
still be responsible in the scope of its effective operational control over PSFs. It will also be 
responsible for the conduct of the PSO in general as it is considered to be a subsidiary organ 
of the UN. Where the wrongful acts are committed by members of national contingents, the 
state may be the only entity which has means at its disposal to prevent these acts and to 
punish the perpetrators and therefore it must be responsible for the conduct of its national 
contingent which remains a state organ. 
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III. United Nations and troop-contributing states’ obligations under 
international humanitarian law during PSOs 
 
1. Participation of PSO in armed conflicts 
 
In order for the UN and TCCs to become responsible for the conduct of PSOs, in 
addition to the attribution of PSOs’ conduct to the UN/TCCs, analysed in the previous chapter, 
the breach of international obligations by the UN/TCCs must be proved. Crimes committed 
by peacekeepers under certain circumstances can amount to a breach of IHL obligations by 
UN/TCCs. This chapter does not analyse various IHL obligations that states and IOs may 
have and customary status of each provisions of the Geneva Conventions (“GC”) (it is beyond 
the scope of the thesis). It does not deal with particular breaches of IHL obligations by PSFs, 
as this would be done by a case-by-case analysis.1 The aim of this chapter is to show that the 
UN and TCCs can be bound by IHL obligations and under what circumstances.  
The chapter starts analysing the question whether IHL may in principle bind the 
UN/TCCs or both by virtue of PSFs’ participation in armed conflicts. The next subsection 
discusses the circumstances under which IHL binds UN and TCCs, namely when there is an 
armed conflict and PSFs begin to participate in it. The second section discusses the scope of 
IHL obligations of the UN/TCCs. Three general problems are addressed: whether 
peacekeepers can be considered combatants or civilians, when the conflict they participate in 
becomes international or non-international, and whether the law of occupation can apply to 
PSOs.  
 
                                               
1 The example of such analysis will be provided on the basis of the particular case-studies in Chapter VI of the 
thesis. 
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A) How can IHL bind UN and TCCs during PSOs? 
The first question is whether the UN and TCCs in principle can be bound by the GC. 
While obviously TCCs are bound by the GC by virtue of their ratification/accession,2 it is not 
true for the UN, which is not the GC party. For the UN to be bound by the GC provisions (1) 
those provisions must be part of CIL; and (2) the UN must be bound by CIL.  
Firstly, it is fair to say that the great majority of the GC provisions represent CIL.3 As 
ICJ stated in the Nuclear Weapons case (GA), “the extensive codification of [IHL] and the 
extent of the accession to the resultant treaties, […] the fact that the denunciation clauses that 
existed in the codification instruments have never been used, have provided the international 
community with a corpus of treaty rules the great majority of which had already become 
customary and which reflected the most universally recognised humanitarian principles.”4 In 
Nicaragua, the Court also considered that “the Geneva Conventions are in some respects a 
development, and in other respects no more than the expression”, of fundamental general 
principles of IHL.5 The Hague Regulations of 1907 (“HR”) are regarded as being declaratory 
of laws and customs of war.6  
Secondly, as a subject of international law, the UN is bound by CIL, including the 
rules of customary IHL.7 In the WHO and Egypt case the ICJ stated that “the [IOs] are 
                                               
2 There are 194 parties to the GC at the present. 
3 See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-Beck, International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary 
international humanitarian law: Volume 1, Rules (Cambridge University Press, 2005), at xliv; Legality of the 
threat of use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 8 July 1996 (requested by UN General 
Assembly), paras. 79, 82. See also Theodor Meron, “State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights: 
Remarks", 83 American Society of International Law Proceedings 372 (1989), at 45-46, who submits that most 
of the substantive provisions of GC I, II and III are based on earlier Geneva Conventions and thus have a strong 
claim to customary law status, unlike GCIV, which however repeats many of the Hague Regulations relating to 
the protection of civilians, that can provide the foundation for building the customary law content of the 
Convention. He states that all of the Conventions contain a core of principles that express customary law (at 46). 
4 Nuclear Weapons case (GA), para. 82. 
5 Nicaragua case, para. 218. 
6 See International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Case of the Major War Criminals, Judgement, 2 October 
1946, at 253-254. 
7  See also Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 151-153 for discussion; see also Rachel Opie, “United Nations’ 
responsibility for United Nations-mandated peace operations: a necessary contribution to the efficacy of 
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subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them 
under general rules of international law.”8 This conclusion is also supported by the academic 
opinion.9 Therefore most of the provisions of the GC are binding upon the UN due to their 
customary status. Having found the TCCs and UN to be bound by the GC, the next issue is 
when these obligations arise.  
There are three situations when such obligations apply: (1) armed conflicts between 
two or more High Contracting Parties (GC Common Article 2) (“CA2”); (2) armed conflicts 
between a contracting party and a Power, not a party to the GC, but which accepts and applies 
their provisions; (3) armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the contracting parties, to all the parties to the conflict (Common Article 3) (“CA3”). 
Regarding first and second situations, because of the fact that most of the GC provisions are 
part of CIL binding upon non-parties to the GC, there is no distinction between High 
Contracting Parties and Powers which are parties to an armed conflict in relation to the 
binding nature of the GC provisions forming part of CIL.  
Common elements of three situations are 1) the existence of the armed conflict and 2) 
Party’s/Power’s participation in it. Therefore for IHL to apply during PSOs there must be an 
armed conflict on a particular territory and PSFs must participate in it. It should be further 
                                                                                                                                                   
international humanitarian law”, New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 18 (2003), at 24; Dietrich Schindler 
(1984), at 526. 
8 Interpretation of the agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 20 
December 1980, para. 37. 
9 Greenwood is of the opinion that “the [UN] is subject of customary [IHL], even if it is not bound by the IHL 
treaties, to the extent that it engages in armed conflict” (Christopher Greenwood, “International humanitarian 
law and United Nations military operations”, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 (1998), at 16). 
Bowett also submits that “while the activities of United Nations forces created for peace-keeping operations are 
initially not belligerent in nature, the military actions taken by them in self-defence or in the general execution of 
their mandate” will be regulated by the laws of armed conflict (Derek William Bowett, United Nations forces: a 
legal study of United Nations practice. (Stevens, 1964), at 503). Kelly comes to the same conclusion in a 
different way suggesting that as the PSFs consist of various national contingents, who do not lose their link with 
the TCCs, they bring to the UN operation all the applicable international treaties which are binding to their 
national governments, especially due to the fact that disciplinary functions remain with the contingent 
commander only (Kelly, Michael, Restoring and maintaining order in complex peace operations: the search for 
a legal framework (Kluwer Law International, 1999), at 177). 
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analysed how PSFs’ participation in the armed conflict can be qualified. Although neither GC, 
nor their Additional Protocols 1977 (“APs”) provide for rules concerning PSOs directly,10 it is 
possible to apply those provisions to the specific situation of PSOs.    
Notably, PSFs cannot become a “party to the conflict” in the meaning of CA3. 
Although CA3 states that not only states or “powers” but also non-state actors can become a 
party to the conflict, unlike other organised groups, PSFs do not act on their own behalf, 
pursuing their own political or any other goals. 11  A PSF is not a separate entity, but a 
subsidiary organ of the UN mandated to maintain peace in the host state. It consists of 
national contingents delegated by TCCs to serve for the UN and these contingents do not lose 
their national identity and remain in the TCC’s military service. 12  Its unique nature and 
structure do not separate them from TCC/UN. Accordingly, they cannot be considered as a 
separate party to the conflict and their participation in it should be analysed in conjunction 
with the TCCs/UN. Therefore the analysis of applicability of IHL to PSOs under CA3 is 
problematic. 
The next question is whether the UN or TCCs may become party/parties to an armed 
conflict which the PSFs appeared involved in the scope of CA2. For that, it should be 
discussed whether the UN can be considered “Power” for the purposes of CA2 (as all TCCs 
are already contracting parties).  
Although CA2 does not clarify whether other entities (not only states) can be 
“Powers”, the choice of the word “Powers” instead of “states” does not exclude any other 
                                               
10 See Anne Ryniker, «Respect du droit international humanitaire par les forces des Nations Unies: quelques 
commentaires a propos de la Circulaire du Secretaire general des Nations Unies du 6 aout 1999», 81 Revue 
internationale de la Croix-Rouge 795 (1999), at 796 
11 As Glick points out, “[t]he term ‘party to the armed conflict’ is deemed to encompass any de facto authority 
exercising command and control over military forces.” (Glick, Richard D., “Lip service to the laws of war: 
humanitarian law and United Nations armed forces”, 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 53 (1995-1996), 
at 74). 
12 In this sense Opie points out that “the contributing states retain responsibilities as prescribed in their national 
laws and international obligations, and it is that law which is applicable to each contingent.” Rachel Opie (2003), 
at 25. 
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subject of international law, such as IOs, from becoming a party to conflict.13 The fact that 
API extended the application of CA2 to armed conflicts involving national liberation 
movements (even though PSFs does not fall under this category), may be indicative to the 
possibility of interpretation of the word “Power” to include not only states but also non-state 
entities (as pre-existing subjects of international law).14 The UN, having legal personality and 
being subject of international law, can also be considered a “Power” in the meaning of CA2.15 
If it becomes involved in an armed conflict with state forces, such conflict must be of no less 
international character than those where national liberation movements participate.16  
Moreover, the UN accepts the application of the GC provisions to the PSOs (or at least 
some of them) within the meaning of GC CA2(3). It follows from the following. The UN 
included in the model agreement between the UN and TCCs a provision that “[PSOs] shall 
observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general international conventions 
applicable to the conduct of military personnel”, including GC.17 The S-G’s Bulletin also 
                                               
13 See, for instance, Commentary to Article 43(1) of API, para. 1661, which provides in the discussion of 
whether an entity (not a state) may be a “Power” or a “Party to an armed conflict” in the meaning of CA2(3) GC 
and Article 1(4) API, that it is not “out of the question that the United Nations could be a "Party to an armed 
conflict" in the material sense, although the problem of the accession of the UN to the GC and the Protocol 
remains a delicate question which has not yet been resolved.” See also Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 136; see 
also Claude Pilloud, Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, Bruno Zimmerman, Commentary on the additional 
protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International Committee of the Red 
Cross: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), at 507. 
14 Claude Pilloud (1987), at 507; Commentary to API, Article 1(4), para. 90. 
15 Finn Seyersted, , United Nations forces in the law of peace and war (A. W. Sijthoff, 1966), at 350, 201, see 
also Edward Kwakwa, The international law of armed conflict: personal and material fields of application 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992). Kelly also suggests that the term “Power” could be argued to encompass 
UN forces as a “military power”, party to a conflict, or occupying power, because the UN’s capacity to deploy 
force and engage in conflict or occupy territory brings it within the scope of the GC and AP as potential adherent 
(Michael Kelly (1999), at 175). 
16 As Seyersted submits, it would be contrary to the purpose of the GC, if the GC “were considered to be 
inapplicable to armed conflicts of an international character, because one of the parties, although a subject of 
international law, was not a state. Such conflicts could not be allowed to fall between two stools because they are 
neither internal nor between states” (Finn Seyersted (1966), at 350). Moreover, the fact of participation in the 
conflict of another subject of international law may exclude the conflict from qualifying as purely “internal” one. 
See discussion of international/non-international armed conflicts in the next section of this chapter. 
17  Report of the Secretary-General, Model agreement between the United Nations and Member States 
contributing personnel and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations, Comprehensive review of the 
whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, 23 May 1991, A/46/185, para. 28. 
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confirms that IHL norms (at least those mentioned in it) are applicable to the UN PSOs.18 
Although the UN’s acceptance of the GC does not mean that it is bound by them not being a 
contracting party, CA2 requires other contracting parties to be bound by the GC in relation to 
PSOs and therefore IHL applies between them.  
Thus, the UN can be considered a “Power” in the meaning of CA2 and can become a 
“party” to the conflict to which most of the GC provisions having customary status apply.  
However, for the UN/TCCs to become a party to the conflict, for the purposes of IHL, 
they must be considered participating in the conflict. Although it may sound obvious, it 
should be established that the PSFs participating in the armed conflict “belong to” the 
UN/TCC for the purposes of IHL. This analysis is separate from the one in the previous 
chapter on the attribution of the conduct to the UN/TCCs. The present analysis is conducted 
on the basis of IHL rules, and not under the secondary rules of international responsibility, as 
this chapter deals with the substantive obligations of states and IOs under IHL.  
To establish whether the PSF “belong to” the UN/TCC, we can refer to GCIII Article 
4, which provides a prisoners-of-war (“POW”) status to certain categories of persons. The 
most interesting for the present analysis are the following: (1) members of armed forces of a 
party to the conflict (having a de jure link to the state as being its organ); (2) members of 
militia and volunteer corps (not forming part of the armed forces), including organised 
resistance movements “belonging to” a party to the conflict and fulfilling certain conditions. 
This category would have a de facto link to the party concerned. As ICRC submits, the 
                                               
18  Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 173. See The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the observance by United 
Nations forces of international humanitarian law, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999. See the discussion on this 
issue further in this Chapter. 
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concept “belonging to” requires a de facto relationship between organised armed group and a 
party to the conflict.19 
API combines both categories and broadening the notion of “armed forces of a party to 
a conflict”, which includes any organised group or unit under command responsible to a party 
of the conflict for the conduct of its subordinates and subject to an internal disciplinary 
system.20 
The application of these provisions of GCIII and API to the PSFs is not 
straightforward. National contingents remaining in military service have a de jure link with 
their TCC and are in fact its armed forces notwithstanding the international status of the UN 
forces. They must be fully discharged from their active military duty to cease to be members 
of armed forces,21 which is not the case with the members of PSFs. Conversely, they are 
considered to be UN forces and UN’s subsidiary organ. Although they are not strictly “armed 
forces” of the UN (and it is doubtful at all whether it may have a regular army), they have de 
jure and de facto link with the UN which makes them “belonging to” it.  
Therefore, regarding the definition of armed forces under Article 43 API,22 for the 
purposes of IHL the PSFs can be considered “armed forces” of both the UN and TCC. The 
PSFs consist of organised groups of national contingents subordinated to the internal 
disciplinary system. This system includes internal organisation of the national units 
                                               
19  ICRC, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under international 
Humanitarian Law”, 90 International Review of the Red Cross 991 (2008), at 999.   
20  API, Article 43(1). The British Military Manual explains that the requirement of being under command 
responsible to a party of the conflict is satisfied if “the commander is regularly or temporarily commissioned as 
an officer or is otherwise recognised as a commander by the party concerned.” It further states that “the essential 
feature of the requirement is that the commander should accept responsibility for the acts of his subordinates and 
equally his responsibility to, and his duty of obedience to the orders of, the power or authority upon which he 
depends.” Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The manual of the law of armed conflict (Oxford University Press, 
2004), at 39, para. 4.3.3. 
21 See ICRC Interpretive Guidance (2008), at 1001. 
22 The ICRC considers that the rule based on Article 43 API, which provides that “The armed forces of a party to 
the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to 
that party for the conduct of its subordinates, “ is of customary status. See Jean-Mare Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Vol. I, Rule 4, at 14 
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themselves and a UN superior-subordinate system in general under UNFC or S-G Special 
Representative. It is for TCCs to discipline and enforce compliance with the rules of 
international law. However, the PSFs are also under command responsible to the UN for the 
conduct of its subordinates, but separately members of national contingents are under 
command of their national contingent commanders responsible for the conduct of their 
subordinates not only before the UNFC but also their TCCs.  
API Article 43 explicitly provides that a party to the conflict can also be an authority 
not recognised by the adverse party (not only government).23 The Commentary to this article 
suggests that under API entities, which are not states, but which are, at least to some extent, 
subjects of international law, may become parties to the conflict and may take the form of an 
authority not recognised by the adversary.24 If interpreting broadly this provision, the UN may 
be such a party or authority, representing PSFs. Moreover, as the Commentary suggests, the 
possibility that the UN could be a party to an armed conflict is not excluded.25 
The analysis demonstrates that the PSFs can be considered simultaneously as armed 
forces of TCCs and de facto UN “forces”. For the purposes of IHL, the connection with two 
entities makes the PSFs joint armed forces of the TCC and UN. Commanded by the UN 
official in general and national commanders for each contingent, the PSFs can be regarded as 
coalition forces for the purposes of IHL. Similarly, if the whole PSF becomes involved in the 
armed conflict, all TCCs and the UN may be considered as a joint party to that conflict.26 
They would be bound to respect and ensure the respect of the law of armed conflict.27 The 
                                               
23 API, Article 43 (1). 
24 Commentary to Article 43(1), API, para. 1663. 
25 Ibid, para. 1661. 
26 See the next subsection for the analysis of the situations when not the whole PSF, but only some units 
participate in the armed conflict. 
27 See also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Luigi Condorelli (2000), at 3, who argues that as the TCCs do not 
relinquish control over their national contingents forming part of PSFs and retain at the very list disciplinary 
command over their personnel, the dual link with the UN and TCCs “entails a two-pronged responsibility as to 
compliance with international humanitarian law.” (Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence, Condorelli, Luigi, 
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British Military Manual also confirms that the “responsibility for ensuring compliance with 
the law of armed conflict by the members of a PSO force is divided between the national 
authorities of each contingent and the [UN] or other [IO] under whose auspices the operation 
is conducted.”28 That, however, concerns states’ substantive obligations under IHL and is 
without prejudice to the finding of international responsibility of the UN/TCCs, where the 
attribution of particular conduct of PSOs under secondary rules, becomes involved.  
This conclusion is in line with the ICRC position that TCCs remain individually 
responsible for the application of the GC whenever they provide contingents for the PSFs and 
should issue appropriate instructions to their contingents’ members, whereas the UN is 
responsible to issue the appropriate instructions (compatible with IHL obligations) to the 
PSFs’ unified command.29 Both TCCs and the UN may become responsible for the violations 
of IHL, committed by peacekeepers. However this question depends on whether TCCs/UN 
exercise effective control over particular conduct of PSFs, dealt with in the previous chapter. 
 
B) Under which circumstances do the UN and TCCs become a party to an armed 
conflict? 
 
i) How can the UN and TCCs become a party to an armed conflict? 
The question when the UN and TCCs become bound by IHL obligations depends on 
purely factual circumstances. IHL applies to PSFs if there was in fact an armed conflict and 
                                                                                                                                                   
“Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests”, 837 International 
Review of the Red Cross (2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqcp.htm). 
28 British Military Manual, at 379, para. 14.8. 
29 See, Umesh Palwankar, “Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peace-keeping 
forces”, International Review of the Red Cross 227 (1993), at 230, 231. 
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the PSFs participated in it. It is irrelevant under which mandate the PSO was acting or under 
which chapter of the UN Charter it was established.30  
The UN/TCCs may become a party to an armed conflict, if PSFs take direct part in 
hostilities.31 What is significant is the fact of participation in hostilities, not the existence of 
authority to do that.32 PSFs, being joint armed forces of the UN and TCCs by their conduct 
(namely participation in hostilities) can involve their TCCs/UN in the armed conflict. 
However, pure deployment of PSFs in the territory of the host state with the mandate to 
maintain peace without use of force may not be considered as amounting to participation in 
hostilities. Only when they start to use force beyond self-defence, they may be considered 
taking part in hostilities.33 Having their armed forces participating in hostilities, the TCCs/UN 
become a party to the conflict.  
For them to become a party to an armed conflict, two possible situations may exist: 1) 
there was already a recognised armed conflict in the territory of the host state/states and once 
the PSFs were deployed, they started to participate as a third party to that conflict; 2) PSFs 
may become involved in a separate armed conflict with a host state or a non-state actor in the 
territory where there was no pre-existing armed conflict. It is necessary to analyse when the 
existence of armed conflict can be recognised and under which circumstances PSFs become 
involved in it. 
According to the Commentary to CA2, an armed conflict between states is defined as 
“any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the 
                                               
30 See also Christopher Greenwood (1998), at 11, 22, who also suggests that the application of the IHL to a 
particular PSO will depend on the existence of an armed conflict in which the PSF participates and not on the 
legal character of the force’s mandate or how the PSF was classified for the UN purposes. See also Keiichiro 
Okimoto (2005), at 207. 
31 See also British Military Manual, at 378-379, para. 14.5. 
32 Christopher Greenwood (1998), at 11, 22. He actually considers that the UN forces become a party to the 
conflict. See also Murphy, Ray, "United Nations peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the use of force", 8 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 71 (2003), at 168. 
33 See discussion in detail about the relevance of self-defence further in this section.  
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armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the parties 
denies the existence of a state of war.”34 The occurrence of de facto hostilities (or any hostile 
act) would be sufficient.35 The Commentary continues by stating that “it makes no difference 
how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the 
participating forces.”36 ICRC considers that the international armed conflict (“IAC”) occurs, 
“when one of more states have recourse to armed force against another state regardless the 
reasons or the intensity of this confrontation.”37 This definition seems to be very broad as to 
include even small incidents of use of force during the presence of some units of armed forces 
of one state on the territory of another state. However the ILA disagrees with this definition 
by stating that the “organised armed forces are only recognised as engaged in armed conflict 
when fighting between them is more than a minimal engagement or incident.”38 According to 
the ILA, a certain level of intensity of fighting should be reached in order to qualify a 
situation as an armed conflict irrespective of its nature.39 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber defined interstate conflicts not less broadly than ICRC, 
stating that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States.” 40  Internal armed conflicts were defined as “protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State.” 
While for the interstate armed conflict, it is necessary to prove only the “resort to armed 
force”, or occurrence of the hostilities between two/more states, for the recognition of internal 
                                               
34 Commentary to CA2(1) of GC.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 ICRC, Peacekeeping operations: ICRC statement to the United Nations, 26-10-2010, at 1; see also Christopher 
Greenwood (1998), at 23. 
38 International Law Association (ILA), Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law, 
The Hague Conference, Use of force (2010), at 2. 
39 See ILA (2010), at 30, 32, see also Dieter Fleck, Michael Bothe, The handbook of international humanitarian 
law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2008), at 48 for the same view. 
40 Prosecutor v Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 
(“Tadić Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction”), 2 October 1995, para. 70. 
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armed conflict, two criteria need to be fulfilled: the violence must reach certain level of 
intensity and the groups participating in it must be sufficiently organised.41  
The criterion of “protracted armed violence” refers to the intensity of the armed 
violence, rather than to its duration.42 What matters is whether the acts are perpetrated in 
isolation or constituted part of a protracted campaign entailed engagement of both parties in 
hostilities. 43  Some factors indicate the “intensity” criterion was satisfied (although not 
essential): number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; type of weapons; 
number and calibre of munitions fired; number of persons and type of forces partaking in the 
fighting; number of casualties; extent of material destruction; UNSC’s involvement.44 
For recognition of an armed conflict the participating parties must be sufficiently 
organised to confront each other with military means. 45  Governmental armed forces are 
presumed to satisfy this criterion,46 whereas other armed groups are sufficiently organised if 
they have some hierarchical structure and its leadership have the capacity to exercise control 
or authority over its members to implement basic obligations of CA3.47 
It follows that an armed conflict would exist where the organised groups or military 
units use armed force in fighting. The assessment is done on factual basis.48 The fighting must 
be of a collective nature, 49  and does not constitute separate hostile acts of individual 
persons.50 The use of force must be of such intensity and such duration as to go beyond law 
                                               
41 See, Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, ICTY, 7 May 1997 (“Tadić Trial Judgement”), para. 
562; Prosecutor v Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, ICTY, 30 November 2005 (“Limaj Trial 
Judgement”), para. 84; ICRC Opinion Paper (2008), at 3, 5. 
42 Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement (“Haradinaj Trial Judgement”), 3 April 2008, para. 
49. 
43 Prosecutor v Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgement (“Boškoski Trial Judgement”), 10 July 2008, para. 
185.  
44 Haradinaj Trial Judgement, para. 49. 
45 Ibid, para. 60. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Boškoski Trial Judgement, paras. 195-196. 
48 See ICRC Opinion Paper (2008), at 1. 
49 See also ICRC Opinion Paper (2008), at 3. 
50 Claude Pilloud (1987), at 512. 
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enforcement actions of police forces (e.g. against insurgents) so that the military forces are 
used.51 
To recognise an armed conflict between a PSF and host government forces or 
organised groups of insurgents, these criteria must be fulfilled. The PSF must act collectively 
and the use of force must reach such level as to exceed what is normally considered law 
enforcement action. However, unlike the use of force against insurgents, which may be 
considered internal affair of the state and where the government can use law enforcement or 
military forces, the use of force against PSF, can be an entirely different action, as they are 
external or foreign forces irrespective the characterisation of armed conflict of international or 
internal nature. 52  This external nature of one of the parties may render irrelevant the 
difference in use of law enforcement and military force and the scale of use of such force. The 
PSFs’ involvement in the armed conflict of any nature may be closer to the definition 
proposed in Tadić for IACs (i.e. “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States”) and occur when the PSFs and another organised armed group resort to 
armed force.53  
The other criterion of collective character of the use of armed force may be more 
important for the situation of PSOs. An individual, unauthorised act of a peacekeeper against 
insurgents or government armed forces cannot make the whole operation participate in the 
armed conflict.54 An act of individual peacekeeper would be his own action and would not 
represent an action of the whole PSO. The situation is different if the whole operation 
                                               
51 See also ICRC Opinion Paper (2008), at 3.  
52 This issue will be discussed further in this Chapter. 
53 Tadić Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 70. See also Christopher Greenwood (1998), at 23, who also 
suggests that if a broad interpretation of the “armed conflict” “were to be applied the activities of [UN] forces, 
then the threshold of armed conflict would be passed as soon as any fighting which went beyond purely sporadic 
acts of violence occurred between the members of the [UN] forces and organised armed forces.” 
54 See also Michael Cottier, “Article 8 para. 2(b)(iii)”, in Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: observers' notes, article by article, (Beck, 2008), at 337.  
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participated in hostilities. This would be a collective action and can be attributed to the PSO 
itself and therefore it may render the UN/TCC a party to the conflict.  
The question is how many peacekeepers must participate in the conflict to represent a 
sufficient indication of PSO’s collective action. The response to this question must not depend 
on the exact number of those who actually used force but on the circumstances where it was 
used. Unauthorised actions of several peacekeepers may not be sufficient. However, if they 
received an order from their superiors to participate in hostilities and to render an attack on 
opposing armed groups, this indicates a collective action as sanctioned by superiors acting on 
behalf of the UN/TCCs. Everything also depends on the position of those superiors in the 
military hierarchy of the particular PSO, namely whether the order was issued by the UNFC 
or by the national contingent commander. The following situations are possible. 
The most straightforward case is where the PSO had a mandate to participate in the 
armed conflict. If they used force against the other party to the conflict in pursuance of their 
mandate, the collective nature of their participation can be presumed. If participation in the 
armed conflict was not explicitly provided for but could be implied from the nature of 
mandate itself or from the scale of hostilities in the territory where the PSFs are deployed, and 
the PSFs in fact participated in hostilities, this may also render the UN/TCC a party to the 
conflict.  
If the mandate is silent about PSFs’ participation in conflict, the characterisation of the 
UN/TCC as party to the conflict depends on the factual situation of the use of force. For 
example, if the UNFC ordered armed force to be used against insurgents or government forces 
and the order was executed, the UN/TCC may be considered a party to the conflict. If there 
was no such order, but his actions were understood by the national contingent commanders as 
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the armed force should be used, this can also amount to the collective action of the PSF and 
its participation in the conflict.  
However, if only one national contingent commander orders the use of force in spite 
of the contrary instructions by the UNFC, it may be difficult to say that the UN becomes a 
party to the conflict. Presumably, if such an order was made and executed only by one 
particular contingent deployed in separate territory from the others and their acts can be 
distinguished from the acts of other PSO contingents, then only a particular TCC of that 
contingent would become involved in the conflict and not other TCCs, because only its armed 
forces acting on the order of the national commander (or on the instructions of TCCs), 
participates in hostilities. However, it is not always possible to distinguish acts of each 
contingent if they act jointly. Then the “coalition” of TCCs/UN as a whole may be considered 
as involved in the conflict. 
If the criterion of collective action has been fulfilled, it is necessary to establish which 
acts amount to participation in armed conflict. As discussed above, the characterisation of a 
situation as an armed conflict requires not only organisation and collective action from the 
parties, but also a degree of intensity of fighting between them. Therefore the level of use of 
force must be sufficiently high to characterise situation as an armed conflict.  
The same is true for an armed confrontation between PSFs and organised armed 
groups, if the existence of the armed conflict in a territory was not recognised before. 
However, for the most part, the PSF are deployed already in the zones of existing armed 
conflicts of international or internal nature. If the armed conflict was already recognised (and 
achieved the necessary level of intensity in case of internal conflicts), the norms of law of 
armed conflict are already applicable there. There is no need to prove again the intensity of 
fighting, if some other forces or groups become another party to the conflict, under the 
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condition that these groups are sufficiently organised and capable of becoming a new party of 
the existing armed conflict. The same may be said about the PSFs that are deployed and start 
to participate in the already existing armed conflict. While the criterion of intensity may be 
used to characterise that conflict as an armed conflict for the application of IHL, there is no 
need to prove the same intensity for the PSFs’ actions for the UN/TCCs to become a separate 
party to that conflict. The PSFs can be considered an organised group with the internal 
hierarchical military structure under responsible command. The fact of their collective 
participation in combat must be enough to render the UN/TCCs a party to the existing armed 
conflict.  
 
ii) How can PSFs participate in an armed conflict? 
The discussion so far concerned the question of how the UN/TCCs may become a 
party to an armed conflict by virtue of the PSFs’ participation in it. It was concluded that the 
criterion of PSFs’ collective participation in the armed conflict is crucial. The next step is to 
analyse what actions of the PSFs can amount to their participation in the armed conflict. This 
issue depends on the question which acts amount to the direct or active participation in 
hostilities.55 This analysis is firstly based on the discussion of direct participation in hostilities 
by civilian population. Further remarks are made regarding the participation of PSFs in 
hostilities. 
According to Dinstein, the term “hostilities” encompasses all types of acts of violence, 
meaning acts that cause injury to human beings (physical or mental harm) or destruction or 
damage to property, subject to two caveats: 1) hostilities exclude acts of violence, committed 
                                               
55 See also Geer-Jan Alexander Knoops, “The transposition of inter-state self-defence and use of force onto 
operational mandates for peace support operations”, in Roberta Arnold,  Law enforcement within the framework 
of peace support operations (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), at 9, who points out that the question of whether and when 
PSFs engaged in combat may run parallel to the question when civilians take directly part in hostilities. 
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by belligerent parties, not related to military operations (law enforcement measure against 
common criminals); 2) hostilities include certain non-violent acts directly connected to 
military operations against the adversary (logistics or gathering intelligence about the 
enemy).56 The Commentary to Article 51(3) API provides that “hostile acts [are] acts which 
by their nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment 
of the armed forces.”57 Almost the same wording was used to describe hostilities by the 
Commentary to Article 43(2) (with inclusion of “acts of war” instead of simply “acts”).58 The 
Commentary to Article 51(3), described “direct” participation in hostilities as “acts of war 
which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and 
equipment of the enemy armed forces.”59  
This difference in wording may lead to different results. If a person does not want to 
cause actual harm to the armed forces by his acts and even unaware that his acts would do that, 
he cannot “intend” to cause actual harm, but his acts (even without awareness of the person) 
may be actually “likely” to cause such harm. This issue was discussed in several ICTY 
judgements. While judgements in Galić and Kordić simply adopted the definition of acts, 
which are “likely” to cause actual harm, 60  without pursuing any discussion, the Strugar 
Appeals Chamber discussed more this issue.61 Having reiterated the version used by Kordić 
Appeals Chamber, the Strugar Appeals Chamber after an extensive analysis adopted the 
definition of participation in hostilities as a participation in the “acts of war which by their 
                                               
56  Dinstein, Yoram, The conduct of hostilities under the law of international armed conflict (Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd, 2010), at 1-2. 
57 Commentary to API, Article 51(3), para. 1942 (emphasis added). 
58 Ibid, Article 43(2), para. 1679. 
59 Ibid, Article 51(3), para. 1944 (emphasis added). 
60 Prosecutor v Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement, (“Galić Trial Judgement”), 5 December 2003, para. 48; 
Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement (“Kordić Appeal Judgement”), 17 
December 2004, para. 51. 
61 Prosecutor v Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgement, (“Strugar Appeal Judgement”), 17 July 2008, paras. 
172-179. 
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nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the 
enemy’s armed forces.”62 
The ICRC Guidance provides for more detailed approach to the definition of “direct 
participation in hostilities” by introducing three conditions to be fulfilled (note that the ICRC 
Guidance cannot be legally binding and constitute more a recommendation by the ICRC to 
the states rather than a compilation of state practice).63 According to it, first element is a 
threshold of harm, meaning that “act must be likely to adversely affect the military 
operations” of a party or to “inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects 
protected against direct attack.”64 Therefore this act can be directed either against military 
objects or personnel of a party to the conflict or against the civilian population or objects. 
However, it seems that the acts against military objects can be less serious (as can only 
“adversely affect” them) than against civilians (where the inflictions of death, injury or 
destruction is required to be proved).  
The second element is a direct causation, where there is a “direct causal link between 
the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part.”65 The third element is a belligerent 
nexus, meaning that “the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.”66  
The latter criterion may be difficult to fulfil for the PSFs. If the PSF uses force against 
one party to the conflict to prevent an armed attack on the military objects of another party to 
the conflict or to stop violence between the parties in order to maintain peace between them, 
                                               
62 Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 178 (emphasis added).  
63 See Nils Melzer, “Direct participation in hostilities: operationalising the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’ Guidance”, 103 American Society of International Law Proceedings 299 (2009), at 306, 301; Pomper, 
Stephen, Remarks to “Direct participation in hostilities: operationalising the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’ Guidance”, 103 American Society of International Law Proceedings 307 (2009), at 307.  
64 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance (2008), at 1016. 
65 Ibid; see also Claude Pilloud (1987), at 516. 
66 Ibid. 
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the use of force may be considered an act likely to adversely affect military operations of the 
first party, but it would not be specifically designed to support one of them in detriment of the 
other. If the PSF directs the attack against a party to the conflict, because it uses prohibited 
means of warfare and commits war crimes, this attack maybe considered as designed to inflict 
harm to the detriment of that party in support of adversary.67 Although the aim of the attack 
seems to be legitimate (to disable the party which commits war crimes), the attack may affect 
the military situation between two parties of the conflict.  
Three criteria envisaged by the ICRC in order to define “direct participation in 
hostilities” cannot be entirely adopted for the situation of PSOs as these criteria apply to 
qualify civilians as directly participating in hostilities. If the PSF does so, it will participate in 
the armed conflict on behalf of either of the parties and not becoming a party by itself. The 
PSF already has the de jure link with the potential party to the conflict (UN/TCCs) and if the 
PSF directly participates in the conflict, the UN/TCCs become a party to it.  
Here the element of collective action/participation is important, otherwise individual 
peacekeeper’s participation may be equated to the participation of individual civilian and all 
the criteria of direct participation of civilians in hostilities need to be fulfilled. However, for 
the collective actions it may not be so. A third party to the conflict do not need to act on 
behalf of both original parties; therefore the belligerent nexus in the sense of civilians’ 
participation in hostilities is not required. Although the ICRC states that regarding civilians’ 
participation when the belligerent nexus is not proved, the acts are not of belligerent nature, 
unless the existence of separate armed conflict is proved,68 this does not mean that the PSF’s 
hostile acts have to reach certain level of intensity required to qualify the situation as an 
                                               
67 See also Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops (2008), at 10, who states that “peacekeepers may be considered as 
taking art in an armed conflict whenever providing causally linked military support to any of the fighting 
forces.” 
68 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance (2008), at 1026. 
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armed conflict. As mentioned above, if the PSF acts in collective way in the territory where 
the armed conflict is already recognised, there is no need to prove the existence of a separate 
armed conflict and they may be considered a third party to the existing armed conflict. 
 
iii) PSFs acting in self-defence 
However, the relaxation of the requirement of belligerent nexus to be proved for the 
participation of PSFs in the armed conflict does not mean that all hostile acts can amount to 
direct participation in hostilities and therefore render the UN/TCCs a party to that conflict. 
There is a category of acts excluded from direct participation in hostilities: acts of individual 
self-defence. They are allowed by ordinary criminal law, and peacekeepers not involved in 
hostilities have the right like every other person to defend themselves by using force provided 
that it does not go beyond reasonable self-defence.69 
The ICRC considers that the act of individual self-defence lacks belligerent nexus.70 In 
the absence of the need to prove the belligerent nexus for PSFs, the self-defence acts must be 
still excluded from the acts of direct participation in hostilities, as it is normally legitimate for 
civilians (who have no right to participate in hostilities) to defend themselves from direct 
attack. Moreover, if we adopt the definition of “direct participation in hostilities” proposed in 
Kordić on the basis of the Commentary to Article 51(3) API (namely, that a person needs to 
participate in the acts of war, which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual 
harm to armed forces), such acts will not include acts of self-defence, as those acts would not 
be intended to cause harm, but would be intended to protect a person (or property) against the 
                                               
69 Arnold, Roberta, “The application of the law of occupation to peace support operations”, in Arnold, Roberta, 
Knoops, Geert-Jan G. J., Practice and policies of modern peace support operations under international law 
Transnational Publishers, 2006), at 94. 
70 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance (2008), at 1016. 
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attack.71 However, the scope of those acts of self-defence for PSOs is not obvious especially 
considering the UN’s position on that. 
Although PSOs can be regarded very important for maintaining peace, this does not 
mean that they are exempt from IHL obligations binding all other states and persons. The 
beginning of their participation in the armed conflict is governed by the same rules as 
applicable to other entities/states (reflected in jus in bello) irrespective of whether they are 
aggressors or victims of aggressions (question of jus ad bellum) as this threshold of 
participation in the armed conflict (under jus in bello) denotes the applicability of the norms 
of humanitarian character and binding nature of those norms to all participants in the armed 
conflict irrespective of the reasons of their participation in it (which may have been 
considered for jus ad bellum).72 As CA2 makes IHL rules applicable to any situation of 
commencement of the hostilities automatically irrespective of whether one party is aggressor 
or the victim, PSO’s status and mandate should not matter for the application of IHL to its 
activities.  
The Preamble to API further reaffirms that GC and API fully apply in all 
circumstances irrespective of nature, origin or which party caused the armed conflict to all 
participating parties. As Commentary to API explains, this confirms that jus ad bellum cannot 
affect jus in bello and IHL applies irrespective of which party was an aggressor.73 Applying 
this principles to the situation of PSO, any arguments about special norms and deviation from 
the norms, which should be applicable to the factual situation of their participation or non-
                                               
71 See also Prosecutor v Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement (“Sesay Trial Judgemnet”), 2 March 
2009, para. 233, where the Chamber considered that the peacekeepers could be considered civilians and not 
combatants till the time they participate in hostilities and their civilians and as with all civilians their protection 
would not cease if they use armed force only in exercising their right to individual self-defence. 
72 See also Robert Kolb (2005), at 181, pointing out that the application of IHL does not depend on legality of 
the operation or its objectives envisaged by the parties, but on the existence of hostilities. To state otherwise is to 
confuse motives of the conflict which are relevant to jus ad bellum and the existence of hostilities covered by jus 
in bello. 
73 See Commentary to the API, Preamble, at 28-29, paras. 30, 32. 
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participation in the armed conflict, because of their international status and their good 
intentions to maintain peace (by using any means), should not be considered as sustainable as 
they would blur the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello for the purposes of 
protection of people and right to self-defence as it is understood in the jus ad bellum 
comparing to the right to self-defence of each individual.  
Similarly, the fact that PSFs’ status or mandate presupposes that PSFs can use force 
only in self-defence does not by itself mean that PSFs would never use force beyond self-
defence as it is understood under IHL and therefore would never participate in hostilities. The 
focus must not be on a particular mandate or status but on the factual circumstances of the use 
of force by PSFs.74 Moreover, the UN claims that the PSF’s right to self-defence extends to 
the use of force to resist any attempts to prevent them from discharging their mandate75 does 
not necessarily mean that such use of force would not be considered participation in 
hostilities.76 As discussed above, the applicability of IHL to a particular situation depending 
on the PSFs’ participation in hostilities and the definition and extent of self-defence exception 
(from such participation) depends on rules jus in bello and not on the status of PSFs. Any 
                                               
74 Even if the PSFs have defensive mandate, it does not mean that they are still acting in self-defence. See Article 
31(1)(c) ICC Statute, which provides that the fact that a person is involved in a defensive operation conducted by 
forces shall not in itself constitute self-defence. 
75 See, for instance, with regard to the UNIFIL, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of 
Security Council resolution 425, 19 March 1978, S/12611, para. 4(d); with regard to the UNEF II, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 340, 27 October 1973, S/11052/Rev.1, 
para. 4(d); with regard to the UNPROFOR, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 10 September 1992, S/24540, para. 9. 
76 See Michael Cottier (2008), at 336, who submits that “self-defence” is used and understood by the UN in its 
application to the PSFs in a substantially broader sense than strict self-defence permitted to protected persons 
under IHL. See also Ola Engdahl, Protection of personnel in peace operations: the role of the 'Safety 
Convention' against the background of general international law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), at 102, who points 
out that the UN interpretation of the UN PSF’s right to self-defence is extensive, as it repeatedly stated that self-
defence includes “resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the 
mandate of the [UNSC].” As PSOs often involve an explicit mandate to protect civilian population, this “further 
blurs the distinction between self-defence and actions taken in an armed conflict.” 
 111 
claims to take into account the PSFs’ mandate or their defensive purpose/nature is not 
relevant for the rules of jus in bello and permitted scope of self-defence under them.77 
Individual or personal self-defence should not be confused with the right of a state to 
self-defence under Article 51 UN Charter. The fact of participation of a person/group in 
hostilities must be established on individual basis. If a person used force in particular 
circumstances, it must further be analysed whether the force was used in individual self-
defence. As the jurisprudence of international courts/tribunals shows, 78  the question of 
participation of a particular person in hostilities, likewise the question whether a person 
exercised individual self-defence for the purposes of ICL, is of jus in bello. The question 
whether a particular armed force was involved in a defensive operation conducted by the state 
exercising legitimate self-defence is governed by the jus ad bellum.79 Given that the ICL 
scope of the right to self-defence is closer to the question of determination of the question of 
civilians’ participation in hostilities because they operate under jus in bello rules, the scope of 
self-defence may be considered in the light of ICL.  
This question could be considered under general or domestic criminal law, however 
that would lead to discrepancies between different terms and categories. ICL being itself 
based on humanitarian law rules would serve a good reflection of the principles of the latter 
and contribute to the interpretation of IHL rules applicable to self-defence exception from 
participation in hostilities. Clearly, the question of self-defence cannot be analysed on the 
basis of the same category under jus ad bellum rules (as explained above) and therefore this 
                                               
77  See also Gadler, Alice, “The protection of peacekeepers and international criminal law: legal challenges and 
broader protection”, 11 German Law Journal 585 (2010), at 591. See also Michael Cottier (2008), at 336, 
considering that PSFs are entitled to use self-defence only to the extent other protected persons are permitted to 
use it under IHL without forgoing the protection they are entitled to as civilians. 
78  See Prosecutor v Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgement, (“Boškoski Appeal 
Judgenment”), 19 May 2010, paras. 44, 51; Commentary to Article 51 AP1, paras. 1927-1928; see also 
Prosecutor v Marić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgement, (“Martić Appeal Judgement”), 8 October 2008, para. 268;  
79 See Commentary to Article 51 AP1, paras. 1927-1928; Boškoski Appeal Judgement, paras. 44, 51; see also 
Kordić Appeal Judgement, para. 812; Kordić Trial Judgement, para. 452. 
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category as enshrined in general or PIL cannot be considered and should be distinguished as 
inapplicable. Therefore the subsequent analysis follows ICL rules applicable to the self-
defence category. 
The application of ICL rules on self-defence to the PSF must be done in the same 
manner as to other civilians to establish whether use of force was used in the scope of the 
right to individual self-defence or goes beyond it and therefore may amount to participation in 
hostilities (if the aforementioned conditions are fulfilled).  
The Kordić Trial Chamber defined the notion of “self-defence” as “a defence to a 
person who acts to defend or protect himself or his property (or another […]) against attack, 
provided that the acts constitute a reasonable, necessary and proportionate reaction to the 
attack.”80 The ICC Statute defines “self-defence” in the same way. 81  To constitute “self-
defence” the acts of a person must be in response to an imminent and unlawful use of force 
directed against protected person/property being reasonable and proportionate to the degree of 
danger to that person/property.82  
Several international courts referred to the scope of permitted self-defence to establish 
whether the peacekeepers can be considered either participating in hostilities and therefore not 
protected by IHL and ICL from the attacks, or used force only in self-defence (if used at all) 
and therefore must be granted protection afforded to civilians.  
In case of UNAMIR, the ICTR Bagosora Trial Chamber considered the status of 
UNAMIR as UN peacekeepers and the fact that they were disarmed and concluded that the 
                                               
80 Prosecutor v Kordić and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement (“Kordić Trial Judgement”), 26 February 2001, 
para. 449. 
81 See ICC Statute, Article 31(1)(c).  
82 See Kordić Trial Judgement, para. 451, ICC Statute, Article 31(1)(c). See further discussion on the inclusion 
of “property” in this definition. See also Onder Bakircioglu, Self-defence in international and criminal law: the 
doctrine of imminence (Routledge, 2011), at 38-39, who states that there are three inherent limitations to the 
right of self-defence: “the act must reasonably believe that there is a present or ‘imminent’ danger of grave 
physical harm, that the use of lethal force is absolutely ‘necessary’ and that the use of lethal force is 
‘proportionate’ toward off the threat.” 
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peacekeepers from the Belgian contingent could not be considered as combatants.83 To come 
to this conclusion, the Chamber enquired to the nature of UNAMIR’s mandate and whether 
they were authorised to use force and weapons only in self-defence.84 However, according to 
their mandate the peacekeepers were able to use weapons, including deadly force, not only to 
exercise personal right to self-defence but also to prevent crimes against humanity. 85 
Although the Chamber relied mostly on the factual circumstance of the use of force by 
peacekeepers, the fact of inclusion in the mandate of a possibility to use force to prevent 
crimes against humanity goes further than the exercise of individual right to self-defence.  
Although the right to self-defence covers also defence of another against an unlawful 
attack, it is confined to the cases of imminent attack and is exercised on the individual basis. 
The possibility of using deadly force to prevent crimes against humanity under the mandate 
can be interpreted broadly and understood in different ways. If peacekeepers use weapons 
against a particular attacker86 to protect a group of civilians from imminent and unlawful 
attack, this can amount to self-defence, but if they use force against other armed forces only 
because they may commit crimes against humanity, this is related to the purpose of 
peacekeeping operation and does not amount to individual self-defence under jus in bello 
rules and is not covered by Article 31(1)(c) ICC Statute, which excludes the situations when a 
person is involved in a defensive operation conducted by force from the scope of self-defence. 
It concerns individual self-defence not collective self-defence, governed by Article 51 UN 
Charter.87  
                                               
83  Prosecutor v Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, (“Bagosora Trial 
Judgement”), 18 December 2008, para. 2175. 
84 Ibid, para. 185. 
85 Ibid. 
86 The use of force in self-defence should be directed against the original attacker with the purpose to repel the 
attack. See Hannah Tonkin, “Defensive force under the Rome Statute”, 6 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 86 (2005), at 104 and 106. 
87 See Kai Ambos, “General principles of criminal law in the Rome Statute”, 10 Criminal Law Forum 1 (1999), 
at 27. 
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In Abu Garda, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber considered the mandate of AMIS 
peacekeepers and factual circumstances of use of force and found that there was no evidence 
to suggest that AMIS personnel took any direct part in hostilities or used force beyond self-
defence.88 Their mandate authorised them to use force in self-defence only in very limited 
circumstances, to protect civilians whom AMIS encounters under imminent threat and in the 
immediate vicinity, and to use force to protect themselves and their installations and 
equipment.89 The mandate drafted in such a way confines the used of force to the cases of 
individual self-defence (or of another person) permitted under ICL. If the peacekeepers in fact 
follow their mandate, they would not be considered as participating in hostilities. 
The SCSL Sesay Trial Chamber, however, approached the problem differently. It 
considered that it is settled law that the concept of self-defence for PSOs includes the “right to 
resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the [PSO] from discharging its duties under the 
mandate of the [UNSC]” and that “the use of force by peacekeepers in self-defence in the 
discharge of their mandate, provided that it is limited to such use, would not alter or diminish 
the protection afforded to peacekeepers.”90 The Chamber referred to UNAMSIL’s mandate to 
use force only in “specific and defined circumstances”, such as to ensure the security of its 
personnel and the freedom of movement of its personnel and to protect civilians under threat 
of physical violence and found that UNAMSIL peacekeepers were prohibited from engaging 
in hostilities under their mandate.91 Comparing the actual use of force with the one permitted 
under their mandate, the Chamber found that the force used by the peacekeepers was not 
beyond their mandate and therefore could not be constructed as taking part in hostilities.92  
                                               
88 Prosecutor v Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (“Abu Garda 
Pre-Trial Decision”), 8 February 2010, paras. 130-131. 
89 Ibid, paras. 115-116. 
90 Sessay Trial Judgement, paras. 228, 233, 1925. 
91 Ibid, paras. 1908 and 1917. 
92 Ibid, para. 1941. 
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Such focus primary on the mandate of the forces and extension of the right to self-
defence to the situations where the PSFs use force against those who prevent them to 
discharge their mandate under the UNSC resolution, disregards the distinction between jus ad 
bellum and just in bello.93 Supposedly the UNSC resolution contained a mandate for the PSF 
to fight against a party to the ongoing conflict, then under such construction, the PSF would 
act in self-defence, if that party tries to prevent them to discharge their mandate under the 
UNSC resolution to fight against them, which seems to be absurd. Therefore the focus must 
not be on the fact that PSFs use force in discharging their mandate, but on whether they in fact 
use force (complying with that mandate or not) in the scope of self-defence, in the way it is 
understood in ICL.  
For the application of self-defence to PSFs’ acts, it should be further analyse to what 
extent they can use force to protect their property. The inclusion of property and not only 
persons protected by violent acts in the exercise of the right to self-defence can be 
problematic. The Kordić Trial Chamber mentioned protected property following definition of 
“self-defence” provided in Article 31(1)(c) ICC Statute, allowing a person to defend himself 
or another person and in case of war crimes, a property “which is essential for the survival of 
the person or another person” or “for accomplishing a military mission.”94 Although Article 
31(1)(c) may be regarded as constituting to a large extent CIL,95 the inclusion of clause about 
the lawful defence of property may not sufficiently reflect a customary rule.96 The defence of 
property, which is essential for the survival of the person/another person, due to its 
indiscriminate scope of application, seems to extend not only to civilian property but also to 
                                               
93 See also Marco Sassòli, “The role of human rights and international humanitarian law in new types of armed 
conflicts”, in Orna Ben-Naftali, International humanitarian law and international human rights law: pas de deux, 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), at 43. 
94 ICC Statute, Article 31(1)(c), Kordić Trial Judgement, paras. 450-451. 
95 Kordić Trial Judgement, para. 451; Antonio Cassese, International criminal law (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed., 2008), at 261. 
96 Antonio Cassese (2008), at 261. 
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military equipment. Moreover, the provision explicitly mentions the property which is 
essential for “accomplishing a military mission”.97  
The question is whether peacekeepers are permitted to act in self-defence, when using 
force to protect the property, attack on which would otherwise amount to an international 
crime. The ICC Statute makes a war crime “intentionally directing attacks against personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles” involved in PSOs “as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict.”98 The inclusion of installations, materials and vehicles (apart from personnel) in the 
list of the objects protected against the attack may mean that peacekeepers using force to 
protect their property may be considered as acting in self-defence. The prohibition of attack 
on these objects might not protect the property itself but personnel who may be harmed by 
that attack while remaining in installations or vehicles. A more general word “property” 
(essential for the mission or the survival of peacekeepers) was not mentioned in the provision. 
The clause about the entitlement to the protection given to civilians/civilian objects confirms 
that peacekeepers may have no more/no less protection against a direct attack as 
civilians/civilian objects have.  
The Convention on the safety of UN and associated personnel criminalises intentional 
attacks upon the personnel or liberty of UN or associated personnel and also “a violent attack 
upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means of transportation of any 
[UN] or associated personnel likely to endanger [their] person or liberty.”99 Therefore the 
attack not on the PSO’s property itself is a crime, but only when the attack on that property 
                                               
97 The inclusion of the property, which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, appeared to be a very 
controversial issue, which provoke a considerable debate. The discussion on this issue falls beyond the scope of 
this thesis. For further discussion on this issue see Antonio Cassese (2008), at 261-262; Kai Ambos (1999), at 
26-27. 
98  ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) for international armed conflicts and (e)(iii) for non-international armed 
conflicts. 
99 Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel (“UN Safety Convention”), Article 
9(1)(a) and (b). 
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can endanger peacekeepers’ life or liberty. Therefore, the peacekeepers using force to protect 
themselves or these objects can be considered acting in self-defence. 
 
iv) Other criteria of PSFs’ participation in hostilities 
However the fact that peacekeepers used force beyond self-defence does not 
necessarily mean that they actively participated in hostilities and that IHL immediately 
applies to them. If peacekeepers used force disproportionately but their actions do not qualify 
as participation in hostilities according to the analysis below (and therefore IHL does not 
apply), their actions must be justified under rules of IHRL and criminal law and not under 
IHL,100 which provides for combatant privilege and applies the notion of military necessity to 
justify collateral damage.  
As discussed above, the definition of participation in hostilities presupposes that there 
are certain hostile acts which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to 
the personnel or equipment of the enemy’s armed forces.101 What is important is not only that 
certain acts are hostile acts likely to adversary affect the position of a party to the conflict, but 
that they were specifically done with intention to harm that party to the conflict and not just 
happened to harm other party, therefore persons who performed the hostile acts intended to be 
in conflict with the other party. The fact that those persons did not want to have open, large 
scale confrontation with the other party does not mean that they did not intend to harm the 
other party by their actions. Any reasons (even legitimate) advanced to justify the intention to 
harm the party must not affect the determination of the matter.  
                                               
100 McLaughlin, Rob, “The legal status applicable to use of lethal force when operating under a United Nations 
Security Council Chapter VII mandate authorised “all necessary means”, 12 Journal of Conflict & Security 389 
(2007), at 396-397. 
101 See discussion in Chapter III, section 1 (b). 
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For a TCC to become a party to the ongoing conflict, its contingent needs to perform 
certain hostile acts, which are likely to adversely affect a party to the ongoing conflict and are 
intended to cause harm to personnel or equipment of that party. The intention to harm a party 
to the conflict needs to come from a national commander of a particular contingent (to render 
the TCC a party to the conflict) or from the UNFC (or other UN organs). In the latter case, the 
UN becomes a party to the conflict together with the respective TCC.  
The intention can be evident from different factors, but primarily from the nature of 
the PSO’s mandate under the UNSC resolution. If the PSO’s mandate is to use force against a 
particular party to the conflict (even if pursuant to the legitimate reasons), this is a direct 
indication of the intention to cause harm to that party and to be in conflict with it. If the 
UNSC resolution does not provide a mandate to use force against a particular party, but 
envisages the use of force in certain circumstances, the analysis shifts to the actual situation 
on the ground. If the PSF uses force directed against a party to the conflict with intention to 
cause harm to it (even if this party was not mentioned in the UNSC resolution), the PSF can 
be considered participating in the armed conflict. Forceful disarmament may provide one of 
such examples. If a PSF is mandated to use all necessary means (i.e. including use of force) to 
disarm parties to the conflict, and in fact it uses substantive amount of force to disarm a party 
and the situation leads to the fighting, the PSF can be considered as participating in hostilities.  
Acts of pure self-defence and defence of others may not amount to the participation in 
hostilities because the intention to harm a party to the conflict will lack. Supposedly, a 
contingent (which is under the mandate not to use force against a particular party to the 
conflict), is attacked by a party to the conflict (an armed group) and responds in self-defence 
against the attack. Its response is necessary and proportionate. The PSF cannot be considered 
participating in hostilities for the purposes of IHL, as it does not intend to cause harm to the 
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armed group, but simply defend its personnel or equipment. If the PSF responds 
disproportionately to the attack: both alternatives are still possible. They may be considered as 
participating in hostilities if they used the right to exercise self-defence as a pretext to inflict 
actual harm to the group. They can be considered being in conflict with the group. If, however, 
the excessive use of force was not because of a hidden intention to harm the armed group but 
because of circumstances of the attack or simple negligence from the part of the commander 
or soldiers, then they may not be considered participating in the conflict with the group.  
Another more difficult scenario is when the PSF protects not only themselves from the 
attack, but also civilians from violence of armed groups. The right to exercise self-defence 
applies also when they protect the others from imminent violence. In this case, everything 
depends on the particular circumstances. If the peacekeepers use force to protect civilians 
from attacking armed groups and use only necessary and proportionate force to achieve this 
result, they cannot be considered as participating in hostilities. However, if the PSF attacks 
armed groups pre-emptively because those groups have committed violence against civilians 
in the past and may do so in the future, but there is no actual threat of violence against 
civilians at particular moment, this may be indicative for the intent to harm a party to the 
conflict. The criterion of imminence of the attack (or use of force) acquires particular 
importance.  
The intention to cause harm to the armed group and be in conflict with it does not 
necessarily mean that this intention will be present during the time when the operation is 
completed. If the intention to cause harm is present during series of subsequent operations 
(where the force is used), it is indicative to an existing pattern of the PSF’s involvement in the 
conflict with an armed group. The PSF can be considered participating in the conflict with 
that group for continuous period of time during which those operations last. Therefore the 
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PSF will be a party to the conflict not only during a particular operation but also in the 
intermediate period between those operations, when the active hostilities are present, because 
the intention to cause harm to the adverse party is present during the whole period of 
continuing armed operations, even if at certain point there is a break between them. This 
intent can be also evident from the PSF’s mandate or from the UNFC‘s orders/instructions.  
Therefore for IHL to apply to the PSF, it is necessary to consider the mandate 
provided by the UNSC, UNFC’ of UN’s orders in relation to the use of force during the PSO. 
They may or may not indicate intention to cause harm to the adverse party to the conflict. It is 
further necessary to look at particular circumstances, when the force was used. If it was used 
in the series of operations, IHL may apply to the whole period of involvement of the PSF in 
the conflict. If it was used only randomly, IHL may apply only during those operations, 
provided that the force was not used only in self-defence.  
 
2. IHL  framework applicable to PSO 
 
A) The status of the peacekeepers in IHL 
The status of the forces deployed for enforcement action where the use of force is 
permitted, is not difficult to determine. They are considered armed forces of the foreign state 
involved in the armed conflict and therefore they would be combatants under Article 4 
GCIII/Article 43 API. However the status of the UN PSFs mandated to maintain peace using 
force only in self-defence is less clear. As discussed above, factual situation of their 
participation in the armed conflict rather then a definition of their mandate should be 
considered.  
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IHL divide persons into two groups: combatants (or members of armed forces of the 
party to the conflict) and non-combatants, including some members of the armed forces 
(chaplains, medical personnel and those hors de combat) and all civilians.102 If peacekeepers 
are not combatants, the question is which category of non-combatants they can belong to. The 
peacekeepers might also be considered civilians under IHL.103  
The difficulty with considering them ordinary civilians lies in their connection with 
the UN and TCC, because PSFs can be considered their de jure or de facto armed forces. 
Under the preliminary view, such forces of external or foreign entities present in the territory, 
where the armed conflict is going on, should be regarded as combatants. However, if they are 
not participating in hostilities, the UN/TCC will not be a party to the conflict. That means that 
the PSFs’ connection with the UN/TCCs is of no relevance for their status (unless their 
mandate is an enforcement action). They will be neutral nationals to the existing parties to the 
conflict (they are not nationals of one of the parties to the conflict because otherwise would 
undermine their impartiality as UN international force). They will be civilians of neutral states 
with the norms of IHL applicable to them under such status. 104  Moreover, they will be 
protected by the UN Safety Convention, if the host state is a party to this convention.105 The 
ICRC also states that PSFs, who are professional soldiers, are treated as civilians, as long as 
they are not taking direct part in hostilities, because they are not members of a party to the 
conflict and are entitled to the same protection against attack as that of civilians.106 
                                               
102 Leslie C. Green (1993), at 85-86. 
103 It can be pointed out that apart from members of the armed forces of the party to the conflict, everybody 
physically present in a territory in a civilian. See Claude Pilloud (1987), at 511. 
104 Neutral nations in the territory of a party to the conflict enjoy the same rights granted to protected persons 
under GCIV, but if their home state maintains normal diplomatic representation in that territory, they remain 
under diplomatic protection. See Leslie C. Green (1993), at 264. See also Walter Gary Sharp (1996), at 123, 
pointing out that “the armed forces of states not a party to the conflict operating in areas of armed conflict are 
protected persons under [GCIV] and are not lawful targets.” See also Paolo Benvenuti (1995), at 118. 
105 See further the discussion on the exact application of this convention. 
106 ICRC, Jean-Marie Henckaerts et al. (2005), at 112. 
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However, if PSFs take direct part in hostilities, this will render the UN/TCCs a party 
to the armed conflict. Under Article 4 GCIII/Article 43 API they can be considered 
combatants.107 Consequently, their status will change from civilians to combatants. One may 
argue, nevertheless, that according to their mandate of non-use-of-force, they still should be 
considered non-combatants. Two objections to this can be put forward.  
Firstly, their mandate and reasons for their participation in the armed conflict should 
not affect the factual situation of application of IHL to the parties of that conflict, namely, any 
legitimate use of force in jus ad bellum should not affect equal application of the jus in bello 
norms to the parties of the conflict.108 Secondly, although the armed forces of the party to the 
conflict may consist of combatants or non-combatants (besides medical and religious 
personnel having special status), for the purposes of IHL, the fact that their states’ internal law 
prohibits some of the members of armed force from participation in hostilities, will not mean 
that such non-combatants under the internal law would receive the protection given to 
civilians by IHL.109 All members of armed forces are combatants for the purposes of military 
                                               
107 See also Richard D. Glick (1995-1996), at 106, who also considers that if the UN forces engage in armed 
conflict, the UN qualifies as a “party to armed conflict” under IHL and its troops become “combatants” under 
IHL. See also Worster, William Thomas, “Immunities of United Nations Peacekeepers in the Absence of a 
Status of Forces Agreement”, 47 Military Law and the Law of War Review 3 (2008), at 316. 
108  See also Benvenuti, Paolo, “The implementation of international humanitarian law in the framework of 
United Nations peace-keeping operations”, in Commission of the European Communities, Law in humanitarian 
crises Vol. 1: How can international humanitarian law be made effective in armed conflicts? (Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1995), at 90; ICRC opinion (29.10.2010). See also Okimoto, 
Keiichiro, “Violations of international humanitarian law by United Nations forces and their legal consequences”, 
6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 199 (2003), at 208, who points out that whether or not UN forces 
are authorised to use force is a matter of jus ad bellum (and it is for the UNSC to decide), but whether or not IHL 
applies is a matter of jus in bello and is guided by the factual existence of an armed conflict in the battlefield. 
Rachel Opie (2003), at 25, also considers that there should not be any exception for the PSOs to qualify them as 
combatants, otherwise any such exception would jeopardise the principle of the equal application of IHL. She 
further argues that any such argument “fails to take account the fact that no matter what the moral justification 
for conflict is, all conflicts have broadly the same effects and thus need to be regulated in all circumstances.” 
This argument is also in line with the general construction and wording of the SG’s Bulletin. 
109 See ICRC Interpretive Guidance (2008), at 1011; Dieter Fleck (2008), at 99.  
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attack. Therefore the general distinction made in Article 3 HR that the armed forces consist of 
combatants and non-combatants, is no longer used.110 The same applies by analogy to PSFs.  
The S-G’s Bulletin is in line with this interpretation of PSFs’ status. According to 
Section 1 it applies both to enforcement actions and to peacekeeping operations (when the use 
of force is only permitted in self-defence), “when in the situations of armed conflict they are 
actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their 
engagement.”111 However it does not affect the status of members of peacekeeping operations 
as non-combatants, “as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the 
international law of armed conflict.” 112  This means that peacekeeping forces (even with 
mandate to use force in self-defence only) may be considered combatants, if they are actively 
engaged in armed conflict (the bulletin applies to them), or if they do not participate in the 
conflict. The existence of the bulletin should not mean that they are regarded as combatants, 
so that they retain their status of non-combatants being entitled to the protection given civilian. 
The application of the bulletin and the PSFs’ status depend on their participation in the armed 
conflict. 
The UN Safety Convention clearly applies to the UN operations conducted under UN 
authority and control.113 However it does not apply when the UN operation is authorised by 
the UNSC as an enforcement action under Chapter VII UN Charter “in which any of the 
personnel are engaged as combatants against organised armed forces and to which the law of 
IAC applies.”114 This provision can be interpreted that the convention protects UN operations 
depending on their mandate and not on the factual situation of involvement of the forces in 
the armed conflict.  
                                               
110 Claude Pilloud (1987), at 515. 
111 The SG’s Bulletin, Section 1, para. 1.1. 
112 Ibid, para. 1.2. 
113 Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel, 1994, Article 1(c) and Article 2(1). 
114 Ibid, Article 2(2).  
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The convention assumes that the UN forces authorised under Chapter VII as an 
enforcement action (where the use of force is presumably permitted) are combatants for the 
purposes of IHL. It gives protection to the forces under UN authority and control without 
mentioning any conditions on their factual non-use of force and non-participation in the 
armed conflict. This distinction is not based on factual situation on the ground important for 
the application of IHL. It does not take into account that the operations not established under 
Chapter VII may become involved in hostilities and use of force beyond self-defence and 
therefore become subject to IHL. 115 The operations established under Chapter VII will not 
necessarily use force beyond self-defence. The mere fact that the operation is authorised and 
controlled by the UN will protect UN forces by the convention from the attack even though 
they factually may be combatants under IHL.  
The convention, however, contains a saving clause that it does not affect the protection 
of UN operations under IHL and IHRL and the responsibility of UN personnel to respect such 
law and standards.116 The first phrase can mean that the UN forces already having civilian 
protection would not lose it on the application of the convention. The latter phrase implies 
that the application of the convention would not discharge UN forces from responsibility to 
observe IHL/IHRL. However, it does not mean that the responsibility of UN forces to observe 
IHL indicates that the UN-controlled forces may have a combatant status. It seems that the 
convention assumes that due to their mandate the forces under UN authority and control are 
not combatants (irrespective any factual situation) and therefore they are protected against any 
attack.  
In fact there may be situations where the UN-controlled forces not authorised by the 
UNSC as an enforcement action, participate in the armed conflict. As discussed above, that 
                                               
115 Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 169. 
116 UN Safety Convention, Article 20(a). 
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would render them combatants under IHL. The UN Safety Convention can still apply 
according to its scope of application. The UN forces as combatants would receive protection 
against an attack from adverse party, whereas the adverse party would not. This would violate 
the principle of equality of parties of the conflict and “combatants privilege”.117  
The UN Safety Convention is not a part of IHL and cannot change the status of UN 
forces participating in hostilities from combatants to civilians. As Bouvier submits, “the 
convention must be regarded as coming under jus ad bellum, which absolutely prohibits 
attacks on [UN] forces, not under jus in bello”, and such prohibition of attacks on UN 
personnel “does not preclude such personnel from the coverage – or from obligations – of 
[IHL] if that prohibition is violated.”118 Even if it could do the, that would lead to more 
serious consequences, such as UN forces becoming unlawful combatants (comparing to 
civilians participating in hostilities), loss of combatant privilege and possible prosecution for 
the conduct of hostilities and loss of most safeguards in the event of capture (except for the 
protection of the UN Safety Convention). Moreover, it is questionable whether the UN Safety 
Convention with its broad scope of application reflects CIL.119 It does not have even close to 
universal number of ratifications from states and therefore could be potentially applied in very 
limited cases of deployment of UN operations.120 Even the provisions of the ICC Statute 
provide that an attack against peacekeepers is a war crime, only so where they are entitled to 
the protection given to the civilians by IHL.121 No such condition is mentioned in the scope of 
application of the Convention. 
                                               
117 See Rachel Opie (2003), at 22, who states that “this approach differs from IHL, where there is no distinction 
made between types of combatants on the basis of the nature of the authorisation for the operation; [i]t is rather 
lawful to attack a person on the basis of his combatant status.”  
118 Antoine Bouvier, “Safety of United Nations personnel ‘Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel’: presentation and analysis”, International Review of the Red Cross 638 (1995), at 664. 
119 See, for instance, Ola Engdahl (2007), at 213, 292, 294, 306, 321. 
120 See Keiichiro Okimoto (2005), 215-216 in this regard. 
121 ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) and (e)(iii). 
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In practice, the UN Safety Convention will apply to UN-controlled forces participating 
in the armed conflict (notwithstanding their mandate) in such a way as to provide them with 
protection from attack by the government forces of a particular state-party to that 
Convention.122 It will not bind states-non-parties. It will not bind the non-state organised 
groups with whom UN forces may be engaged in hostilities. Although such groups may be 
bound by the national norms and prosecuted under national law for the attacks on 
peacekeepers, if the state made it a crime under national law (according to Article 9), 
everything would depend on the state actions which may not be able to fulfill all its 
obligations under the Convention because of being in situation of armed conflict with those 
groups. Therefore the UN Safety Convention will have limited scale of application for the 
protection of the UN forces. If it protects them, other parties to the conflict may be put in 
disadvantage in relation to the UN forces as they are not able to attack adversary combatants 
(UN forces involved in hostilities) lawfully and use their “combatant privilege”.123 Given such 
consequences, it is reasonable if the UN Safety Convention and IHL are mutually exclusive: 
the former regime applies to non-conflict situations, whereas the latter one applies to any 
situation where the existence of armed conflict is recognised and the UN forces will be 
protected only when they are not acting as combatants.124 
 
 
                                               
122 See Rachel Opie (2003), at 23. However, some authors think (and consider that it was an intention of the 
drafters) that the UN Safety Convention will cease to apply when the UN forces are in fact engaged in combat, 
even if according to their mandate, they do not fall in the exclusion category of forces (namely those which were 
created as an enforcement action under Chapter VII). See, for instance, Keiichiro Okimoto (2005), at 215; Ray 
Murphy (2003), at 182-183; 186; Marten Zwanenburg (2000), at 22. 
123  See Marten Zwanenburg, “The Secretary-General’s bulletin on observance by United Nations forces of 
international humanitarian law: a pyrrhic victory?” 39 The military law and law of war review 15 (2000), at 22; 
Rachel Opie (2003), at 23. As Murphy also submits, such a situation could undermine the GC, “which rely in 
part for their effectiveness on all forces being treated equally, [and] if it became a crime to engage in combat 
with the [UN] forces acting as combatants, this could have a dramatic impact on other parties willingness to 
adhere to accepted principles of humanitarian law” (Ray Murphy (2003), at 183). 
124 Ray Murphy (2003), at 185-186; Marten Zwanenburg (2000), at 21. 
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B) Nature of the armed conflict with participation of PSF 
Although in recent years a clear distinction between customary norms applicable to 
IAC and non-international armed conflicts (“NIAC”) has become blurred and there is a 
tendency to disregard the differences between the two regimes, 125  it is still necessary to 
analyse whether such a conflict is international or internal to delineate the precise scope of 
norms of the law of armed conflict applicable to PSFs. No doubt if PSFs participate in the 
armed conflict occurring between two/more state, this conflict is international.126 It is more 
difficult to qualify an armed conflict, in which PSFs get involved and which is initially of 
internal character.  
As discussed above, PSFs represent the UN/TCCs as a party to the conflict. Therefore 
PSFs cannot be considered as an organised non-governmental group participating in an armed 
conflict. PSFs would represent a foreign actor becoming involved in the internal armed 
conflict.127 Moreover, as the UN is subject of international law, the conflict which PSFs 
involve in against another subject of international law is covered by the international 
regime.128 In this way PSFs may internationalise the armed conflict.129  
For the situations of internationalised armed conflict, it is common to divide a single 
conflict into different armed conflicts.130 The exact norms of IHL applicable to the parties 
depend on who their adversaries are. Initial parties to the conflict will still be in NIAC 
                                               
125 Theodor Meron, “The humanisation of humanitarian law”, 94 American Journal of International Law 239 
(2000), at 261; Lindsay Moir, The law of internal armed conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 51; 
Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 182. 
126 See CA2 to the GC. 
127 Greenwood considers that “under customary law, it is not a precondition of the existence of an international 
armed conflict that all the parties must be states, although it is necessary that they possess some kind of 
international status, at least de facto.” (Christopher Greenwood (1998), at 7). 
128 Marten Zwanenburg (2005), at 184. 
129  See Jelena Pejic, “Status of armed conflicts”, in Wilmshurst, Elizabeth, Breau, Susan Carolyn, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law., Perspectives on the ICRC study on customary international 
humanitarian law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 92. 
130 See, for instance, ICRC (2011), at 33; Bierzanek, Remigiusz, « Quelques remarques sur l’applicabilité sur 
droit international humanitaire des conflits armés aux conflits internes internationalisés »,  Swinarski, Christophe, 
Pictet, Jean, International Committee of the Red Cross, Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et 
sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l'honneur de Jean Pictet (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), at 285. 
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between them.131 If the foreign state acts on behalf of insurgents, against governmental armed 
forces, this conflict between the foreign state and the government is international as involves 
two states.132 However, if the foreign state acts on behalf of the government against insurgents, 
the conflict between them is regarded as NIAC, because the foreign state literally acts against 
a non-state actor, rather than against another state and two states are not in conflict with each 
other.133  
It may be possible to apply the same logic to the participation of PSFs in NIAC 
regarding them as a foreign state. And some authors argue for this.134 However this reasoning 
would not take into account a specific nature of PSFs and of their involvement in armed 
conflict.  
There may be different situations of involvement of PSFs in the armed conflict. PSFs 
may act/use force in favour of opposition group(s) against governmental forces pursuant to 
their mandate, for example, when the government represents a dictatorship regime and 
commits grave human rights violations. They may also act in favour of the governmental 
forces against insurgents and help the government to restore its control and public order in its 
territory. In these situations the PSFs’ participation in hostilities against either of them may be 
qualified according to the aforementioned rules of IAC/NIAC. 
However because of special nature of PSOs, the situations where they participate in 
the armed conflict may not be clear-cut. PSFs participating in the armed conflict may not act 
on behalf of either party to the existing armed conflict. If they use force to fulfill their 
mandate which does not provide for the aim to defeat one party of the conflict in favour of 
                                               
131 See Nicaragua case, para. 219; Remigiusz Bierzanek (1984), at 285. 
132 Remigiusz Bierzanek (1984), at 285; see also Jelena Pejic (2007), at 92, who states that “there is generally no 
dissent ether in jurisprudence or in doctrine that third state intervention in a civil war  on the side of the rebels 
against a government gives rise to an international armed conflict between the states in question.” 
133 See Lindsay Moir (2002), at 51, see also Jelena Pejic (2007), at 92; Remigiusz Bierzanek (1984), at 285.  
134 See, for instance, Jelena Pejic (2007), at 94. 
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another one, they are not acting on behalf of one party to the conflict. They act on the basis of 
the UN mandate and therefore their participation in that armed conflict makes the UN/TCCs a 
separate (third) party to that conflict.135 Therefore in the potential situation of a NIAC, the 
PSFs’ participation means that there are at least three parties to that conflict: governmental 
authorities of the host state, armed organised group (or groups), and UN/TCCs represented by 
the PSFs. In this situation the PSFs would not be considered acting against or on behalf of 
particular party to the conflict and therefore the normal rules of application of IHL in 
internationalised armed conflict would not fully apply in such situations. A further question is, 
however, what rules will then apply. 
As PSFs represent foreign actors (UN/TCCs), in a situation where they use force 
against governmental forces (even without support to opposition groups), the rules of IAC 
apply between them.136 Both parties must respect all the provisions of IHL applicable in this 
type of conflicts vis-à-vis each other.  
A more difficult situation is where the PSFs use force against insurgents or organised 
non-state groups (and not acting on behalf of the government). In this case the foreign status 
of PSFs must also play a major role. As discussed above, they would not act in support/on 
behalf of the governmental forces. As a foreign third party, they are expected to respect the 
IHL norms applicable to IAC, because their actions cannot be compared with the actions of 
governmental forces dealing with the internal situation of fighting against insurgents. They do 
not act in the territory of their national state but of a foreign state and do not act to help that 
foreign state to suppress the opposing groups. Therefore their relations with those groups 
cannot be considered internal but rather of an international nature. The applicable IHL norms 
must also be of international nature. Some authors also support this conclusion, arguing that 
                                               
135 See Finn Seyersted (1966), at 213-214. 
136 See, mutatis mutandis, Nicaragua case, para. 219. 
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when PSFs engage in armed conflict with irregular armed forces, the conflict between the UN 
and rebel forces is IAC and respective norms of IHL apply.137  
Therefore in the circumstances of fighting between governmental forces and 
opposition groups, where the PSFs may become involved, it is for the PSFs to apply the full 
list of IHL provisions applicable to IAC to both parties, if they are not acting in support/on 
behalf of the government in suppressing opposition groups.  
 
C) Applicability of the law of occupation to the situation of PSO 
 
i) Circumstances triggering the application of the law of occupation 
The GC, containing IHL norms applicable to the situations of occupation, do not 
provide for a definition of occupation. For such a definition one needs to refer Article 42 HR, 
proving that “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of 
the hostile army” and such occupation “extends only to the territory where such authority has 
been established and can be exercised.” As the ICJ stated, it must be proved that the military 
forces were not only stationed in particular locations of the territory of another state, but also 
that they had substituted their own authority for that of the territorial state.138 Two criteria 
must be fulfilled: the presence of the hostile army in the territory of another state and the 
ability and actual exercise of the authority by that army.  
There is no requirement that there must be a certain degree of fighting between the 
“hostile” army and the governmental forces. Moreover, as CA2 provides, occupation may 
                                               
137  Richard D. Glick (1995-1996), at 90; Keiichiro Okimoto (2005), at 211; Ray Murphy (2003), at 184. 
Seyersted points out that as long as the UN forces pursue independent aims from the host government or act as 
an independent force which takes its orders from the organisation and not from the host government, any armed 
conflict occurring between the UN force and non-state organised groups cannot be considered of an internal 
nature. See Finn Seyersted (1966), at 213. 
138 Congo case, para. 173. 
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exist even when it meets with no armed resistance. The question further arises whether the 
“hostile army” means the armed forces of any foreign state appearing in the territory of 
another state or both states must be in the state of armed conflict and be therefore adversaries 
before the law of occupation applies.  
The construction of CA2 supports the former proposition. It firstly mentions that the 
GC apply to the situations of armed conflict between two High Contracting Parties, then 
stating that the GC also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
Party without making a connection with the existence of an armed conflict between two 
parties mentioned in the previous paragraph. The semi-official ICRC Commentary to the GC 
states that the paragraph concerning occupation does not refer to cases where the territory is 
occupied during hostilities, because then the Convention would have been in force since the 
outbreak of hostilities; it only refers to cases where the occupation has taken place without 
hostilities or declaration of war.139 Therefore for GCIV it is irrelevant whether occupying 
armed forces are “hostile” or not.  
The question is whether the occupation may exist where the territorial state explicitly 
or implicitly consented to the presence of foreign forces in its territory. The notion of pacific 
occupation can be relevant. Academic opinion supports the existence of such type of 
occupation.140 It is also supported by the terms of GCIV, and in particular CA2, which applies 
not only to the occupations arising from the armed conflict, but also in other case of 
                                               
139 Commentary to CA2, para. 2, at 21. 
140 As Kwakwa submits, “if occupation is a result of an invitation from, or agreement with, the state to which the 
territory belongs, the occupation is regarded as a pacific one,” but it still remains an occupation. (Edward 
Kwakwa (1992), at 46-47; see also Yutaka Arai, The law of occupation: continuity and change of international 
humanitarian law, and its interaction with international human rights law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 
at 41). Roberts considers that in the situations where the host government invited foreign troops for taking over 
important administrative functions in the host state, “the result may be so similar to a foreign occupation that it 
might reasonably be so viewed and the law on occupations might reasonably be regarded as applicable.” 
(Roberts, Adam, “What is a Military Occupation?”, 55 British Yearbook of International Law 249 (1985), at 
278). 
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occupation, even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance. 141  GCIV covers the 
relationship between foreign forces, present on particular foreign territory and a local 
population which could arise either in context of the existence of an armed conflict 
(belligerent occupation) or where no armed conflict existed (non-belligerent occupation), 
including occupations by agreement (pacific occupation).142  
One of the reasons for this is that as GCIV contains important general rules for the 
protection of civilians from a foreign military power in whose hands they are, these rules must 
be faithfully observed irrespective of whether the situation is designated as an “occupation” or 
something else.143 Accordingly, the focus is on the factual needs to protect civilian population 
and to apply certain rules of GCIV to them, rather than on the recognition or definition by 
parties of that situation as an “occupation”. 
It seems logical to disregard the importance of the consent from the territorial state as 
long as it can be proved that the authority of the territorial state was substituted by the 
authority of the foreign armed forces as in this case it would assume responsibility for the 
people and territory which it occupies irrespective of whether the territorial state voluntarily 
provided such authority to the armed forces of another state. The issue of authority exercised 
over population is more important rather than the issue of consent. The exercise of authority 
by the foreign armed forces over population distinguishes the situations of occupation from 
simple stationing of foreign armed forces by agreement. In the latter situation the law of 
                                               
141 See Adam Roberts (1985), at 274. 
142  See Michael Kelly (1999), at 227, who also argues that GCIV was “part of an attempt by the 1949 
Conventions to overlook some of the finer points of legal debate on the application of the laws of war and to 
concentrate instead on the factual circumstances where the need for regulation arises.” 
143 Adam Roberts (1985), at 279. 
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occupation does not apply.144 The stationing armed forces do not substitute the territorial state 
authority with their authority over a part or the whole territory of the host state.145  
 
ii) Application of the law of occupation during an armed conflict 
The previous discussion concerned the question of when the law of occupation starts 
to apply irrespective of the existence of the armed conflict, as an alternative to it under CA2. 
Another question is in what circumstances the particular provisions of GCIV on the 
occupation (for instance, contained in Section III GCIV) since the outbreak of hostilities 
become applicable. The circumstances of their application do not necessarily coincide with 
the circumstances when a general application of all GC is triggered.  
The “occupation” provisions remain an integral part of GCIV and therefore must be 
analysed in its context. Any finding of the application of the “occupation” provisions in a 
broader context within the framework of GCIV does not change the previous analysis of 
application of the GC and IHL to the particular situations under CA2, namely when there is an 
armed conflict or where there is an occupation without armed conflict. Therefore the 
following analysis refers to the obligations of the parties under the law of occupation, when 
GCIV is found to be already applicable.  
There are two possible interpretations of “occupation”. The stricter approach closely 
follows the text of Article 42 HR which would apply to the situations where a party to the 
conflict is in a position to exercise the authority over the territory to be able to discharge all 
                                               
144 See Adam Roberts (1985), at 298. 
145 Roberts argues that there may be specific circumstance, which might trigger the application of the law of 
occupation, such when the stationing agreement was achieved through duress against the host state, or the 
agreement was concluded after an invasion and occupation had already begun, or where the foreign forces, 
whose functions were initially presented as limited, come to exercise much more extensive powers. See Adam 
Roberts (1985), at 398. 
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the obligations imposed by the law of occupation.146 Under this approach the responsibilities 
of the occupying army under the law of occupation depends on the actual control it is capable 
to exercise over particular territory.147  
Such approach is followed by some military manuals. 148  According to the British 
Military Manual the state of occupation is recognised if “the former government has been 
rendered incapable of publicly exercise its authority in that area” and “the occupying power is 
in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the former government.”149 Accordingly, 
the law of occupation applies to the territory where the territorial government cannot exercise 
the authority, but the foreign armed forces stationing on such territory are capable to do that, 
as that territory is under their control.  
Under this strict approach the rules of occupation would not apply during the invasion 
phase and in battle areas,150 because in the areas of battle the authority may not be established 
or exercised. Therefore, no GCIV provisions concerning occupation would apply during this 
stage. This approach, however, does not consider the protective nature of GCIV towards 
civilian population and the fact that some of the provisions related to the law of occupation 
may become relevant even before the authority of the occupying party was established and 
can be exercised.  
Another less restrictive approach to the interpretation of occupation can be adopted. It 
focuses on the authority and control not over the territory but over the protected persons 
falling in hands of the adverse party.151 This interpretation is provided in the Commentary to 
                                               
146 See ICRC, Official Statement (2005), section 1.  
147  See Zwanenburg, Marten, “Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the law of 
occupation”, 86 International Review of the Red Cross 745 (2004), at 748, who argues for this approach; see also 
Green, Leslie C., The contemporary law of armed conflict (Manchester University Press, 1993), at 247; Dieter 
Fleck (2008), at 274. 
148 See ICRC, Official Statement (2005), section 1. 
149 British Military Manual, at 275, para. 11.3. 
150 ICRC, Official Statement (2005), section 1. 
151 See ibid, section 2. 
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Article 6 GCIV. It suggests that for GCIV the interpretation of “occupation” should be wider 
than that contained in Article 42 HR. It applies to civilians of a territory in their relation with 
the troops advancing into that territory, whether fighting or not.152  
The essence of this approach lies in the division of provisions not according to the 
particular stage of the presence of the one state on the territory of another (e.g. the stage of 
invasion, stage of battle, stage of establishment of the authority, stage of occupation), but 
depending on the need to protect persons finding themselves in the hands if the foreign army. 
This is because many IHL rules applying in occupations also apply in other situations, for 
example, in combat areas, or in the territory of a party to the conflict.153  
However, Zwanenburg argues that this approach “appears to conflate the 
determination of ‘protected person’ with the determination of an occupation, and does not 
recognise that [GCIV] contains a number of provisions that apply specifically to occupied 
territories.”154 Contrary to his argument, although there are provisions that can be applicable 
only where the state of occupation was established according to the authority exercised over 
the territory by the occupier, this gradual approach permits to differentiate factual situations 
of different degrees of control exercised by armed forces over the population of particular 
territory and apply provisions of the law of occupation depending on the need of protection 
for protected persons. Not all provisions of the law of occupation become applicable 
immediately when protected persons fall in the hands of foreign armed forces (e.g. Articles 52, 
55, 56 GCIV are supposed to be applied for a longer period of occupation) but only some of 
them which can be feasibly applied in those circumstances.155 If the circumstances trigger the 
application of certain provisions, related to the relationship between the foreign armed forces 
                                               
152 Commentary to Article 6, para. 1 of the CG IV, at 60. 
153 Adam Roberts (1985), at 250. 
154 Marten Zwanenburg (2004), at 749. 
155 See with regard to concrete provisions the Commentary to Article 6, para. 1 of the CG IV, at 60-61. 
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and civilian population, those provisions will apply,156 otherwise the state will be able to 
violate those provisions claiming that its authority over a particular territory has not been 
established or cannot be exercised.  
A party to the conflict must not violate any of the GCIV provisions, when this 
convention becomes applicable (in the situation of the armed conflict or occupation). Once 
the convention applies, the party is bound by all of its provisions. This specifically applies to 
the provisions regarding negative obligations for the states to refrain from particular conduct. 
If, for example, a party finds itself in the position of forcibly transferring or deporting 
protected persons, it is precluded from doing so under Article 49 (subject to its conditions), 
and the fact that it did not exercise authority over the territory does not matter. While certain 
positive obligations of the state under some articles of GCIV may be triggered only by the 
circumstances of the established authority of the state over the territory, negative obligations 
must not be confined to any phase of the state’s presence in the territory and apply regardless 
the place of those provisions under any GC heading. This follows from the nature of CA1, 
which requires the parties to respect and ensure respect for the GC provisions “in all 
circumstances”.157  
The application of positive obligations is similar. They apply as soon as a party 
appears in a position to fulfill those obligations. Not all positive obligations apply 
simultaneously, but only those that the party is able to fulfil at a particular moment. Positive 
obligations by their nature require a state to take measures only as far as possible to fulfill 
those obligations. Consequently, if a party is found in a position to fulfil a positive obligation, 
it must do so as far as possible, but if it does not have sufficient means or control to do that, it 
cannot be required to do that. For example, a duty of a party to ensure the food and medical 
                                               
156 See the examples of such provisions provided in the Commentary to Article 6, para. 1 of the CG IV, at 60-61. 
157 See also Hannah Tonkin (2009), at 781, arguing that the obligations under Common Article 1 are binding on 
states in the time of peace and of armed conflict. 
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supplies of population under Article 55 arises only under certain circumstances and only if it 
has sufficient means available, but need not be specifically linked to the fact that the party 
established and can exercise its authority over a particular territory. GCIV does not provide 
for such a requirement, unlike HR, which specifically mention that in order to apply 
provisions of the law of occupation over a particular territory, it must be actually placed under 
the authority of the armed forces and that such authority was established and can be exercised. 
Therefore for the purposes of application of GCIV, the gradual approach to the application of 
certain provisions depending on the factual circumstances must be adopted. 
A relatively similar approach was chosen by the Naletilić Trial Chamber. However it 
interpreted the Commentary differently. It distinguished between situations where the law of 
occupation deals with individuals as civilians protected under GCIV and situations where it 
deals with property and other matters.158 The Chamber considered that the law of occupation 
would apply to individuals when they fall into “the hands of the occupying power”, thus 
following Commentary’s approach,159 whereas the application of the law of occupation to the 
property (or “other matters”) would depend upon the fulfilment of the requirements of Article 
42 HR, namely the exercise of the authority over the territory by the occupying power.160 
However such an interpretation would lead to awkward results, when the provisions of GCIV 
on occupation would protect civilians from physical harm by the occupying power but not 
from the destruction of their property in the intermediate period before the authority is 
established. This would be contrary to the very nature of GCIV protection and would 
contradict CA1 (to respect the provisions in all circumstances). Therefore the scope of 
                                               
158 Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic, IT-98-34-T, Judgement (“Naletilic Trial Judgement”), 31 March 2003, 
paras. 221-222. 
159 See ibid, para. 221. 
160 See ibid, para. 222. 
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application of the law of occupation does not depend on the subject matter of their regulations 
(persons or property), but on the factual situation where such protection is needed.  
The gradual approach better applies to the specific situation of PSOs. The UN 
exercising formal command and control over PSOs cannot be regarded the only occupying 
power. It lacks the capacity to implement some of the provisions of the law of occupation. 
Therefore the responsibility for complying with the rules of the law of occupation is shared 
between the UN and TCCs. The protected persons under authority and control of PSFs must 
not be deprived from the protected given to other persons finding themselves in the hands of 
normal occupying powers, only on the basis of special status of PSOs. Thus, the provisions of 
GCIV on the law of occupation apply as far as possible in the situations of PSOs depending 
on the factual circumstances when protected persons find themselves in the hands of the 
PSFs.161 Especially it concerns negative obligations under the law of occupation which must 
be respected by PSFs.  
According to academic opinion, it is possible that UN PSFs can occupy part or the 
whole territory of state.162 It is when they displace their authority with the one of the host state. 
By virtue of displacement of the authority of the host state, UN PSFs may find themselves 
face to face with local people who in most of the cases did not give their consent for the 
PSFs’ authority to govern them instead of the host state. Some of those persons being in the 
                                               
161 See also Siobhán Wills, “Military interventions on behalf of vulnerable populations: the legal responsibilities 
of states and international organisations engaged in peace support operations”, 9 Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law 387 (2004), at 328, who suggests that because the rules of occupation are well known, “it should be possible 
to apply the principles of occupation law by analogy even if there is dispute as to whether the facts fit occupation 
law criteria.” 
162  See Christopher Greenwood, at 28. Roberts also suggests, “it is just conceivable […] that in different 
circumstances a peacekeeping force could find itself organising some kind of ‘occupation by consent’, [and] if 
central authority in the host state were to collapse, a peacekeeping force might find itself extending its authority 
and taking full charge of such matters as public order and safety” (Adam Roberts (1985), at 291 and 289). Kelly 
also considers that the application of the law of occupation to PSFs depends on the fact of the presence of PSFs 
on foreign territory where they are the sole or primary effective authority (Michael Kelly (1999), at 178). See 
also Derek William Bowett (1964), at 490, who considers that in some circumstances the UN may be in actual 
“belligerent occupation” of territory or may exercise a civil affairs administration subsequent to hostilities and 
therefore the customary and conventional laws of war are relevant to UN forces. 
 139 
military groups may also resist PSFs’ authority over them (even if this resistance does not 
amount to the full armed conflict situation). By that the local population may be adverse or 
even hostile to the PSFs and the application of the law of occupation is triggered, even 
without full recognition of the armed conflict as the civilian population needs protection from 
the foreign entity. Therefore the law of occupation in the PSFs’ context needs to apply 
depending on the factual circumstances, in the same way as it applies when not PSFs but a 
state is an occupying power. 
The following factual situations may involve the application of most of the provisions 
of the law of occupation: when there is no other governmental authority on the particular 
territory and the PSFs’ authority is the only authority that can exist; there are persons in the 
need of protection and they find themselves in the hands of PSFs. In such situations the law of 
occupation applies to PSFs and the UN and TCCs are required as far as possible to respect 
and ensure respect for provisions of GCIV.163 Obviously, in any context including in the 
situations where the law of occupation is applicable, the PSFs are bound to respect human 
rights law.164 
 
iii) Application of the law of occupation to the UN territorial administrations 
An example of potential application of the law of occupation can exist in the situations 
when the UN established a territorial administration, e.g. UNMIK (United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo) or UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor). Although it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the responsibility of 
all UN missions other than military contingents of PSOs, some of the arguments related to the 
application of IHL to the UN administration can be addressed here. 
                                               
163 The reasons for such an application are discussed below in relation to the UN territorial administration. 
164 See next chapter, Chapter IV, for the further discussion on the concurrent application of the international 
humanitarian and human rights law. 
 140 
Although the UN rejects the application of the law of occupation to its territorial 
administrations for political reasons,165 it does not necessarily mean that it cannot in principle 
apply to the international territorial administrations, if the conditions for its application are 
fulfilled, namely that the territory is placed under the authority of the PSO.166  
It was mostly argued against the application of the law of occupation to UNMIK and 
UNTAET for various reasons, including: 1) the UN as an IO and not a state cannot be an 
occupying power;167 2) it does not participate in the armed conflict against the states where it 
established its administration and the administration is pacific in nature;168 3) the territorial 
states normally give implicit/explicit consent to the UN;169 4) the termination of a territorial 
administration differs from usual situations of occupation;170 5) unlike any other occupation, 
where status quo of the territory after occupation is preserved, the UN administration may 
transform the status of the territory in a separate state (e.g. East Timor for instance).171  
These arguments can be disproved. As discussed above, the UN as a subject of 
international law is bound by the rules of CIL, including the law of occupation.172 The law of 
occupation is based on the exercise of factual control irrespective of the status of the 
occupying entity.173  As it was discussed above, there is no need for a power to be in conflict 
                                               
165  See Steven Ratner, “Foreign occupation and international territorial administration: the challenges of 
convergence”, 16 European Journal of International Law 695 (2005), at 703; Carsten Stahn, The law and 
practice of international territorial administration: Versailles to Iraq and beyond (Cambridge University Press, 
2008), at 472. 
166 They were previously discussed in this section.  
167 See Ralph Wilde, International territorial administration: how trusteeship and the civilizing mission never 
went away (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 354; Carsten Stahn (2008), at 467.  
168 Carsten Stahn (2008), at 473; See Ralph Wilde (2008), at 355. 
169 See Carsten Stahn (2008), at 471; Steven R. Ratner (2005), at 698. See also Lindsey Cameron, Rebecca 
Everly (2010), at 236, who argue that the applicability of the law of occupation to international territorial 
administration highly depends on the presence or the absence of the consent.  
170 See Steven R. Ratner (2005), at 699, 702; Ralph Wilde (2008), at 316. 
171 See Knoll, Bernhard, The legal status of territories subject to administration by international organisations, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 244-245. As Ratner points out, for international organisations missions, 
“the status quo is a problem to be overcome, not a situation to maintain.” See Steven R. Ratner (2005), at 700. 
172 See also Carsten Stahn (2008), at 469. 
173 Carsten Stahn (2008), at 469-470. 
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with a territorial state to become an occupying power.174 This is expressly provided by CA2, 
which may govern peacetime occupations.175 The existence of consent of the territorial state 
does not necessarily exclude the existence of occupation. Although formal consent may have 
been obtained from a nominal government, it does not necessarily mean that it was obtained 
from the population itself.176 The government might be under pressure to give such consent, 
which makes it invalid.177 As discussed, a “pacific occupation” exists when there is consent of 
the territorial state.178 It is important that the UN administration substitutes the authority of 
the territorial state with its own authority, then whether the state formally consented. 
Although the annexation of territory or any change to its status after the end of 
occupation is not permitted, it does not mean that such consequences would prevent the 
application of the law of occupation in the first place. This would contradict the very logic of 
the law of occupation designed to protect civilian population from the occupying power. The 
law of occupation depends on the existence of factual situation which triggers its 
application.179 If the law of occupation were not applied to the occupying power, which 
prepares to change the status of the territory under its occupation, civilian population would 
be deprived from the essential guaranties provided by GCIV. Therefore the law of occupation 
                                               
174 See also Ralph Wilde (2008), at 310-311. 
175 See also Carsten Stahn (2008), at 471-472; Michael Kelly (1999), at 227. 
176 See Steven R. Ratner (2005), at 698. Lindsey Cameron and Rebecca Everly also point out that for instance 
Serbia continued to consent to the presence of UNMIK in Kosovo long after local authorities in Kosovo stopped 
consenting to it. See Lindsey Cameron, Rebecca Everly “Conceptualising the administration of territory by 
international actors”, 21 European Journal of International Law 221 (2010), at 236. See also John Cerone 
“Minding the gap: outlining KFOR accountability in post-conflict Kosovo”, 12 European Journal of 
International Law 469 (2001), at 484, who argues that the presence of a formal consent may be insufficient to 
overcome the presumption of occupation which arises from the circumstance of particular case (he was 
discussing the consent to the presence of KFOR). 
177 See Gregory Fox Humanitarian occupation (Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 110-111, 177-179. 
178 See also Michael Kelly (1999), at 227. 
179 See also See Lindsey Cameron, Rebecca Everly (2010), at 239; Carsten Stahn (2008), at 470, 472; Stadlmeier, 
Sigmar, Leidenmuehler, Franz, “The law of occupation and peace support operations – at odds?”, in Arnold, 
Roberta, Law enforcement within the framework of peace support operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2008), at 24, 31 
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might apply to the UN territorial administration, if the conditions for such application 
(discussed above) exist.180  
Furthermore, there may be more arguments in favour of the application of the law of 
occupation to the UN administrations rather than against it. Firstly, the application of the law 
of occupation is crucial, when the UN displaced the authority of the territorial state and there 
is no other state authority over that territory.181 Civilian population in that territory finds itself 
in the hands of foreign authority or occupying power, no matter how benevolent its mandate 
is. The GCIV provisions apply in this type of situations to adequate protect civilians.182 
Secondly, if the law of occupation is not to apply to the situation of the UN administration, 
there will be a legal vacuum in the protection of population from the actions of the foreign 
authority.183 Either the UN/TCCs will have to recognise the extraterritorial application of 
IHRL and their obligations under it (in case of the UN only those which become a part of 
customary IHRL)184 or civilian population may find itself without any legal protection. In 
these circumstances the law of occupation and its detailed provisions may provide necessary 
protection to civilian population.185 Thirdly, the gradual approach to the application of the law 
of occupation advocated in this section appears to be the most suitable for the situations where 
the UN finds itself in the occupation of territory. 186 The UN is not required to fulfil all 
                                               
180 See also Sigmar Stadlmeier, Franz Leidenmuehler (2008), at 27; Roberta Arnold (2006), at 113. 
181 See also Carsten Stahn (2008), at 474, who states that “the purpose of the laws of occupation is to provide a 
supplementary legal regime for such cases, which establishes a minimum normative framework for the 
maintenance of law and order and he protection of individuals.” 
182 Roberta Arnold (2006), at 113. 
183 See also Lindsey Cameron, Rebecca Everly (2010), at 239. 
184 See the next chapter for the detailed discussion. 
185 See Carsten Stahn (2008), at 476; See also Bruce Oswald “The creation and control of places of protection 
during United Nations peace operations”, 83 International Review of the Red Cross 1013 (2007), at 320, who 
argues that reasons for using the law of occupation during PSO include “the really that as a specialised regime of 
law created to meet the requirements of military forces interacting with civilian population, it is a more context 
sensitive legal regime to apply during peace operations than […] human rights law.”  
186 See also ibid, at 474, who states that “it is […] plausible to argue that some provisions of the Hague and the 
Geneva law may apply by way of analogy to certain territorial administrations.” 
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positive obligations contained in the law of occupation provisions.187 What is more important 
is that it does not act in contravention of those provisions breaching its negative obligations. 
This will insure at least minimum protection given to civilians.  
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis in this chapter has shown that the UN and TCCs can be bound by the 
rules of IHL by PSOs’ participation in the armed conflict. The UN being bound by the rules 
of customary IHL and TCCs as parties to the GC can become a joint party to the armed 
conflict. Their obligations under IHL become applicable when there is an armed conflict and 
the PSFs participate in it. If the PSFs’ participation was of collective nature, both the UN and 
TCCs become a joint party to the conflict. If only one contingent participated in the conflict, 
only its respective TCC becomes a party to it. Participation in the conflict is understood as 
taking direct or active part in hostilities. Not only must PSFs use force against one of the 
parties to the conflict, they also must have intention to harm that party and to be in conflict 
with it. The force used for individual self-defence cannot be considered taking direct part in 
hostilities as lacking necessary intent. For the acts done beyond individual self-defence, the 
intention to harm the opposite party must still be proved. 
Being deployed in a host state with a mandate not to use force beyond self-defence, 
the members of PSFs can be considered as civilians of neutral states, as their TCCs are not 
parties to the conflict. However, once PSFs start to directly participate in hostilities, they 
become combatants by virtue of them being armed forces of the TCCs/UN. Their 
participation in hostilities may internationalise an internal armed conflict in a host state. The 
application of the law of IAC or NIAC depends on whether they were deployed to support 
                                               
187 See also ibid, at 477. 
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governmental forces or opposition groups or with purely neutral mandate and become 
occasionally involved in hostilities with either party to the conflict.  
The law of occupation may be applicable to the situation of PSOs. The application of 
the GCIV provisions on occupation must be done on factual basis depending on the 
circumstances of the case. They apply as soon as civilians find themselves in the hands of 
foreign forces and certain provisions of the law of occupation start to apply as soon as 
circumstances so demand. The PSFs must not act in contravention of any provisions of the 
GC, no matter which part of the conventions it is. The UN/TCCs are obliged to respect their 
IHL obligations. 
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IV. United Nations and troop-contributing states’ obligations under 
international human rights law during PSOs 
 
Peacekeepers committing crimes during their deployment in a host state can violate 
not only IHL but also IHRL. This chapter analyses the UN and TCCs’ obligations under 
IHRL. The discussion does not cover substantive obligations under particular IHRL 
instrument but aims to explore the situations where IHRL becomes applicable. It examines 
two particular problems: extraterritorial application of IHRL and simultaneous application of 
IHRL and IHL.  
Both issues are equally important for defining legal framework applicable to PSOs. 
The first issue is important because peacekeepers commit their crimes outside their home 
state’s territory. The question is whether their TCCs are bound by IHRL when their organs act 
in the territory of another state. The notion of jurisdiction under IHRL will be discussed in 
this regard. The first section explores the jurisprudence of IHR bodies answering the question 
whether the notion of jurisdiction is interpreted as requiring an additional limitation to the 
human rights obligations of states/IOs or it essentially reflects the notion of attribution 
discussed in Chapter II. 
Second issue arises in the situations when IHL starts to apply and the question is 
whether IHRL is suspended or it applies simultaneously with IHL and therefore peacekeepers 
who commit crimes violate not only IHL obligations, but also IHRL. Second section argues 
for simultaneous application of IHL and IHRL. It also analyses potential conflict between 
IHL and IHRL norms and how it can be overcome.  
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1. Extraterritorial application of the human rights law during PSOs 
 
A) Are there any territorial limitations to the human rights obligations? 
PSFs participate in the operations outside territory of their national states. Such 
situation leads to a possibility of extraterritorial application of IHRL norms to the conduct of 
PSFs. Some human rights treaties seem to establish limitations to the IHRL obligations of the 
states acting outside their territory by including the notion of “jurisdiction” as a condition for 
the states to be bound by IHRL obligations.1 However other treaties do not contain such a 
limitation.2 There is no consistency in the wording of provisions on jurisdiction in different 
legal instruments: some human rights treaties talk about jurisdiction only, others provide for 
territorial condition too.3  
The problem of “jurisdictional” and “territorial” clauses in the human rights treaties 
concerns the application of IHRL to the UN which does not have a territory and depending on 
the interpretation of the notion of “jurisdiction” may not have it either. However, it does not 
mean that the UN is not bound by IHRL. As discussed above, the UN is bound by CIL, 
because it is a subject of international law. The UN is not a party to human rights treaties and 
is not bound by them, but its obligations can arise from CIL.4  
                                               
1 See, for instance, European Convention on Human Rights (1950), Article 1; Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (1966), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 2(1); 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969), Article 1(1), etc.  
2 See, for instance, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966); Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979); 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). 
3 See difference in wording in the ECHR, Article 1 and ICCPR, Article 2(1). See further discussion in the next 
section on the interpretation of these provisions by the international bodies.  
4 See also Frédéric Mégret, Florian Hoffmann “The UN and a human rights violator? Some reflections on the 
United Nations changing human rights responsibilities”, 25 Human Rights Quarterly 314 (2003), at 317; Julia 
Werzer “The UN Human Rights Obligations and Immunity: An Oxymoron Casting a Shadow on the Transitional 
Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor”, 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 105 (2008), at 108-109; 
Robert Kolb (2005), at 257. 
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At least some fundamental provisions contained in the human rights treaties form part 
of CIL.5 There is no academic consensus on the precise scope of customary IHRL.6 Most of 
the debates on this point start from the discussion of binding nature of the rights provided in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), not binding per se but considered to 
reflect at least in part CIL.7 It was argued that certain fundamental rights contained in the 
UDHR now have acquired the status of CIL,8 however, it is disputed which rights contained 
in the UDHR acquired this status.9  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss each particular right and its status, 
although some indications can be provided. The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) 
of the Foreign Relations Law, Section 702 lists prohibitions of human rights violations 
forming part of CIL already in 1987: genocide, slavery, murder or causing disappearance of 
individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged 
arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination or a consistent pattern of gross violations 
of internationally recognised human rights.10 Prohibition against slavery, arbitrary deprivation 
of life, torture, arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination are included in the UDHR.11 
Meron discussing customary IHRL agrees in general with the list provided in the Restatement 
but also includes some other rights: the core of due process guarantees (Article 14 ICCPR), 
                                               
5 Andrew J. Cunningham “The European Convention on Human Rights, customary international law and the 
constitution”, 43 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 537 (1994), at 542. 
6 See Sigrun Skogly Beyond national borders: states' human rights obligations in international cooperation 
(Intersentia, 2006), at 110. 
7 See also Melissa Robbins “Powerful states, customary law and the erosion of human rights through regional 
enforcement”, 35 California Western International Law Journal 275 (2005), at 281. See also for the discussion 
of different authors views on whether the provisions of the UDHR have become part of CIL Hurst Hannum 
"Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law: The Status and Future 
of the Customary International Law of Human Rights", 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 287 (1995-1996), at 322-234; Sigrun Skogly (2006), at 120-122. 
8 See Richard B. Lillich "Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law", 25 Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1-30 (1995), at 5; Sigrun Skogly (2006), at 119. 
9 See Theodor Meron Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law (Clarendon, 1989) at 83-83. 
10 See also Hurst Hannum (1996), at 341-342. 
11 See also Ibid, at 342-351 for the discussion of particular provisions of the UDHR as reflecting CIL. 
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right to human treatment of detainees (Article 10 ICCPR), right to self-determination, 
prohibition of retroactive application of penal measures (Article 15 ICCPR).12  
Although the UN may be bound by at least some human rights obligations which 
gained status of CIL, the issue of jurisdiction may become an obstacle to apply human rights 
obligation to the UN and TCCs, when their peacekeepers commit crimes in the territory of the 
host state.13 The main question is how the “jurisdiction” is understood with regard to human 
rights treaties and whether it limits human rights states’ obligations. 
From the preliminary point of view jurisdictional limitations in the treaties are 
necessary, because states cannot be responsible for all human rights violations in this world 
and can only be responsible for those which they could prevent. The international supervisory 
bodies by using the criterion of jurisdiction may limit the responsibility of states for particular 
human rights violations, that is to say that a state is not responsible for the breach of human 
rights obligations, unless it had jurisdiction over the acts leading to human rights violations. 
As discussed above under the state responsibility rules, a state is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act, only if it is attributable to it and constitutes breach of its 
international obligations.14 Applying this rule to the violations of human rights obligations, an 
act constituting a violation of IHRL must be attributable to the state in question in order for 
that state to become responsible for the wrongful act. The attribution also limits the 
responsibility of a state for a particular act constituting a human rights violation.  
Although some treaties contain limitations on the basis of jurisdiction, they do not 
include a clause on attribution of particular acts to the state in question. However, this rule of 
attribution can be implied in respect to any wrongful act, including human rights violations. 
                                               
12 Theodor Meron (1989), at 95-97. 
13 As Stahn points out, “the applicability of human rights standards to international organisations cannot be based 
on the concept of territory sovereignty, because international entities usually lack permanent ownership or title 
over territory. (Carsten Stahn (2008), at 489-490). 
14 See, ASR, Articles 1 and 2.  
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Another possibility is that the notion of jurisdiction is used by human rights bodies instead of 
the attribution for the same purpose, in this way giving the notion of “jurisdiction” the same 
meaning as an attribution has under the rules of international responsibility.  
Therefore a further inquiry should be made regarding the scope of jurisdiction in the 
way it is interpreted by human rights bodies to find out whether the limitation on jurisdiction 
in IHRL treaties can potentially coincide with the condition of attribution of the wrongful act 
as part of state/IO responsibility under PIL. If they do not coincide in scope, there is a need to 
analyse whether the jurisdictional condition constitutes an additional limitation to the 
international responsibility comprised by the requirement to prove a breach of international 
obligations (i.e. without a proof of state’s jurisdiction, an act would not constitute a breach of 
IHRL obligations).  
 
B) In which circumstance do individuals become subject to states’ jurisdiction under 
human rights treaties? 
 
i) Notion of “jurisdiction” in human rights treaties 
In discussing the notion of “jurisdiction” in human rights treaties, it should be firstly 
noted that it is different from a classic concept of jurisdiction under general international law. 
The latter concerns the power or authority of the state under international law to regulate or 
otherwise impact upon persons, property and circumstances in accordance with its municipal 
law.15 What the state is entitled to do under general international law does not necessarily 
coincide with what it actually does exercising its “jurisdiction”. The question of whether the 
state’s actions are in conformity with the rules of general international law and within its 
                                               
15 See Roger O’Keefe "Universal jurisdiction: clarifying the basic concept", 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 735 (2004), at 736. See further discussion on jurisdiction in the next chapter. 
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authority to regulate or impact upon persons or property does not affect the fact that it 
performed certain actions (within or outside its authority). These actions, performed by the 
state, are subject to the human rights scrutiny and whether or not they violated IHRL does not 
depend on whether the state’s actions went beyond its authority under general international 
law. Therefore “subject to states’ jurisdiction” does not refer only to the state’s actions 
authorised under general international law but includes any actions that the state performs 
exercising its “jurisdiction” whether or not they were within its authority under general 
international law.  
Another question is in which circumstances a person becomes “subject to state’s 
jurisdiction” (ICCPR, ACHR) or falls “within its jurisdiction” (ECHR). He may become 
subject to its jurisdiction, when a state acts against a person whether or not these acts 
performed abroad. The analysis of states’ responsibility would include the question of 
attribution of conduct to the state and of substantive breach of IHRL obligations. If, however, 
to become “subject to state’s jurisdiction” a person needs to have a link with a state concerned, 
the analysis of state’s responsibility would include the attribution of conduct and finding on 
substantive breach of IHRL obligations, and a separate analysis on the existence of the link 
between the state and individual.  
The following discussion of the jurisprudence of human rights bodies and the ICJ aims 
to demonstrate whether these international institutions in their findings on the states’ 
violations of IHRL examine the notion of “jurisdiction” from the perspective of “attribution” 
of conduct to the state concerned or they undertake an additional analysis on whether a person 
had another link with the state in addition to being affected by the act attributed to the state. 
The following discussion does not aim to address the wrongfulness/correctness of the analysis 
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of the question of attribution or to examine in detail the reasoning of the courts/bodies on 
every case and therefore has a limited purpose to verify the aforementioned proposition. 
Notably the normative status of practice of different courts and human rights bodies is 
different. The ICJ judgements are binding upon the parties.16 The ECtHR judgements have 
binding authority for the parties.17 Although the practice of the HRC is generally considered 
not to be binding,18 the “views” of the Committee on individual communications may have 
some legal force.19 The judgements of the Inter-American Court are legally binding,20 unlike 
reports and recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Despite 
the highlighted difference in their normative status, all the decisions will be equally analysed.  
The ICJ discussed the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR in the Wall case, where 
the Court relying on the object and purpose of the ICCPR considered it “natural” that when 
the states parties exercise their jurisdiction outside their territory, they should be bound to 
comply with its provisions.21 The Court noted that “the drafters of the Covenant did not intend 
to allow states to escape from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their 
                                               
16 See Article 94 of the UN Charter. 
17 It follows from Article 46, para. 1 ECHR on binding force and execution of the judgements, which states that 
“the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgement of the Court in any case to which they 
are parties.” See also Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad The execution of judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (Council of Europe Pub., 2002), at 7; see also Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman 
International human rights in context (Oxford University Press, 3d ed., 2007), at 965. 
18 See Dominic McGoldrick The Human Rights Committee: its role in the development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon, 1991), at 151; Kerstin Mechlem Treaty Bodies and the 
Interpretation of Human Rights”, 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 905 (2009), at 909. 
19 Although there is no provision in the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which would indicate a precise legal 
effect of the “views” or on the enforcement of the Committee’s “views”, if a state does not comply with them 
(see Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman (2007), at 892; Dominic McGoldrick (1991), at 151), the 
“views” of the Committee can serve as an authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR, by itself legally binding, and 
states not complying with the “views” of the HRC, violate the ICCPR itself (See also discussion in Henry J. 
Steiner, Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman (2007), at 915-916; Kerstin Mechlem “(2009), at 925). The Concluding 
Observations are not legally biding (Kerstin Mechlem (2009), at 924). Although General Comments of the 
Committee are not binding, some national courts use selected General Comments in their judgements discussing 
international standards (see Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman (2007), at 874) and therefore the 
General Comments can “exert considerable persuasive force on decision makers in domestic legal systems and 
national courts” (Kerstin Mechlem (2009), at 927-928). 
20 See  Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman (2007), at 1027, 1029.  
21 Legal consequences of the construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian territory, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 
9 July 2004 (“Wall case”), para. 109. The Court also noted that the practice of the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC)21 and the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR confirm this. 
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national territory.” 22  The Court further adopted the HRC’s view that the state becomes 
responsible for all the conduct by its authorities or agents that affects the enjoyment of rights 
enshrined in the ICCPR.23 It concluded that the ICCPR is applicable “in respect of acts done 
by a state in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”24  
The Court adopted the approach under which the acts performed by state (and 
therefore attributed to it) in breach of the ICCPR will entail state’s international responsibility 
under the Covenant. No additional link between the state and persons concerned was needed 
and therefore no additional limitation was envisaged for the finding of international 
responsibility of that state. Notably, the Court used the word “jurisdiction” in the sense that 
the state in fact carried out certain acts outside state’s territory and not in the sense of its 
authority under general international law to perform those acts.  
However, when the ICJ further analysed the application of the ICESC, the reasoning 
was different. While noting that the ICESC contains no provision on its scope of application 
and that it guarantees rights which are essentially territorial, the Court considered that “it is 
not to be excluded that it applies both to territories over which a state party has sovereignty 
and to those over which that state exercises territorial jurisdiction.” 25  It concluded with 
respect to Israel that “the territories occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subject to 
its territorial jurisdiction as the occupying Power. In the exercise of the powers available to it 
on this basis, Israel is bound by the provisions of the [ICESC].”26  
                                               
22 Ibid. The Court explained, that it was only intended to “prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-
vis their states of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that state, but of that of the state of 
residence.” 
23 Ibid, para. 110, Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Article 
40 of the Covenant, “Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel”, 21 August 2003, 
CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 11. 
24 Wall case, para. 111. 
25 Ibid, para. 112. 
26 Ibid. 
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The Court found that violations of the ICESC dependent on the state’s exercise of 
“territorial jurisdiction”. The rights guaranteed by the ICESC are “territorial” because the 
Covenant requires the states to take positive actions rather than not to violate rights. While the 
state may be required to comply with the latter obligations everywhere (inside or outside its 
jurisdiction), the positive obligations must be linked to the territory, over which the state has 
“territorial jurisdiction”. Accordingly, the state has “territorial jurisdiction” over the territory 
it occupies. However, for ICCPR no territorial jurisdiction was required. Therefore there are 
certain obligations which require the establishment of “territorial jurisdiction” of the state to 
find its violation of those obligations, whereas other obligations become applicable 
irrespective territorial jurisdiction of the state only because they are attributed to it.  
The Court followed the same logic in the Congo case. Its finding of attribution of the 
conduct of its soldiers to Uganda and of the breach by that conduct of relevant provisions of 
the IHR instruments was enough to hold the state responsible without conducting additional 
analysis on the state’s jurisdiction under each of the human rights instruments violated by the 
state.27 The Court dealt with the issues of state’s conduct in occupied territories and other acts 
of state’s organs separately and in both occasion found state’s responsibility for human rights 
violations.28 Moreover, the ICJ deployed a single standard for all human rights treaties that it 
mentions in the judgement and did not refer specifically to the ICCPR, mentioning 
“international human rights instruments” that are applicable in those circumstances.29  
Therefore the Court used the same approach to jurisdiction as it did in Wall, although 
not specifically referring to the notion of jurisdiction. According to the Court in Congo, there 
are certain human rights obligations binding upon the states by virtue of the attribution of the 
conduct of their organs to those states and there are other human rights obligations binding 
                                               
27 See, Congo case, in particular, paras. 213, 215-217, 219-220. 
28 See, ibid, para. 220. See also John Cerone (2006), at 1477. 
29 John Cerone (2006), at 1477; see Congo case, para. 216. 
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state because it occupies a particular territory of another state. As the Court did no explain 
which obligations come to the second category, the further analysis of the case-law of human 
rights bodies is needed. 
The human rights bodies do not always strictly follow the reasoning of the ICJ on the 
issue of jurisdiction of human rights treaties. While the practice of the HRC and Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is generally in line with the ICJ approach, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has applied distinct reasoning on the matter of 
jurisdiction. The following analysis will firstly discuss their practice. 
 
ii) Interpretation of jurisdiction by the HRC and IACHR 
The approach taken by the HRC on the interpretation of Article 2(1) on jurisdiction 
has been relatively broad. This is significant because unlike the ECHR (containing the 
obligations of the states to secure to everyone “within their jurisdiction” the rights), the 
ICCPR provides that the states must respect and ensure the rights to all individuals “within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”30 In Saldias de Lopez concerning the arrest and initial 
detention and mistreatment of the victim in the foreign territory by Uruguayan agents, the 
HRC held that it could consider the allegations despite jurisdictional provisions, inasmuch as 
the alleged acts were perpetrated by Uruguayan agents acting on foreign soil.31 The HRC 
interpreted the notion of “jurisdiction” as referring “not to the place where the violation 
occurred, but rather to the relationship between the individual and the state in relation to a 
violation of any of the rights sent forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred,”32 because it 
                                               
30 ICCPR, Article 2(1). 
31 Saldias de Lopez v Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, 29 July 1981, HRC, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (1984) 
(“Saldias de Lopez case”), para. 12.2. See also Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979, 
29 July 1981, HRC, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 92 (1984), para. 10.1.  
32 Ibid, para. 12.2. See also Celiberti de Casariego case, para. 10.2. 
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would be “unconscionable” to permit a state party to perpetrate in the territory of another state 
the human rights violations, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.33  
The HRC in its General Comment No. 31 stated that the state must respect and ensure 
the rights of the Covenant to any one within the power or effective control of the state’s forces 
acting outside its territory, “regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective 
control was obtained such as forces constituting a national contingents of a state party 
assigned to an [PSO].”34 In its Concluding observations on Israel, the Committee held that the 
provisions of the ICCPR “apply to the benefit of the population of Occupied Territories, for 
all conduct by the state party’s authorities or agents in those territories that affect the 
enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant fall within the ambit of state responsibility of 
Israel under the principles of [PIL].”35 The ICJ approved this statement in Wall.36  
The HRC in the Concluding observations on Israel found that jurisdiction depends on 
the rules of state responsibility, namely on the attribution of particular acts to that state. It 
does not need to be established the state exercised effective control over the territory or over 
the persons in detention. What must be established is that the acts breaching human rights 
obligation of the state under the ICCPR were performed by state’s organs or agents and 
attributable to it. Therefore the finding of attribution of conduct to the state would encompass 
the finding on state’s jurisdiction for its responsibility for breach of human rights obligations.  
The approach of the IACHR to the interpretation of “jurisdiction” is similar to the 
HRC,37 and also quite broad.38 The IACHR stated that in the finding of state’s jurisdiction, the 
                                               
33 Ibid, para. 12.3. 
34 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, “The nature of the general legal obligations imposed on 
states parties to the Covenant”, 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10, see also Human Rights 
Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, “Concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee: Belgium”, 12 August 2004, CCPR/CO/81/BEL, para. 6. 
35 Concluding observations on Israel, CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 11.  
36 See Wall case, para. 110. 
37 See also Joanne Williams “A human rights law of internal armed conflict: the European Court of Human 
Rights in Chechnya”, 16 European Journal of International Law 741 (2005), at 719. 
 156 
victim’s nationality or presence on the particular geographic area is not important, what is 
important is whether under specific circumstances, the state observed the rights of a person 
subject to its “authority and control” usually exercised through the acts of the state’s agents.39 
Moreover, in Alejandre the Commission held that when a state’s agents exercise power and 
authority over a person outside national territory, the state’s obligation to respect human 
rights continues.40 The Commission applied the American Declaration to the situation, where 
the military aircraft belonging to Cuba downed two unarmed civilian airplanes in international 
airspace and therefore the agents of Cuba, although outside their territory, placed the civilian 
pilots under their authority.41 Although the Cuban pilots did not exercise physical control over 
the civilian airplane and the acts occurred outside Cuban territorial control, the state was 
responsible for those acts because its agents committed them. This approach to the notion of 
“control” suggests that where state’s agents are able to kill a person outside its territory, the 
state exercises sufficient control over that person to be responsible for violating his rights.42  
This case of the IACHR had very similar facts to Banković before the ECtHR, but in 
spite of their similarity, the ECtHR came to a completely opposite conclusion regarding the 
question of jurisdiction. If the ECtHR in Banković took the same approach as the IACHR, its 
outcome could have been different.43 The Court would have to discuss whether the air strikes 
conducted by NATO member states were attributable to NATO or to its member states.44  
                                                                                                                                                   
38 Christine Byron "Blurring of the Boundaries: The Application of International Humanitarian Law by Human 
Rights Bodies, A", 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 839 (2007), at 878; see also John Cerone (2006), at 
1478. 
39 Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Report Nº 109/99, IACHR, 29 September 1999 (“Coard case”), 
para. 37; see Saldano v. Argentina, Report No. 38/99, IACHR, 11 March 1999, para. 19; Ferrer-Mazorra et al v 
United States, Case 9903, Report No. 51/01, IACHR, 4 April 2001, paras. 179, 182; Alejandre and others v 
Cuba, Case 11.589, Report No. 86/99, IACHR, 29 September 1999, para. 23. 
40 Alejandre case, para. 25. 
41 Ibid, para. 25. 
42 Douglass Cassel “Extraterritorial application of Inter-American human rights instruments”, in Coomans, Fons, 
Kamminga, Menno T., Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, (Intersentia, 2004), at 177. 
43 See Christine Byron (2007), at 878.  
44 See the discussion below. 
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iii) Interpretation of jurisdiction by the ECtHR 
The ECtHR in general adopted the most stringent approach to the notion of 
“jurisdiction” as compared to other human rights bodies and the ICJ. Such approach was 
mainly advanced by the Court in Banković which influenced the development of consequent 
jurisprudence by the ECtHR. In this case the Court confined the recognition of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of states to the cases where the state “through its effective control over the 
relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or […] 
exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that government.”45 
The Court consequently did not find a jurisdictional link between the victims of the NATO air 
strikes and NATO MSs participated in them.46 The ECtHR also mentioned obiter that it is 
prepared to recognise the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a state, in the cases involving 
activities of diplomatic agents abroad or on vessels registered in the state, as these situations 
were recognised by CIL and treaty provisions as involving exercise of states’ extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.47  
The problem with reasoning in Banković is that the Court started to analyse the 
question of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR in the light of the “jurisdictional competence” 
of the state.48 It focused not on whether the state in fact exercised “jurisdiction”, but whether 
it had “competence” to exercise “jurisdiction.”49 As discussed above, the question whether or 
not the state is allowed to exercise jurisdiction under general international law does not affect 
the question whether it actually exercised it and whether while exercising its jurisdiction, it 
violated human rights. Pursuing its analysis from the wrong proposing the Court fell in its 
                                               
45 Banković and others v Belgium and others, Application No. 52207/99, 12 December 2001 (Admissibility), 
para. 71. 
46 Ibid, para. 82. 
47 Ibid, para. 73. 
48 See ibid, paras. 59-60. 
49 Ibid, paras. 59-60. 
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own trap when started to discuss its previous jurisprudence. While discussing Loizidou, it 
recognised that the focus in that case was on “effective overall control” which Turkey 
exercised in fact over a part of the territory of Cyprus.50 It did not focus on whether or not 
Turkey was permitted under general international law to exercise such control over the 
territory of another state violating its sovereignty. Moreover, it mentioned that the 
responsibility of states can be engaged when as a consequence of military action (lawful or 
unlawful) it exercised effective control over an area outside its territory,51 which means that 
even if the military operation was unlawful under general international law, the Court is 
prepared to find that acts were within states jurisdiction.  
By starting with the wrong proposition on the notion of jurisdiction, the Court further 
developed very limited circumstances under which the persons may find themselves “within 
state’s jurisdiction” for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR. The Court’s approach may be 
explained by the fact that the ECHR contains positive obligations of the states parties and the 
states cannot be required to fulfill those obligations vis-à-vis persons unless the states are 
permitted to take actions under general international law. However this approach omits to 
consider that by their actions, the states may have already acceded the limits of their 
“jurisdictional competence” under general international law (for example establishing its 
control over particular place or part of the territory of another state without its consent), but it 
does not mean that already committing those acts in contravention of general international law 
they should be exempt from their obligations under the Convention. The fact of them 
exercising jurisdiction must be taken into account and not whether or not it was lawful under 
general international law.  
                                               
50 See also Marko Milanović “Norm conflict, international humanitarian law, and human right law”, in Ben-
Naftali, Orna, International humanitarian law and international human rights law: pas de deux, (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), at 27. 
51 See Banković case, para. 70. 
 159 
Another problem of this decision is that the Court refused to “divide and tailor” the 
obligations of the states under the Convention, in particular with respect to positive 
obligations, which by their nature depend on particular facts of a case. The problem is not that 
the Court relied on the notion of “effective control” when finding extraterritorial jurisdiction 
of states, but failed to recognise that there may be different aspects of such control which 
would not necessarily depend on the territorial control and may entail different scope of 
state’s obligations depending on the level of the factual control exercised by the state in 
particular situation or circumstances.52  
The approach taken by the Court in Banković was not supported by the case-law of 
other human rights bodies53 and was progressively changed towards the broader approach to 
human rights violations beyond the states’ borders. There are no pre-Banković cases, 
providing for such a stringent approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction of states or requiring 
Article 1 ECHR apply extraterritorially only in the situations where a state exercises effective 
control over a territory.54 In the recent (post-Banković) ECtHR jurisprudence there are more 
instances where the state is found to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. For most of them the 
key factor to be considered is the presence of effective control by state agents over either 
individual persons or territory. 55  The discussion bellow will firstly consider that ECtHR 
jurisprudence, where the extraterritorial jurisdiction of states was found on the basis of 
effective control over the territory of another state; then a place; and further individuals.  
                                               
52 See Orna Ben-Naftali “The extraterritorial application of human rights to occupied territories”, 100 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 90 (2006), at 93. See also Martin Scheinin “Extraterritorial effect of 
the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, in Coomans, Fons, Kamminga, Menno T., 
Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties (Intersentia, 2004), at 77, who suggests that in this case the 
focus should have been made not on the effective territorial control of states over Belgrade, but whether the 
NATO states had effective control over the consequences of the air strike in respect of the individual 
complainants. 
53 See previous discussion on this issue. 
54 See Alexander Orakhelashvili “Restrictive interpretation of human rights treaties in the recent jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights”, 14 European Journal of International Law 529 (2003), at 546. 
55 See Shane Darcy "Human Rights Protection during the War on Terror: Two Steps Back, One Step Forward 
War on Terror Symposium", 16 Minnesota Journal of International Law 353 (2007), at 363. 
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The ECtHR recognised that the state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction may be found if it 
exercises effective control over an area outside its territory. This effective control may be 
established as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action. 56 It can be exercised 
directly, through state’s armed forces or through subordinate local administration.57  
In “pre-Banković” Loizidou the ECtHR considered that it is not necessary to determine 
that Turkey exercised detailed control over the policies and actions of the “TRNC” authorities 
and given the large number of Turkish troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus, its 
army exercised “effective overall control” over that part of the island and Turkey was obliged 
to secure the rights and freedoms of inhabitants of that area as coming within Turkish 
“jurisdiction”.58 The ECtHR refused to follow the argument endorsed by Turkey that TRNC is 
an independent state59 and concluded the alleged violations fell within Turkey’s jurisdiction 
and thus imputable to Turkey.60  
The Court affirmed the extraterritoriality of human rights obligations using principles 
of attribution.61 Subsequent Cyprus v Turkey confirmed that the Court was referring to the 
attribution of conduct in the strict sense.62 In this case the ECtHR explained that Turkey must 
bear general responsibility under the Convention for all the policies and actions of the 
“TRNC” authorities (not only for the acts of its soldiers and officials) because of Turkish 
military and other support to the “TRNC”.63 All the TRNC’s acts were imputable to Turkey.64  
                                               
56 Loizidou v Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, 23 March 1995 (Preliminary objections), para. 62; Ilaşcu v 
Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, 08 July 2004, para. 289. 
57 Loizidou (preliminary objections) case, para. 62; Ilaşcu case, para. 289. 
58 Loizidou v Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, 18 December 1996 (Merits), para. 56. 
59 Ibid, para. 56. 
60 Ibid, para. 57. 
61  See Rachel Opie “Human rights violations by peacekeepers: finding a framework for attribution of 
international responsibility”, New Zealand Law Review 1 (2006), at 15. 
62 John Cerone, "Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law during 
Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations", 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transitional Law 1447 (2006), at 
1483. 
63 Cyprus v Turkey, Application No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001, para. 65.  
64 Ibid, para. 65. 
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The Court’s finding of imputability of human rights violations to Turkey on such basis 
is controversial considering international law on state responsibility. The Court employed the 
lower standard of application of the rules of attribution than set in the ASR.65 The ECtHR did 
not analyse whether “TRNC” can be considered a de facto state organ or if all its acts were 
done under effective control of the state under any ASR article on attribution. According to 
the Court, the state is responsible for all the acts of the entity because of its support to 
“TRNC” and its “effective overall control” over territory, which is not in line with the 
Nicaragua test.66   
Although such factors cannot be sufficient for attribution of conduct of entity under 
ASR Articles 4 and 8, under certain conditions this situation may be similar to ASR Article 9 
on the attribution of conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities. 
Article 9 may be relevant in the situations where the state loses control over part of its 
territory and private persons (e.g. irregulars) exercise elements of governmental authority in 
the area.67 However this article entails the responsibility of the state that lost control over that 
territory, rather than to the foreign state (i this case it would be Cyprus rather than Turkey). 
However, if the foreign state establishes its authority over a part of another state’s territory 
and replaces the authority of the territorial state as a result of occupation, it may entail 
responsibility of foreign states under Article 9 for the conduct of the entity exercising 
elements of governmental authority in the absence or default of authorities of the foreign state, 
if the territory is under foreign state’s control.68  
                                               
65 See John Cerone (2006), at 1483. 
66 See, inter alia, Nicaragua case, paras.115-116. See more detailed discussion on this issue in Chapter II of this 
dissertation. The discussion on the adoption of the Loizidou reasoning in the Tadić case, can be found in Chapter 
II, section 1(b), at IV.1. See also John Cerone (2006), at 1460, who also suggests that the ECtHR seems to adopt 
a lower standard for attribution than that employed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case and set forth in ASR Article 
8.  
67 See ASR Commentary to Article 9, paras. 4-6. 
68 This scenario was not envisaged in the ASR Commentary to Article 9, however, according to it, the situation 
described in Article 9 may happen during the foreign occupation (see, para.1). 
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Even if it is not the case, the foreign state may still be under obligation to prevent the 
human rights violations (i.e. to secure the rights and freedoms of the Convention) without 
attribution of particular conduct of the entity to the state, if the ECtHR finds jurisdiction of 
the foreign state, which it did in Loizidou and Cyprus v Turkey. However, in those cases the 
Court did not talk only about positive obligation of Turkey to prevent human rights violation 
over the territory under its effective control. Interestingly, the ECtHR equated the existence of 
jurisdiction of the state and imputability of the acts to the state, 69  using the notion of 
jurisdiction as the attribution and employing its own test of control over the acts. If for the 
Court jurisdiction and imputability (attribution) are the same things, there is no need to prove 
them both and the findings of attribution of particular conduct to the state and substantive 
breach of human rights obligations is enough to entail state’s responsibility for the conduct. 
In Ilaşcu the ECtHR continued same approach taken in the case-law concerning 
Northern Cyprus despite all its controversy and extended it to the situation with 
Transdniestria. The Court firstly reiterated its previous finding that if the state exercises 
overall control over the area outside its territory, it may engage its responsibility not only for 
the acts of its soldiers, but also for the acts of the local administration which survives there 
because of its military and other support.70 It further found Russia responsible not only for the 
actions of its agents in arresting the applicants and transferring them into the hands of the 
Transdniestrian police and regime,71 but also for the acts of “MRT” in which Russia did not 
participate.72 The latter finding was based on the fact that “MRT” set up with the Russian 
support, remained under Russian “the effective authority, or at the very least under the 
                                               
69 See also John Cerone (2006), at 1483. 
70 Ilaşcu case, paras. 290-291. 
71 See Ilaşcu case, para. 359. 
72 Ibid, para. 368.  
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decisive influence” and survived by virtue of different types of Russian support.73 The Court 
concluded that the applicants came within “jurisdiction” of Russia and its responsibility is 
engaged for the acts complained.74  
Interestingly, for this time the Court did not expressly find that Russia had “effective 
overall control” over the territory of Transdniestria (it found that the “MRT” had such 
control).75  The Court instead focused on the military, political and financial support that 
Russia gave to “MRT” to ensure its survival.76 It attributed the conduct of “MRT” authorities 
to Russia using rules of attribution of its own design. 77  Accordingly, the state may be 
responsible for the acts of the entity acting in the territory of another state if it renders support 
to this entity without a need of effective control to be exercised over its acts or territory where 
those acts took place. The establishment of jurisdiction substitutes the need to prove the 
attribution of the acts to states for the purposes of state responsibility according to Court.  
The Court’s reasoning concerning Moldovan jurisdiction was even more interesting. It 
considered that even though Moldova did not and could not exercise its authority over the 
territory of “MRT”, the applicants were still within its jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 
1 ECHR, but this situation “reduces the scope of that jurisdiction in that the undertaking given 
by the state under Article 1 must be considered by the court only in the light of the contracting 
state’s positive obligations towards persons within its territory.”78 The Court considered that 
the state must use diplomatic, economic or other measures to continue to guarantee the 
enjoyment of rights under the Convention in its territory.79 It follows that if a state does not 
                                               
73 Ibid, para. 367 
74 Ibid, para. 369. 
75 See ibid, para. 305. 
76 See ibid, para. 367. 
77 John Cerone (2006), at 1491; see also Marko Milanović (2011), at 49.  
78 Ilaşcu case, paras. 308, 310. 
79 Ibid, paras. 306, 308. 
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exercise authority over a part of its territory, it is bound only by limited positive obligations, 
but not negative obligations, which were omitted by the Court.  
This can lead to a nonsensical result: if a state violates right to life of a person in its 
own territory under which it does not have authority (e.g. its agents killed a person in that 
territory), these acts do not fall within its jurisdiction as negative obligations, but it must use 
all its diplomatic means to influence members of the entity not to commit the same killing to 
fulfill its positive obligations. If the Court in Ilaşcu wanted to find Moldova alongside with 
Russia responsible for the acts of “MRT”, it made no sense to reduce the obligations of 
Moldova to only positive obligations, excluding negative obligations. It could be stated that 
Moldova still had positive obligations, although limited, to protect persons in the territory 
over which it does not have authority. As for the finding Russia’s responsibility for “MRT”, 
this is even broader jurisdiction than ordinary rules of attribution of conduct under ASR. 
According to the following Court’s jurisprudence there is no need to establish that a 
state had effective control over a territory in order to find that the state had jurisdiction under 
Article 1 ECHR. One of the situations where the ECtHR found that the state had jurisdiction, 
even though it did not have territorial control, is where the state exercised control over the 
premises and detention facilities located in any territory and individuals present there.80  
Further Court’s case-law shows that there is no need for the state agents to exercise 
control over the particular premises at all to bring about the authority and control over 
individuals necessary to establish state’s jurisdiction. Being held in the hands of the state’s 
                                               
80 In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08, 02 March 2010, the Court found 
that the UK had jurisdiction over individuals arrested by it and transferred to the detention facilities run by it in 
Iraq, as the UK exercised control and authority over the individuals detained there (paras. 87-88). 80  The 
applicants, however, had to prove the state’s involved in their arrest and its control over the premises. See also 
Hussein v Albania and others, Application No. 23276/04, 14 March 2006 (Admissibility). 
The authority and control need not be established over detention facilities only. It can be established over any 
particular place, for example over a ship. The court found de facto control over a ship intercepted by the state 
agents. The crew of the ship, according to the Court in the Medvedyev case, also fell within state’s jurisdiction 
(Medvedyev and others v France, Application No. 3394/03, 29 March 2010 (Grand Chamber), para. 59).   
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officials, according to Öcalan, is already enough.81 Accordingly, there is no need for control 
by the respondent state over the premises themselves, the control over a person is sufficient.82 
In recent cases, the ECtHR expanded even further the notion of “jurisdiction, even in 
contravention to its own previous reasoning provided in Banković.83 The approach taken by 
the ECtHR in recent cases appears to be closer to the rules relating to the attribution of acts to 
a state for the purposes of establishing international responsibility of states.84 
In Al-Skeini the Court found that since the UK assumed the exercise of “some of the 
public powers” in Iraq (i.e. authority and responsibility for maintenance of security), the UK, 
through its soldiers engaged in security operations, “exercised authority and control over 
individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional 
link” between the victim and the state for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.85 The deaths 
                                               
81 In Öcalan v Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, 12 May 2005, para. 79, the Court found the applicant to be 
under Turkish authority and control and therefore under its “jurisdiction” from the moment he was handed over 
to the Turkish officials by Kenyan officials, even there Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory.  
82 It is supported by the reasoning of the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR) in M v Denmark, 
Application No. 17392/90, 14 October 1992 (Admissibility), para. 1 that where it stated that the state agents, 
including diplomatic or consular agents, “bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that state to 
the extent that they exercise authority over such persons or property”, and “[i]n so far as they affect such persons 
or property by their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the state is engaged”. 
83 In Pad, the ECtHR concluded that the victims of the alleged incident fell within jurisdiction of Turkey on 
because it admitted that the fire discharged from the Turkish helicopters caused the death of the victims, 
although the incident happened in the territory of Iran (Pad and others v Turkey, Application No. 60167/00, 28 
June 2007 (Admissibility), paras. 54-55). The Court did not discuss whether the victims at that moment were 
under authority or control of Turkish agents, probably because Turkey did not dispute its jurisdiction (para. 54). 
However notably the Court found Turkish jurisdiction not only where after helicopter’s landing the victims were 
surrounded by the Turkish forces and therefore physically came into their control, but also where the fire was 
discharged from the flying helicopter. This approach completely departs from reasoning in Banković (see also 
Marko Milanović (2011), at 185). The test of jurisdiction also seems to turn to the attribution of conduct to the 
state’s agents than to the fact that they exercised physical control over the persons or territory.  
84 See also Isaak v Turkey, Application No. 44587/98, 28 September 2006 (Admissibility), at 19-21, where the 
ECtHR held that a state can be responsible for violations of human rights of persons outside its territory who are 
found to be under this state’s authority and control through its agents lawfully or unlawfully operation in the 
other state, because Article 1 ECHR cannot be interpreted to allow the state to perpetrate human rights violations 
in the territory of another state which it could not perpetrate in its own territory. Moreover, the events took place 
in the territory of the neutral UN buffer zone, therefore outside the territorial control of Turkey. The Court, 
however, found that the applicant came under the Turkish authority/effective control and therefore within 
jurisdiction as a result of the acts of Turkish and “TRNC” soldiers and officials (at 21). The Court focused on the 
fact that human rights violations were committed by state’s agents (including by the “TRNC” authorities, whose 
acts are considered by the Court to be imputable to Turkey) rather than on the control over the territory. 
85 Al-Skeini case, para. 142. 
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occurred during such security operations resulted from either acts of British soldiers or 
unidentified gunmen fell within the UK jurisdiction.86  
It is possible to interpret Al-Skeini in the light of the concurrent opinion of Judge 
Bonello who advocated for the “authority and control” test (he calls it “functional test”) 
according to which if the perpetrator of human rights violations was within the state’s 
authority and control or the ability to investigate, punish and compensate for the human rights 
violations was within state’s authority and control, the violations would fall within that state’s 
jurisdiction.87 Accordingly, the Court applied the test of “authority and control” finding the 
UK’s jurisdiction over the individuals killed during the UK operations. The fact that it was 
done “during the security operations” and that the UK exercised “some of the public powers” 
in Iraq were factors (as opposed to requirement) leading the court to conclude that the 
violations were within the state’s authority and control and in other cases there may be other 
factors which could contribute to the finding of authority and control for the purposes of 
state’s jurisdiction.  
Another view was expressed that the Court did not fully depart from Banković and still 
requires to prove the exercise of “some of the public powers” by the state.88 Accordingly, 
what was said in Banković is still valid and transposed through “public powers” requirement 
which constitutes “exceptional circumstances” of finding of “authority and control” over the 
victims located extraterritorially. 89 This approach suggests that the Court will find state’s 
                                               
86 Al-Skeini case, para. 143. 
87 Al-Skeini case, concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, paras. 11, 12, 14, 19. 
88  See, for instance, Marco Milanović (2012), at 130; Anna Cowan (2012), at 224-225; Conall Mallory 
“European Court of Human Rights Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (Application No 55721/07) judgment 
of 7 July 2011”, 61 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 301 (2012), at 309, 311; Max Schaefer (2011), 
at 579. 
89 See Marco Milanović (2012), at 130, who points out that “the Court applied a personal model of jurisdiction to 
the killing of all six applicants, but it did so only exceptionally, because the UK exercised public powers in Iraq. 
But, a contrario, had the UK not exercised such public powers, the personal model of jurisdiction would not 
have applied. In other words, Banković is, according to the Court, still perfectly correct in its result. While the 
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“authority and control” outside the state’s territory only when that state exercises “some of the 
public powers”. That retains Al-Skeini still within Banković and does not allow the ECtHR 
jurisprudence to progress further in relation to extraterritorial jurisdiction.90  
However Al-Skeini should not be interpreted in such a restrictive way. In fact, the 
Court did not need to explicitly overrule Banković in order to make a shift to another 
jurisdictional  test. According to Judge Bonello, the Court previously adopted different tests 
depending on the circumstances of the case and that diminished the human rights protection.91 
He advocated for the “authority and control” test (“functional test”) to be the only one the 
Court applies.92  
The “authority and control” test does not need to be restricted by the “public powers” 
requirement. Although the UK exercised some “public powers” in Iraq, the Court did not 
analyse whether a particular territory was under the UK “effective overall control”.93 The 
Court did not suggest that those public powers would necessarily derive from the occupation 
of the territory. The Court did not provide any explanation for the scope of public powers. 
The exercise of “some of the public powers” is already enough and there is no need to 
exercise all of public powers of sovereign state. Anything that is normally done by a state on 
its own territory and instead done by another state extraterritorially can be considered “public 
powers”, including as in this case participating in a security operation and therefore it is likely 
                                                                                                                                                   
ability to kill is ‘authority and control’ over the individual if the state has public powers, killing is not authority 
and control if the state is merely firing missiles from an aircraft.” 
90 See also Conall Mallory (2012), at 310, who considers that “Al-Skeini is a progressive judgment for the 
understanding of article 1 jurisdiction in the [ECtHR]. However it could be argued that the extent of the 
progression is strongly hindered by the finding being based on the exercise of public powers as opposed to the 
specific action of the UK forces.” 
91 Al-Skeini case, concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, paras. 17-18. 
92 Ibid, paras. 19-20, who rather colourfully describes that “this would be my universal vision of what this Court 
is all about – a bright line approach rather than case by case, more or less inspired, more or less insipid, 
improvisations, cluttering the case-law with doctrines which are, at best, barely compatible and at worst blatantly 
contradictory – and none measured against the essential yardstick of the supremacy and universality of human 
rights anytime, anywhere.” 
93 See also Max Schaefer (2011), at 579; Anna Cowan “A new watershed? Re-evaluating Banković in light of Al-
Skeini”, 1 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 213 (2012), at 224. 
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that the Court may qualify “public powers” broadly and apply rather “authority and control” 
test without considering “public powers” as an absolute requirement.  
Apart from “public powers” qualification, it was enough for the Court that the acts 
occurred during the operations conducted by British soldiers. The fact that the acts were 
committed by the state’s agents was not decisive (the jurisdictional link was established even 
where an act was committed by an unidentified person). The physical control over the victims 
by the state’s agents was not necessary to establish (as most of the victims were not detained 
by the British soldiers).94 Such relaxed conditions to establish a jurisdictional link can be 
explained by the fact that the applicants did not complain about the acts themselves which 
resulted in death, but about the adequacy of the investigation conducted by the UK in the 
result of those acts, which is by itself a positive obligation rather than a negative one not to 
violate the right to life. The situation may be different if the complaint was that the state 
directly violated the substantial (as opposed to procedural) right to life, as that would require 
to establish whether the acts were committed by its agents or someone else.95  
Even if the criteria of “the exercise of some of the public powers” and engagement in 
“security operations” are maintained for finding “authority and control” over individuals 
suffered a violation of their rights during security operations, they can easily be applied to the 
PSOs situations when they are deployed to maintain security in particular area (one of the 
“public powers” according to the Court)96 and conduct their security operations. According to 
such reasoning, the UN/TCCs would be responsible for the violations of human rights 
committed during their PSOs.  
 
                                               
94 See also Max Schaefer (2011), at 579. 
95 See also See Marco Milanović (2012), at 131. 
96 See Al-Skeini case, para. 149. 
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C) Is the concept of “jurisdiction” to be considered in the light of the rules of 
attribution? 
As discussed above the jurisprudence of the HRC and IACHR supports that 
jurisdiction is to be interpreted as to cover the acts of the state’s agents which violate human 
rights obligations of that state and there is no need for the state’s control to be established 
over the foreign territory or physical control over persons in order to make a finding of state’s 
violation of its negative obligations through its agents. This is mostly evident from Alejandre 
of the IACHR. However the approach of the ECtHR on this issue is not straightforward. Its 
jurisprudence was mostly influenced by the controversial case of Banković, where the Court 
confined the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the cases of established effective 
control over the foreign territory. The subsequent jurisprudence, nevertheless, provided for a 
more expanded approach, where the state exercises either control over premises or physical 
control over a person during their arrest or abduction by that state’s agents. More recent Al-
Skeini may align the approach taken by the ECtHR with those of the HRC and IACHR.97 Al-
Skeini provides for the establishment of jurisdiction of the state by the way of effective 
control based on the fact that the human rights violations were committed by British soldiers 
during their security operations. This interpretation is close to the one of the HRC and IACHR.  
The argument that the finding of state’s jurisdiction in Al-Skeini must be based on the 
fact that the UK exercised some public powers in Iraq cannot be sustained. It can lead to an 
absurd situation where the persons killed by the state’s agents during security operations 
conducted in the territory where the state exercises some public powers would fall within 
state’s jurisdiction, whereas those killed during operations conducted in the territory where 
the state refused to exercise public powers would not. Similarly, the persons killed or 
                                               
97 See also John Cerone (2006), at 1486, who also suggests that “the Court’s recent judgements show a more 
fluid approach to extraterritorial application of the European Convention, projecting a trend toward convergence 
(or re-convergence) with the approach of the Human Rights Committee and IACHR.” 
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mistreated during their detention by the state’s agents would be under state’s jurisdiction, 
whereas those who were killed or mistreated on spot without being arrested or taken to the 
detention facilities would not and the state would avoid responsibility by asking its agents to 
perform any prohibited acts outside its detention facilities.98  
As such situations are unsatisfactory, the approach taken by the ICJ in the Wall and 
Congo cases and by the HRC and IACHR is a preferred approach. The finding that the state 
exercised jurisdiction must be based on the rules of attribution of the conduct, rather than on 
whether or not the state had effective overall control over a territory. The “jurisdiction” clause 
in human rights treaties is not a separate/additional condition for the establishment of state 
responsibility, The finding that the state in fact exercised its jurisdiction in any territory (i.e. 
performed certain conduct) and actual human rights violations by that conduct leads to the 
responsibility of that state, in the same way as the attribution to the state of the conduct and 
the breach of international obligations leads to the finding of state responsibility under ILC 
articles.99 Even if the state performed acts which it had no authority to perform in foreign 
territory under general international law (it had no jurisdiction in the sense of general 
international law), this does not exempt it from responsibility under human rights law for the 
acts that were actually performed.  
While the rules on attribution act as a condition or limitation to the responsibility of 
the state for particular breach of negative obligations, in order to find a breach of positive 
obligations, there is no need to establish the attribution of acts of private persons to the state. 
                                               
98 See also Loukis G. Loucaides “Determining the extra-territorial effect of the European Convention: facts, 
jurisprudence and the Banković case”, 4 European Human Rights Law Review 391 (2006), at 400; Marko 
Milanović “From compromise to principle: clarifying the concept of state jurisdiction in human rights treaties”, 8 
Human Rights Law Review 411 (2008), at 426. See also concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, Al-Skeini case, 
where he gives an example of absurdity of application of this principle, when two civilians were killed by a 
British soldier in a street in Basrah together, but one before the arrest and the second one after the arrest, then 
according to that principle, the second one would be within the UK jurisdiction and the first one would not (para. 
15).  
99 See ASR Articles 1 and 2. 
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As the state cannot be responsible for all the acts of private persons committed beyond its 
national territory, the “jurisdictional” limitation can usefully restrict state’s positive 
obligations to certain situations. Some authors are of the opinion that a mere presence of state 
organs or agents in some location (without exercise of any authority or ability to prevent 
violations) cannot be sufficient for establishing state’s positive obligations over the persons 
happened to be nearby.100 The finding of effective control over a territory or persons may be a 
useful element to establish jurisdiction of state with regard to its positive obligations.101 
Although it is enough to find that an act complained was attributed to the state for the 
purposes of state responsibility (the state breached negative obligations), in the circumstances 
where the acts cannot be attributed to the state (as it was done by a private party), the state 
may be still in violation of its positive obligations, but only if it had control over that act.102  
Supposedly, state agents killed a person outside state’s territory and violated the right 
to life of that person. The argument is that if the act of killing is attributed to the state 
(because it was done by its agents), the person killed was subject to that state’s jurisdiction by 
virtue of state’s agents performing this act. If a state’s agent was simply present somewhere 
outside that state’s territory and a person was killed by another private person, the state cannot 
be responsible for it. If however a person was killed by a private person but in the place over 
which that state exercised effective control outside its territory (e.g. in detention facilities run 
by the state), the state can be responsible for violations of its positive obligations to prevent 
                                               
100 As Cerone points out, without exercising any control, “the mere extraterritorial presence of a state agent in the 
same physical location as an individual would not be sufficient to bring that individual within the jurisdiction of 
that state party for the purpose of applying positive obligations, e.g., the duty to protect that individual’s right to 
life from violation by a third party.” See John Cerone (2006), at 1506. King also suggests that “a state will rarely 
owe positive duties to persons outside the scope of its lawful authority: rather the state will need to refrain from 
interfering with people’s rights.” See Hugh King (2009), at 551-552. Scheinin also argues that a state cannot be 
said to be responsible for a violation, “unless it had some factually possible and meaningful way to prevent the 
violation.” See Martin Scheinin (2004), at 75. 
101 See also Marko Milanović (2011), at 18, 119. 
102 See also Al-Skeini case, concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, para. 19. 
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killing and protect the person and this person falls within that state’s jurisdiction by virtue of 
its exercise of effective control over the place. 
The situations where the state has positive obligations to protect individuals from the 
third parties may include those where the state exercises effective control over particular 
territory (where the state has to ensure the fulfilment of its negative and positive obligations 
towards the inhabitants of that territory, e.g. to establish public order and to protect them from 
acts of private parties); or exercises physical control over the persons when arresting, 
capturing or detaining individuals (where the state must not only avoid violating their rights in 
detention but also protect them from such violations by others).103  
Such an interpretation in separating negative and positive obligations of the state 
according to its involvement into the situation in question, may not have been supported by 
the earlier ECtHR jurisprudence.104 In Banković the Court held that there is no support in 
Article 1 ECHR that the positive obligations can be divided and tailored in accordance with 
the particular circumstances of the extraterritorial act.105 However, this approach was not 
maintained by the further ECtHR jurisprudence.  
In Ilaşcu, analysing the scope of the positive obligations binding Moldova in the 
territory of Transdniestria, which according to the Court, is out of Moldova’s effective control, 
the ECtHR held that “such a factual situation reduces the scope of that jurisdiction in that the 
                                               
103 See Rick Lawson “Life after Banković: on the extraterritorial application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, in Coomans, Fons, Kamminga, Menno T., Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, 
(Intersentia, 2004), at 106, who argues that “to the extend that [the state agents] assume de facto control over 
individuals and interfere with their lives, they should take ‘measures within the scope of their powers which, 
judged reasonably, might have been expected’ to take to avoid violations of these individual’s rights.” See also 
Marko Milanović (2011), at 210. 
104 The Court stated, for example, in the Cyprus v Turkey case (para.65) that the in the areas where the state 
exercises effective overall control, its jurisdiction under the Convention must be considered to extend to securing 
the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention, even where those acts are done by local 
administration, and not directly by the state’s agents. The Court earlier suggested that the state’s obligations are 
confined to the particular territorial scope (under state’s effective control) and are exercised in its entire range 
and their scope cannot be adjusted to the different situations on the basis of the ability to prevent a particular 
result or conduct. In such a case it would be feasible to limit them by the stringent concept of jurisdiction to be 
exercised in certain, well defined circumstances. 
105 Banković case, para. 75.  
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undertaking given by the state under Article 1 must be considered […] only in the light of the 
Contracting state’s positive obligations towards persons within its territory”. 106 The Court 
found that Moldova should have used all the legal and diplomatic to guarantee the rights and 
freedom under the Convention. 107  In this way the Court “divided and tailored” positive 
obligations of Moldova.108 It required the state to fulfill its obligations as far as possible using 
all means available to it, even though it did not require Moldova to fulfill the entire range of 
positive obligations because it did not have control over the “MRT” territory.  
In Al-Skeini, the ECtHR explicitly overruled its finding in Banković stating that 
“whenever the state through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and 
thus jurisdiction, the state is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual 
the rights and freedoms […] of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that 
individual. In this sense […] the Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’.”109 The 
Court adopted case-by-case approach to the finding of state’s jurisdiction over a particular 
human rights violation. The state is required to secure only those rights which can be violated 
by the acts (or in the situations) over which the state exercises effective control. The scope of 
state’s obligations depends on the scope of authority and control exercised by the state and the 
range of rights the state bound to respect is dependant upon the level of that state’s control 
established on case-by-case basis.110  
Analogous test was proposed by Judge Bonello in his concurrent opinion in Al-Skeini. 
He considered that as the state’s jurisdiction arises from the fact of assuming the obligations 
under the Convention (when signing and ratifying it) and from having the capability to fulfil 
                                               
106 Ilaşcu case, para. 308. 
107 Ibid. 
108 See also John Cerone (2006), at 1504. 
109 Al-Skeini case, para. 130.  
110 See John Cerone (2006), at 1497; Martin Scheinin (2004), at 76; Rick Lawson (2004), at 84, 120; See also 
Marco Sassòli (2011), at 65, proposing “functional approach” which would distinguish the degree of control 
necessary according to the right to be protected. 
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them under the circumstances of the case, both for the intra-territorial and extraterritorial 
situations, the Court should consider whether the commission of the alleged violation depends 
on the state’s agents and whether it was within the State’s power to punish the perpetrators 
and to compensate the victims and therefore when the observance or the breach of human 
rights is within its authority and control.111 The “authority and control” test is also applicable 
to the finding of whether the state had positive obligations in relation to the violation of 
human rights in issue: if the state is not in a position of authority and control to ensure 
extraterritorial fulfilment of its positive obligations, then its jurisdiction is excluded in respect 
to those positive obligations.112  
The question however is what would trigger the authority and control that the state 
exercises extraterritorially in respect of positive obligations. The state’s control over 
individual or territory can be particularly relevant for its ability to take such measures to 
enable it to fulfill its positive obligations and to protect persons from human rights violations 
committed by particular acts. The focus is on the establishment of factual control over the 
territory or persons. The examination of the degree of this control will be able to delineate the 
state’s responsibility for the violations of its positive obligations. The degree of control 
depends on the state’s ability to prevent the particular conduct, even if it entails positive 
obligations of states to prevent the conduct committed by private persons. 113  As for the 
finding of state’s responsibility over the acts committed by its organs, the state clearly has 
ability to prevent them.  
The jurisdictional analysis of the state’s responsibility for the human rights violations, 
must be done in the light of the rules on attribution of conduct to states. Most of the 
jurisprudence of the human rights bodies supports this conclusion. While it was not expressly 
                                               
111 Al-Skeini case, concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, paras. 11, 13, 16. 
112 Ibid, para. 19. 
113 See also Rachel Opie (2006), at 22.  
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acknowledged, the analysis on establishment of state’s jurisdiction is in line with the rules on 
attribution. Any additional condition introduced in the second limb on the breach of 
international obligations of states (one of the conditions to establish state responsibility) 
would either be equal in scope with the first limb on attribution or unduly restrict the scope of 
states’ human rights obligations under human rights treaties allowing the states to escape the 
responsibility for their acts on the sole basis of their extraterritorial conduct.  
As for the IHRL obligations of TCCs in the situations where PSFs commit human 
rights violations in the territory of host states, they are still valid and untouched according to 
the conclusion stated above, because they would not be barred by the “jurisdictional” 
limitation of human rights treaties. The rules on attribution described in Chapter II are 
applicable to find TCCs responsible for PSFs’ conduct.  
It should be pointed out that the Behrami case discussed in Chapter II with regard to 
the attribution of conduct of PSOs cannot change this conclusion either. Even though the 
Court found the case inadmissible, it clearly focused its analysis on the rules of attribution of 
conduct of peacekeepers to the states and IOs and not on the issue of jurisdiction under 
Article 1. The Court left this issue untouched and therefore the question of jurisdiction needs 
to be seen in the light of the subsequent jurisprudence of the Court (including  Al-Skeini) 
rather than Behrami which does not provide a relevant authority for that. 
The exact scope of human rights obligations of TCCs which constitutes breach of 
human rights obligations by the state should be further analysed with regard to the concurrent 
applicability of IHRL and IHL to the situation of PSFs when they participate in the conflict. 
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2. The relationship between human rights and international 
humanitarian law obligations of states and the UN during PSOs 
 
A) Interpreting IHL and IHRL in the light of their concurrent application 
As discussed above, in some circumstances PSFs may participate in the armed conflict 
and the IHL rules apply and bind the UN and TCCs. The question is whether IHRL 
obligations continue to bind the UN and TCCs too in whole or in part.  
This question was dealt with by the ICJ on several occasions. The Court showed little 
hesitancy in holding states responsible for violations of their extraterritorial human rights 
obligations during times of armed conflict.114 In Nuclear Weapons (GA), the ICJ observed 
that the protection of the ICCPR does not cease in times of war. 115  Being concerned in 
particular with Article 6 ICCPR, the Court stated that “the right not arbitrarily to be deprived 
of one’s life applies also in hostilities” and that in such situations the test of what is 
“arbitrary” deprivation of life is to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, i.e. law 
applicable in armed conflict.116  
This paragraph provoked different interpretations. It is sometimes argued that the 
Court meant that IHL rules will displace IHRL rules by virtue of operation of lex specialis.117 
This cannot be the case. The ICJ clearly states that the protection of the ICCPR continues in 
times of war. The Court’s reasoning is specifically focused on the particular article of the 
Covenant – Article 6. The Court does not state that in times of war the rights of the whole 
Covenant must be displaced by IHL as a lex specialis, nor does it say that in general that all 
                                               
114 Shane Darcy (2007), at 357. 
115 Nuclear Weapons case (GA), para. 25.  
116 Ibid, para. 25.  
117 This was the position of the US that the human rights treaties, in particular the ICCPR would not apply during 
armed conflicts. See for discussion, Patrick Walsh "Fighting for Human Rights: The Application of Human 
Rights Treaties to United States' Military Operations", 28 Penn State International Law Review 45 (2009), at 53. 
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the articles of the ICCPR must be interpreted by the rules of IHL. It states that in a particular 
article (Article 6), the finding on “arbitrariness” must include the analysis of the laws of 
armed conflict. It does not say either that the right to life is no more protected, but the 
examination of any violations of this right must be conducted in the light of IHL applicable to 
the particular situation of armed conflict. Therefore the right to life still applies in 
hostilities.118  
Wall confirms this approach. In this case having reiterated that the protection offered 
by the human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, the Court observed 
that there are three possible situations in the relationship between IHL and HRL: some rights 
may be exclusively matters of HRL, some other rights may be exclusively matters of IHL, 
others may be matters of both of them.119 Unfortunately the Court did not give any examples 
of the rights falling under each of three categories. However this reasoning confirms that IHL 
rules will not displace IHRL, but IHRL will even complement IHL rules in the situations not 
covered by IHL. Particular articles of IHRL will not be abandoned because of the application 
of IHL rules, but IHL and IHRL will both regulate particular situations during the armed 
conflict.  
As the Court further explained in Congo, both IHL and IHRL must be taken into 
consideration.120 The Court did not mention that the conflict between them must be resolved 
according to the lex specialis, like it stated in the previous cases.121 The Court did not explore 
                                               
118 See Christopher Greenwood "Human Rights and Humanitarian Law - Conflict or Convergence Frederick K. 
Cox International Law Center Lecture in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law", 43 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 491 (2010), at 501. 
119 Wall case, para. 106. 
120 Congo case, para. 216. 
121 See also Paul Eden, Matthew Happold “Symposium: the relationship between international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law”, 14 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 441 (2009), at 442. 
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when both IHL and IHRL are applicable, which of them would be preferred in case of a clear 
conflict of norms.122  
The HRC also stated that the ICCPR applies in the situations of armed conflict noting 
that “while, in respect certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of [IHL] may be 
specifically relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of 
law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”123  
It can be concluded that IHL and IHRL norms apply concurrently during armed 
conflicts and they are not mutually exclusive.124 The norms of both branches of international 
law complement each other in armed conflicts and the relationships between states and 
individuals involved. Any reference to the lex specialis rule is to be made in the sense of 
harmonisation and interpretation of a more general rule by a more specific one and not by a 
simple substitution of IHRL rules by IHL norms as more specific to all situations arising from 
the fact of existence of the armed conflict.125  
As stated above, a state is responsible for the acts of its troops abroad and during 
armed conflicts, because the human rights treaties generally do not confine their scope of 
applications to the time of peace, in the same manner as IHL treaties for the time of armed 
conflict.126 Such a situation would be able to provide protection not only to the population of 
the adverse party to the conflict, but also to the nationals of the co-belligerent states and 
                                               
122 See also Laura M. Olson "Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity between International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law - Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-
International Armed Conflict Security Detention: The International Legal Framework", 40 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 437 (2009), at 445. 
123 General Comment No.31, para. 11.  
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neutral states due to the application of IHRL irrespective of the nationality of the persons 
protected.  
In the situations where both IHL and IHRL govern particular conduct one type of 
norms can be interpreted in the light of another including not only treaty norms but also 
customary norms of both IHL and IHRL. 127  For example, the right not to be arbitrary 
deprived from life can be interpreted in the light of IHL rules on distinction between civilians 
and combatants, where the killing of a combatant in the course of combat using allowed 
methods and means of warfare may not be considered “arbitrary” for the purpose of Article 6 
ICCPR or Article 4 ACHR.128  
Regional human rights bodies on some occasions also had to deal with the question of 
interrelationship between IHL and IHRL. The IACHR in Coard recognised that IHL and 
IHRL may substantially overlap in some situations.129 The Commission noted that if the test 
of observance of a particular right, e.g. right to liberty, is distinct from that applicable in the 
time of peace, the applicable standards must be deduced by reference to the applicable lex 
specialis, i.e. IHL. 130  The Commission considered IHL to be “a source of authoritative 
guidance” for the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention.131 In the present case, the 
Commission interpreted the provisions of the American Declaration on prohibition of 
arbitrary detention (Articles I and XXV) in the light of IHL standards (Article 78 GCIV) and 
found state’s actions incompatible with the terms of the Declaration.132  
                                               
127 See also Anthony E. Cassimatis (2007), at 634. 
128 See for the interpretation of Article 4 of the ACHR La Tablada case, paras. 188-189, 327-328. 
129 Coard case, para. 39.  
130 Ibid, para. 42. 
131 Ibid, para. 42.  
132 Ibid, paras. 42 and 57. Curiously, the IACHR also stated that in the situations where IHL and IHRL “provide 
levels of protection which are distinct, it is bound by its Charter-based mandate to give effect to the normative 
standards which best safeguard the rights of the individual”(para. 42). It is interesting to see whether this 
statement could resolve any potential conflict of norms of IHL and IHRL as to provide maximum protection to 
the individuals. If this statement is taken literally, it would follow from it that in the situations of armed conflict 
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In La Tablada, the Commission noted that the American Convention contains no rules 
that define or distinguish civilians from combatants, so it had to apply IHL rules as sources of 
authoritative guidelines.133 While finding that the rules of NIAC applicable, it concluded that 
the right to life of the persons participating in the attack was not violated by the state, as they 
were legitimate military targets during the time of participation in the fighting.134 Although 
both IHL and IHRL were applicable there, the Commission did not apply the Convention only. 
It applied more specific rules dealing with particular type of situation, namely, with NIAC, 
expressly referring to IHL rules. The Commission applied IHL as a method of interpretation 
of provisions in the Convention itself.135 
The ECtHR approaches the issue of interpretation of ECHR norms in the light of IHL 
rules with more caution. It did not expressly state that it would apply IHL rules to find a 
violation of the Convention. Moreover, some of the relevant provisions of the Convention are 
drafted in a more exhaustive way which does not leave much room for interpretation.136 The 
Court interprets the ECHR on its own terms, even though it has borrowed some rules and 
terminology from IHL, without specifically mentioning it.137 
However, the ECtHR reasoning supports the idea that IHL should be at least taken into 
account in the interpretation of particular provisions of the Convention. For example, the 
Court requires states to take all feasible precautions in choosing means and methods of their 
                                                                                                                                                   
the combatants may be also protected from the attack and depravation of life, as in this case IHRL would provide 
better protection to them rather than IHL. 
133 La Tablada case, para. 161. 
134 La Tablada case, paras. 188-189, 327-328. 
135 See also Vera Gowlland-Debbas “The relevance of paragraph 25 of the ICJ’s Advisory opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons”, 98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 358 (2004), at 361. 
136 See, for example, Article 2 on the protection of the right to life, the text of which does not use the word 
“arbitrary” (that can be interpreted in different ways) and instead provides an exhaustive list of circumstances, 
when the deprivation of the right to life may be permitted. See also Article 5 for the same construction.  
137 Louise Doswald-Beck "Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Are There Some Individuals Bereft of All 
Legal Protection Proceedings of the Ninety-Eigth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law", 98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 353 (2004), at 355. 
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security operations with a view to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life.138 The 
Court looks at the type of weapons used in the security operations and can find a state 
violating the right to life, if the state among other factors used heavy and indiscriminate 
weapons.139  
The ECtHR also considered that Article 2 ECHR extends so far as to require states to 
take steps to protect the lives of those not/no loner, engaged in hostilities (wounded, prisoners 
of war or civilians).140 The Court stated that Article 2 “must be interpreted in so far as 
possible in light of the general principles of international law, including the rules of IHL 
which play an indispensable and universally-accepted role in mitigating the savagery and 
inhumanity of armed conflict.”141 The ECtHR interpreted the provisions of the Convention (at 
least Article 2) in the light of IHL rules, although the text of the provisions does not provide 
much room for interpretation. The Court prefers not to focus on the discussion whether the 
state invokes the correct aim for use of force, but rather discusses the state’s use of force in 
the scope of “absolute necessity” requirement implicitly incorporating principles and rules of 
IHL in the discussion of IHRL norms. By that the ECtHR started to develop its own IHRL 
rules applicable to the conduct of hostilities.142 
 
B) Possible solutions to the potential conflict of the IHL and IHRL norms 
As discussed above the human rights bodies tend to interpret their respective treaties 
in the light of IHL rules. However, not all the provisions of human rights treaties can be 
                                               
138 See Ergi v Turkey, Application No. 23818/94, 28 July 1998, para. 74, Isayeva v Russia, Application No. 
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reconciled with IHL rules.143 It is possible to explore potential solutions to the conflict of 
norms of IHL/IHRL.  
It is possible to invoke the derogations provisions of the human rights treaties to solve 
conflict of norms of IHL/IHRL. This can be a solution for the conflict of norms between IHL 
rules and derogable rights of human rights treaties. The derogation provision is relevant to the 
right to life under the ECHR, as it provides that the derogation from the right to life is 
possible in respect of death resulting from the lawful acts of war.144 Thus, if the state invoked 
derogation while being involved in the armed conflict, its acts would not violate right to life if 
they were in conformity with IHL, even though these acts did not fall within one of the 
legitimate aims provided by Article 2.  
However the application of derogation provisions is not a solution for any situation 
involving concurrent application of IHL/IHRL norms. One of the problems of reliance on 
derogation provisions is that different human rights treaties place stringent restrictions on the 
possibility for states to derogate from their human rights obligations and some human rights 
can never be derogated from during a state of emergency.145 There are certain conditions to be 
fulfilled before the state may invoke the derogation clause. Under the ICCPR there needs to 
exist a situation of public emergency “which threatens the life of the nation and the existence 
of which is officially proclaimed.” 146  While the existence of the armed conflict can be 
considered a situation of public emergency, the HRC explicitly stated that even during an 
armed conflict, “measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent 
that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation.”147  
                                               
143 See the examples of such norms in the discussion below. 
144 See ECHR, Article 15 (2).  
145 See also Shane Darcy (2007), at 358. 
146 ICCPR, Article 4(1). See also Louise Doswald-Beck (2004), at 354. 
147 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, “States of emergency (Article 4)”, 31 August 2001, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 3. 
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Regarding the armed conflict where PSFs become involved in, it can hardly threaten 
the life of the nations of TCCs. As noted by Lord Bingham in Al-Jedda, “it is hard to think 
that these conditions could ever be met when a state had chosen to conduct an overseas 
peacekeeping operation, however dangerous the conditions, from which it could withdraw.”148 
There may be few, if any, such public emergency situations which could be officially 
proclaimed by TCCs to PSOs. Although the conditions of Article 15 ECHR are less 
stringent,149 any state would hardly proclaim “war” the situation of armed conflict between its 
contingent forming part of the PSO and their adversaries in the host state. Moreover, states 
cannot derogate from all the provisions of a human rights treaty, just because of state of 
emergency. States can only take derogating measures to the extent “strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation”,150 meaning that they can only derogate from particular provisions, 
by showing the reasons for such derogations.151 Therefore although the use of derogation 
clauses may solve some of the conflicts of norms, it is not available in all circumstances, 
especially with regard to PSOs.  
Another possible solution is to apply lex specialis rule in the way proposed in Nuclear 
Weapons (GA), i.e. the provisions of IHRL can be interpreted in the light of the norms of IHL. 
The discussion below addresses the potential conflicts of IHL and IHRL norms from the 
position of application of lex specialis. This discussion primarily focuses on the text of 
particular provisions of IHRL that may be in conflict with IHL rules and how the differences 
can be overcome. It does not concern the provisions that are not directly in conflict with each 
other and can be interpreted in the light of one another.  
                                               
148 Al-Jedda (House of Lords) case, per Lord Bingham, para. 38.  
149 Article 15 of the EHCR requires the existence of “war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation.” 
150 See ICCPR, Article 4(1); ECHR, Article 15(1); ACHR, Article 27(1).  
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One example of potential conflict of norms is the rules relating to preventive detention 
and judicial review of detention. Article 9 ICCPR provides that “no one shall be subject to 
arbitrary arrest or detention”. This open-ended wording permits to interpret “arbitrary” in 
terms of IHL rules in relation to the detention of combatants or civilians.152 Article 5 ECHR 
contains a closed list of grounds on which a person may be deprived of his liberty.153 None of 
these grounds can be interpreted in an open-ended way as to encompass the detention of 
POWs under Article 21 GCIII or interment of civilians for security reasons under Articles 41-
43 GCIV. If we apply lex specialis rule to Article 9 ICCPR, the detention of combatants or 
civilians during the armed conflict in conformity with Article 21 GCIII and Article 41-43 
GCIV respectively will not be considered arbitrary.  
For the application of lex specialis rule to Article 5 ECHR (even in conformity with 
the aforementioned IHL norms) the court have to disregard the closed list of grounds for 
detention. There is no legal test to apply against the facts of a case on depravation of liberty 
under Article 5 ECHR (like e.g. the test of “arbitrary” detention). According to this provision, 
if a person was deprived of his liberty on any ground other than six ones provided in para.1, 
the right to liberty of this person was violated.154 If a PSF from a ECHR MS decides to intern 
persons from the host state for security or other reason without a trial under Article 21 GCIII 
or Article 41-43 GCIV and the case reaches ECtHR, the Court will have to introduce a 
“necessity” test in the analysis under Article 5, as it does not provide for one or directly 
transpose IHL rules to the right to liberty discussion without adopting them in the language of 
the ECHR. However the latter option does not seem to reflect the usual Court’s approach to 
                                               
152 See also Marko Milanović (2009), at 474-475. 
153 See Article 5, para. 1 for the list of 6 grounds: detention after the conviction by court; detention for non-
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the interpretation of the ECHR.155 The state may derogate from Article 5 ECHR if the state of 
emergency was recognised under Article 15, although it may not always be the case. 
The construction of Article 5 ECHR differs from Article 2 ECHR (right to life) which 
provides for the “absolutely necessary” test, although containing a closed list of grounds 
under which a person may be deprived of his life. The list of grounds is even more limited 
(contains only three grounds), but may be interpreted broadly as to include the instances of 
armed conflict, especially the ground of “defence of any person from unlawful violence.”156 
However, this ground covers only the case of pure individual self-defence and not actions 
done during defensive or offensive operations. The application of “absolute necessity” test 
may be problematic here, because under IHL there is no need to prove necessity in killing 
combatants (excluding hors de combat). 157   Notably, the “derogations” provisions under 
Article 15 envisage the derogations from the right to life on the basis of lawful acts of war, 
but for application of those derogations the state of emergency threatening the life of the 
nation must be recognised. According to the previous discussion, this may be problematic 
especially with regard to PSOs’ situation, because the involvement of PSFs in armed conflict 
is unlikely to be considered state of emergency for their TCCs and without application of 
derogation provisions, killing of a person by PSFs must be justified as absolutely necessary. 
Regarding judicial review of the detention under Article 5(4) ECHR and Article 9(4) 
ICCPR, everyone deprived of this liberty is entitled to take proceedings to have the 
lawfulness of his detention reviewed by court. In case of combatants, IHL rules do not require 
any review of detention of POWs (Article 21 GCIII). Although Article 5 GCIII provide for 
the determination by a “competent tribunal” of the status of persons (whether they are lawful 
                                               
155 See the discussion in the previous subsection on the case-law of the ECtHR in this regard. 
156 See the discussion in the previous subsection. The other two grounds provided in Article 2 ECHR are: the 
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or unlawful combatants and therefore entitled to the protection of GCIII), it does not deal with 
the question of review of combatants’ detention. The internment of civilians can be reviewed 
by a court or “administrative board” under Article 43 GCIV, whereas Article 5(4) ECHR and 
Article 9(4) ICCPR both provide for the lawfulness of detention to be challenged in a court.   
One more example of the potential conflict of norms may exist where the ECHR 
imposes some positive obligations upon the states requiring them, e.g. to introduce substantial 
changes to the law in force in the territory, where they are bound to apply the Convention, for 
instance, in the occupied territories.158 If the laws in force contravene the obligations of the 
state under IHRL, requiring it to execute persons for their political views, the state may be 
required to introduce changes in existing laws of states. Article 43 HR requires the occupying 
states to respect, unless absolutely prevented, the existing laws in force in the occupied 
territory. The state may not be considered as “absolutely prevented” to respect such laws, 
when restoring and ensuring public order and safety in the occupied territory. However, this 
would contradict its human rights obligations to respect right to life and freedom of 
expression of those persons. The problem is whether the lex specialis will still work in favour 
of IHL and not IHRL in the occupied territories. Or in such kind of situations it is possible 
that the IHL “absolutely prevented” test is interpreted in the light of IHRL.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the rules of IHRL apply to PSOs even though peacekeepers 
act outside their home countries and in the circumstances of existing armed conflict. It was 
argued that in order to find that the UN or TCCs violated human rights obligations of 
customary (for the UN and TCCs) and treaty (for TCCs) nature, one needs to prove the 
                                               
158 See Christopher Greenwood (2010), at 507; see also Guglielmo Verdirame “Human rights in wartime: a 
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general test of international responsibility, namely that peacekeepers breached human rights 
obligations of their respective states and they were attributed to their states (or to the UN). 
There is no need to prove an additional link of their victims with the TCCs/UN. This 
statement is true for the violation of negative obligations under IHRL, namely when 
peacekeepers themselves commit wrongful acts. It is also possible that the UN/TCCs are 
found in violation of their positive obligations if certain conditions are met. If they exercise 
effective control over particular territory or place (e.g. detention facilities), they may be also 
required to ensure that the rights of the persons residing on that territory or detained in that 
place are not violated and have positive obligations to prevent acts of violence against them. 
IHRL continues to apply not only in peacetime but also during armed conflicts and 
occupation together with IHL. IHL rules do not displace IHRL rules, but IHRL complements 
the protection provide by IHL. In the situations where both of them regulate the same subject 
matter they will be interpreted in the light of each other. Where, however, it is not possible 
due to the potential conflict of norms of IHL and IHRL the lex specialis rule starts to operate. 
Therefore the norms of IHRL contained in human rights treaties have to be interpreted by the 
rules of IHL, especially it concerns the situations where the wording of provisions leaves 
some possibility for interpretation. In the circumstances where no such interpretation is 
possible, the derogation clauses of the treaties may be important in order to reconcile different 
approaches of IHRL and IHL to a particular situation.  
 188 
V. Individual criminal responsibility of peacekeepers 
 
This chapter discusses individual criminal responsibility of peacekeepers over crimes 
committed by them during PSOs. As before, the focus is made on military personnel of 
national contingents of PSOs. The chapter aims to prove that despite broad immunity 
provided to them by the UN in its UN SOFAs concluded with host states peacekeepers may 
be subject to jurisdiction of different states depending on the category of crimes they commit. 
The chapter also demonstrates that UN SOFAs will not preclude the ICC from exercising its 
jurisdiction over the crimes committed by peacekeepers.  
For these purposes, the chapter firstly discusses the jurisdiction and immunities of 
peacekeepers in national courts and then in the ICC. Section 1, firstly, explores international 
law on criminal jurisdiction and obligations of states under international conventions. 
Secondly, the relevant UN SOFA provisions are analysed. Thirdly, the enquiry is made to the 
possibility of peacekeepers committing international crimes and whether obligations of the 
host states under UN SOFAs and international conventions may be in conflict. Fourthly, the 
immunities of peacekeepers under UN SOFAs are discussed. In Section 2, the possibility of 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over peacekeepers is analysed and then further enquiries 
are made to the possible immunities provided to peacekeepers under the ICC Statute.  
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1. Criminal jurisdiction of states over crimes committed by peacekeepers and 
immunities attached to their status  
 
A) Is the establishment of criminal jurisdiction and prosecution of alleged offenders an 
obligation or permission? 
It is important to distinguish between jurisdiction and immunities from jurisdiction. As 
ICJ stated in Arrest Warrant, only where a state can establish jurisdiction the question of 
immunities with regard to exercise of that jurisdiction can be considered.1 The jurisdiction 
does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction.2 
The distinction between jurisdiction and immunities will be further addressed with regard to 
the wording used by UN SOFAs.  
Regarding criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by peacekeepers in the 
territory of host states two questions can be considered: 1) whether the host state and TCCs 
are entitled to exercise their jurisdiction over peacekeepers; 2) whether they are obliged to do 
that under international law. The present discussion focuses on the analysis of prescriptive 
jurisdiction (as opposed to enforcement jurisdiction)3 which concerns state’s authority under 
international law to regulate particular conduct in accordance with its national law4 and can be 
                                               
1  Case concerning the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), 
Judgement, ICJ, 14 February 2002, para. 46. Even though the ICJ declined to consider the question of 
jurisdiction of Belgian courts in this case due to the fact that the Congo ultimately abandoned its arguments in 
this regard, the distinction between jurisdiction and immunities was spelled out by the Court. 
2 Ibid, para. 59. 
3 Unlike prescriptive jurisdiction, which can be extraterritorial, enforcement jurisdiction is strictly territorial, 
because a state is only permitted to enforce its laws within its own territory, unless it obtains another state’s 
consent to act in its territory (e.g. a state’s police are not allowed to arrest suspects in the territory of another 
state without its consent). See Roger O’Keefe (2004), at 740; Memorandum by the Secretariat, Immunity of 
State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, International Law Commission, 31 March 2008, A/CN.4/596 
(“UN Secretariat Memorandum (2008)”), , at 12, fn.16. 
4  See Karinne Coombes International organisations and peace enforcement: the politics of international 
legitimacy (Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 423; Roger O’Keefe (2004), at 736. 
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based on the following principles: territorial principle, principle of nationality, passive 
personality, protective principle, and universal jurisdiction.5  
According to Lotus, the states are not prohibited by international law to exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction unless there is a rule to the contrary. 6  Therefore any type of 
prescriptive jurisdiction is, in principle, permitted and the states in their territory may 
criminalise any conduct or may indict a person or convict him. Any arguments against 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction can be made only by showing that there is a clear rule 
prohibiting a state to establish jurisdiction over the conduct committed abroad.7 Such a rule 
regarding PSOs is contained in UN SOFAs. 
Another question is whether the exercise of jurisdiction and in particular universal 
jurisdiction can become an obligation. For response, it is necessary to refer to the text of 
conventions providing for such universal jurisdiction.  
The CAT provides that each state party must take necessary measures to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offence of torture in cases where the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him.8 No other connection with the 
state is required. It clearly provides for the obligation to establish universal jurisdiction.9 This 
obligation conditioned to the presence of the accused in the territory of the state, but this is the 
                                               
5 This principle is proved to be controversial and provoked substantial academic discussion not only on the 
possible limitations in its application (with regard to the so-called “universal jurisdiction in absentia”), but also 
on the ability of the states at all to exercise universal jurisdiction. 
6 Case of S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), Judgement, PCIJ, 7 September 1927, (“Lotus case”), at 18-19. See also 
Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in international law (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 23-24; dissenting opinion 
of Judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant case, para. 50. 
7 See, dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant case, paras. 54-55, who points out 
that there is no such rule either in conventional international law, nor in customary international law. 
8 CAT, Article 5, para. 3. 
9 See also Committee against Torture, Communication No. 181/2001, Suleymane Guengueng et al. v Senegal, 
Communication No. 181/2001, Judgement, CAT, 19 May 2006, CAT/C/36/D/181/2001, para. 6.3; International 
Law Association, “Final report on the exercise of universal jurisdiction in respect of gross human rights 
offences”, Committee on international human rights law and practice, London Conference (2000), at 6. 
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only condition for exercising universal jurisdiction.10 The case of Nepalese Col. Kumar Lama 
currently being tried in the UK courts may be able to confirm this principle.11 
Unlike the obligation of states exercising universal jurisdiction, the obligations under 
territorial and active and passive personality principles are not conditioned on the presence of 
the accused.12 The question then is whether those states are under an obligation to take all 
possible measures to establish jurisdiction and seek to prosecute the alleged offender, even 
where he is not present in their territory, by the way of issuing international arrest warrants 
and extradition requests. The response to this question depends on the nature of the 
obligations provided by Article 5 and subsequent articles.  
From preliminary view, the states must take all necessary measures to establish 
jurisdiction including legislative measures, executive and judicial, such as arrest, investigation, 
prosecution and extradition. 13  The territorial state is obliged to conduct investigations ex 
officio or on the basis of a complaint by the victim under Articles 12, 13 CAT.  
                                               
10 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against Torture: a commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), at 255. 
11  Nepalese Col. Kumar Lama was arrested by the UK police in 3 January 2013 under the suspicion of 
commission of torture in Nepal in 2005. At that moment he was also a UN observer in South Sudan. Despite 
protests by the Nepalese government the UK courts proceed with his prosecution, as the UK was bound by the 
CAT to prosecute him exercising universal jurisdiction with the suspect being present in its territory. The 
Nepalese government invoked different arguments in favour of his release, including that his arrest violates state 
sovereignty, Col. Lama’s diplomatic immunity as being UN observer and principle of dual jeopardy. It remains 
to be seen how the issue will be resolved by the UK courts. See in particular: Robert Booth, “UK defends 
decision to prosecute Nepalese colonel accused of torture Charges against Colonel Kumar Lama spark 
diplomatic row between Britain and Nepal”, The Guardian, 6 January 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jan/06/uk-defends-prosecute-nepalese-colonel (last visited on 
11/08/2014); Lekhanath Pandey, “UK court seeks amicus curiae in Col Lama's case,” Himalayan Times, 27 
February 2014, 
http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullNews.php?headline=UK+court+seeks+amicus++curiae+in+Col+Lama's
+case&NewsID=407275 (last visited on 11/08/2014); Chiran Sharma, “London court concludes hearing on case 
against Col Lama”, Republica, 4 August 2014, 
 http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=80306#  (last visited on 
11/08/2014). 
12 It needs to be firstly specified that in relation to the passive personality principle, the CAT provides states with 
the margin of discretion, mentioning that if the state considers it appropriate, it shall take necessary measures to 
establish jurisdiction when the victim is a national of that state, basically converting obligation to establish 
jurisdiction into a simple permission to do so.  For the territorial and national states this obligation is 
unconditional. See CAT, Article 5, para. 1(3). See also Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 255. 
13  See Amnesty International, “Universal Jurisdiction: The duty of states to enact and enforce legislation: 
Chapter 9: Torture: The legal basis for universal jurisdiction”, IOR 53/012/2001 (2001), at 4. See also Manfred 
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In Habré, the ICJ did not directly deal with the scope of the obligation under Article 5, 
as not disputed between parties, and the breach had been already remedied by the respondent 
state (Senegal).14 However, it mostly focused on the adoption of legislative measures (or 
presumably any other measures) to enable the state to exercise the forms of jurisdiction 
(including universal jurisdiction) mention in Article 5 and those obligations are mostly of 
preventive character.15 As for the obligation to investigate, according to the Court, it falls 
under Article 6(2), which requires the states to make preliminary inquiry into the facts of the 
case.16 This obligation relates only to the situations where the suspect is already present in the 
territory of the state and not where a suspect is absent.17 
Nowak and McArthur consider that if the suspected offender is outside the territory of 
the state which started investigations, its authorities “may request extradition from another 
state, where this person is present, in accordance with Article 8 CAT.”18 However Article 8 
provides only basis and facilitates possible extradition, it does not obliges the states to issue 
extradition request.19 Nowak and McArthur do not suggest that the state is under obligation to 
issue an extradition request either. 20  Article 5 imposes obligations to the territorial and 
national states to adopt certain measures, and does not give them discretion in doing so (only 
for the state, whose national was a victim of alleged torture).  
                                                                                                                                                   
Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 255, considering that apart from legislative measures to establish 
jurisdiction, territorial and national states must also take administrative and judicial measures, such as to start 
criminal investigations, as soon as the state authorities have sufficient information to assume that an act of 
torture is committed on their territory or by their national, even if the alleged offender is not present in their 
territory. 
14 See Question relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgement, ICJ, 20 July 
2012 (“Habré case”), para. 55. 
15 See for instance ibid, paras. 75, 76, 87. 
16 See ibid, paras. 83, 86. 
17 See CAT, Article 6(1). 
18 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 255. 
19 See also CAT, Roitman Rosenmann v Spain, Communication No 176/2000, Judgement, CAT, 12 June 2002, 
CAT/C/28/D/176/2000, para. 6.7. 
20 See Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 346 
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The Committee against Torture analysing this question, did not pronounced directly on 
the issue whether Article 5(1) must be interpreted as requiring states to issue extradition 
requests, where there are sufficient evidence to do that. Discussing the obligation of a state to 
demand extradition of a person suspected of torture, when the victim had the nationality of 
that state, the Committee in Roitman Rosenmann stated that the corresponding provision of 
Article 5(1)(c) (requiring the state to establish jurisdiction, “when the victim is a national of 
that State if that State considers it appropriate”) “establish[es] a discretionary faculty rather 
than a mandatory obligation to make, and insist upon, an extradition request.”21  
The problem is that this provision provides for discretion to take measures to establish 
jurisdiction anyway. Whether such discretion to issue an extradition request would exist for 
territorial and national states under Article 5(1), when the alleged offender is not present on 
their territory, is not clear from the Committee’s reasoning. This issue was not discussed in 
Habré either.22 
While it is accurate to impose on the territorial state an obligation to conduct 
investigations into the allegations of torture, especially on the basis of Articles 6(2), 12, 13, it 
may be too brave to require the territorial and national states to initiate preliminary 
proceedings for issuing arrest warrant and extradition requests if the offender is not present in 
their territory. Such a broad interpretation of the measures would make the obligations 
provided in Article 5 intertwine with the obligations provided by subsequent Articles 6, 7, 
which condition the obligations of taking an alleged offender into custody, making 
preliminary inquiries and prosecution on the presence of the offender in the state’s territory.23  
If a state were required under Article 5 to issue an arrest warrant and an extradition 
request for a person who allegedly committed torture in its territory and who is not present 
                                               
21 Roitman Rosenmann case, para. 6.7. 
22 See, for instance, Habré case, para. 74. 
23 See CAT, Articles 6, para.1 and Article 7, para. 1. 
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there, there would be no need to limit the obligation of that state to prosecute and arrest the 
offender to the presence of the offender in its territory under Articles 6, 7, as the issue of 
arrest warrant and extradition request are done in order to ensure the arrest and prosecution of 
the person. One would have to talk about the obligation of territorial and national states to 
prosecute the offenders wherever they are found in this world. This would be a far-reaching 
obligation, but seems not to be supported by Article 7.  
Therefore the obligation to take measures necessary to establish its jurisdiction under 
Article 5 must be interpreted as an obligation of the state to provide under its national law a 
basis for exercise of territorial, national or universal jurisdiction, should the occasion arise 
that a perpetrator of torture offences is found on its territory. If the offender is present on the 
territory of a state party, two further obligations start to apply: 1) the state must take him into 
custody or take other legal measures to ensure his presence under Article 6; 2) either extradite 
or prosecute the offender under Article 7. There is no obligation to extradite per se (to comply 
with extradition request),24 however the state must choose between two alternatives: either 
extradite or prosecute. 
Aut dedere aut judicare obligation provided by Article 7 clearly depends on the 
presence of the alleged offender in the states territory. The principle requires the states to 
prosecute offender in its custody or extradite him to another state having links with the 
offender or the crime.25 However, as stated by the Committee against Torture and ICJ, the 
obligation to prosecute the alleged perpetrator for acts of torture does not depend on the prior 
                                               
24 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 346, 360, 364; Carlo Tiribelli "Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: 
A Response to Impunity in International Criminal Law", 32 Columbian Journal of Transnational Law 133 
(2009), at 255-256, 259. 
25  Ademola Abass "International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction", 6 International Criminal Law 
Review 349 (2006), at 353. 
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existence of a request for his extradition.26 The prosecution is not subject to any condition 
other than the presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the state.27 Therefore if no 
other state issued an extradition request, the state where the perpetrator is found, is obliged to 
submit the case for the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, which may or 
may not result in institution of proceedings.28  
Only if a request for extradition has been made, there is the other alternative for the 
state to proceed with extradition or still to submit the case to its own authorities for 
prosecution, as the objective of this provision is to prevent any act of torture from going 
unpunished. 29  The extradition is an option for the state, whereas prosecution is an 
international obligation.30 The state is not obliged to prosecute an alleged offender only if it 
can be shown that there is no sufficient evidence to prosecute,31 but still have to extradite that 
person, if any extradition request was made.32 Therefore there is no option for the state not to 
prosecute the person if there is sufficient evidence that he committed acts of torture or that 
evidence can be easily obtained.33 Especially this would concern the states in which territory 
the crime was committed, as they are in the best position to obtain such evidence. A state 
cannot be obliged to prosecute a person against whom it does not have sufficient evidence.34  
                                               
26 Habré case, para. 94;, Suleymane Guengueng et al. v Senegal, para. 9.7, see also Herman Burgers and Hans 
Danelius The United Nations Convention against Torture: a handbook on the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Norwell, MA, 1988), at 133, 137. 
27 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 360. 
28 See also Habré case, paras. 90, 94.  
29 Suleymane Guengueng et al. v Senegal, para. 9.7; Habré case, para. 95. 
30 Habré case, para. 95. 
31 Suleymane Guengueng et al. v Senegal, para. 9.8. 
32 See ibid, para. 9.11. 
33 See Raphael Van Steenberghe "The obligation to extradite or prosecute: clarifying its nature", Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1089 (2011), at 1114, who points out that states bound by the obligation to 
prosecute or extradite, “have a free choice between prosecution and extradition, while emphasis is put on 
prosecution since extradition appears only as a means at the disposal of the custodial state for complying with its 
obligation to prosecute.” 
34 See also ibid, at 1091, 1108, who argues that the obligation of the state is to submit the case to the competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, not automatic punishment, judgement or prosecution is required. See 
also Roger O’Keefe "The grave breaches regime and universal jurisdiction", Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 811 (2009), at 816. 
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Similar obligations are provided in the GC regarding the crimes constituting grave 
breaches, although the language used is different.35 The obligation of states to search for 
alleged perpetrators of grave breaches of the GC corresponds to the obligation of states to take 
offenders into custody provided by Article 6 CAT. The same is true for the obligation to bring 
such persons before the state’s own courts, or alternatively to hand the persons over for a trial 
to another state party, which corresponds to a similar obligation to prosecute or extradite 
under Article 7 CAT.  
The provisions of the GC, however, are not explicit on the conditions under which this 
obligation is not to be exercised, nor provide for any guidance to the circumstances of 
establishment of jurisdiction, including universal jurisdiction, but such conditions may be 
implied. Accordingly, the state must “bring before its courts” the same persons, whom it must 
“search for”. The nationality of those persons does not have any significance. The state may 
not be obliged to “search for” any persons not present in its territory (i.e. exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction), otherwise it violates another state’s sovereignty, if acting without 
its consent.  
Therefore the state is required to search for (and potentially arrest) and prosecute the 
persons who are present in its territory.36 It may also choose to extradite this person, if it 
                                               
35 GC I, Article 49; GC II, Article 50; GC III, Article 129; GC IV, Article 146, which reads as follows: 
“Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or 
to have ordered to be committed [grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions], and shall bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the 
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, 
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.” 
 See also below the discussion on which crimes amount to grave breaches of the GC. 
36 See also Roger O’Keefe (2009), at 828, who points out that in the context of grave breaches provision, the 
obligation of state party to bring the suspect before its courts obviously presupposes that the suspect is present on 
its territory: the provision does not oblige states parties to try such persons in absentia. The obligation to 
prosecute or extradite applies only when the suspect is present in the territory of state party, as the state cannot 
extradite a person who is not under its custody (at 829). See also Claus Kress "Reflections on the iudicare limb 
of the grave breaches regime", 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 789 (2009), at 800, who states that 
“while the power to initiate an investigation on the basis of universal jurisdiction over war crimes exists 
irrespective of the location on the alleged offender, the duty to act under the grave breaches regime comes into 
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prefers to.  If there is no extradition request or the state is unwilling to extradite the person, its 
obligation to prosecute is still valid, as the extradition is simply an alternative for a state, but 
does not affect its primary obligation to prosecute under this article.37 As the Commentary to 
Article 146 GCIV provides, “as soon as a Contracting Party realises that there is on its 
territory a person who has committed such a breach, its duty is to ensure that the person 
concerned is arrested and prosecuted with all speed. The necessary police action should be 
taken spontaneously, therefore, not merely in pursuance of a request from another State.”38  
This provision applies to all High Contracting Parties and not only to states in which 
territory the crime was committed or which nationality the perpetrator was. Moreover, it 
specifically mentions that the nationality of alleged perpetrator is irrelevant. If any state party 
is obliged to search for and prosecute any alleged perpetrator present in its territory, the 
obligation to establish jurisdiction (by analogy with Article 5 CAT) can be implied.39 The 
provision makes no difference between territorial, national or other states, but rather 
envisages universal jurisdiction of states to prosecute for grave breaches. It is an obligation 
for a state party to vest its courts with jurisdiction on the basis of universality in the absence 
of any other ground for jurisdiction, since there is no point in bringing suspects before its 
courts unless those courts have competence over the impugned conduct.40 
                                                                                                                                                   
play only where there are reasons to believe that the alleged offender is present on the territory of the state 
concerned.” 
37 See also Claus Kress (2009), at 796; dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant 
case, para. 62; see also Commentary to Article 9 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, para. 7, stating that in the absence of an extradition request, “the custodial state would have no choice 
but to submit the case to its national authorities for prosecution [and] this residual obligation is intended to 
ensure that alleged offender will be prosecuted by a competent jurisdiction, that is to say, the custodial state, in 
the absence of an alternative national or international jurisdiction.” 
38 GC IV, Article 146, at 593. 
39 See also Raphael Van Steenberghe (2011), at 1105, who states that “the obligation to extradite or prosecute is 
often viewed as entailing a correlative obligation to establish the necessary extraterritorial jurisdiction over the 
prohibited conduct” and therefore provides for an implicit obligation for the custodial state to vest its courts with 
jurisdiction over grave breaches on the basis of, inter alia, universality.” See also Rober O’Keefe (2009), at 817; 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts "The grave breaches regime as customary international law", 7 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 683 (2009), at 698. 
40 Roger O’Keefe (2009), at 817.  
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B) Allocation of criminal jurisdiction between the national courts of states as provided 
by the UN SOFA 
Territorial principle constitutes a traditional ground for criminal jurisdiction under 
international law and extraterritorial jurisdiction is an exception.41 However, in case of PSOs, 
the host state is precluded from exercising its criminal jurisdiction over the offences 
committed by military forces in its territory by virtue of UN SOFAs. UN SOFAs are bilateral 
agreements between the UN and host states on the status of PSOs. Although for each PSO a 
separate SOFA is normally concluded, they are usually based on the UN Model SOFA.42 
Sometimes PSFs are deployed even before a SOFA was negotiated,43 however, the UNSC 
may include in its resolution that the UN Model SOFA is applicable as the default regime 
governing the situation of PSO, until a specific SOFA is signed. 44  The present analysis 
focuses on the UN Model SOFA (here and after “UN SOFA”). 
UN SOFA provides that “military members of the military component of the [UN 
PKO] shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating states in 
respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in [host 
country/territory].” 45  It should be firstly noted that the UN SOFA excludes territorial 
jurisdiction of the state over particular acts, and not simply provides for immunities for 
military components of PSOs. Moreover, the language used suggests that the UN SOFA may 
also exclude jurisdiction of any other state, except for the state of nationality. It does not 
permit the host state to exercise jurisdiction over any criminal offences committed in the 
                                               
41 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 308; Lee A. Steven, Christine E. Cervasio "Genocide and 
the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States is in Breach of Its International Obligations", 39 
Virginia Journal of International Law 425 (1998), at 432. 
42  See Gabrielle Simm "International law as a regulatory framework for sexual crimes committed by 
peacekeepers", 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 473 (2012), at 500. 
43 Gabrielle Simm "International law as a regulatory framework for sexual crimes committed by peacekeepers", 
16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 473 (2012), at 501. 
44 Anthony J. Miller (2006), at 81; see also Zeid Report, para. A.2. 
45 UN Model SOFA, para. 47(b). 
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territory of the host state, even if the most serious crimes were committed by PSFs. As this 
provision precludes jurisdiction of the state per se and not grants immunities, there is no 
possibility for a waiver of this rule (cf. immunities).46  
The consequences of operation of this provision may be far-reaching, especially 
because this provision is not conditioned on the state of nationality exercising jurisdiction 
over a particular offence. A proper operation of this provision may result in impunity of 
military peacekeepers committing most serious crimes of international law, if their state of 
nationality for any reason fails to prosecute them.47 There may be plenty of reasons why a 
TCC may do that.48 If for any reasons a TCC fails to prosecute its own peacekeepers, there 
could be a jurisdictional gap leaving the alleged offenders unpunished,49 as the host state 
cannot prosecute them either.  
However, there are some limitations to this provision. Firstly, the UN SOFA provides 
that the S-G will obtain assurances from TCCs that they will be prepared to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crimes committed by the military members of PSOs in the host state.50 
This provision attempts to fill in a jurisdictional gap created by the provision on exclusive 
                                               
46 See also D.W. Bowett (1964), at 441. 
47  See also Gabrielle Simm (2012), at 506; Roisin Burke "Status of forces deployed on UN peacekeeping 
operations: jurisdictional immunity", 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 63 (2011), at 92. 
48  Among them, those reasons could be: the existence of internal laws, not providing for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, inability to gather sufficient evidence and to call/find witnesses located in remote areas of the host 
state, or any political reason and shame for the conduct of its peacekeepers, who were supposed to protect local 
population and not to perpetrate unlawful acts against it. See Zeid Report (2005), at 29; Gabrielle Simm (2011), 
at 481-482. TCCs are often reluctant to admit publicly the existence of wrongful acts committed by the members 
their national contingent. See Zeid Report (2005), at 24. 
49 Marco Odello (2010), at 365. 
50 UN Model SOFA, para. 48. 
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jurisdiction of TCCs.51 The problem of this safeguarding provision was that those assurances 
were not often obtained.52 
The amended Model MoU53 includes a new provision requiring TCCs to assure the 
UN that they will exercise jurisdiction over crimes and offences committed during PSOs and 
further reiterates that PSFs are subjected to TCCs’ exclusive jurisdiction.54 It also places the 
primary responsibility for conducting investigations of misconduct by members of national 
contingents with TCCs and obliges them to forward the case to their appropriate authorities 
for due action, if suspicions of misconduct are well founded.55  
It does not, however, make the exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs conditioned on the 
actual exercise of the jurisdiction by TCCs over the crimes committed during PSOs and on 
fulfilment of other obligations by TCCs under the MoU. Irrespective of whether TCCs violate 
their promises to the UN to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by their national 
contingents in the territory of the host state during PSOs, the host state cannot in any case 
exercise its jurisdiction over PSFs.  
The problem is by virtue of the existence of two separate documents – UN SOFA and 
MoU – TCCs and a host state owe obligations to the UN, but not to each other. If a TCC does 
not exercise its jurisdiction, the host state cannot claim that it does that. Similarly, if a TCC 
contributes very undisciplined and badly trained contingent, committing crimes, and whose 
national commanders do not take any measures to discipline the members of the contingent in 
                                               
51 Model MoU is used as a basis for the MoU concluded between the UN and TCCs, which are binding in nature 
and covering military personnel of TCCs. Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany "The amended UN model memorandum 
of understanding: a new incentive for states to discipline and prosecute military members of national 
peacekeeping contingents?", Journal of Conflict & Security Law 321 (2011), at 329. 
52 The provisions on agreement from the part of TCC to exercise jurisdiction over their military personnel 
appeared in the earlier Troop-Contributing Agreements which preceded the Memoranda of Understanding, 
however, this practice was changed after introducing in 1996 MoU, where that provision did not reappear. See 
Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany (2011), at 329-330; see also Roisin Burke (2011), at 72. 
53 Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany (2011), at 335. 
54 Revised MoU, Article 7quinquiens, para. 1. 
55 Model MoU, Article 7 quarter and 7sexiens; see also Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany (2011), at 337, 340. 
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violation of several provisions of the MoU,56 the host state cannot require such contingent to 
be removed from its territory, nor can it prosecute them for any misconduct.  
The only way for the host state to require at least some action from the UN would be 
by virtue of the violation of the para.6 UN SOFA, which provides that the UN PKO “shall 
refrain form any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and international nature of 
their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of the present arrangements. The [UN PKO] and its 
members shall respect all local laws and regulations. The Special Representative/Commander 
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the observance of those obligations.” The host 
state may either argue that the UN violates its obligations under the UN SOFA because the 
UNFC did not fulfil its duties to ensure the observance of local laws and regulations or that 
the UN infringes the provision of the SOFA, because its PSO’s activities resulted in the 
commission of crimes are inconsistent with the spirit of the SOFA or because they do not 
respect all local laws and regulations. As a result the host state may withdraw its consent for 
the PSO, if this consent was ever obtained by the UN. However, the fact that the TCC 
violated the assurances given to the UN or its obligations under the MoU can hardly play any 
role for the host state claiming its rights under the SOFA. 
Even the UN SOFA in force may not preclude other states (than the host state) 
asserting jurisdiction over the crimes committed by PSFs on the basis of passive personality 
principle for example, as the victim of the crime may have nationality of the neighbouring 
state.57 Other states are not parties to the UN SOFA (only the host state and the UN are 
parties). The host state may be more willing to extradite a peacekeeper to the neighbouring 
                                               
56 See Revised MoU, Article 7bis, 7ter. 
57 See Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany (2011), at 353, see also Rain Liivoja An Axiom of Military Law: Applicability 
of National Criminal Law to Military Personnel and Associated Civilians Abroad (Doctorial dissertation 
submitted to the University of Helsinki, 2011), at 151, who argues that the UN SOFA provisions on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state over its armed forces has no impact on the jurisdiction for any state 
other than the host state. 
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state, should it decide to issue an extradition request, than to wait for the TCC to take any 
action.  
Another question is whether the host state is allowed to extradite a military member of 
PSFs to the third state. Although the host state does not need to establish jurisdiction over the 
offence committed by the peacekeeper in order to extradite him to the state which already 
established its jurisdiction, subject to the double criminality rule, the decision to extradite may 
violate other provisions of the UN SOFA concerning immunities (para.46)58 or the provision 
regulating arrest of peacekeepers by the host state (paras.42(b) and 43), which provide that the 
members of PSO, if arrested, should be immediately transferred to the representatives of 
PSO. 59  Therefore even if any other state established jurisdiction over particular offence 
committed by the military member of PSF and requested extradition from the host state, the 
host state may be precluded from complying with that request because of the provisions of the 
UN SOFA (other than the one envisaging exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs) concerning further 
immunities of PSOs.  
Despite relatively limited scope of application of the provision on exclusive 
jurisdiction in the UN SOFA, it may still shield perpetrators of the crimes from any kind of 
prosecution. The host states are unlikely to request subsequent extradition of peacekeepers 
from TCCs, and the TCCs are highly unlikely to actually extradite their on nationals back to 
the state where the PSO was deployed. Any other state would hardly be able or willing to 
establish jurisdiction based on principles other than territorial/active personality. The TCC is 
the only state which can prosecute their peacekeepers in practice. If it declines to do that, the 
impunity will be a direct consequence of operation of the UN SOFA provisions.  
                                               
58 For more detail see discussion below. 
59 See below. 
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The construction of the provision on the unconditional total exclusion of host state 
jurisdiction in the UN SOFA is unprecedented comparing it to similar provisions in SOFAs of 
other IOs.60 The relatively old text of the NATO SOFA (1951) and recently drafted text of the 
EU SOFA (2003) use an almost identical approach to the allocation of criminal jurisdiction 
between their members. They do not provide for the unconditional exclusive jurisdiction for 
the sending state, but rather regulate the matter depending on nature of offences committed by 
the forces in the territory of the receiving (host) state.  
Under the NATO and EU SOFAs both sending and receiving state have a right to 
exercise jurisdiction over members of military forces.61 Both states have exclusive jurisdiction 
with respect to the offences relating to their national security and not punishable by the law of 
the other state (sending or receiving), such as treason, sabotage, espionage, etc.62 The sending 
and receiving states have concurrent jurisdiction over other offences: the sending state has 
primary jurisdiction in relation to the offences committed by its forces solely against its 
property or security or against person or property of military or civilian state or the state and 
in relation to the offences arising out of actions or omissions done in the performance of 
official duty, whereas the receiving state has primary jurisdiction in relation to any other 
offences.63 Notably, the SOFAs also provide that the state which does not exercise primary 
                                               
60 See also Roisin Burke (2011), at 84. 
61 Agreement between the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian 
staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made 
available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Article 
17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member 
States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this context (EU SOFA), (2003/C 321/02), 31 
December 2003; Article 17, paras. 1 and 2; Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty 
regarding the Status of their Forces (NATO SOFA), 19 June 1951, Article VII, para. 1(a) and (b).  
62 EU SOFA, Article 17, paras. 3 and 4; NATO SOFA, Article VII, para. 2 (a) and (b). 
63 Ibid, para. 6 (a) and (b); Ibid, Article VII, para. 3 (a) and (b). 
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jurisdiction must notify the other state about it.64 They also provide for the state the possibility 
for a waiver of primary jurisdiction in favour of the other state.65  
Such a construction of provisions on jurisdiction in the EU and NATO SOFAs ensures 
right balance between the national interests of both sending and receiving state and fills 
jurisdictional gaps related to the acts of the visiting military forces, which may result from 
inability or unwillingness of any state to exercise jurisdiction over the offences committed. 
This scheme may be easily adopted by the UN SOFA. Any concerns about usual weakness of 
the host state judicial system and inability to ensure fair trial to the military members of PSFs 
cannot take the effect of absolute exclusion of jurisdiction of the host state over military 
contingents, firstly because not all host states have badly functioning judicial systems, and 
secondly, the fact that members of civilian component of PSOs can actually be prosecuted 
according to the UN SOFA, when the UNFC agrees on it with the host state,66 does not 
support the proposition that any host state cannot be trusted in terms of conducting criminal 
proceedings over international personnel.67 
The unconditional exclusion of host state’s jurisdiction over military members of 
PSOs must be replaced by either case-by-case approach, as with regard to the civilian 
component of PSOs, or by the system of allocation of jurisdiction between states as envisaged 
by the EU and NATO SOFAs. Only then the impunity can be prevented. Otherwise the rule 
on exclusive jurisdiction of the national states may leave unpunished even the perpetrators of 
the most serious international crimes. 
 
 
                                               
64 Ibid, para. 6 (c); ibid, Article VII, para. 3 (c). 
65 Ibid, Article 17, para. 6 (c); ibid, Article VII, para. 3 (c). 
66 See, UN Model SOFA, para. 47 (a).  
67 See D.W. Bowett (1964), at 440, pointing out that “there is no justification, apart form the purely political 
justification, that it is only upon this basis that states will provide contingents.” 
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C) Jurisdiction of states over international crimes committed during PSOs 
Members of PSFs may commit international crimes in host states. There were already 
some allegations of torture and killing committed during PSOs, many instances of 
commission of rape and other sexual violence against local population by peacekeepers.68 The 
most probable international crimes to be committed by peacekeepers are provided by the CAT 
and GC as part of grave breaches regime.69  
For the CAT to apply the acts of perpetrators must intentionally inflict severe pain or 
suffering on a person for specific purposes (such as obtaining information or concession, 
punishment, intimidation, coercion or discrimination) and these acts must be committed by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.70  
While there were instances where peacekeepers committed acts which were 
characterised as pure torture,71 it is more common that they commit rape or other sexual 
violence,72 which according to ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence may amount to torture.73 While 
                                               
68 See, in particular Zeid Report (2005), at 8-9. 
69 This section primarily focus on the widely reported cases of commission of various unlawful acts, which 
(upon the fulfilment of all the elements of crimes) can be considered as international crimes, such as covered by 
the CAT and grave breaches regime of the GC. Although one may not exclude any other international crimes 
envisaged by different international conventions (like terrorism, piracy, genocide, etc.) their commission may be 
only a theoretical possibility. 
70 CAT, Article 1(1).  
71 For example, the soldiers from Canadian contingent of the UNOSOM tortured and killed a teenage boy: see, 
for instance, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/27/world/torture-by-army-peacekeepers-in-somalia-shocks-
canada.html  
72 See Zeid Report (2005), at 8-9. 
73 In the Furundžija case, the Trial Chamber extended the possibility for the acts of torture to include not only 
rape but also all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon physical and moral integrity of a person by 
means of coercion, thereat of force or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s 
dignity. See Ken Roberts (2009), at 757, citing Prosecutor v Furundžija, Case No: IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 
(“Furundžija Trial Judgement”), 10 December 1998, para. 186. 
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before ICTY jurisprudence provided that only in some instances rape may amount torture,74 
more recent cases suggest that rape constitutes torture per se.75  
According to the definition of torture given in Article 1 CAT, the infliction of severe 
pain or suffering must be done with specific purpose. All purposes listed in Article 1 refer to a 
situation in which a victim of torture is a person “at least under factual power or control of the 
person inflicting the pain or suffering,” as the torture presupposes a situation of powerlessness 
of the victim. 76  ICTY jurisprudence suggests that the list of prohibited purposes is non-
exhaustive the conduct does not need to solely serve a prohibited purpose.77 ICTR/ICTY 
cases confirm that like torture defined in the CAT, rape is used for such purposes as 
intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a 
person and can constitute torture.78  
However, another important condition for the crime of torture to be a crime under the 
CAT is that the acts of torture were committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 79 This 
requirement distinguishes cases considered as violation of Article 1 CAT and cases of 
violation of Article 7 ICCPR: for the former the link of torture with official capacity is 
                                               
74 Prosecutor v Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1, Judgment, (“Kvočka Trial Judgement”), 2 November 2001, 
para. 145; also cf. Furundžija Trial Judgement, para. 163; Delalić Trial Judgement, para. 496. 
75 As it was pointed out by the Brđanin Trial Chamber, “severe pain or suffering, as required by the definition of 
the crime of torture, can be said to be established once rape has been proved, since the act of rape necessarily 
implies such pain or suffering.” Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 485. See also Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 
150; See also Christoph Burchard "Torture in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals: a critical assessment", 6 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 159 (2008), at 166, 175. 
76 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 75-77; Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius (1988), at 120. 
77 Prosecutor v Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, (“Delalić Trial Judgement”), 16 November 1998, 
para. 470; Prosecutor v Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, (“Kunarac Appeal Judgement”), 12 
June 2002, para. 155; Prosecutor v Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Judgment, (“Brđanin Trial Judgement”), 1 
September 2004, paras. 487. See also Ken Roberts (2009), at 757. 
78  Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, (“Akayesu Trial Judgement”), 2 
September 1998, para. 687; Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 485; Delalić Trial Judgement, para. 496. 
79 CAT, Article 1(1). 
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required, whereas for Article 7 ICCPR failure of the state to protect against private persons 
committing torture is enough.80 
The military members of PSOs may be considered as public officials, as they retain 
their status as members of armed forces of their national state.81 That is even more the case if 
the acts of torture were committed with the explicit/implicit consent of their superior which 
can be inferred from the knowledge of the superior or his presence on the scene when the acts 
were committed and no action was made to prevent the acts from commission or to punish the 
perpetrators afterwards. It is because the terms “consent or acquiescence” used in Article 1 
CAT are broad and can be interpreted to cover various actions committed by private person if 
a public official somehow permits such acts to continue.82 Therefore it is possible that the acts 
of torture committed by peacekeepers may attract the obligations of the states parties to the 
CAT.  
One should distinguish between torture as a separate transnational crime (relating to 
the CAT), torture as a war crime and torture as a crime against humanity.83 The latter two do 
not need to contain the same requirements as provided by the CAT.84 
Although it is improbable that peacekeepers ever commit crimes against humanity,85 
they may commit war crimes in the territory of the host state. They may become involved not 
only in torture, but other crimes constituting grave breaches such as other inhuman treatment, 
                                               
80  See Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 78 arguing that it would be difficult for the 
Committee against Torture to interpret the state obligations deriving from the CAT in the same broad manner in 
which the Human Rights Committee interprets the obligations of states deriving from Article 7 ICCPR, 
including in the situations where the acts prohibited by Article 7 were inflicted by people “acting in their official 
capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.” See also HRC General Comment No. 20, para. 2. 
81 They may also be considered as persons acting in official capacity if they indeed act in that capacity when 
committing acts of torture. See on the discussion of “official capacity”, Chapter II, Section 1(c) 
82 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 78. 
83 See Christoph Burchard (2008), at 161; Paola Gaeta When is the involvement of state officials a requirement 
for the crime of torture?", 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 183 (2008), at 187. 
84 See Paola Gaeta (2008), at 189, pointing out that “it would be fallacious to reach the conclusion that the 
‘criminal’ definition of torture as a discrete crime, in particular the requirement of the involvement of state 
officials, must perforce apply to torture as a war crime or a crime against humanity.” 
85 See discussion in the next section below. 
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wilful killing, causing serious injuries or unlawful confinement.86 As for the definition of 
torture in the context of armed conflict, as suggested by ICTY jurisprudence, there is no need 
to prove that the perpetrator of the crime of torture was a public official or that the torture was 
committed in the presence of public official for the torture outside of the framework of the 
CAT.87  
However, in order for an offence to qualify a war crime, it must have a nexus with the 
armed conflict. According to the ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence the nexus exists when the armed 
conflict plays a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit the crime, his decision, 
manner or purpose for which it was committed.88  
It follows that if a peacekeeper was able to commit a particular crime against a 
member of local population because they were affected by armed conflict or the armed 
conflict made them particularly vulnerable to enable him to commit such crime, that crime 
may amount to a war crime. However this must be established on particular facts to avoid 
situations where the crimes committed had no connection with the armed conflict but only 
coincided with it in time. 
                                               
86 See GC I, Article 50; GC II, Article 51; GC III, Article 130; GC IV, Article 147. For the consequent analysis 
of grave breaches regime only articles of GC IV will be mentioned as it is more often that the peacekeepers 
commit crimes against civilian population. However, the provisions of other GC can be applied mutatis mutandis. 
87 See Ken Roberts (2009), at 758; Christoph Burchard (2008), at 171; See also Kunarac Appeal Judgement, 
paras. 146-148, reaffirmed in Prosecutor v Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/I-A, Judgement, (“Kvočka Appeal 
Judgement”), 28 February 2005, para. 284. Gaeta also points out that “the definition of the crime of torture under 
the UN Convention is narrower than that of torture as a war crime or as a crime against humanity simply because 
it is necessary not to ‘trivialise’ the ‘intrusion’ of the international community into realm of criminal law by 
imposing the criminalisation of every single instance of wicked conduct of an entirely private nature.” See Paola 
Gaeta (2008), at 191. 
88  The Appeals Chamber in Setako gave a summary of the ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence with regard to the 
requirement of the nexus with the armed conflict: 
The required nexus need not be a causal link, but that the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, 
have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit the crime, his decision to commit it, the 
manner in which it was committed, or the purpose for which it was committed. The Appeals Chamber has 
thus held that “if it can be established […] that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of 
the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were closely related to the armed 
conflict.” To find a nexus, it is sufficient that the alleged crimes be closely related to the hostilities occurring 
in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict  
Setako v Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-04-81-A (“Setako Appeal Judgement”), Judgement, 28 September 2011, 
para.249. 
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There is also no need to prove that a person allegedly committed a war crime was a 
combatant to establish a nexus with the armed conflict. The Appeals Chamber in Akayesu 
held that the perpetrator of the crime does not need to have a special relationship with one 
party to the conflict in order for the nexus between violations and the armed conflict to be 
established.89  
Special jurisdictional regime provided by the GC applies only to those war crimes, 
which constitute GC grave breaches. Although such crimes as torture, inhuman treatment or 
rape may constitute grave breaches, they must fulfil an additional condition: there must be a 
nexus with the IAC. This would be the case if the PSO is either deployed where the IAC is 
taking place or the PSF themselves take part in hostilities in originally NIAC against 
governmental forces. Their participation will convert the armed conflict in international one.90  
Grave breaches regime does not apply to crimes committed during NIAC.91 Therefore 
although it is not strictly necessary that peacekeepers are to be considered combatants in order 
to establish the nexus with an armed conflict to qualify their acts as war crimes, it may be 
necessary in order to consider the crimes which they committed as amounting to grave 
breaches. If the nexus between IAC and the crimes committed by peacekeepers is established, 
the states (including the host state) will be bound by the provisions of GC concerning 
jurisdiction and prosecution for grave breaches.92 
For the sake of the present analysis, supposedly, that those requirements were satisfied, 
and the CAT and GC apply to certain crimes committed by peacekeepers. The UN SOFA 
                                               
89 It is because IHL “would be lessened and called into question if it were to be admitted that certain persons be 
exonerated from individual criminal responsibility […] under the pretext that they did not belong to a specific 
category.” Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement, (“Akayesu Appeal Judgement”), 
1 June 2001, paras. 443-444. 
90 See discussion in Chapter III. 
91  See, for instance, Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 80; see also William Schabas An introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, 4th, 2011), at 132.  
92 See also Geert-Jan G. J. Knoops The prosecution and defence of peacekeepers under international criminal 
law (Transnational Publishers, 2004), at 250. 
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does not address this situation and all the provisions of the UN SOFA concerning exclusive 
jurisdiction of TCCs continue to apply to any offences committed by military personnel of 
PSOs. However, both the CAT and GC provide for separate obligations for the state in 
relation to the jurisdiction and prosecution for international crimes which may contradict the 
provisions of the UN SOFA. 
In relation to jurisdiction the CAT explicitly requires the state parties (if the host state 
is a state party) to take such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over 
offences of torture when the offences are committed in their territory (i.e. territory of the host 
state).93 If a peacekeeper commits a crime of torture falling under the provisions of the CAT 
in the territory of the host state, because of the existing UN SOFA the host state may find 
itself violating international law in either way: if it fails to establish jurisdiction over the 
crime of torture committed by the military member of the PSF, because the UN SOFA 
basically excludes its jurisdiction, it violates the CAT (if it is a party to the CAT), but if it 
nevertheless establishes jurisdiction over such conduct, it violates the UN SOFA provisions. 
Therefore the conclusion of the UN SOFA per se may amount to the violation of obligation of 
the host state to take measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over the acts of 
torture.  
It is because the UN SOFA provides for exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs and in this 
way excludes the exercise of jurisdiction by the host state. It would be a different situation if 
the UN SOFA provided just for immunities for peacekeepers and not excluded the jurisdiction 
itself. The exercise of jurisdiction can coexist with the immunities and not to be in conflict 
with it as these are separate regimes. However in case of the UN SOFA it is the jurisdiction 
                                               
93 CAT, Article 5, para. 1(1).  
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which is excluded and therefore this provision is in conflict with the provisions of the CAT 
requiring states to establish jurisdiction over crimes of torture. 
The convention also provides for obligations to take necessary measures to establish 
such jurisdiction for a state of nationality of the perpetrator and the victim, and for any other 
state in which territory the offender is present, if it does not extradite him.94 However, this 
does not require them to issue an extradition request or arrest warrant (unless the perpetrator 
is present on their territory). Similarly, the fact that any other state may establish its 
jurisdiction over the crimes perpetrated in the territory of the host state will not free it from its 
obligation to prosecute the offender present in its territory.  
The next question is whether the obligations of the host state will be fulfilled if TCCs 
assure the UN that they will generally exercise jurisdiction over any offence committed by 
their personnel. It seems it is not enough. The text of Articles 5 and 7 CAT does not condition 
the obligation of the territorial state or any other state to exercise its jurisdiction and prosecute 
the offender found in its territory on the fact that other state may do so in the future. The 
construction of the provisions implies that the host state must establish its jurisdiction and 
prosecute the offender for the acts of torture committed in its territory. The same is true for 
the obligations under GC grave breaches regime, which clearly requires states to search for 
and bring the alleged perpetrators regardless their nationality before their own courts.  
The UN SOFA does not absolve the host state from its obligations under the GC, since 
the UN SOFA cannot modify provisions of the GC and the host state is still bound to search 
for and try perpetrators of grave breaches.95 Accordingly, the obligation to prosecute for war 
crimes or torture cannot be nullified by a bilateral agreement between two parties to the CAT 
                                               
94 CAT, Article 5, para. 1(2) and (3) and para. 2. 
95 Keiichiro Okimoto (2003), at 228. 
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or GC, and therefore a SOFA would violate their obligations under those treaties.96 This is 
because the CAT and GC are treaties of humanitarian character. They cannot be terminated or 
suspended under Article 60 VCLT 1969 as a consequence that one of the parties breached it.97 
A treaty in conflict with a treaty of humanitarian character has no effect and is unenforceable, 
because humanitarian treaties cannot reciprocally be terminated nor can their breaches be 
excused on a bilateral basis.98 The provisions of the UN SOFA may be disregarded by the 
host state if they conflict with its obligations under the CAT and GC. 
Only if any other state issues an extradition request, the host state may avoid the 
conflict of its obligations by complying with that request and actually extraditing the persons 
concerned. Otherwise, if there is no such request, the host state is under obligation to 
prosecute a peacekeeper. The possibility that some other state issues an extradition request is 
very improbable in practice. The nationality of most victims tends to be the one of the host 
state, the offender may still be present in the territory of the host state, whereas the state of 
nationality – the TCC may decide not to exercise its jurisdiction until the offender is 
repatriated or returned to the TCC from the mission.  
Even if the state of nationality decides to exercise its jurisdiction over those crimes 
when it gets to know about them and issues an extradition request to the host state, the host 
state may be prevented from complying with this request. Firstly, by complying with the 
request for extradition even to the TCC, the host state violates the provisions of the UN SOFA 
due to their inflexibility. The host state issuing and executing an arrest warrant violates 
immunities and inviolability provisions of the UN SOFA. It has to transfer the offender to the 
custody of the UN PSO under the UN SOFA. There may, however, be proper arrangements 
                                               
96 Steffen Wirth “Immunities, related problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute”, 12 Criminal Law Forum 
429 (2001), at 452. 
97 See VCLT 1969, Article 60, para. 5. 
98 Alexander Orakhelashvili “Article 30 Convention of 1969” in Corten, Olivier, Klein, Pierre, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vol. I (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 793. 
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made between the host state, the UN and the TCC to surrender the person to the TCC’s 
authorities by-passing the provision of the UN SOFA, if indeed the TCC issues such request 
on extradition.  
This may be almost the only way for the host state not to violate its obligations under 
the UN SOFA and requirements of the CAT and GC: namely the TCC instituting proceedings 
and requesting the extradition of the member of its national contingent and the UN acting in 
collaboration with the host state and the UN delivers the perpetrator to the TCC for the further 
criminal action. Nevertheless, such situation is almost impossible in practice and TCC is 
unlikely to start proceedings and issue extradition request, while the person is still a member 
of the PSO.  
The TCC’s obligations to prosecute the alleged offender appear, when the member of 
national contingent is repatriated or returned to the TCC, as this obligation depends on the 
presence of the offender in state’s territory. Once the offender no longer participates in the 
PSO, the territorial state or any other state which decides to establish jurisdiction may, if they 
prefer to, issue an extradition request for the TCC and the TCC will be under obligation to 
prosecute or extradite the offender. The obligation to prosecute or extradite by other states, 
including the host state, arises, when the alleged offender (if not prosecuted by the TCC) 
decides to travel to any state party to the convention. This obligation derives from the mere 
fact that the alleged offender is present for whatever reason in any territory under the 
jurisdiction of a state party.99 But those situations are no longer covered by the UN SOFA.  
 
 
 
                                               
99 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (2008), at 345. 
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D) Immunities of peacekeepers in domestic courts 
 
i) Immunities ratione personae 
Article 105 UN Charter and the UN Convention on the privileges and immunities 
(1946) provide for privileges and immunities for the UN. However, the military members of 
PSOs are not covered by these instruments. They are not officials of the UN.100  Unlike 
military observers, they are not provided with the status of experts on mission.101 Therefore 
the UN Immunities Convention is not applicable to the military members of PSOs and 
therefore is not relevant for the present analysis. The only document providing military 
members of PSOs with the privileges and immunities is the UN SOFA.102  
The UN SOFA divides PSOs’ personnel into four categories: 1) high-ranking 
members of PSOs, including Special Representative, UNFC and the head of the UN civilian 
police; 2) members of the UN Secretariat assigned to the civilian component, who remain 
officials of the UN; 3) military observers, UN civilian police and other civilian personnel; and 
4) military personnel of national contingents.103 The first three categories are covered by the 
UN Convention. High-ranking officials are given immunity accorded to diplomatic envoys.104 
They have status similar to Assistants S-G under Article V, Section 19 Immunities 
Convention. The second category remains covered by the immunities given to the officials of 
the UN under Article V,105 whereas the third category is granted the status of experts on 
mission under Article VI.106 The fourth category (military personnel PSOs) is covered by the 
                                               
100 See discussion in Roisin Burke (2011), at 88-89. 
101 See for further details ibid, at 90-91.  
102 See also ibid, at 91. 
103 UN SOFA, paras. 24-27. 
104 Ibid, para. 24. 
105 Ibid, para. 25 
106 Ibid, para. 26. 
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privileges and immunities provided by the UN SOFA. 107  These immunities somewhat 
different from those accorded to other categories. This analysis discusses only immunities that 
may affect criminal responsibility of the military personnel of PSOs. 
There are no immunities ratione personae per se for military personnel provided by 
the UN SOFA. However, jurisdiction of the host state is excluded by a provision of the UN 
SOFA, which states that the military personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
TCC.108 This has more far-reaching effect than ordinary immunities do. As discussed above 
the exclusion of jurisdiction of the host state is not conditioned on particular circumstances 
and applies irrespective of the seriousness of crimes committed or the willingness of national 
states to establish their jurisdiction and prosecute peacekeepers. Similarly, the exclusion of 
host state’s jurisdiction, unlike ordinary immunities, cannot be waived in the interests of 
justice.  
This provision is comparable with the immunity from criminal jurisdiction afforded to 
the diplomatic envoys by the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations of 1961 (VCDR 
1961) (as the UN Immunities Convention does not provide the provisions on such immunity). 
Article 31(1) VCDR 1961 provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the 
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. However Article 32(1) further states that the 
immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents may be waived by the sending state. 
Although it is highly improbable that the TCC would ever wish to waive immunity, even if it 
decides to do that, it would not be able to waive its jurisdiction in favour of the host state, as 
the UN SOFA is very inflexible and does not provide them with such an option. 
Controversially, the UN itself (namely, the S-G) cannot waive immunity from jurisdiction in 
                                               
107 Ibid, para. 27. 
108 Ibid, para. 47(b).  
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the host state,109 mainly because it is not immunity at all but exclusion of jurisdiction, and 
secondly such possibility was not provided by the UN SOFA, unlike in the UN Immunities 
Convention, where the S-G has not only a right but also a duty to waive immunities, if the 
immunities would impede the course of justice.110  
Another option provided by the VCDR 1961 that is available for states bound by 
immunities from criminal jurisdiction for diplomatic agents, is to declare any member of 
diplomatic staff a persona non grata.111 The receiving state may notify the sending state about 
its decision anytime and without having to explain its decision. The sending state may recall 
the person concerned or terminate his functions.112 This option can be used by the receiving 
state including in the cases where the person is suspected of having committed a crime and 
the receiving state may not prosecute that person because of the immunities from criminal 
jurisdiction applicable to him. This possibility is clearly unavailable to the host state under the 
UN SOFA. Only the UN may be able to repatriate the person concerned under special 
procedures and after conducting its investigations.113 Moreover, unlike under the VCDR 1961, 
there is no possibility for the host state to declare any military member of PSO unacceptable 
before arriving in his territory of the host state.114 Accepting them to their territory under the 
provisions of the UN SOFA, the host state never knows whether members of military 
personnel may undermine its security and cannot be prosecuted for this.  
In such a situation the UN is given a leading role to take at least some actions against 
alleged perpetrators of the crimes. It can ensure that the person is returned to his TCC from 
                                               
109 See also Roisin Burke (2011), at 91.  
110 See similar provisions with regard to representatives of states (Article IV, Section 14), officials (Article V, 
Section 20) and experts on missions (Article VI, Section 23) of the UN Immunities Convention.  
111 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (“VCDR”), Article 9.  
112 Ibid, Article 9. 
113  See DPKO, “Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Military Members of National Contingents” 
(2003), DPKO/MD/03/00993, paras. 13, 16, 28; see also Zeid Report, para. A.35; see also Zsuzsanna Deen-
Racsmany (2011), at 331. 
114 See for the diplomatic staff VCDR, Article 9; see also Roisin Burke (2011), at 83. 
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the host state that does not have any of such powers. Its powers are only limited to the 
possibility to take into custody a member of the PSO apprehended in the commission or 
attempted commission of a criminal offence.115 However, in this case that person must be 
immediately delivered to the representative of the PSO. 116  After that the host state may 
conduct investigation into offences,117 but no other actions can be taken by the host state 
beyond that, because as soon as a suspected offender is transferred to the UN, the provision 
on jurisdiction, which provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC, starts to apply.118 It is 
for the UN to take any further actions in respect of such a person.  
 
ii) Immunities ratione materiae 
The UN SOFA also provides for immunities ratione materiae for all members of 
PSOs. 119  Under this provision, all members of a PSO, including military members, are 
immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed in 
their official capacity.120 Similar provisions are provided by the UN Immunities Convention 
regarding UN officials and experts on missions. 121  This immunity has limited effect for 
military members of PSOs. Any possible civil proceedings are already covered by subsequent 
more extensive provision and must be discontinued if the UNFC certifies that the proceedings 
are related to the official duties of the members of PSO.122 The criminal jurisdiction of the 
host state is already excluded, which implies impossibility of instituting any kind of criminal 
proceedings.  
                                               
115 UN SOFA, para. 42(b). 
116 Ibid, para. 42(b). 
117 Ibid, para. 44. 
118 Ibid, para. 42; para. 47. 
119 See Ibid, para. 46. 
120 UN SOFA, para. 46. 
121 UN Immunities Convention, Article V, Section 18(a) (for the UN officials); Article VI, Section 22(b) (for the 
experts on missions). 
122 UN SOFA, para. 49. 
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The provisions of the UN SOFA are not binding on other states, apart from the host 
state and therefore such immunities would not extend beyond the borders of the host state, 
should any other state decide to exercise its jurisdiction over the military member of PSO. 
Especially it is possible due to the fact that unlike the UN officials and or any members 
afforded the status of experts on mission, who are covered by the corresponding provisions of 
the UN Immunities Convention, the military members of PSO enjoy only those immunities 
provided by the UN SOFA, which is a bilateral agreement between the UN and the host state. 
The nature of the UN SOFA does not provide the immunity provision with a binding effect 
not only for other states, which may decide to establish jurisdiction but also for TCCs not 
parties to the UN SOFA.  
Therefore the only visible effect to the status of the military personnel of PSO that the 
provision of the UN SOFA on immunities ratione materiae may have is, paradoxically, when 
the other provisions of the UN SOFA (i.e. provision on exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC) 
terminate, namely when the PSO members returned to their TCCs. The host state may be 
prevented from making any extradition request or issue an arrest warrant in relation to the 
conduct covered by the immunity rationale materiae, namely the official acts of the military 
members of PSO. Only under such limited scenario which is by itself very unlikely to happen, 
the provision has its practical effect for military members of PSO who are covered by much 
more far-reaching provision on exclusive jurisdiction of their respective TCCs.  
In those very limited situations where the provision might still apply the host state may 
not be able to issue an arrest warrant or extradition request to the TCC or any other state 
where the person allegedly committed a crime is found, until it is sure that the immunity 
ratione materiae does not apply. The question is whether a state may violate its obligations 
under the SOFA, if it actually issues an arrest warrant/extradition request, without 
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consideration of the question concerning immunities of the former military personnel of the 
PSO. This question was analysed by the ICJ in Arrest Warrant but in relation to the 
immunities ratione personae for certain high-ranking state officials under CIL.123 In this case 
the ICJ held that by issuing and circulating an international arrest warrant against incumbent 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, Belgium violated his immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and his inviolability under international law.124 This pronouncement cannot be 
taken to mean that the same would be true for immunities ratione materiae, as the Court 
discussed personal immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
The ICJ in Mutual Assistance briefly dealt with this question discussing immunities 
ratione materiae of the officials of Djibouti, when France issued summons against them.125 
The ICJ, however, preferred to deny the claim without going into substance of the matter. The 
Court considered that Djibouti at no stage informed the French courts that the acts concerned 
performed by its officials were acts of Djibouti.126 According to the Court, the state seeking to 
claim immunity for its organ must notify the other state concerned that the judicial process 
must not proceed against its organs to ensure that the latter state respects any such immunity, 
and by doing so the notifying state assumes responsibility for any internationally wrongful act 
in issue committed by such organs.127  
The same seems to be true for international organisations. The ICJ held in Special 
Rapporteur that the UN Secretary-General has the authority and responsibility to inform the 
member state of his finding as to whether a UN agent enjoys immunity and to request it to act 
                                               
123 The immunities ratione personae are not discussed here as irrelevant in relation to the military members of 
PSOs. 
124 See Arrest Warrant case, paras. 70-71. 
125  See Case concerning certain questions of mutual assistance in criminal matters (Djibouti v France), 
Judgement, ICJ, 4 June 2008, paras. 181-197. 
126 Ibid, para. 196. 
127 Ibid, para. 196. 
 220 
accordingly.128 Following this reasoning, if the host state decides to institute proceedings 
against a former military member of PSO and to issue an arrest warrant/extradition request, 
the UN would be expected to notify the host state about the fact that the acts of that 
peacekeeper which form the subject of the proceedings, were the acts of the UN and then the 
host state may not proceed with such a request, if the UN certifies so. The UN will assume 
responsibility for the internationally wrongful act committed by peacekeepers.129 If the UN 
does not notify the host state, it can proceed with the extradition request. It does not mean that 
the TCC has to respond to such a request.  
Another question is whether crimes committed by peacekeepers can be at all covered 
by immunity ratione materiae as official acts of the UN. Notably, the acts must constitute the 
official acts of the UN, and not TCCs as it is the UN which grants immunities to PSOs’ 
personnel under the UN SOFA. This question should be analysed with regard to the UN 
functional immunities ratione materiae and not state immunities ratione materiae for which 
different considerations apply. 
Under Article 105 UN Charter the UN enjoys only those immunities that are necessary 
for the fulfilment of its purposes. The UN officials and experts on missions are given only the 
immunities which are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions. 130  The 
immunities enjoyed by the UN and its organs and agents are confined to those which are 
strictly necessary to the exercise of functions in fulfilment of its purposes.131 This is reflected 
                                               
128 Special Rapporteur case, para. 60. 
129 See for instance ibid, para. 66. 
130 See UN Charter, Article 105 in relation to the UN officials and UN Immunities Convention, Section 22 in 
relation to the experts on missions. 
131 The legal position of intergovernmental organizations: a functional necessity analysis of their legal status 
and immunities (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), at 152, 165; August Reinisch “Securing the Accountability of 
International Organizations”, 7 Global Governance 131 (2011), at 136; See also Reparation for Injuries Suffered 
in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 11 April 1949, at 180, 184; Special 
Rapporteur case, paras. 56, 60; Nuclear Weapons case (WHO), at 78-79; Jurisdictional immunities of the state 
(Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgement, ICJ, 3 February 2012, at 196. See further discussion of these 
cases below. 
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in the principle of functional necessity132 which services as the criterion to determine the 
extent of privileges and immunities.133 As this reflects a general scope of the UN immunities, 
the same is true for the peacekeepers (although they are not granted experts’ or officials’ 
status but provided with similar immunities under the UN SOFA). 
The scope of functional immunities of IOs is different from the scope of states’ ratione 
materiae immunities as they (unlike IOs) have general competences and functions not limited 
by the principle of speciality. 134  This means that the acts that are covered by the IOs’ 
immunities would be confined to only those which are necessary to exercise the IOs’ 
functions. As for both states and IOs the acts that are covered by the immunities ratione 
materiae are “official acts”, the latter category of “official acts” is different for states and IOs 
given that “official acts” of IOs’ officials/agents must also be necessary for the fulfilment of 
IOs’ functions. Therefore any instances where the state could potentially claim immunities for 
its officials do not result for the same consideration to be applicable to the IOs’ immunities. 
The following analysis addresses the meaning of “official acts” of IOs only.  
In order to understand which acts are covered by the IO’s official acts, the official acts 
for the purposes of their attribution to IOs and official acts for the grant of IOs’ immunities  
should be compared. This question is considered in the light of the distinction between intra 
vires and ultra vires acts.135 
                                               
132  See Peter Bekker (1994), at 39, who defines the functional necessity as the entitlement of the IO to what is 
strictly necessary for the exercise of its functions in the fulfilment of its purposes. See Nuclear Weapons case 
(WHO), at 78-79. 
133 Peter Bekker (1994), at 166, August Reinisch (2011), at 136; Ola Engdahl (2007), at 134.  
134 See Nuclear Weapons case (WHO), at 78, para. 25, where the ICJ stated that “international organizations are 
subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence. International 
organizations are governed by the “principle of speciality”, that is to say, they are invested by the States which 
create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those 
States entrust to them.” 
135 See also ILC 3080th meeting report, A/CN.4/SR.3080, at 8 concerning the discussion on this issue in the ILC 
in the scope of consideration of responsibility of IOs for ultra vires acts, where it was pointed out that the official 
acts for the purposes of IOs’ responsibility cannot be compared with the official acts for the purposes of IOs’ 
privileges, as the latter law is more restrictive towards ultra vires acts and would not mean that ultra vires acts 
should not be covered by the former. 
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As discussed above, ultra vires acts of IO’s agents/officials acting in official capacity 
can be attributed to the IO.136 Although those acts must be “within overall functions” of an IO, 
they do not need to be necessary for the fulfilment of functions of the IO, unlike those acts 
qualifying for the application of immunities. Therefore the situation may be different for the 
definition of official acts for the immunities purposes.  
For that the intra vires acts would fall in the category of necessary acts for the 
performance of the IOs’ functions. This is because intra vires acts by definition being within 
authority of the organ/agent provided in the constituent instrument of the IO cannot be 
unnecessary, as the IO’s constituent instrument would not provide organs/agents with the 
authority to take unnecessary actions. This may not be true in respect of ultra vires acts of the 
organ/agent, i.e. those which are performed in excess of the authority or in contravention to 
instructions.137 A further question therefore is whether ultra vires acts can be considered 
necessary for the functional immunity of the IO to apply. 
As the ICJ stated in Reparations, IOs have only those powers that are essential to the 
performance of their duties.138 Further in Nuclear weapons (WHO) the ICJ considered that the 
IOs are vested by states with the powers, “the limits of which are a function of the common 
interest whose promotion those states entrust to them.”139 It is evident from those statements 
that IOs have only those powers (which can be either expressed in the constituent instrument 
or implied) that are necessary for the performance of their functions. Therefore when the IO’s 
                                               
136 See Article 8 ARIO. 
137 See also August Reinisch (2011), at 139. Cf. United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission, 
Sixty-third session (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011), A/66/10, at 225, para. 135 re the discussion in 
the ILC on the immunities of states, where some members of the commission expressed the view that the ultra 
vires acts should not be covered by immunity ratione materiae “since, in those situations, the official is acting 
neither under the instruction of the state nor under the authority of his functions.” This consideration was not, 
however, supported by the Special Rapporteur (see ILC Report (2011), A/66/10, at 219, para. 108). 
138 Reparations case, at 182. 
139 Nuclear weapons case (WHO), at 78, para. 25. 
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acts exceed its powers (i.e. being ultra vires), they would not be necessary for the 
performance of IO’s functions. 
That was also confirmed in Certain expenses, where the Court stated that where an IO 
takes actions which are appropriate for the fulfilment of one of its purposes, the presumption 
is that such action is not ultra vires the IO.140 Conversely, those acts which are ultra vires 
would not be appropriate for the fulfilment of the IO’s purposes.  
This confirms that whenever the acts of an IO’s organ/agent are ultra vires the IO, 
they are not necessary for the performance of the IO’s functions and therefore cannot be 
covered by the functional immunity of the IO. Moreover, in another case the ICJ stated that 
all the UN agents, “in whatever official capacity they act, must take care not to exceed the 
scope of their functions.”141 This statement shows that in order for the immunities to become 
applicable, a UN agent must act “in official capacity” and not exceed the scope of his 
functions.  
Therefore the acts to be covered by immunity must be official acts intra vires. This 
would be different from the question of IO responsibility which can be incurred even when 
the acts are ultra vires.142 As the Court noted, “the question of immunity from legal process is 
distinct from the issues of compensation for any damage incurred as a result of acts performed 
by the [UN] or by its agents acting in their official capacity,”143 separating the notion of 
official acts for the purposes of immunities from the official acts for the purposes of the IO’s 
responsibility for damages.  
The official acts for the purposes of state responsibility and for the purposes of 
immunities cannot be compared because they originate from different perspectives: while the 
                                               
140 Certain expenses case, at 168. 
141 Special Rapporteur case, at 89, para.66. 
142 See for instance Certain expenses case, at 168, ARIO, Article 8. 
143 Special Rapporteur case, at 89, para.66. 
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international responsibility is a factual question of international law arising from application 
of rules on international responsibility, the question of application of immunities depends on 
internal rules of the organisation144 and it is for the IO to make a decision on their application 
to the particular conduct.145 Unlike the international responsibility arising independently from 
the IO’s wish for the acts attributed to it and which are internationally wrongful, the 
immunities must be claimed by the IO. As the ICJ stated regarding the UN, it is for the 
Secretary-General to “assess whether his agents acted within the scope of their functions and 
where he so concludes, to protect these agents […] by asserting their immunity.” 146 
Accordingly, when the immunity is not asserted by the UN, the agent may not be able to 
claim it himself.147 In this way the acts for which the immunity was claimed cannot be the 
only acts which the IO is responsible for, as otherwise any IO may not assert immunities in 
order to avoid its international responsibility for them.148 This also confirms that the official 
acts for the purposes of international responsibility would be broader in scope than those that 
the IO asserted the immunity for.  
The immunity can be waived for the acts which are covered by the IO’s immunity. By 
waiving immunity the IO would not avoid responsibility either. Unlike state immunities, with 
the UN, the Secretary-General has not only a right but also a duty to waive any immunity 
where it would impede the course of justice (without prejudice to the UN interests).149 Even if 
at any point the immunity is applicable to the acts of peacekeepers, the Secretary-General 
                                               
144 See also Rosanne Van Alebeek (2008), at 247 
145 Peter Bekker (1994), at 174. 
146 Special Rapporteur case, at 87, para.60. 
147 See also ILC Report (2011), A/66/10, at 230, paras. 164, 167 for similar situation with regard to the states’ 
immunity, which must be involved by the state and not the official himself (on which the ILC was in agreement 
(see also the opinion of the Special Rapporteur in this regards (ILC Report (2011), A/66/10, at 277, paras. 144, 
147)).  
148 See also, for instance, Cortés Martín (2008), at 216. See ILC Report (2011), A/66/10, at 225, para. 135 for 
similar arguments in relation to states’ immunity. 
149 See UN Immunities Convention, Section 20 (officials), Section 23 (experts). See also Peter Bekker (1994), at 
192, who states that an IO “should feel compelled to waive its immunity in situations where the immunity is not 
strictly necessary for the exercise of [its] function sin the fulfilment of its purposes.” 
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must consider whether such immunity would impede the course of justice. It is likely that 
immunity applicable to any act of peacekeepers potentially amounting to a crime for which he 
can be prosecuted must be waived by the Secretary-General. 
The crimes committed by peacekeepers may be considered ultra vires acts and not 
covered by the UN immunities as they are not necessary to perform the UN functions. The 
peacekeepers acting for the UN purpose to maintain international peace and security do not 
need to commit crimes against the very people they are deployed to protect. It is not the 
function of the UN or PSO to commit crimes against the local population. Therefore it would 
not be possible for them to claim UN immunities from legal process for the crimes they have 
committed.  
It is especially so for international crimes threatening international peace and security 
rather than maintaining it. Therefore there is no doubt that international crimes committed by 
the peacekeepers cannot be covered by the UN immunities. Although there is an academic 
debate regarding whether the immunity of state officials ratione materiae can cover acts 
amounting to international crimes committed by state officials,150 this cannot be the same in 
                                               
150 The debate is was especially heated by the Arrest Warrant case, in which the ICJ may have suggest that 
immunities ratione materiae provided to state officials apply even with regard to international crimes. The Court 
stated that a former Minister for Foreign Affairs can be tried by a court of another state in respect of acts 
committed prior or subsequent to his/her period of office and in respect of acts committed during that period of 
office in a private capacity (para. 61). As this case concern the commission of international crimes and the Court 
did not make a specific comment on this issue, there were some concerns that it could be interpret as application 
of immunity ratione materiae to the commission all crimes, including international crimes, provided that they 
were perpetrated in the official capacity.  It should be noted however that in that case the Court examined the 
question of the application of immunity ratione personae, and not ratione materiae. Its reasoning, therefore, may 
be interpreted in a more discreet way, which does not entail far-reaching consequences. The ICJ may have 
implicitly excluded international crimes from the ambit of official acts of state and therefore the immunity 
ratione materiae would not apply. It may have been a general statement on the issue of immunities ratione 
materiae, which did not specify that it relates to international crimes (See Chanaka Wickremasinghe “Arrest 
warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), preliminary objections and merits, 
judgment of 14 February 2002”, 52 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 775 (2003), at 781).  It may 
also be that the Court decided not to pronounce on this issue at all and this omission does not mean that one must 
interpret it a contrario. Given the ambiguity of the Court’s words pronounced obiter (Claus Kress (2009), at 803), 
this passage cannot be construed in favour of one or another position.   
Another judicial position was expressed in the Blaškić case, in which the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered 
that although there is a well-established general rule under international law that each State is entitled to claim 
that acts performed by one of its organs in its official capacity be attributed to the State, so that the individual 
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relation to the UN immunities as they require an additional element, namely that the acts 
should be necessary for the fulfilment of the UN functions. The state immunity has no bearing 
on that.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the peacekeepers will not enjoy the UN immunity from 
legal process for the crimes committed during PSOs as these are the acts which are not 
necessary for exercise of the UN functions and even contrary, contravene the purposes of the 
UN and PSOs in maintaining peace and security. 
 
2. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over peacekeepers 
and immunities related to PSOs 
 
A) Jurisdiction of the ICC 
Not all serious crimes fall under jurisdiction of the ICC: it is limited to the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.151 These are the crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. The crime of 
genocide can be only committed with specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
                                                                                                                                                   
organ may not be held accountable for those acts and this rule is based on the sovereign equality of States, there 
are few exceptions related to one particular consequence of the rule: “these exceptions arise from the norms of 
international criminal law prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide”, under which “those 
responsible for such crimes cannot invoke immunity from national or international jurisdiction even if they 
perpetrated such crimes while acting in their official capacity” (Prosecutor v Blaškić, IT-95-14-AR108bis, 
“Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 
1997” (“Blaškić Appeal Decision”), 29 October 1997, para. 41). The issue of application of state immunities to 
the international crimes received a widespread response from academic word but a definite conclusion on this 
issue does not seem to exist (see further Dapo Akande, Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of state officials, 
international crimes, and foreign domestic courts”, 21 European Journal of International Law 815 (2010), at 
839-840; see also resolution of Institut de Droit International Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of 
Heads of State and of Government in International Law, resolution, Session of Vancouver (2001), Article 13(2); 
Antonio Cassese (2008), at 1088. Claus Kress (2009), at 804; Steffen Wirth (2001), at 451; International Law 
Association (2011), at 14). 
151 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 (“ICC Statute”), Article 5, para. 1. 
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national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such”.152 The crime of aggression can be only 
committed by a person “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State.”153 It is difficult to imagine how these crimes can be 
applicable to peacekeepers.  
As for the crimes against humanity, although the acts constituting these crimes can be 
committed by peacekeepers (such as rape, torture, unlawful depravation of liberty or murder), 
there is an additional chapeau requirement: the acts must be committed “as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of 
the attack.”154 Widespread attack refers to the large-scale nature of the attack and to the 
number of victims, while systematic attack indicates the organised nature of the acts of 
violence, and the improbability of their random occurrence.155 Random or isolated acts of 
violence are excluded.156 The ICC Statute further defines attack directed against any civilian 
population as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts [...] against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit 
such attack.”157 It is difficult to image that PSFs would have a policy to commit an attack 
against civilian population.158 
Therefore with regard to the specific situation of PSOs the most probable crimes that 
may be committed by peacekeepers are war crimes, as they may cover isolated acts 
committed by individual peacekeepers acting without direction or guidance from superiors or 
                                               
152 Ibid, Article 6. 
153 Ibid, Article 8bis. 
154 Ibid, Article 7. 
155 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, “Decision on the Prosecution's 
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see also Machteld Boot Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes: nullum crimen sine lege and the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Intersentia, 2002), at 478. 
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outside widespread or systematic patterns.159 As discussed above, in order to qualify for war 
crimes the acts committed by peacekeepers must have a nexus with an armed conflict.160 War 
crimes do not need to be committed only in the context of IAC. While this requirement is still 
valid for the first group of crimes,161 including grave breaches of the GC,162 the second group 
of war crimes provided by the ICC Statute may be committed in NIAC.163 Although the list of 
crimes committed in NIAC is shorter, their inclusion in the ICC Statute makes determination 
of status of particular armed conflict (international or non-international) not so significant, 
unlike crimes under grave breaches of the GC for the purpose of establishing compulsory 
universal jurisdiction and aut dedere aut judicare principle.  
The chapeau of Article 8 ICC Statute provides for the Court’s jurisdiction for war 
crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”164 This formulation may significantly reduce the list of crimes 
over which the Court has jurisdiction and make application of the ICC Statute to the crimes 
committed during PSOs very rare. However, the use of word “in particular” does not exclude 
other crimes from the cover of the ICC Statute but establishes a priority for the crimes 
committed on a large-scale. The Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba considered, “the term ‘in 
particular’ makes it clear that the existence of a plan, policy or large-scale commission is not a 
prerequisite for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes but rather serves as a 
practical guideline for the Court.”165  In practice, however, the Pre-Trial Chambers have 
                                               
159 William Schabas (2011), at 127; Geert-Jan G. J. Knoops (2004), at 252, see also Antonio Cassese (2008), at 
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160 See Section 1 of this chapter in relation to the discussion on what constitutes a nexus to the armed conflict. 
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162 Ibid, para. 2 (a). 
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Decision on Charges”), 15 June 2009, para. 211. 
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virtually ignored Article 8(1) requirement in their decisions for issuing arrest warrants and 
confirmation of charges.166  
The Court may have jurisdiction over the crimes committed by peacekeepers only 
when the host state is a state party to the ICC Statute or their TCC is a state party or either of 
them accepted the ICC jurisdiction.167 The only exception to this rule is if the UNSC refers to 
the prosecutor of the ICC the situation, in which crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction have 
been committed.168 In such a case, neither territorial nor national state needs to be a party to 
the ICC Statute.169 In other cases, when a territorial state or national state is a state party, a 
prosecutor of the ICC can initiate an investigation of a crime under Court’s jurisdiction170 or 
any state party may refer a situation to the prosecutor.171 Self-referrals are not excluded.172 
The UNSC or any state party may refer a situation, and not a particular crime to the 
prosecutor of the ICC.173  In practice this may mean that even if the crimes which were 
committed by peacekeepers in the territory of the host state are not directly referred by the 
UNSC or a state party, they may also appear among those investigated and possibly 
prosecuted by the Court, when the UNSC or a state party refers a general situation of the host 
state to the prosecutor. It is especially the case, when many serious crimes are committed on 
the territory of the host state by governmental or non-governmental forces and not by 
                                               
166 William Schabas (2011), at 128. This criterion may constitute guidelines for the prosecutor to establish 
priority in its policy, if the Court is overloaded with cases, because no such requirement exists in IHL. Machteld 
Boot (2002), at 548. 
167 See ICC Statute, Article 12, para. 2(a) and (b) and para. 3. 
168 Ibid, Article 13(b).  
169 See, mutatis mutandis, Ibid, Article 12, para. 2. 
170 Ibid, Article 13(c). 
171 Ibid, Article 13(a). 
172 The Appeals Chamber in the Katanga case confirmed the possibility for the states to refer their on situations 
to the ICC and that self-referrals are in conformity with the principle of complementarity under Article 17 of the 
Statute and general duty of the states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over international crimes under sixth 
para. of the Preamble of the ICC Statute. See Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-
01/04-01/07 OA 8, “Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case”, (“Katanga Appeal Admissibility Decision”), 25 
September 2009, paras. 85-86. 
173 See ICC Statute. Article 13(a) and (b).  
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peacekeepers. PSOs are normally deployed in such situations. The fact of referral of situation 
in the territory of the host state does not exclude particular group of persons from the possible 
prosecution, 174  even if these persons are peacekeepers who also committed crimes under 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court. Unable to conduct its own investigations or 
prosecutions, the host state itself may refer the situation to the ICC prosecutor and cannot 
exclude any person or group of persons from the ICC jurisdiction.175  
The question, however, is whether the jurisdiction of the ICC or self-referral by the 
host state is precluded by reason of the UN SOFA provision on exclusive criminal jurisdiction 
of TCCs. The UN SOFA cannot bind any other state or entity apart from the UN and the host 
state. Therefore the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction anyway. If the host state and a TCC are 
state parties to the ICC Statute, there is no question of jurisdiction. If the host state is a state 
party but not the TCC, the situation is the same, because although the host state jurisdiction is 
excluded by the UN SOFA, the ICC is not a party to the UN SOFA and therefore its 
jurisdictional provisions operate independently from the UN SOFA. The UN SOFA is binding 
only on the actions of the UN and the host state and not to other entities.  
Regarding self-referrals, the UN SOFA does not explicitly prohibit any referral of the 
situation to an international court. It excludes jurisdiction of domestic courts of the host state, 
and not jurisdiction of other courts in the world. Moreover, the state would refer a “situation” 
and not a particular peacekeeper to the ICC. Neither would it be in a position to influence a 
choice of crimes under consideration by the ICC prosecutor. To consider a particular 
                                               
174 See William Schabas (2011), at 173-174. As Schabas suggests, that is why the concept of referrals in the ICC 
Statute relates to “situations” rather than to “cases”, as “this language was adopted to avoid the danger of one-
side referrals, which could undermine the legitimacy of the institution” (at 174). 
175  When Uganda referred the “situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army” in northern and western 
Uganda to the ICC, the prosecutor concluded that “the scope of the referral encompasses all crimes committed in 
Northern Uganda in the context of the ongoing conflict involving the LRA” and notified Uganda about it. See 
Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision to convene a status conference on the investigation on 
the situation in Uganda in relation to the application of article 53, (“Uganda Decision”), 2 December 2005, paras. 
4-5. Therefore Uganda was not allowed to refer only crimes committed by the LRA, all other persons allegedly 
committing crimes in a particular territory may also be subject to the ICC jurisdiction. 
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provision of the UN SOFA as precluding the host states from referring its internal situation to 
the ICC would be too far to extend the reach of the UN SOFA provisions. Moreover, the UN-
ICC Relationship Agreement explicitly provide for cooperation of two entities in relation to 
the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction.176 Therefore the host state will not be precluded by 
the UN SOFA to refer its own situation to the ICC prosecutor.  
Even if the host state or any other state refers a situation to the ICC prosecutor or they 
initiate the investigation proprio motu, the case may still be inadmissible.177 This is because 
the Court’s jurisdiction is based on the principle of complementarity provided under Article 
17 ICC Statute.  
Article 17 suggests that a case may be declared inadmissible if a state started 
investigation or prosecution or the case is not of sufficient gravity. If no state has started 
investigation, and accordingly no action was taken, the question of admissibility does not 
arise, as the situation does not fall under paragraphs (a), (b) or (c).  178 The inaction of state 
                                               
176 See in particular Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations, 2004 (“UN-ICC Relationship Agreement”), Article 19. 
177  Even with respect to self-referrals the Court conducts an admissibility analysis. See Katanga Appeal 
Admissibility Decision, paras. 80-83. 
178 See, Katanga Appeal Admissibility Decision, para. 78. The Appeals Chamber in the Katanga case stated that 
“in considering whether a case is inadmissible under article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Statute, the initial questions to 
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complementarity in international criminal law: origin, development and practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 
(2008), at 161; 6. Jann Kleffner Complementarity in the Rome Statute and national criminal jurisdictions 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), at 105. 
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makes the cases admissible,179 and the unwillingness or inability of the state will be discussed 
only if the state started investigation or prosecution.180  
A question is whether the investigation conducted by the UN or the host state would 
be covered under Article 17, if neither of them would ever be able to prosecute peacekeepers 
(the UN, because it does not have such capacity,181 and the host state because of the UN 
SOFA). The UN investigation seems to be excluded, because the UN is not a state, and 
Article 17(a), (b) and impliedly (c) apply only to states’ investigations. Moreover, the host 
state’s investigation would also be excluded, because both paragraphs (a) and (b) and 
impliedly (c) refer to the investigation or prosecution by a state “which has jurisdiction over” 
the case. The host state’s jurisdiction is excluded by the UN SOFA, therefore it does not have 
jurisdiction and its investigation unable to lead to any prosecution, cannot trigger the 
application of Article 17. Only the investigations or prosecution of TCCs may render a case 
against peacekeepers inadmissible. There may be situations where other states may initiate 
investigation or prosecution, but those cases would be very rare, especially regarding 
peacekeepers.  
Therefore the ICC may step in, where TCC’s inactivity on investigation or prosecution 
of the crimes committed by peacekeepers can be proved. However, where a TCC started 
investigation or prosecution of its peacekeepers, the ICC may be precluded from admitting the 
                                               
179 The Appeals Chamber explained that “in case of inaction, the question of unwillingness or inability does not 
arise; inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction […] renders a case admissible before the Court, subject 
to article 17(1)(d) of the Statute.” Katanga Appeal Admissibility Decision, para. 78. 
180 In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered that if no state which has jurisdiction over the case is acting or 
has acted, there is no need to make any analysis on unwillingness or inability.180 (Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-
01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of arrest, Article 58, (“Lubanga Arrest 
Warrant Decision”), 10 February 2006, para. 40). Similarly the Appeals Chamber in the Katanga case stated that 
“the question of unwillingness or inability of a State having jurisdiction over the case becomes relevant only 
where, due to ongoing or past investigations or prosecutions in that State, the case appears to be inadmissible.” 
Katanga Appeal Admissibility Decision, para. 75. 
181 The UN does not have a court martial or other integrated penal system to deal with crimes committed by 
peacekeepers. See Marten Zwanenburg (1999), “The statute for an International Criminal Court and the United 
States: peacekeepers under fire?”, at 127-128. 
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case, if it is not proved that the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out an 
investigation or prosecution. 182  If the state has investigated the case, but decided not to 
prosecute, for the case to be admissible, it must be shown that the decision not to prosecute 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely to prosecute.183 When the 
person has already been tried by a national court for the same conduct, the ICC can only 
exercise jurisdiction if the proceedings in that court were for the purpose of shielding the 
person from criminal responsibility or otherwise were not conducted independently or 
impartially and in a manner inconsistent with intent to bring the person to justice.184  
State’s inability genuinely to investigate or prosecute the case is less probable in 
relation to TCCs. It requires show that the state is unable to obtain the accused or necessary 
evidence and testimony (it may happen with TCCs due to the remoteness of the case occurred 
in the host state) and it was due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its 
national judicial system.185 It is highly unlikely that a state with such a collapsed judicial 
system will contribute personnel to the PSO.  
Unwillingness of TCCs to prosecute their peacekeepers for political reasons is more 
probable. A TCC may decide to shield a person from criminal responsibility186 to avoid the 
embarrassment for peacekeepers committing international crimes. It may also intentionally 
delay proceeding not to bring a peacekeeper to justice.187 Although the proceedings against 
peacekeepers may not be conducted independently or impartially, it must also be shown that 
                                               
182 ICC Statute, Article 17, para. 1(a).  
183 Ibid, para. 1(b).  
184 Ibid, para. 1(c) and Article 20, para. 3(a) and (b).  
185 Ibid, para. 3. See also Prosecutor v Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11, “Decision on the admissibility 
of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi” (“Gaddafi Admissibility Decision”), 31 May 2013, para. 205. See 
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186 See ICC Statute, Article 17, para. 2(a). 
187 Ibid, para. 2(b). 
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the proceedings were inconsistent with intent to bring the person concerned to justice,188 
meaning that the proceedings were a sham leading to a suspect evading justice rather than to 
establish his criminal responsibility,189 which is difficult to prove. Both of these elements 
must be proved.190  
Apart from complementarity, it must also be proved that the case is of sufficient 
gravity to justify further action by the Court.191 To determine that, the Court considers such 
factors as the scale, nature and manner of commission of the alleged crimes, their impact on 
victims, and the existence of any aggravating circumstances.192 The gravity of a case should 
not be assessed only from a quantitative perspective (i.e. by the number of victims), but rather 
the qualitative dimension of the crime should also be taken into account.193 Other factors 
mentioned in Rule 145(l)(c) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence relating to the 
determination of sentence may be considered: extent of the damage or harm caused to victims 
and their families; nature of unlawful behaviour; means employed to execute the crime, etc.194  
In case of peacekeepers, although the crimes committed by them do not amount to a 
large-scale or widespread nature, the fact that international crimes are committed by a person 
entrusted with the mission to protect safety and security of local population and not to commit 
crimes against it, may be an additional factor to consider in relation to the impact of the 
                                               
188 Ibid, para. 2(c); see also Mohamed M. El Zeidy (2008), at 197. See Prosecutor v Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, 
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crimes on victims for assessing the gravity of the crime.195 The gravity of crimes lies in the 
breach of what is akin to a relationship of trust between the peacekeepers and the members of 
local population, whom they are sent to protect and assist.196 Because the crimes committed 
by peacekeepers violate their role as protector performed by the mission as a whole, and the 
fact of this violation can be considered as sufficiently grave, the ranking of particular 
peacekeeper within his mission should not make any difference in the assessment of gravity 
threshold for peacekeepers.197  
 
B) Immunities under the ICC Statute 
Article 27 ICC Statute provides for the irrelevance of official capacity and immunities 
attached to such official capacity for the ICC jurisdiction. Neither immunities ratione 
materiae, nor immunities ratione personae may exempt a person from criminal responsibility 
or from the ICC jurisdiction. The Pre-Trial Chamber in Al Bashir considered that “the current 
position of Omar Al Bashir as Head of a state which is not a party to the Statute, has no effect 
on the Court's jurisdiction over the […] case.”198  
Applying this rule to the status of peacekeepers under the UN SOFA, any member of 
the PSO cannot claim immunity from the ICC jurisdiction on the basis of their actions 
amounting to the official acts of the UN and the immunity ratione materiae provided by the 
                                               
195  See also Melanie O’Brien “Prosecutorial discretion as an obstacle to prosecution of United Nations 
peacekeepers by the International Criminal Court”, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 525 (2012), at 
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196 Report of the Group of Legal Experts, Ensuring the accountability of United Nations staff and experts on 
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198 See Al Bashir Pre-Trial Decision, 4 March 2009, para. 41. The PT Chamber, however, did not discuss the 
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UN SOFA. The provision on the exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs over members of their 
national contingents is not relevant here, because it does not provide for any immunity, but 
rather excludes jurisdiction only of the domestic courts of the host state.  
There are other provisions of the ICC Statute dealing with the question of immunities. 
Article 16 allows the UNSC to defer an investigation or prosecution of the ICC for a period of 
12 months, if it requests the Court to that effect by adopting a resolution under Chapter VII 
UN Charter and this request is renewable. 199  The UNSC already used this possibility to 
exempt peacekeepers from the ICC jurisdiction. By issuing resolutions 1422 and 1487 
(renewing the previous one) the UNSC requested the ICC to defer for 12 months any 
investigation or prosecution involving current or former officials or personnel from TCCs not  
parties to the ICC Statute over acts or omissions relating to a UN established or authorised 
operation.200 These resolutions provoked a lot of criticism for their widespread cover of the 
UN operations, in fact exempting the whole class of persons in any arising case from the ICC 
jurisdiction in contravention to the purpose of the ICC Statute.201 The resolutions exempt not 
only ordinary peacekeepers from the ICC jurisdiction, but also almost all participants in the 
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Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002)", 14 European Journal of International Law 85 (2003), at 94, who 
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“the exception of peacekeepers from proceedings before the ICC is also difficult to reconcile with Article 27 of 
the Statute which rules out immunities based on official capacity.”  
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military enforcement operations conducted under authorisation of UNSC. The private acts of 
officials and personnel seem not to be exempt from the ICC jurisdiction, as the resolutions 
apply to the ICC investigation or prosecution of the acts or omissions “related to” the 
operations.202 However they are now a part of history, as the UNSC did not agree on their 
renewal. 203  Those resolutions are more ad hoc arrangement, requiring the UNSC to take 
positive action and to issue a resolution. When the UNSC does not adopt any resolution of 
such kind, peacekeepers may be prosecuted by the Court like any other person in the world.  
Another provision of the ICC Statute, the immunities question, is Article 98. It relates 
to the state cooperation with the ICC and does not affect the ICC jurisdiction. It provides that 
the Court may not request surrender or assistance from the state which would have to violate 
its obligations under international law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunities204 or 
its obligations under international agreements, where the consent of a sending state for 
surrender is required.205 The existence of such immunities or international agreements may 
prevent the ICC from ordering a request for surrender of persons under Article 98, but they do 
not exclude persons’ individual criminal responsibility under the Statute.206 
The question is whether the Court is precluded from issuing a request for surrender of 
peacekeepers by virtue of the UN SOFA. This concerns only the host states, and not any other 
states, as only the host state is bound by the UN SOFA. The Court is not precluded from 
issuing a request for surrender to any other state party, as they are not bound by the UN 
SOFA and therefore no situation envisaged by Article 98 in relation to peacekeepers may 
exist. The host state obligations may be covered only by Article 98, para.2, not para.1, as this 
paragraph talks about state immunities and diplomatic immunities attached to the person, and 
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the UN SOFA does not provide for such immunities for military personnel of PSO (only 
regarding certain high-level officials, which is a separate issue).  
However, Fleck, contends that Article 98(1) may fully apply to peacekeepers who are 
operate or not under the UN SOFA, as the peacekeepers still enjoy, as he suggests, functional 
immunities of their respective TCCs, as organs of their sending states.207  This argument 
cannot be approved. Article 98(1) deals with “state” and “diplomatic” immunity of persons. 
Neither of them is provided by the UN SOFA. It is the UN SOFA concluded between the UN 
and host state, and not between TCCs and a host state, which grants any kind of immunities 
and exclusion from jurisdiction of the host state and the UN is not a state and cannot grant 
state immunity for a PSO. Moreover, although the national contingents of PSOs remain in 
TCC’s national service, they also constitute an organ of the UN and normally act on its behalf. 
They perform functions of the UN and not of their TCCs and must obey the orders of the 
UNFC and not instructions from their TCCs. Therefore the rationale to grant them any sort of 
functional immunity of their respective states does not exist.  
Even if it was true that the military members of PSOs remain covered by their TCCs’ 
immunities (which would make the UN SOFA provisions unnecessary), the applicability of 
their functional immunities to the ICC would make the ICC prosecution of any member of 
armed forces or any other official of any state impossible, unless their state of nationality 
decides to surrender him to the ICC by itself, as it will still be attached to the person even 
after this person ceased to be an official. Article 27 clearly excludes such possibility. 
Moreover, to hold a person immune for e.g. war crimes (one of the four categories of crimes 
under the ICC Statute) only because he was a member of armed forces would contravene the 
                                               
207 Dieter Fleck "Are foreign military personnel exempt from international criminal jurisdiction under Status of 
Forces Agreements?", 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 651 (2004), at 668-669. 
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very nature of the GC. 208  Therefore Article 98(1) does not exclude the surrender of the 
military members of PSOs to the ICC as suspects in commission of international crimes on 
the basis of any functional immunity that may (or may not) be attached to them.  
The application of Article 98(2) to the situation, where the host state is bound by the 
UN SOFA, is more complex. This provision was specifically drafted with SOFAs in mind.209  
Even if Article 98(2) is applicable to the situations covered by the UN SOFA, its 
application has a limited effect. As discussed above, Article 98 does not affect ICC 
jurisdiction and a peacekeeper can still be indicted and prosecuted (once surrendered to the 
ICC), because the ICC Statute treats the question of immunities for peacekeepers under the 
heading of cooperation and surrender of persons to the court, and not as an issue of 
jurisdiction.210 Any other state party must comply with the Court’s request for cooperation 
and surrender such a person to the ICC, once it finds him present in its territory. This 
provision may prevent the surrender of nationals of non-parties only and does not apply where 
the TCC is a state party to the ICC Statute,211 or even if it applies, the Court may issue the 
same request to the TCC, and it will be obliged to cooperate with the Court.212 Therefore the 
                                               
208 See also Michael Akehurst “Jurisdiction in international law”, 46 British Yearbook of International Law 145 
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only effect of this provision regarding the host state is when a peacekeeper of a non-party 
TCC is present there.  
The obligations under the UN SOFA that the host state may infringe while complying 
with the Court’s possible request for surrender, do not derive from the clause providing for 
the TCC’s exclusive jurisdiction over the military personnel of the PSO,213 as it regulates the 
question of allocation of jurisdiction between the host state’s courts and TCC’s courts, and 
does not affect the issue of surrender to the international court that already established its 
jurisdiction. Nor does it talk about international jurisdiction, as opposed to the national one.214 
The provision on ratione materiae immunity for official acts of members of PSOs215 does not 
preclude the host state from surrendering a peacekeeper to the ICC, because it also relates to 
the question of jurisdiction, separately covered by Article 27 ICC Statute, and this immunity 
is expressly excluded by this article. Accordingly, the only obligation under the UN SOFA 
that may preclude the host state from surrendering a peacekeeper to the ICC is the obligation 
not to arrest members of PSO, except where requested by the UNFC or when a member is 
apprehended in the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offence, and if it did 
so, an obligation to deliver any member of PSO, arrested by the host state, to the 
representatives of the UN PSO.216 Therefore if the ICC issues a request for surrender, the host 
state may be precluded to arrest a member of PSO or if arrested, must deliver him to the UN.  
However, the UN SOFA does not expressly preclude the host state to comply with a 
surrender request issued by the ICC. Any such possibility depends on willingness of the UN 
to cooperate with the Court. Although the UN is not a party to the ICC Statute, it has 
obligations to cooperate with the ICC under a separate agreement – UN-ICC Relationship 
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agreement, Article 19 of which requires the UN to fully cooperate with the Court and to take 
all necessary measures to allow the Court to exercise its jurisdiction for persons covered by 
privileges and immunities under UN Immunities Convention and the relevant rules of 
international law.  
Although military members of PSOs are not covered by the UN Immunities 
Convention, they are covered by certain immunities under the UN SOFA. It is for the UN to 
waive such immunities (even though such possibility was not expressly provided in the text of 
the UN SOFA) and fully cooperate with the Court. In practice, it may mean that in order to 
cooperate with the Court’s request for surrender of a peacekeepers issued for the host state, 
under the UN SOFA provision the UN UNFC may request the host state to take into custody 
the peacekeeper and further surrender him to the ICC or the UN may together with the host 
state transfer that person to the ICC.  
One of the examples of such procedure is provided in the UN-ICC MoU concerning 
cooperation between MONUC and ICC, which provides in Article 16 that MONUC is 
prepared to help the DRC government in carrying out arrest and securing appearance of 
persons sought by the ICC.217 This Article may encompass situations where the ICC issued a 
request to the host state for surrender of a MONUC peacekeeper. Unlike other articles of the 
UN-ICC MONUC MoU (e.g. Articles 11, 12 dealing with the ICC requests for interview and 
testimony of peacekeepers) containing safeguarding clauses of non-applicability of those 
articles to situations where peacekeepers may be charged by the ICC, Article 16 dealing with 
arrests does not contain such a clause, meaning that the requests for arrests of peacekeepers 
may also be included.  
                                               
217  Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court 
Concerning Cooperation between the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC) and the International Criminal Court International Organizations, Article 16(1). 
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Although both the host state and the UN acting on request by the host state may deal 
with arrest and detention of its peacekeepers, it is for the UN to waive inviolability of 
peacekeepers, and not for the TCC, as the UN SOFA is concluded between the UN and the 
host state. 
The ICC is not precluded from issuing a surrender request to the host state being under 
the obligations of the UN SOFA, because of specific nature of the UN SOFA it may not be 
covered by Article 98(2). There is no provision in the UN SOFA requiring the consent of a 
sending state to surrender a person of that state to the Court.218 No provision of the UN SOFA 
is talking about the consent of the sending state, let alone the consent to surrender a person of 
that state to the Court.219 There is no provision in the UN SOFA to explicitly prohibit the 
surrender of a peacekeeper, especially to an international court. Even if it could be inferred 
from the UN SOFA, that the consent of the UN is required to do so (as it is an agreement 
between the UN and the host state), it is not “a sending state”, as provided by Article 98(2).220 
It follows that in principle Article 98(2) does not preclude the ICC to issue a request to 
surrender to the host state and the host state with the cooperation of the UN will be able to 
comply with it, if other conditions under the ICC Statute are satisfied.  
 
Conclusion 
                                               
218 See text of Article 98, para. 2 of the ICC Statute. 
219 See also Dieter Fleck (2003), at 656 with regard to the NATO SOFA. 
220 Tan points out, “the terms ‘international agreement’ used in Article 98(2) refer to agreements entered into 
between states, and cannot include agreements entered into between or including international organisations.” 
See Chet J. Jr. Tan "Proliferation of Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements among Non-Ratifiers of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court", 19 American University International Law Review 1115 (2003), at 
1141. Schabas also of the opinion that the reference to ‘sending state’ and ‘requested state’ suggests that these 
are agreements between states, and not with international organisations. See William Schabas The International 
Criminal Court: a commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 1042. See also Legal 
Service of the EU Commission (2002), at 159, suggesting that Article 98(2) must apply only to the SOFAs, 
concluded between states parties to the ICC Statute. See also David Scheffer "Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: 
America's original intent", 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 333 (2005), at 346, who states that “the 
original intent behind Article 98(2) was relegated to persons acting at the direction of the ‘sending state’.” 
(emphasis preserved). 
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The analysis demonstrated that peacekeepers are provided by the UN SOFA with 
certain immunities will not be able to avoid criminal responsibility for the crimes they commit 
during PSOs in the territory of the host state. Although the UN SOFA provides for the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the host states over the acts committed by the military members of 
PSO, the UN SOFA remains a bilateral agreement between the UN and the host state 
concluded for the duration of PSO and binding only the host state while the peacekeepers are 
stationing there. The peacekeepers are not excluded from the jurisdiction of other states 
(including TCCs) and the host state after military members of PSO cease to be peacekeepers 
covered by the UN SOFA (subject to the immunity ratione materiae, not covering 
peacekeepers from jurisdiction of other states not bound by SOFA).  
If peacekeepers commit international crimes (such as torture or GC grave breaches), 
all the states parties to the CAT and GC will have a duty to establish jurisdiction and 
prosecute peacekeepers for those crimes when perpetrators are present in their territory. If a 
perpetrator of an international crime is present on the territory of the host state, and the host 
state is a party to the convention, it will violate international law anyway: either violating the 
GC or CAT for not prosecuting that offender following the UN SOFA or violating the UN 
SOFA and prosecuting offender following the obligations under the GC or CAT. The mere 
fact of signing the UN SOFA including a provision on exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs 
amounts to the violation of its obligations under international law. It is because of total 
inflexibility of the UN SOFA provision on exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs which does not 
consider international crimes. It is unprecedented and leads to potential impunity of military 
personnel. 
Under the ICC, Article 27 excludes any kind of immunities and therefore 
peacekeepers are not excluded from the ICC jurisdiction either. The provisions of the UN 
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SOFA do not bind the ICC. The UN SOFA provision excluding the host state jurisdiction 
over peacekeepers will make irrelevant host state’s investigation for the principle of 
complementarity under Article 17, as the host state will be considered as a state not having 
jurisdiction over the case concerned.  
The question of surrendering peacekeepers to the ICC under Article 98, (separate from 
the question of jurisdiction) is more controversial. Article 98(1) deals with the state or 
diplomatic immunities, not concerning peacekeepers having only with immunities under the 
UN SOFA. Under Article 98(2) only the host state (and not other state) may be precluded 
from surrendering a person to the ICC and only because of the UN SOFA provision on the 
inviolability of peacekeepers (no detention of peacekeepers). However, the UN is obliged to 
cooperate with the ICC by virtue of the UN-ICC Relationship agreement and therefore must 
facilitate any requested surrender. Moreover, Article 98(2) ICC Statute may not even cover 
the UN SOFA and the host state will be obliged to comply with the ICC request for surrender 
of a peacekeeper.  
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VI. Application of the system of international responsibility to the case-
studies of peace support operations: UNOSOM and MONUC/MONUSCO 
 
This chapter aims to illustrate the approach taken in the previous chapters to the 
system of international responsibility for UN PSOs. The norms of international law discussed 
in the previous chapters are applied to two examples of PSOs: the United Nations Operation 
in Somalia (UNOSOM), in particular UNOSOM II and the United Nations Organisation 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (renamed MONUSCO).  
The analysis of this chapter is primarily based on different reports of NGOs, mass 
media, commissions of enquiry, Secretary-General’s reports, etc. Some of these sources may 
not be seen as very reliable and may contain certain allegations and inconsistencies. However, 
the aim of this chapter is not to establish facts of what has happened in those missions and 
which crimes were definitely committed by peacekeepers (these questions are for the courts to 
decide). This chapter uses those materials as an illustration of how the findings of the 
previous chapters apply in the real situations of PSOs. Accordingly, this chapter will proceed 
with the assumption that the content of the documents referred to is accurate.  
The first section of this chapter discussed individual criminal responsibility of 
peacekeepers for the offences committed during UNOSOM and MONUC, international status 
of the allegedly committed crimes and the possibility of the prosecution for them. The second 
section deals with the application of IHL to UNOSOM and MONUC and potential breaches 
of international obligations under IHL and IHRL committed by the TCCs and the UN. The 
third section addresses the attribution of conduct of peacekeepers to the UN/TCCs. If the 
attribution is possible, the UN/TCCs may be responsible for the crimes committed during 
MONUC and UNOSOM. 
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1. Individual criminal responsibility of peacekeepers for the offences 
committed during the PSOs 
 
There are numerous reports indicating that PSFs in both missions might have 
committed different offences during the deployment of MONUC/MONUSCO and UNOSOM. 
Some offences were investigated by the UN and TCCs and the peacekeepers’ involvement in 
their commission was officially accepted by the UN; the prosecutions conducted by the TCCs 
led to the convictions.1 However, there are many more other offences allegedly have been 
committed by peacekeepers, but no sufficient evidence was gathered (due to different 
reasons)2, or prosecutions in TCCs were not commenced or failed to proof the fault.3 It does 
not mean that those alleged crimes had never happened. The chapter will deal with both 
proved and only alleged acts possibly amounting to crimes.  
 
A) Crimes allegedly perpetrated by MONUC 
MONUC has got a bad reputation for numerous allegations of sexual abuses against 
the local population. Although only some allegations were substantiated, the number of the 
acts allegedly to have been committed by members of PSO demonstrates that the cases of 
sexual abuse and violence are not incidental. Even the UN recognised the existence of sexual 
                                               
1 See generally Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
“Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in 
the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, A/59/661, 5 January 2005 
(“OIOS Report (2005)”); se also See Canada, Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, available at 
http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm, Chapter “The Somalia mission: post-deployment”, the Court Marital: 
Investigations and Charges. 
2 OIOS Report (2005), A/59/661, at 1, which states that among 72 allegations only 6 were fully substantiated; in 
Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, “Report by the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services on its investigation into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the 
Ituri region (Bunia) in the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 
A/61/841, 5 April 2007 (“OIOS Report (2007)”) among 217 allegations only 1 was substantiated (see para. 22).  
3 See, for instance, See Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Chapter “The Somalia mission: post-
deployment”, the Court Marital: Investigations and Charges. 
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exploitation and incidents of rape by MONUC peacekeepers of local women and girls.4 Most 
of the reported cases concern peacekeepers’ sexual contact with local girls as young as 12-16 
years old in exchange of some food or small sums of money. The UN Office of Internal 
Oversight Services (OIOS) described five substantiated examples of sexual misconduct 
committed by peacekeepers with the girls who were 12-14 years of age.5 Most of the non-
substantiated allegations were from girls 12-16 years old.6 Some girls as young as 13 were 
raped by MONUC soldiers.7 For example, one peacekeeper was arrested in the attempt to rape 
a 12-year-old girl making pornographic videos.8 There were cases, when the girls were raped 
and then given food or money to portray sex as consensual (so-called “rape disguised as 
prostitution”).9 Some girls were subjected to bribes or intimidation by peacekeepers.10 Media 
reports describe other instances of rape and widespread sexual misconduct by peacekeepers.11  
Even if the girls engaged in sexual relationships with peacekeepers deliberately, for 
most of them this was the only possibility to survive – so-called “survival sex” – when they 
have sexual relations to get some food, money or protection.12 It was because the civil conflict 
of 2004 in the DRC resulted in economic hardship, family breakdown and poor education.13 It 
                                               
4 See, for instance, Secretary-General report, S/2004/650, at 8, para. 32. 
5 See A/59/661, OIOS Report (2005), paras. 12-19. 
6 OIOS Report (2005), para. 25. 
7 Human Rights Watch, “MONUC: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform”, Testimony of Anneke Van Woudenberg 
before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights 
and International Operations, March 1, 2004, published on March 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/02/28/monuc-case-peacekeeping-reform; Ray Murphy “An assessment of UN 
efforts to address sexual misconduct by peacekeeping personnel”, 13 International Peacekeeping 531 (2006), at 
535. See also Price Zeid’s report, para. 9, who states that allegations of rape and sexual assault comprised 13 per 
cent and 5 per cent respectively of the all allegations of sexual misconduct. 
8 See Clayton, Jonathan, Bone, James, "Sex scandal in Congo threatens to engulf UN's peacekeepers", Jonathan 
Clayton, James Bone, Times Online, December 23, 2004, available at http://www.eyeontheun.org/articles-
item.asp?a=406&id=329. 
9 See Prince Zeid’s report, A/59/710, para. 6. 
10 See OIOS Report (2007), para. 13. 
11 See Jonathan Clayton and James Bone (2004), describing concrete examples of misconduct by members of 
various national contingents of MONUC; see also Max du Plessis, Stephen Pete “Who guards the guards? The 
international Criminal Court and serious crimes committed by peacekeepers in Africa”, ISS Monograph series, 
No. 121, February, 2006, at 6-7. 
12 Human Rights Watch (2005), Testimony of Anneke Van Woudenberg. 
13 OIOS Report (2007), para. 26. 
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cannot be said that they did it of their own free will. Moreover, many girls are too young to 
give a valid consent for sexual intercourse. In some domestic jurisdictions the peacekeepers 
would be prosecuted for rape if engaging in sexual relationships with girls of that age. 
However, there are not many prosecutions of peacekeepers in their respective TCCs. In 
August 2006 the DRC made it a crime to have sexual relationships with a child less than 18 
years of age (the age threshold was previously 14 years of age), 14  meaning that any 
peacekeeper who has sex with girls under 18 violates criminal law of the host state in 
contradiction to para.5 MONUC SOFA, requiring them to observe local laws and regulations.  
The described acts may also amount to international crimes under certain conditions. 
Rape and other forms of sexual violence can be a separate war crime or charged as a war 
crime of torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, or outrages upon personal dignity.  
Even if the victim of such a relationship seems to be consenting because she expects to 
receive some money or food from the peacekeeper, her consent can still be vitiated by the 
presence of coercive circumstances or for the reasons of her age. The ICC Elements of Crimes 
provide that a war crime of rape will be committed, if a perpetrator took advantage of a 
coercive environment, or if a victim was incapable of giving genuine consent by virtue of 
natural, induced or age-related incapacity.15 Similarly, ICTY jurisprudence supports that. In 
the Kunarac case, the ICTY Trial Chamber concluded that commonly to different legal 
systems, serious violations of sexual autonomy are to be penalised, which is violated 
“wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a 
voluntary participant.”16 The crime of rape will be found if the sexual penetration occurred 
                                               
14 See ibid, para. 4. 
15 See ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, para. 2 and accompanying fn., Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-1, para. 
2. 
16 Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 457. 
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without consent of victim given voluntarily,17 and if a perpetrator took advantage of coercive 
circumstance without relying on physical force the consent may be negated.18 
Applying this to the situation of MONUC, one may argue that the consent of the girls 
engaged in prostitution for survival may be negated by the coercive circumstances they live in 
and impossibility to find food or any other sources of income. They do this not by their free 
will and their sexual autonomy was violated. Moreover, when peacekeepers engage in sexual 
relationship with children, their consent is invalid due to their age-related incapacity to give 
such consent. Therefore, the widely reported acts of MONUC peacekeepers against local 
population may amount to rape, even if they pay for sex.  
Those acts may also amount to cruel or inhuman treatment, if the perpetrator inflicted 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon the victim.19 There is no need to prove that 
the perpetrator took advantage of coercive circumstances. Such acts may also amount to 
outrages upon personal dignity, which will be committed if the perpetrator humiliated, 
degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of the victim and it was as severe as to become an 
outrage upon personal dignity.20 Moreover, as discussed above, under certain circumstances 
those acts may amount to torture.21  
However, these offences will only amount to international crimes, if certain additional 
elements are present. They may be considered war crimes, if nexus between the acts and 
armed conflict is proved. As discussed before, the nexus would be present if an armed conflict 
                                               
17  Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 460. Although the reasoning in Kunarac case can be criticised for not 
departing completely from the requirement of lack of consent to be shown, the focus on free will and sexual 
autonomy of the victim can be regarded a step forward for broadening the scope of the circumstances under 
which the crime can be found. See also Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Peterson (2007), at 138-139, who also 
argue that if the international element of crime is established (with regard to the war crimes it is a nexus with the 
armed conflict), this would make the circumstances of crime “intrinsically coercive” and make genuine consent 
by the victim impossible anyway. In this way the proof of consent is not needed. 
18 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, paras. 128, 129-130, 132-133. 
19 See, for example, ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(a)(ii)-2, para. 1; Article 8(2)(c)(i)-3, para. 1. 
20 See, ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 8 (2)(b)(xxi), paras. 1 and 2; Article 8(2)(c)(ii), paras. 1 and 2. 
21 See discussion in Chapter V, section 1(c). 
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played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit a crime, his decision to commit 
it or the purpose for which it was committed.22  
In the present case, there was an armed conflict in the territory of the DRC, at least 
during the time when the majority of the reported offences were committed.23 The fact that 
many girls were already raped by armed groups during the armed conflict and had no means 
to support themselves contributed to their decision to contact peacekeepers directly or 
indirectly. Some of them were brought by boys (often former child solders). Moreover, the 
decision to submit themselves to peacekeepers being the only possibility for them to survive 
is also a consequence of the armed conflict. The peacekeepers would not be able to so easily 
commit the offences and find girls (especially children) with whom they engage in sexual 
relationship for small amount of food or for providing them some protection but for the 
existence of the armed conflict. The armed conflict made the local population particularly 
vulnerable. Accordingly, in certain cases the armed conflict played a substantial part in the 
peacekeepers’ ability to commit crimes and those crimes (especially committed against 
children) had a nexus with the armed conflict and therefore can amount to war crimes.  
Although these crimes are grave enough to become GC grave breaches, the armed 
conflict where they were committed must be international.24 As will be discussed below, it is 
only possible to consider conflict in the DRC international if the PSFs were involved in 
combat with the DRC armed forces (FARDC) and only for the time they participate in 
hostilities. Therefore it is highly unlikely that these crimes will be GC grave breaches.  
There is a slight possibility to consider these crimes amounting to crimes against 
humanity. As previously discussed, although those crimes are sufficiently grave to fall under 
the category of crimes against humanity, they must satisfy an additional chapeau requirement 
                                               
22 See discussion in Chapter V, section 1(c), citing the ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence in relation to this matter. 
23 See discussion in the next section below concerning the existence of armed conflict in the DRC. 
24 See Chapter V, section 1(c). 
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– they must constitute a widespread or systematic attack against civilian population. 25 
Although the number of crimes allegedly committed by peacekeepers against civilians may 
show relatively systematic nature of crimes, it cannot be said that they were committed 
pursuant to or in furtherance of an organisation policy. The UN policy is definitely the 
opposite – it tries to prevent those crimes and not to encourage them. It does not seem that 
any of TCC pursues a contrary policy. Therefore, it those crimes cannot amount to crimes 
against humanity. 
It may be possible for some acts of rape to amount to a separate crime of torture, 
although the rape must be committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.26 Although acts 
of rape allegedly committed by peacekeepers were mostly committed in their private capacity, 
the peacekeepers remain state organs. There were instances where their superiors were 
allegedly aware about their subordinates’ acts and did nothing to prevent them and permitted 
them to continue.27 Even if the acts may have been committed in private capacity, it was the 
official capacity of the military superiors to prevent those acts and punish perpetrators (or at 
least initiate investigations). If the superiors omitted to take measures intentionally, those acts 
under certain condition may amount to the crime of torture.  
Apart from the sexual offences, other possible misconduct by the military 
peacekeepers in MONUC was discovered. There were allegations that peacekeepers were 
involved in gold and arms smuggling with armed groups in the DRC. In 2007 some 
international newspapers reported that Indian peacekeepers in Goma had swapped arms for 
                                               
25 See Chapter V, section 2(a). 
26 CAT, Article 1(1), see also discussion Chapter V, section 1(c).  
27 See next section of this chapter for further details. 
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minerals with rebel movement CNDP.28 It was also alleged there was weapons trading in Ituri 
between Pakistani peacekeepers and FNI militia, responsible for some of the worst massacres 
in eastern Congo.29 Although OIOS found no evidence to that effect, the Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) considers that there is clear evidence in this regard. 30  The HRW also 
considered that the gold trading and possible provision of arms and ammunition by the UN 
peacekeepers to militia groups served directly to stoke the violence that they were intended to 
prevent.31 While gold or armed smuggling per se cannot be considered a war crime/crime 
against humanity, those acts may amount to the assistance to the armed groups in the 
commission of their war crimes.  
To be liable for aiding and abetting to a war crime, a person must carry out acts 
specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain 
crime, which have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, however it generally 
involves a lesser degree of directness of participation in the commission of crime than 
required to establish primary liability for a crime.32 These acts must be carried out with the 
knowledge that they assist the commission of the crime.33 Moreover, the person does not need 
to know the precise crime intended to be committed, but must be aware of its essential 
                                               
28 See Julie Reynaert “MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian Protection in the Kivus”, International Peace 
Information Service (2011), at 25; see also article La Libre Belgique (2007); see also Human Rights Watch 
(2008), Letter to Ban Ki-moon.  
29 Human Rights Watch, “UN: Hold Peacekeepers Accountable for Congo Smuggling”, Letter to Chief of UN 
Peacekeeping Urges Follow-Through, Letter to Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, July 24, 2007, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/22/un-hold-peacekeepers-accountable-congo-smuggling.  
30 Human Rights Watch (2007), Letter to Jean-Marie Guéhenno; see also OIOS Report on case no. 0151/06 
(2007), paras. 22-25, 98. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 102; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgement, para. 127, 192. It should 
however be noted in the light of the recent Perišić Appeal Judgement that specific direction remains an important 
element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting and in the cases where an accused’s assistance is remote from 
the actions of principal perpetrators, specific direction must be explicitly established. See for instance Prosecutor 
v Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement (“Perišić Appeal Judgement”), 28 February 2013, para. 73. 
33 Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 102; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 45. 
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elements.34 Therefore, where peacekeepers smuggle arms to opposition groups, it must be 
established that the arms obtained from peacekeepers facilitated in a substantive way the 
commission of the crimes by those groups, and that peacekeepers knew about that and about 
the crimes that those groups were going to commit. If proved, peacekeepers involved in arms 
smuggling aided or abetted the commission of crimes. 
 
B) Crimes allegedly perpetrated by UNOSOM/UNITAF 
Many crimes were allegedly committed during UNOSOM, however some of them 
were committed not by the contingents of UNOSOM I or II but by those who were under the 
UNITAF command or US command outside the UN command. 
There was a widely reported incident of the involvement of Canadian military 
contingent in the torturing and killing of a Somali teenage boy. This incident led to the 
prosecutions and some convictions in Canadian domestic courts.35 This incident represents an 
example of commission of a transnational crime of torture by the peacekeepers. The elements 
of crime provided under Article 1 CAT could be established.36 Severe pain and suffering were 
intentionally inflicted on the boy for the purpose of punishing him for the attempted theft 
which he was suspected of. The infliction of pain and suffering was done by one of the 
military members, who can be considered a public official (as he was in national military 
service of Canada) and it was not a private act. Moreover, there were other members of 
military contingent who were accuse and some were convicted for negligence performance of 
                                               
34 Prosecutor v Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement (“Nahimana Appeal Judgement”), 28 
November 2007, para. 482; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 50. 
35 See Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Chapter “The Somalia mission: post-deployment”, the 
Court Marital: Investigations and Charges. 
36 See Chapter V, section 1(c), for the discussion of those elements. 
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duty37 and the acts of torture were committed at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of other public officials. Therefore the international crime of torture can be 
established. 
There was another widely reported incident where two members of Belgian military 
contingent allegedly tortured a Somali civilian boy by dangling him over an open fire to teach 
him a lesson because he was suspected in attempting to steal.38 On the trial they alleged that 
they were playing with the boy and were subsequently acquitted.39 Depending on the evidence 
present during the trial, it was possible that such conduct may amount to the transnational 
crime of torture. If severe pain or suffering, physical or mental were inflicted and one of the 
purposes (not necessarily the sole purpose) of those acts was to punish a boy (or for any other 
prohibited purpose)40 and the perpetrators were from the military contingent, the transnational 
crime of torture can be established. The same can be said about the incident when a Belgian 
soldier forced a Muslim Somali child to eat pork and saltwater and then eat his vomit.41 There 
were instances when without provocation, Belgian troops allegedly harassed, beat and killed 
many Somalis, many of whom were unarmed.42 
There were reports that the soldiers from Italian contingent tortured Somali civilians 
with electric shocks, burnt them with cigarettes, threw them into razor wire and left them in 
                                               
37 See Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Chapter “The Somalia mission: post-deployment”, the 
Court Marital: Court Martial proceedings in the torture and death of Shidane Arone. Sergeant Boland, the guard 
duty in the bunker, where the boy was tortured pleaded guilty to the chare of negligent performance of duty. 
Major Seward, who gave an order as the Officer Commanding 2 Commando to “abuse” intruders, was found 
guilty of negligent performance of duty. 
38 See Nieck Ammerlaan (1997); “Somalia – atrocities committed by UN troops”; CNN (1997); “Belgian UN 
troops admit to 'roasting' Somali boy”, Electronic Telegraph, 24 June 1997, available at 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1139565/posts. 
39 Nieck Ammerlaan (1997). 
40 See Chapter V, section 1(c).  
41 “Somalia – atrocities committed by UN troops”; Nieck Ammerlaan (1997); Robert Fox (1997). 
42 Alex de Waal “U.S. War Crimes in Somalia”, 30 New Left Review 131 (1998), at 135, 137. 
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the sun for long periods without water.43 They also allegedly tied a young Somali girl to the 
front of an armoured carrier and raped her while officers looked on.44 The Italian paratroopers 
claimed that they were specifically trained in methods of torture to aid interrogation.45 There 
were other military contingents involved in various atrocities committed against Somalis: 
beatings, looting, rapes, assaults, shooting down civilians, indiscriminate firing on crowds, 
etc.46 
In other instances, the members of military contingents locked children to closed metal 
containers for the attempts to steal something.47 On at least one occasion a boy was found 
dead in from heat exhaustion and suffocation.48 This may amount to a war crime of inhuman 
treatment or punishment and in case of death, a war crime of wilful killing. There were many 
more instances which can qualify as torture or inhuman treatment or punishment.49 
Furthermore, on some occasions soldiers from national contingents tried to prevent 
Somali people from stealing by shooting at them.50 Moreover, there were orders, issued by 
superiors of national contingents to shoot or to use deadly force against civilians trespassing 
into the territory of compounds.51  
                                               
43 Robert Fox (1997); “Somalia – atrocities committed by UN troops”; William Norman Grigg, “Beasts in Blue 
Berets”; Natalia Lupi “Report by the enquiry commission on the behaviour of Italian peace-keeping troops in 
Somalia”, 1 Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 375 (1998), at 378.  
44 Robert Fox (1997); “Somalia – atrocities committed by UN troops”; Natalia Lupi (1998), at 378. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See Ibid; Alex de Waal (1998), at 137. 
47 Ibid; Alex de Waal (1998), at 136; William Norman Grigg, “Beasts in Blue Berets”; CNN (1997); “Somalia – 
atrocities committed by UN troops”. 
48 Alex de Waal (1998), at 136. 
49 See Ibid, at 135-136. 
50 See Ibid, at 136; Canada Can't Shake Somali Scandal; New Military Chief Quizzed on Troops' 1993 Torture-
Killing, Washington Post Foreign Service, Toronto, December, 29, available at 
http://www.netnomad.com/canada.html. 
51 See Charles Trueheart. See also Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Chapter “The Somalia mission: 
post-deployment”, the Court Marital: Court Martial proceedings in the torture and death of Shidane Arone. In the 
case of Captain Rainville, the prosecution argued that he told his subordinates to use deadly force against fleeing 
Somalis, who attempted to trespass the compound. He received instructions from LCol Mathieu that any attempt 
to breach the camp perimeter would be considered a hostile act and that soldiers could shoot to wound thieves.  
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In all these situations the nexus of a crime with the armed conflict must be established. 
In the circumstances, where such crimes took place, there was an ongoing armed conflict in 
Somalia between different military groups, who did not exercise authority in the country.52 
The law enforcement authorities were not available immediately to arrest and try those who 
commit theft. In such a situation members of national contingents tried to punish and detain 
trespassers by their own means and methods. Therefore the existing armed conflict played a 
substantial part in the perpetrators’ ability to commit the crime or their decision to commit it53 
and the nexus between the crime and armed conflict can be established.  
Moreover, crimes of torture, inhuman treatment or wilful killing can also fall under 
grave breaches provisions of the GC, if the nexus with international armed conflict is 
established. As will be argued below, there are reasons to believe that at the time of 
participation of UNITAF and UNOSOM II in hostilities, there was an international armed 
conflict present in the territory of Somalia and therefore the crimes committed by members of 
military contingents related to the armed conflict can amount GC grave breaches. 
Other reports suggest that the national contingents attacked civilian objects, which 
resulted in large number of casualties. In the incident of 17 June 1993, the UN forces attacked 
Mogadishu’s largest hospital suspecting that General Aidid had taken refuge there.54 The staff 
and patients who could move sought safety in the basement, but not all could move and some 
doctors continued their operations.55 Eleven artillery shells and helicopter rockets struck the 
hospital, but the exact number of casualties is unknown.56 It was subsequently revealed that 
the attack was planned.57  
                                               
52 See discussion in the next section below. 
53 See Chapter V, section 1(c), for the definition of the nexus with the armed conflict. 
54 Alex de Waal (1998), at 138. 
55 Ibid, at 138-139. 
56 Ibid, at 139. 
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Another attack happened on 12 July, when the US helicopters fired ten tow rockets 
into a building where members of Aidid’s political movement were holding a mainly civilian 
meeting.58 On the day of the attack, it was a meeting place for elderly, clansmen, intellectuals 
and militia leaders.59 The ICRC estimates 54 people died during the attack (although the 
parties gave different estimations).60 Another major incident happened on 3 October 1993, 
when several hundred people died in a series of battles near Olympic Hotel.61 
Although some circumstances of the attacks are unclear, those attacks may amount to 
war crimes. War crimes of wilful killing or wilful causing great suffering may have been 
committed. The nexus with the international armed conflict is not difficult to establish. It may 
also be possible to establish war crimes of attacking civilians or civilian objects (including 
indiscriminate attack), depending on the proof of intention of perpetrators.62  
 
C) Criminal responsibility of the members of the national contingents 
Military members of MONUC/MONUSCO are covered by the provisions of the UN 
SOFA concluded with the government of the DRC. 63  In relevant parts this agreement 
coincides with the UN Model SOFA discussed above (although the numbering of provisions 
differs).  
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Like the UN Model SOFA, the MONUC SOFA exempts peacekeepers from criminal 
jurisdiction only of the DRC and only during the period a particular peacekeeper is assigned 
to MONUC. Should a peacekeeper decide to travel to the DRC after his repatriation or 
termination of his assignment to MONUC or when he is present in any other country, he may 
be subject to criminal jurisdiction of the state which was capable to establish such jurisdiction, 
because the relevant provision of the MONUC SOFA (Article 51(b)) protects only military 
members of military contingents of MONUC and would not protect those who ceased to be a 
member. As MONUC SOFA was signed only by the DRC and the UN as a bilateral treaty, its 
provisions do not bind other states that may wish to establish jurisdiction over the conduct of 
peacekeepers (for example, if peacekeepers committed crimes against nationals of the 
neighbouring states).  
It can be established in some instance that the rape or sexual violence committed by a 
MONUC peacekeeper amounts to the transnational crime of torture, any state party to the 
CAT in which the peacekeeper is present is under an obligation to establish jurisdiction and to 
prosecute or extradite the peacekeeper. The DRC will be under such obligation, as it became a 
party to the CAT in 1996 (before MONUC was deployed). Because of the MONUC SOFA, it 
may come across with the situation where it violates the CAT for not prosecuting the crime 
occurred on its own territory with the presence of the perpetrator. If it chooses to prosecute 
the perpetrator, it will violate the MONUC SOFA.  
In such a situation the best choice for the TCC would be to issue an extradition request 
to the DRC and together with the termination of his duties as a peacekeeper. The DRC in 
collaboration with the UN could satisfy the extradition request by the TCC and send him back 
to the TCC for prosecution. In this way the host state would comply with its obligations under 
the CAT (either prosecute or extradite) by extraditing the peacekeeper to the TCC.  
 259 
The collaboration of the DRC with the UN is essential in this case as the DRC is 
required under Article 46(b) MONUC SOFA after the arrest of a peacekeeper to immediately 
deliver him to the representatives of MONUC which means a violation of the CAT for not 
taking the peacekeeper into custody. However if the peacekeeper after the arrest of the DRC 
appears to be in the UN custody and then sent back in collaboration with the DRC to the TCC 
in compliance with an extradition request, DRC will comply with its obligations if the same 
result is achieved (a peacekeeper is sent to another state for prosecution). Nevertheless, if the 
TCC decides not to prosecute the peacekeeper for torture, and if he decides to further travel to 
a state party to the CAT, that state will also be obliged to establish jurisdiction and prosecute 
or extradite the peacekeeper.64 The peacekeeper will not have immunity ratione materiae 
provided by Article 50 MONUC SOFA in any state as it does not cover ultra vires acts and in 
particular international crimes, as they are not necessary for any UN purposes, including for 
maintaining international peace and security in DRC.65 
The same system could work for UNOSOM, but the problem with Somalia was that 
there was no government in Somalia and no central authority with the responsibility to enter 
into international relations for Somalia.66 Accordingly, there was no government to sign the 
SOFA.67 There was no government able prosecute peacekeepers for the crimes committed. 
Although Somalia was during the UNOSOM’s deployment a state party to the CAT and GC, 
there was no government to prosecute peacekeepers for the allegedly international crimes.  
                                               
64 See Article 5(2) and 7(1) of the CAT. 
65 See discussion in Chapter V, section 1(d). 
66 Report of the commission of inquiry established pursuant to Security Council resolution 885 (1993) to 
investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them, New York, 24 
February 1994, UN Doc. S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, para. 31. 
67 See also Michael Kelly (1999), at 21. 
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There appeared to be such possibility, when the system of justice started to partially 
work in Somalia,68 however, it was mostly supported and organised by UNOSOM itself and 
undoubtedly would not be able to prosecute the peacekeepers. Moreover, the mission was 
concluded in March 1995 and the peacekeepers left the country. The only real possibility for 
prosecution of peacekeepers could arise in their respective TCCs. It should not be forgotten 
that if a TCC refused to prosecute its peacekeepers for international crimes, any other state (if 
it is a party to the respective conventions), where they may be found, is obliged to establish its 
jurisdiction and prosecute (or extradite) perpetrators of grave breaches of the GC or 
transnational crime of torture under the CAT.  
The events in which UNOSOM participated happened long before the ICC Statute 
came into force and therefore they do not fall under the ICC jurisdiction ratione temporis. The 
events occurred in the DRC while MONUC was deployed can fall under jurisdiction of the 
ICC. If MONUC peacekeepers committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC (for 
example, war crimes), they can be prosecuted by the ICC. Indeed, the DRC is a state party to 
the Rome Statute since 2002 and the reported cases which may amount to international crimes 
were committed after this date. Moreover, the DRC referred to the ICC the situation of crimes 
within jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of the DRC 
since the entry into force of the Rome Statute, on 1 July 200269 and several cases are already 
pending and concluded before the ICC. In principle, the prosecutor can open the case against 
anyone who has committed crime(s) within the jurisdiction of the ICC in the territory of the 
DRC, including peacekeepers.  
The analysis confirms that some acts committed by peacekeepers may amount to the 
war crimes within jurisdiction of the ICC. If the TCC has not started investigation of those 
                                               
68 See next section for the details. 
69 See Office of the Prosecutor press release, “Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo”, ICC-OTP-20040419-50. 
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crimes by the time the Pre-Trial Chamber issues a decision on admissibility (the investigation 
by the DRC and the UN will not count),70 the case (if found of sufficient gravity) can be 
admissible. As discussed before, the only problem would be whether the peacekeeper who 
allegedly committed a war crime can be surrendered by the DRC bound by the MONUC 
SOFA. The argument was made that Article 98(2) may not cover the UN SOFAs and 
therefore the DRC in cooperation with the UN (bound by the UN-ICC Relationship 
Agreement) have to surrender the peacekeeper to the ICC upon its request.71  
 
2. Breach of international obligations by peace support forces of 
MONUC and UNOSOM 
 
A) Application of IHL during the deployment of UNOSOM  
For the analysis of IHL application to UNOSOM, the first step is to identify whether at 
that time the armed conflict existed in the territory of Somalia independently from the 
participation of UNOSOM in it.  
When UNOSOM was deployed in Somalia, there was no government in this country 
and several armed militia groups were acting in the Somali territory.72 Several attempts were 
made by the UN to achieve national reconciliation in Somalia by concluding agreements 
between leading warlords,73 but they failed. Civil war and active fighting continued during the 
deployment of the UN. Clearly, there was no peacetime situation. There was no government 
                                               
70 See discussion in Chapter V, section 2(a). 
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72 See Samuel Makinda Seeking peace from chaos: humanitarian intervention in Somalia (Lynne Rienner, 1993), 
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73 See Ioan Lewis and James Mayall “Somalia”, in Berdal, Mats R., Economides, Spyros, United Nations 
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to enforce peacetime laws Somalia. There was no international involvement of foreign states, 
other than by UNOSOM and UNITAF, to the territory of Somalia. Therefore the situation in 
Somalia could not be recognised as international armed conflict without considering the 
involvement of UNOSOM/UNITAF.  
As previously discussed, the armed conflict exists between armed groups within a 
state, when there is a protracted armed violence.74 Two conditions must be fulfilled: the 
violence must be of certain level of intensity and the participating groups must be sufficiently 
organised. The first condition was clearly fulfilled during that time in Somalia. The fighting 
between main groups resulted in killing of 15,000 – 40,000 people between January 1991 and 
August 1992.75 The second condition was also fulfilled. There were two main groups fighting 
for the power: the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Aidid and the Somali 
Salvation Alliance led by Ali Mahdi.76 The fact that several other groups also participated in 
political reconciliation talks organised by the UN,77 can demonstrate sufficient organisation of 
the fighting groups (at least some of them). 
Moreover, UNSC resolutions started to mention the application of IHL in Somalia 
since the authorisation to deploy UNITAF.78 It does not mean, however, that there was no 
armed conflict before that date. The gravest fighting and resulting casualties occurred before 
the deployment of UNITAF (see above).79 Therefore the conflict was of sufficient intensity to 
                                               
74 See discussion in Chapter III, section 1(b), see also Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 562; Lemaj Trial Judgement, 
para. 84. 
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recognise the application of IHL there.80 Accordingly, at the moment of UNOSOM/UNITAF 
deployment IHL of non-international armed conflict was applicable in the territory of Somalia 
(Somalia has been a party to the GC from 1962). 
The next question is whether UNOSOM and UNITAF became a party to the conflict 
and if so, what was the duration of their participation in it.  
As discussed, participation in hostilities presupposes that there are certain hostile acts 
which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or 
equipment of the enemy’s armed forces.81 The finding on the use of force exceeding to certain 
extent the scope of permitted individual self-defence, may not be enough to render a PSO 
participating in hostilities. Intent to harm other party’s armed forces and therefore to be in 
conflict with it must also be established. Moreover, for the finding on continuous participation 
in hostilities, the intent must be present during the whole period of the use of force. If the 
intent is present only during a particular operation, the PSO will be participating in the armed 
conflict only for the duration of that operation. Therefore to find a PSO participating in the 
conflict, one must establish that the force was used and there was intent to participate in the 
conflict and whether it was continuous or present only during a particular operation. This 
analysis needs to be applied to UNOSOM. 
Originally UNOSOM I was deployed with consent of main armed groups operating in 
Somalia.82 In its resolution 751 (1992), the UNSC initially authorised the deployment of 50 
observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu,83 and was subsequently increased to 3,500 
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personnel.84 It was apparent that UNOSOM I did not have robust mandate to use force beyond 
self-defence and was said to be ineffective to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid. Clearly, 
UNOSOM I had no intention to cause harm to either armed group participating in the conflict 
in Somalia and therefore did not participate in hostilities or become a party to the conflict in 
Somalia.  
For securing the delivery of humanitarian aid the UNSC authorised the deployment of 
UNITAF, which was not a peacekeeping operation in any sense.85 Its mandate was to use all 
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia.86 It was led by the US and predominately consisted of the military 
members of the US contingent (28,000 of 37,000 were from the US).87 Other states also 
agreed to contribute their contingents to UNITAF, even those who originally contributed 
forces to UNOSOM I (among them Australia, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, 
etc.). UNOSOM I and UNITAF were deployed simultaneously under close coordination of 
the activities. 88  UNITAF unlike UNOSOM I was equipped with the robust Chapter VII 
mandate and could use force beyond self-defence to secure the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.89 On different occasions it, indeed, used force against opposing armed groups.90   
The fact that the UNSC resolution specifically provided for such a mandate and that 
the force was actually used is prima facie evidence of the participation of UNITAF in the 
armed conflict in Somalia. UNITAF was not deployed with consent of the armed groups 
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operating in Somalia and was not under the UN command and control. Although UNITAF 
mandate was not to direct the force against particular group fighting in Somalia, for the 
purposes of IHL, UNITAF represented a coalition of the foreign states which intervened in 
the territory of Somalia (although legitimately and authorised by the UNSC) and participated 
there in hostilities.91 Therefore this situation amounts to IAC between the states contributing 
contingents to UNITAF and Somalia. No intensity of the conflict is needed to be proved.92 
Even though there was no government in Somalia, organised groups fighting against a foreign 
enemy, may have been fighting on behalf of Somalia, being a party to the GC. UNOSOM 
continued to operate under its original peacekeeping mandate when UNITAF was deployed 
under close coordination with it.93 
The problem could be if the states contributed contingents to UNITAF and UNOSOM 
I at the same time. This may lead to unexpected results. Becoming a party to the conflict 
because of its armed forces fighting on behalf of UNITAF against organised groups, the state 
also contributed its armed forces to the peaceful UNOSOM I which under IHL may also be 
labelled as combatants because they remain members of armed forces of the state party to the 
armed conflict.  
UNOSOM I became know as UNOSOM II after 26 March 1993 and assumed the 
robust mandate of UNITAF and responsibility for all military and civil operations in 
Somalia. 94  The mandate was also pursuant to Chapter VII, under which UNOSOM was 
authorised to implement the arms embargo, provide security and assist in the repatriation of 
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refugees, to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of secure 
environment throughout Somalia.95 
The formal transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II took place on 4 May 1993.96 
UNOSOM II was given broader mandate than UNITAF or UNOSOM I, as it was involved in 
all possible peace activities – additionally to its peace-enforcement mandate, it was 
responsible for several ordinary peacekeeping activities: monitoring cease-fire, assistance in 
repatriation of refugees, etc.97 As new mandate authorised the use of force against those 
militia who refused to disarm, such action could directly challenge the military power of 
political movements and unless they decide to disarm, a collision between the militia and 
UNOSOM II was inevitable.98 In May 1993 the UNFC issued Fragmentary Order 39, which 
stated that “organised, armed militias, technicals, and other crew seed weapons are considered 
a threat to UNOSOM forces and may be engaged without provocation.”99 Next fragmentary 
order of 8 July included a reference to “enemy forces”.100 They reflect a general situation of 
UNOSOM being in armed conflict with SNA.101 
UNOSOM II must be regarded as an enforcement measure, albeit under the command 
and control of the UN.102 It represents the first peacekeeping operation in UN history that has 
been given the mandate to use force not only in self-defence but to pursue its mission.103 It 
became apparent that with the expanded mandate, a confrontation between UNOSOM II and 
armed militia is inevitable. 104 This constitutes prima facie evidence of the involvement of 
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UNOSOM in the conflict with the armed groups, but further inquires must be made regarding 
the actual participation of the UNOSOM forces in hostilities.  
It is unclear whether the participants of UNITAF and UNOSOM II can be considered 
participating in the conflict in the intermediate period of March 1993-May 1993, when 
following the peace talks in Addis Ababa, the situation was relatively stable. However by 
mid-May tensions started again.105 In the incident on 7 May 1993 the Belgium contingent 
became involved in fighting with one of the militia groups loyal to SNA, which caused 
serious casualties.106 Given that the actual transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II took 
place from 4 May 1993, it is possible that UNOSOM II participated in the conflict during the 
operations, where it used force beyond self-defence. Moreover, the subsequent events 
escalated the confrontation between the UNOSOM and armed groups even further.  
On 5 June 1993, during the inspection of armed depot belonging to SNA and possibly 
the attempting to destroy anti-UNOSOM radio station, the Pakistani contingent was attacked, 
allegedly by the members of SNA led by General Aidid, killing over 20 soldiers, wounding 
over 50 and some were missing.107 Other contingents which came to help Pakistani troops 
were also attacked. 108  Following these events, the UNSC adopted resolution mandating 
UNOSOM II basically to use force against SNA and its leader General Aidid. It condemned 
the attacks on UNOSOM peacekeepers on 5 June 1993 launched “apparently” by SNA109 and 
referring to UNOSOM mandate provided by previous resolution (814(1993)), reaffirmed its 
authorisation for UNOSOM to “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for 
the armed attacks […], and establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout 
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Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention 
for prosecution, trial and punishment.”110  
As was recognised by the UN Commission of Inquiry, the resolution resulted in a 
virtual war situation between UNOSOM II and the SNA, as both sides attacked each other 
over a period of four months.111 The full-scale participation of UNOSOM II in hostilities 
began from this date, as UNOSOM II stated to use force proactively. 112  UNOSOM’s 
offensive stated on 12 June,113 when UNOSOM made combine air and ground attack against 
three weapon sites, including Radio Mogadishu,114 resulting in more dozen civilians being 
killed.115 On 17 June UNOSOM undertook major cordon and search operation in an SNA 
enclave and had to fight back against the attack lasting four hours.116 Five soldiers from 
Moroccan contingent were killed and 40 were wounded.117 On 12 July UNOSOM II attacked 
the place of the meeting of clan elders and militia leaders, killing around 50 and wounding 
170 people, mainly civilians.118 On 9 September US and Pakistani forces opened fire on 
Somali men, women and children killing 60 people who, as contended by US officials, had 
attacked with grenades and gunfire.119 
Some operations were undertaken by US forces. They comprised US Quick Reaction 
Force which was available to support UNOSOM II activities but under US command and 
control and not UNOSOM II UNFC.120  However 3,000 US logistics personnel who also 
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supported UNOSOM II were under its command and control.121 Therefore not all operations 
undertaken on behalf of the UNSC were clearly controlled or commanded by the UN. The 
degree of control which the UN could exercise over each operation remains obscure.  
One such operation happened on 3-4 October 1993, when the US Army Rangers 
attacked the Olympic Hotel supposing that the top SNA leaders would be there.122 In this 
incident, 18 American soldiers were killed and 78 wounded, whereas the Somali death toll is 
estimated to be in the hundreds, even up to 1000.123 The decision to launch an attack on 3 
October was unilateral act of the US and was taken outside the UN chain of command without 
even informing other UN contingents – Malaysian and Pakistani contingents participated in 
the battle only later, when they were called to help US troops.124  
The involvement of international forces in the conflict led to a high proportion of the 
casualties, in particular during the hunt for Aidid: 625-1500 Somalis were killed by 
UNOSOM (the majority were women and children) and 1000-8000 were injured.125 During 
the period following the attacks on Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993, the UN initiated almost 
all military actions and all casualties occurred as a result of UNOSOM II operations.126 The 
main hostilities continued until 8 October 1993.127 
In February 1994, the UNSC adopted a resolution revising the mandate of UNOSOM 
II as a whole, which became less coercive and more in line with the one of ordinary 
peacekeeping missions.128 It provided for UNOSOM II simply to encourage and assist the 
Somali parties in implementing peace agreements and the ongoing political process; to protect 
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the UN and humanitarian relief personnel and major ports and essential infrastructure for 
humanitarian relief and assistance.129   
Although the mandate was provided under Chapter VII, the use of force would no 
longer be allowed in relation to disarmament and only for the force protection.130 Therefore 
UNOSOM would abandon coercive means and revert to reliance on the cooperation with the 
Somali parties. 131   Accordingly, after this date UNOSOM II was involved only in some 
incidental hostilities132 and not on such a large scale. In early 1994 the US and most European 
states withdrew their forces. The rest of the UNOSOM contingents were withdrawn by March 
1995. 
Analysing further the involvement of UNOSOM II in the armed conflict in Somalia, it 
can be said that in the period of June 1993-February 1994, the states contributing contingents 
to UNOSOM II and the UN which led almost all those contingents (except for the US troops 
which were under separate US command and independent of the UN chain of command but 
also participated in the conflict)133 can be considered as a party to the armed conflict in 
Somalia. Like in the case of UNITAF, UNOSOM II involvement made the conflict in 
Somalia international. The troops participated in the robust Chapter VII mandate which 
expressly mandated them to use force beyond self-defence. The mandate was such as the 
impartiality of the mission was forfeited, as the resolution expressly directed peacekeepers to 
act against one of the major military groups in Somalia and its leader.  
The disarmament efforts of UNOSOM coincided with military efforts to arrest Aidid, 
which often involved the use of force and which contributed to the perception that UNOSOM 
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was using force to bring about the desired outcome and direct force against Aidid and its SNA 
group. 134  The mission was deployed clearly without consent of the parties. 135  Even the 
Lessons Learned report recognises that the existence and application of IHL in the conduct of 
military operations involving the use of force was not fully understood by some military 
forces deployed in Somalia and that the troops must be aware of IHL and abide by those 
provisions during the exercise of their duties. 136  Therefore it is evident that UNOSOM 
participated in the armed conflict at this period of time. 
More ambiguous situation existed after February 1994. UNOSOM was still deployed 
under Chapter VII mandate and without consent of the parties, but the mandate was reduced 
and was not any more directed against a particular armed group. There was incidental fighting 
between some of the contingents of UNOSOM II and armed groups but not on such a large-
scale and of such a collective nature as to constitute a pattern of involvement of UNOSOM in 
the armed conflict. It is better to view the participation of UNOSOM II in the armed conflict 
only for the time and so far as it became involved in incidental hostilities with the major 
armed groups. Beyond those instances UNOSOM II may be regarded as non-participating in 
the conflict. Such an involvement would render only particular contingents a party to the 
conflict and not the rest of the mission.  
It is also possible to argue that the law of occupation may be applicable to UNOSOM 
II and UNITAF. Firstly, it should be reiterated that the provisions of GCIV are applicable as 
soon as protected persons fall into the hands of the party to the conflict and Chapter III of this 
work advocated for gradual application of the provisions of the law of occupation.137 The 
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participation of the party to the armed conflict must also be established. Otherwise there is a 
need to prove that the PSO established its authority over a particular territory.  
Applying this finding to the situation of involvement of UNOSOM II and UNITAF in 
the armed conflict, it is possible firstly to distinguish the requirement of GCIV in relation to 
the law of occupation which applies every time the protected persons fall into the hands of 
UNOSOM II and UNITAF and the requirements of application of GCIV to the occupied 
territories without the existence of armed conflict, and the requirements of HR which 
envisage the existence of authority of UNOSOM II and UNITAF over a part of territory of 
Somalia. For the application of the law of occupation during the armed conflict no analysis is 
needed and everything depends on the particular circumstances of the breach of GCIV and 
whether some provisions related to the law of occupation are violated. As for the application 
of GCIV without the existence of the armed conflict, the possibility of establishment of 
authority of UNOSOM should be discussed. 
As mentioned before if a PSO occupies a particular territory as a sole authority, this 
fact can be indicative to the actual establishment of its authority over that territory. 138 
UNOSOM II involvement in Somali conflict may be regarded as representing such a situation. 
As Kelly argues, UNOSOM was accepted by the majority of Somalis as being the primary 
authority in that area. 139  Osinbajo also points out, “Somali political leadership impliedly 
abdicated authority in Somalia or at least shifted the responsibility to UNOSOM and 
continued so to do in the absence of a government.”140 The mandate given to UNOSOM by 
the UNSC also supports the assumption that UNOSOM exercised authority over the part of 
Somali territory. It authorised UNOSOM to assume responsibility for the consolidation, 
                                               
138 See Chapter III, section 2(c). 
139 Michael Kelly (1999), at 67. 
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Quarterly 910 (1996), at 919. 
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expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.141 It also mandated 
UNOSOM to assist in the re-establishment of national and regional institutions, civil 
administration and police in Somalia, and in the restoration and maintenance of law and order 
including in investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of IHL. 142 
UNSC resolution 865(1993) also mandated UNOSOM to re-establish the Somali police, 
judicial and penal systems.143 The fact of giving to UNOSOM those functions presupposes its 
capacity to exercise its authority over the territory of Somalia.  
It can be said that UNOSOM in fact exercised such authority. It was the political 
authority in Somalia, which can be shown by its actions taken to re-establish Somali judicial 
institutions and appointment of judicial personnel.144 It was also the sole legislative authority 
in Somalia: it specifically provided that civil and criminal codes were to apply in the Somali 
courts. 145  For example, Special Representative Admiral Howe, empowered by UNSC 
resolution 814, declared that 1962 Somali penal code would be the law enforced by 
UNOSOM II in the territory of Somalia.146 There was also an obligation of UNOSOM to 
enforce compliance with the decisions and orders of the courts,147 and the operational control 
of the police was to be under the UNOSOM Forces Command until the UNOSOM civilian 
police assumed control.148 UNOSOM’s mandate envisaged de jure and de facto UNOSOM’s 
legal authority to provide both factual and legal force for the Somali legal/judicial system and 
other re-established institutions,149 and therefore UNOSOM became the only real political and 
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legal authority in Somalia since the UN intervention.150 Kelly considers that UNOSOM was 
an occupying power to which at least some of the laws of occupation were applicable.151 In 
fact UNOSOM was capable to exert authority until March 1994 (when troops from Western 
countries left Somalia), 152  and therefore the laws of occupation applied to UNOSOM II 
operations in southern Somalia between 4 May 1993 and March 1994,153 although after this 
date until final withdrawal on 31 March 1995, the UNOSOM’s authority was eroded.154  
This analysis confirms that in the situation, where there was no other entity able to 
exercise authority in Somalia apart from UNOSOM and where UNOSOM (not having a 
consent from Somali government which did not exist) was given a mandate to exercise such 
authority and certain functions of the government by the UNSC and indeed exercised them 
including by virtue of the enforcement actions, UNOSOM can be considered to have 
established authority and capable to exercise it and therefore the laws of occupation to some 
extent were applicable to it in certain period of time and in the particular part of the territory 
of Somalia. 
 
B) Application of IHL during the deployment of MONUC 
The application of IHL during the deployment of MONUC is more ambiguous. The 
DRC has central government, although certainly weak and not able to control the entire 
territory and exercise its law enforcement functions properly. There were armed hostilities 
between the governmental forces – FARDC and different armed groups mostly in eastern part 
of the country. Civilians continue to suffer from the atrocities committed by the armed groups 
and sometimes by security agents of the government.  
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Most of the UNSC resolutions concerning the DRC called the parties to refrain from 
the violation of IHL and IHRL and to end hostilities.155 By specifically mentioning IHL, the 
UNSC recognised the application of IHL in the territory of the DRC. More recent resolutions 
started to omit mentioning IHL and provide reference only to IHRL, peace, stability and 
consolidation in the DRC,156 which evidences the application of only peacetime IHRL norms 
is assumed. In 2010 MONUC was renamed to MONUSCO, which is also indicative of the 
stabilisation of the situation in the DRC and its transition into peace consolidation. 157 
However the UNSC resolution which established MONUSCO still referred to IHL158 and 
ongoing military operations159 between the parties engaged in the conflict.160  
Accordingly, it is difficult to provide for a particular date when IHL ceased to apply, 
given that there have been still instances of armed clashes between governmental forces and 
rebel groups in certain areas. When MONUC was initially deployed, armed forces of foreign 
countries were still present in the DRC territory, but a cease-fire was proclaimed.161 Some 
incidents of fighting between foreign forces in the DRC still occurred.162 The foreign forces 
were gradually withdrawn by 2003.163 Since this date apart from the deployment of MONUC, 
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there were no other foreign armed forces present in the DRC (only foreign armed groups). 
The conflict may be considered of non-international character.  
The intensity of hostilities was quite high. In late 2004 armed groups in Ituri were 
engaged in frequent fighting between themselves as they battled for control over the 
resources.164 The governmental forces (which are clearly sufficiently organised) were fighting 
against different armed groups. There were Kisangani massacre killing 180 people in 2002, 
the Bunia (Ituri) crisis in 2003, where 400 people were massacred in two weeks, the Bukavu 
(South Kivu) offensive in 2004, when 88 people lost their lives and about 25,000 were 
displaced, the Goma crisis and Kiwanja massacre in 2008, when at least 67 civilians were 
killed, systematic rape of civilians near Kibua Mpofi in North Kivu in 2010.165  
These groups can be distinguished: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR) consisting of about 6,000-8,000 and led by the most extremist leaders of the FDLR; 
the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), DRC-based rebel group, once 
led by Nkunda, who was arrested and after the Congo-Rwanda joint military offensive in 
2009, no longer exists as a cohesive group; Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Ugandan 
Muslim rebel group, which in June 2010 was dislodged by military operation of Congolese 
armed forces; Mai Mai militia, loosely grouped and with no unified or consistently articulated 
political demands; and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Ugandan rebel group, active since 
1980s which has been weakened significantly and lost a number of its top leaders.166 
At least some of those groups at certain periods of time may be considered sufficiently 
organised. Therefore there was an NIAC existing in the DRC during most of the time when 
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MONUC was deployed, at least at the time the reported offences were committed by the 
members of MONUC. 
The next question is whether MONUC became a third party to the existing armed 
conflict between the government forces and armed groups or acted from the side of the 
government against those groups.  
MONUC was firstly established on 6 August 1999 as an observer mission, but in 2002, 
its nature was changed and it became a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with a 
robust mandate.167 In reality the mission continued to operate until late 2003 as observer 
mission.168 
MONUC was provided with Chapter VII mandate. The mandate did not explicitly 
require use of force beyond self-defence by MONUC and mostly was left open for 
interpretation by the commanders on the ground and in the UN headquarters.169 Already in 
2003 the UNSC resolution 1493 provided that MONUC is mandated to use all necessary 
means to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent threat of physical 
violence.170 Subsequently, MONUC was tasked to use all necessary means to deter use of 
force to threaten political process, still to protect civilians, to seize or collect arms from armed 
groups, to support governmental forces in its operations to disarm foreign combatants.171  
UNSC resolution not only called on the government to develop with MONUC a joint 
concept of operations for the disarmament of foreign combatants but also stressed that 
MONUC may use cordon and search tactics to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the 
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military capability of illegal armed groups.172 The UNSC further welcomed robust actions 
taken by MONUC against armed groups and militia.173 Consequently, the UNSC gave priority 
to the protection of civilians in MONUC mandate and stressed the necessity of joint planning 
of operations of FARDC with MONUC in accordance with IHL, IHRL and refugee law.174 
The UNSC several times emphasised that support of MONUC to FARDC-led operations 
against armed groups was conditioned on FARDC’s compliance with IHL, IHRL and refugee 
law and MONUC must be sure that FARDC had necessary training in the protection of 
civilians and if some units commit grave violations of such laws, support of MONUC to those 
units must be suspended or, if the situation persists, even withdrawn.175  
MONUC’s mandate was further extended by requiring them to deter any attempt at the 
use of force to threaten Goma and Nairobi processes (on disarmament of armed groups or 
their joining of governmental forces and elimination of threats and stability in the DRC) from 
any armed group including by using cordon and search tactics and undertaking all necessary 
operations to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal armed 
groups that continue to use violence in eastern DRC.176 However, the resolution established 
MONUSCO unlike previously neither provided for the mandate to deter attempts of armed 
groups to breach the peace process, nor mentioned that the mission is to undertake preventive 
actions to protect civilians or to disrupt military capacity of armed groups.177 
Therefore although MONUC was not mandated to use force on a large scale against a 
particular party to the conflict and clearly beyond self-defence, as in the case of UNOSOM II, 
its mandate envisaged some proactive actions from the part of MONUC military forces going 
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beyond simple personal self-defence. The fact that MONUC has a mandate to use all 
necessary means to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence and undertake cordon 
and search operations for that end is one of the examples. Another example is to deter use of 
force to threaten political process. Moreover, it could undertake preventive actions to disrupt 
military capacity of armed groups. 
Depending on the interpretation of those ambiguous statements, MONUC may 
become involved in the armed conflict. Although the protection of civilians may presuppose 
pre-emptive offensive operations against armed groups, which will be beyond self-defence 
and can amount to the participation in the armed conflict, MONUC’s mandate was limited by 
the fact that PSFs can use force to protect civilians only when they are under imminent threat 
of violence, which may not go beyond the use of force in self-defence in the own protection 
or protection of others.  
However the most troublesome part of the mandate is to deter use of force by those 
who threaten process, especially coupled with undertaking preventive actions to disrupt 
military capacity of the armed groups. This wording can be interpreted as giving MONUC 
mandate to engage in confrontation with the armed groups and undertake offensive operations. 
This may evidence the intent of MONUC to direct actions specifically against a party to the 
conflict and to cause harm to that party. If MONUC undertakes such operations (irrespective 
of its motive), it would act beyond self-defence and engage in the armed conflict. 
MONUC’s mandate also provided that they would support and assist the governmental 
forces in their operations. As the DRC forces clearly used force beyond self-defence and 
conduct offensive operations, the involvement of MONUC in such operations would render 
them a party to the conflict. Everything depends on the degree of their involvement in the 
operations. 
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Despite that there are clear indications of potential involvement of MONUC in the 
armed conflict with opposition groups, its mandate, envisaged in the UNSC resolutions, does 
not permit to make a definitive conclusion on whether MONUC was actually a party to the 
conflict. Unlike in the case of UNOSOM it does not permit MONUC to get involved in large-
scale military operations. MONUC was provided with the Chapter VII powers and may 
potentially use the force beyond self-defence. Accordingly it is better to refer to the factual 
situation and circumstances under which the force was in fact used by the peacekeepers.  
Following the increase of fighting in late 2004 between armed groups in Ituri, 
MONUC began to shift from reactive to preventive actions using cordon and search 
operations.178 The intensity of fighting between MONUC and armed groups increased in early 
2005 and resulted in a number of casualties during the incidents.179 There were reports that 
civilians were killed in fighting between MONUC and armed groups.180 Indeed between 2005 
and 2007 several offensive operations were deployed in eastern part of the DRC.181 MONUC 
conducted aggressive cordon-and-search operations intended to force armed groups to join 
disarmament programme and pre-empt attacks on local civilians.182 By June 2005, MONUC 
disarmed about 15,000 fighters in the region.183 On 25 February 2005, during one of such 
operations an armed group (FNI) ambushed a group of UN peacekeepers and killed several 
soldiers. In response MONUC commenced extended security operations. On 1 March 
MONUC conducted a large-scale cordon-and-search operation carried out with infantry 
troops from Pakistan, Nepal and South African and use of Indian attack helicopters aiming to 
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dismantle an FNI headquarters in Ituri. 184 This operation was a four-hour battle with the 
involvement of helicopter gun shops and reinforcements.185 It resulted in killing 50-60 FNI 
militia by MONUC, which was regarded as if MONUC was acting punitively.186 Several 
other operations were conducted by MONUC using force in November 2006 against rebels 
belonging to CNDP in support of governmental armed forces, where the use of attack 
helicopters and other means killed 200-400 fighters.187  
Accordingly, although MONUC used force against armed opposition groups, it did so 
against not only one particular group but against different groups. The force was used in some 
isolated instances against each fighting group and cannot constitute a pattern which would 
evidence permanent involvement of MONUC in the armed conflict with any of the armed 
opposition groups. In those instances where MONUC is engaged in hostilities against the 
armed groups (when not acting purely in self-defence) the IHL norms apply between them. 
IHL also apply during combined operations of MONUC and governmental forces against 
opposition groups, if MONUC’s involvement presupposes its participation in hostilities. 
Beyond those operations MONUC’s military members can be regarded as not participating in 
hostilities.  
Furthermore, as MONUC following its mandate occasionally participates in hostilities 
on the part of governmental forces and against opposition groups and those groups cannot be 
regarded as representing a state government, the norms of NIAC apply between 
MONUC/governmental forces and opposition groups during the instances of active fighting. 
The norms of NIAC also continue to apply between the governmental forces and opposition 
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groups during the period when the existence of armed conflict can be recognised, namely 
when there is a protracted armed violence considering the intensity of hostilities and 
organisation of groups.  
 
C) Breach of IHL and IHRL obligations by military contingents of MONUC and 
UNOSOM 
As discussed in Chapter IV, IHRL continues to apply during an armed conflict and 
states whose agents participate in any hostilities can be responsible for their violation of IHRL. 
A state is responsible for human rights violations during an armed conflict if the violations are 
attributed to it and therefore fall within its jurisdiction in the meaning of human rights treaties. 
Similarly, if peacekeepers commit violations of IHRL, the UN (if it is of CIL) and/or their 
TCCs may be responsible for those violations on the condition that they are attributable to one 
or the other. An offence committed by a peacekeeper may simultaneously lead to a violation 
of IHL and IHRL by the UN/TCCs, if IHL is applicable in those circumstances or only to a 
violation of IHRL, if the IHL norms are not applicable. Considering this, particular breaches 
of IHL/IHRL committed by MONUC and UNOSOM military contingents must be discussed. 
The acts of sexual violence committed by the MONUC peacekeepers may result in the 
violation of IHRL norms on the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment under Article 3 ECHR, Article 7 ICCPR, Article 5 ACHR and Articles 1, 16 CAT. 
Such acts violate GC CA3 as violence to life and person (para.1(a)) and outrages upon 
personal dignity (para.1(c)), if committed during an armed conflict.  
Although the acts of some MONUC peacekeepers involved in arms smuggling cannot 
be considered as a direct breach of IHRL/IHL, they may still entail international responsibility 
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of their respective TCCs for the breaches of IHL/IHRL committed by the armed opposition 
groups, to whom the arms were smuggled.188 
Apart from committing acts or torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(including intentional wounding of civilians) prohibited under provisions mentions above and 
constituting GC grave breaches and violations of, inter alia, Article 12 GCI, Article 12 GCII, 
Article 13 GCIII, Article 27 GCIV for IAC and GCCA3 for NIAC, UNOSOM peacekeepers 
were also reportedly involved in unlawful killings of civilians, which is a breach of the same 
articles of GC. It is also a breach of IHRL (Article 2 ECHR, Article 6 ICCPR and Article 4 
ACHR). Use of deadly force against civilians who attempted to steal something in the 
military compounds cannot be absolutely necessary or proportionate under IHRL or IHL.189 
Reportedly, operations conducted by UNOSOM led to significant civilian 
casualties. 190  It may be due to several reasons including deliberate targeting civilians or 
civilian objects, indiscriminate attack or disproportionate attack, etc. All these can lead to 
breaches of IHL. The prohibition of attack on civilian population and civilian objects is 
contained in Article 51(2) and Article 52(1) API. Moreover, Article 51(4) and (5) API provide 
for the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. Blaškić Appeals Chamber considered that those 
principles reflect CIL,191 and therefore the UN and TCCs are bound by them.  
Moreover, during an UNOSOM operation, reportedly, a civilian hospital was attacked 
which led to a large number of victims among doctors and their patients.192 Apart from the 
provisions mentioned above, Article 18 GCIV specifically provides that “civilian hospitals 
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organised to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no 
circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all times be respected and protected by the 
parties to the conflict.” Therefore if at least some of the reported cases are confirmed, 
UNOSOM’s military members committed violations of IHL and IHRL.  
 
3. Attribution of conduct of military members of MONUC and UNOSOM to 
the UN and TCCs 
 
A) Attribution of conduct of members of national contingents of MONUC 
As discussed above, MONUC military members have been reportedly involved in the 
commission of sexual offences including rape against local women and girls. The question is 
whether this conduct can be considered ultra vires or done in private capacity and if the 
former, whether it can be attributed to the UN or TCCs.193 
The acts of sexual violence were clearly not committed as part of an official policy of 
the UN or TCCs, nor performed following the orders of the superiors. Contrary, there is a 
policy of zero-tolerance against acts of sexual abuse in the UN. Despite that, some national 
contingent commanders appear to tolerate such state of affairs without taking appropriate 
measures to prevent or punish for such conduct.194 Although the majority of those acts are 
committed outside military camps, some of them were committed inside the camps or in the 
close vicinity to them. 195  As there was an order to wear uniform to easily identify 
peacekeepers outside the compounds, they may be uniformed when or before committing the 
                                               
193 See also discussion in Chapter II, section 4(c). 
194 See OIOS Report (2005), para. 34.  
195 The OIOS noted in its report that inadequate security perimeter fencing around the military camps enables the 
peacekeepers and their illegal visitors to move about the camp unnoticed by their supervisors or the few camp 
guards. See OIOS Report (2005), para. 34. 
 285 
misconduct. 196  This can attest to the fact that the conduct of peacekeepers cannot be 
considered as private.  
Peacekeepers remain in national service and at the time of commission of acts they are 
in service of the mission deployed in a foreign country. During the duration of their 
deployment they are obliged to obey the orders and instructions of their superiors and can be 
disciplined for disobedience. Therefore it cannot be said that they were acting in purely 
private capacity, while they were on mission and had to obey the orders and instructions of 
their superior commanders.  
If members of military contingent being on mission disobey the orders of their 
superiors, they may be acting ultra vires. The ultra vires conduct can be attributable to a state 
or IO or both.197 The conduct is ultra vires, if the agent exceeds their authority or contravenes 
the instruction but still acts within their apparent authority or uses means placed at his 
disposal by state/IO.198  
Peacekeepers committing acts of sexual abuse were deployed in the DRC by the UN 
and TCCs (which lent them to the UN). They were provided with the official functions to 
protect civilians and because of those official functions they got an access to the local 
population being in relationship of trust with them. Like in detention there is a professional 
relationship between peacekeepers and protected population which requires them respect the 
population and to avoid any abuse of power.199 But for their deployment their functions and 
their position of power (reinforced by the UNSC mandate and possession of certain weapons), 
they would not be get access to vulnerable women and girls who see their sexual relationships 
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with the peacekeepers as means of survival, provision of food and protection from atrocities 
committed by armed groups.200 Most of them submit to peacekeepers because of the nature of 
their official capacity. Therefore those relationships went beyond purely private and therefore 
peacekeepers were acting within their apparent authority in its broad understanding.201  
A further question is whether sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers can be 
attributed to the UN or their TCCs. For the conduct to be considered ultra vires of an IO, it 
must fall within the overall functions of that organisation. It is difficult to image any function 
of the UN within which sexual abuse of local population during the PSO can fall. Quite 
contrary, the peacekeepers were mandated to protect the local population from such abuse and 
not to commit offences by themselves. The acts of peacekeepers cannot fall within the 
functions of the UN in maintaining international peace and security or promotion of human 
rights and humanitarian assistance. Therefore sexual abuse would be difficult to see as ultra 
vires acts of the UN.202  
Moreover, it may be difficult to establish effective control exercised by the UN over 
the conduct of peacekeepers needed to prove its attribution to the IO.203 The UN engaged in a 
policy of zero-tolerance to prevent the sexual abuse from occurring. It took various measures 
which were available to it to prevent that conduct. However the conduct still continued and 
there were further allegations of peacekeepers being involved in the same conduct.204 The 
UNFC could have ordered to the national contingent commanders to take more effective 
measures to prevent widespread sexual abuse in the mission. Detailed instructions for the 
national contingent commanders addressing sexual abuse including potential sanctions could 
                                               
200 See Human Rights Watch (2005), Testimony of Anneke Van Woudenberg. 
201 See also discussion in Chapter II, section 1(c). 
202 It is unless, as discussed before “within overall functions of the IO” is not interpreted as meaning that they 
were on mission at that moment. Then this requirement is fulfilled. 
203 See discussion in Chapter II, section 4(b). 
204 In spite of the OIOS Report of 2005, the 2007 Report indicated even more allegations: 217 instances 
comparing with 72 in 2005. 
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have been issued. Whether or not they would be implemented by the national commanders is 
another question related to the TCC’s responsibility. Any failure to do that by the UNFC 
means that the UN failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the conduct and therefore its 
responsibility may be triggered.  
However the UN cannot be solely responsible for it. Joint responsibility with TCCs is 
the most likely result of the situation. It is because all discipline powers are vested to the 
TCCs and national contingent commanders leaving the UN without any powerful means to 
control peacekeepers’ conduct. 205  It is for the national contingent commander to take 
appropriate measures to prevent sexual abuse from occurring. As such conduct was 
widespread,206 the national contingent commanders cannot be unaware about it and may have 
chosen to tolerate it. As OIOS notes in its report, “it is the demands and requirements of the 
contingent commanders that have the greatest impact on the conduct of the contingent 
troops.”207 OIOS also assessed that the efforts of contingent commanders to enforce discipline 
were found to be inadequate.208 The fact of non-adoption of preventing measures or failure to 
punish and discipline the members of national contingents can indicate unwillingness from 
the part of state to deal with the conduct.  
It is apparent that those measures could be effective in prevention of offences 
committed by members of national contingents. Reportedly in one national contingent 
preventing measures were adopted including establishing recreational facilities, installing 
wire mesh within the military camp perimeter fencing to prevent direct contact between 
peacekeepers and the local population, not paying to peacekeepers their mission allowances 
                                               
205 See also Chapter II, section 4(b). 
206 See Sandra Katrin Miller “Accountability for the conduct of UN-mandated forces under international human 
rights law: a case study concerning sexual abuse of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC), in Arnold, Roberta, Knoops, Geert-Jan G. J., Practice and policies of modern peace support 
operations under international law (Transnational Publishers, 2006), at 267; Prince Zeid’s report, para. 8.  
207 OIOS Report (2005), para. 28. 
208 Ibid, para. 34. 
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while deployed (for them not to have cash to pay for sex).209 In this contingent the instances 
of sexual abuse became very rare.210  
The national commander of another contingent failed to take any assigned measures 
for security and perimeter control and there were very limited or no recreational facilities,211 
As a result most allegations received during the investigation were made against the 
peacekeepers from this contingent.212 This means that the measures adopted by the national 
commanders are able to prevent the conduct. Accordingly, national contingent commanders 
and their TCCs had a material ability to prevent the sexual abuse and therefore had effective 
control over the conduct of peacekeepers. If they did not take such measures available to them, 
having become aware about the conduct, TCCs may be responsible for the conduct of their 
organs (peacekeepers).  
Another case of possible international responsibility is the assistance provided to the 
governmental forces of the DRC by MONUC following the UNSC mandate and assistance 
given to the members of armed opposition groups by some peacekeepers involved in arms 
smuggling. Reportedly, the violations of IHL and IHRL were committed from both sides 
(namely governmental forces and opposition groups).213  
In the case of assistance to the governmental forces, the UNSC resolution provides for 
the support by MONUC to FARDC-led operations against armed groups and joint planning of 
those operations in accordance with IHL, IHRL and refugee law.214 MONUC and FARDC 
undertook several joint operations in 2009-2010. MONUC’s mandate to support 
governmental forces evolved over time: starting from the mandate to support operations of 
                                               
209 OIOS Report (2007), para. 17. 
210 Ibid. 
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213 See Patrick Cammaert (2010), at 104. 
214 SC resolution 1794, S/RES/1794 (2007), paras. 5 and 7; SC resolution 1906(2009), para. 22. 
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disarmament led by the FARDC, and continuing with the mandate to develop a joint concept 
of operations with the FARDC and support operations jointly planned and led by the 
FARDC.215  
The FARDC is also considered a massive human rights violator. 216  It allegedly 
committed large number of rapes, torture, killings and other international law violations.217 
Although MONUC’s duty is limited to proving logistical support including facilitating 
transport to FARDC, providing vital supplies, such as ammunition, weapons, food, and fuel 
and offering occasional fire support under strict conditions, the mission is sometimes 
considered as FARDC’s accomplice.218  
 The acts of assistance can be attributed to the UN. Firstly, the UNSC resolution itself 
provides for such a mandate. Secondly, the peacekeepers were acting pursuant to the order of 
the UNFC participating in the FARDC operations, their planning and supporting 
governmental forces. The TCCs could hardly say anything against it (even if they did, it 
would be in contravention of their role). Therefore the UN had ability to prevent and stop 
such assistance (which it indeed did at some point) and therefore could be considered as 
exercising effective control over the conduct.  
The UN may be responsible for the assistance to the DRC under Article 14 ARIO, if it 
is proved that the forces of the DRC committed internationally wrongful acts and such 
conduct would be internationally wrongful, if committed by the UN and that the UN assisted 
the DRC forces with knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act. If alleged crimes 
committed by the FARDC were proved, they constitute a breach of IHL and IHRL. As the 
UN is bound by CIL including IHL and IHRL norms having customary status, the conduct is 
                                               
215 See Patrick Cammaert (2010), at 106. 
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internationally wrongful for the UN too. The most difficult limb of Article 14 ARIO is to 
prove that the UN assisted the DRC forces knowing that the DRC was committing crimes.  
Although the UN reportedly withdrew some assistance to some of the FARDC forces 
at certain point, 219  it continued to support the others and their operations. 220  Moreover, 
providing MONUC with the mandate to support the FARDC and to conduct joint operations 
with it, the UNSC in its resolutions expressed concern about grave misbehaviour and human 
rights violations by FARDC members. 221  Being aware about those violations, the UNSC 
nonetheless mandated MONUC to continue its assistance to the FARDC. If the UN became 
aware about crimes committed by the FARDC some time before it decide to withdraw the 
support or those whom it continued to support also committed crimes, it may be responsible 
for assistance in the commission of internationally wrongful acts committed by the DRC 
forces.  
After the events in question (2009-2010), the UN established a due diligence policy in 
2011, which if followed, would ensure that the UN is not responsible for the assistance to the 
commission of crimes by the forces it provides support to.222 This policy provides that prior to 
engaging in supporting non-UN forces, a risk assessment will be conducted to identify 
whether there is a real risk of those forces committing gave violations of international law. If 
the UN concludes that such a risk exists, the support will not be provided or will be 
withdrawn (if it latter transpires that such violations are committed). This policy is to be 
welcomed and should be followed, if the UN does not want to be considered assisting in the 
commission of international law violations. 
                                               
219 See also Patrick Cammaert (2010), at 105. 
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A more difficult question is whether the UN/TCCs may be responsible for the acts of 
peacekeepers assisting the opposition groups by virtue of their involvement in the arms 
smuggling. Even if the arms smuggling assisted opposition groups in the commission of 
crimes and that peacekeepers involved in it knowing about that, it will be difficult to find the 
UN/TCCs responsible for that. Firstly, the acts of assistance, namely, arms smuggling must be 
attributed to the UN or TCC. Although the UN became subsequently aware about that and 
initiated investigations, it could hardly prevent such conduct. The UN would not have 
effective control over such conduct, and it had contrary policy of stopping any arms 
smuggling and disarming armed opposition groups in accordance with the UNSC resolution. 
The TCCs may have an effective control over the conduct. The acts were done within the 
apparent authority and ultra vires and may be attributed to the TCC as it had capacity to 
prevent those acts exercising better discipline and training of the peacekeepers through the 
national commander. Although not clear, it seems that some superiors were involved in the 
smuggling, and this can indicate effective control of the TCC over the conduct. 
Even if those elements were established, the responsibility of the TCC as a state 
assisting another state in the commission of a wrongful act under Article 16 ASR may not be 
triggered. This article envisages that a state assists another state and not groups opposing the 
state government. It may be, however, possible to attribute the conduct of the peacekeepers 
under Article 7 ARIO, as the TCC exercised effective control over the assistance given by its 
organs to the armed opposition groups in their commission of the wrongful acts. When 
approaching the situation from this angle, one needs to establish only that the assistance in the 
commission of international crimes or breaches of IHL and IHRL constitutes a breach of 
international obligations which is apparent from the text of GC CA1 and requires the states to 
respect and to ensure respect of the conventions in all circumstances. The same is true about 
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human rights obligations.223 Therefore if all elements are proved, it is possible that the TCCs 
of the peacekeepers involved in the arms smuggling to the opposition groups can be 
responsible for the assistance to those groups in their commission of international crimes. 
 
B) Attribution of conduct of members of national contingents of UNOSOM 
The question of attribution of conduct of UNOSOM peacekeepers is complicated by 
the existence of different command structures within UNOSOM itself. UNOSOM I was under 
command of the UN and was traditional peacekeeping operation. UNITAF was under unified 
command by the US, therefore any acts committed by members of the contingents forming 
part of UNITAF cannot be attributed to the UN.224 They are attributed to their respective 
TCCs, as UNITAF was a coalition of the states or there is in some occasion joint 
responsibility of the US and TCCs. UNOSOM I was not placed under the US command, 
instead a liaison mechanism between UNOSOM I and UNITAF was created.225 
UNOSOM II was generally under UN command, closely supervised by S-G and 
UNSC and commanded by the UNFC.226 However, the US retained substantial influence over 
the operation, especially with regard to its troops. 227  S-G’s Special Representative was 
American retired Navy Admiral Howe who reported directly to the S-G and to whom the 
UNFC reported. 228  The deputy UNFC of UNOSOM II was the US Major General 
Montgomery who was also the Commander of the US Forces, Somalia and the Commander of 
                                               
223 See, for instance Article 2 ICCPR; Article 1 ACHR; Article 1 ECHR, using the word “secure”.  
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the US Quick Reaction Force (the force under sole US command supporting UNOSOM II 
activities) and who directly reported to the US authorities – Commander in Chief, US Central 
Command. 229  Given clear US domination in the command structure and potential major 
influence on the decision taken for the UNOSOM II, the responsibility of the US for the 
operational conduct of UNOSOM II is not excluded. It is especially so in relation to the US 
troops given that US Central Command considered that it retained full command over US 
forces.230 
Accordingly, the acts performed by the US troops, most probably, trigger the 
responsibility of the US and not the UN, although under certain circumstances (e.g. the UN 
was able to prevent certain act) the UN’s joint responsibility cannot be excluded. The conduct 
of other contingents of UNOSOM II will be considered under the normal rules of attribution 
of their conduct to the UN/TCC depending on effective control.  
There were mainly two types of situation where violations of IHL and IHRL were 
committed: in some instances the acts of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, killing and 
wounding were committed by the members of national contingents against civilians which 
tried to steal something in the military compounds and those disproportionate actions were 
taken by the peacekeepers following the order or indifference from the part of national 
contingent commander. In the second type of cases, killing and wounding of civilians and 
attacks on civilian objects were committed as a part of military operations undertaken by 
UNOSOM under the UN command.  
In the first type of situations the UN seemed not able to exercise control over the 
wrongful conduct of members of national contingents. The UN may be unaware about such 
orders of the national contingent commanders or about the conduct itself (until it became 
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widely known). Even if it knew about it, its powers to prevent that conduct were very limited. 
The TCCs and national contingent commanders were in the right position to take some 
actions to prevent the conduct. Even if it was not directly ordered by the commanders, it was 
tolerated by them or was not rightly addressed by issuing explicit instructions to the 
subordinates. Moreover, the soldiers were acting within apparent authority by shooting at 
civilians, detaining them and mistreating them. This cannot amount to private conduct. 
Therefore the conduct can be attributed to the TCCs and the TCCs will be responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts committed by the military members of UNOSOM. 
The situation is different with regard to the breaches of IHL committed during 
UNOSOM military operations. The operations were planned and ordered by the UN. 
UNOSOM contingents were acting collectively pursuant to the UN directions. This situation 
indicates that the UN had effective control over most of the acts committed during such 
operations. Unfortunately, there is no sufficient information to estimate the exact degree of 
control exercised by the UN over particular wrongful acts and to what extent its orders were 
obeyed on the ground, but it can be said that the UN had ability to better plan and execute the 
operations in which UNOSOM II members were participating and therefore to prevent most 
wrongful acts committed during them. It may be responsible for the breaches of IHL to the 
extent it had effective control over particular conduct in breach.  
The TCCs’ ability to prevent certain conduct is less clear. If the orders of the UN 
commander were not to commit breaches of IHL, but the national contingents still committed 
them, the TCCs may also bear responsibility for those violations, if they were able by 
disciplinary, training or other means to prevent them. If it is proved, the TCCs also had 
effective control over the conduct in breach of the IHL obligations and must be responsible 
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for it jointly with the UN. Everything depends on the particular factual circumstances in 
which the internationally wrongful acts were committed during UNOSOM military operations.  
 
Conclusion 
The discussion of UNOSOM and MONUC PSOs has shown that of their military 
members committed violations of international law and can be held responsible for them. The 
individual criminal responsibility of peacekeepers may arise for their commission of 
international crimes during MONUC. Although the existing SOFA precludes the DRC to 
exercise its jurisdiction over the MONUC troops, it cannot preclude the ICC to exercise its 
jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by peacekeepers, as some of their acts amount to 
war crimes. The ICC already investigates the situation in the DRC and potentially can 
exercise jurisdiction over war crimes committed by peacekeepers. The more difficult situation 
is with UNOSOM, as there was no government to prosecute the peacekeepers in Somalia and 
even some functions of the government were performed by UNOSOM itself.  
The norms of IHL were applicable to UNOSOM II and partially to MONUC 
operations. UNOSOM II had the mandate to use force against parties of the conflict, which 
indicates the intention to cause harm to that party by the hostile acts and therefore UNOSOM 
was participating in hostilities, at least until February-March 1994. MONUC had the mandate 
to use force on certain strictly defined occasions, which, however, could be used beyond self-
defence. IHL rules applied to MONUC for the time they participated in the operations 
directed to cause harm to the opposition groups. The UN and TCCs also were bound by the 
rules applicable during peacetime, i.e. by IHRL. 
Most of the violations of IHL and IHRL are attributable to the TCCs or UN or both. 
The rape and other sexual violence can be attributed to the TCCs in certain circumstances (as 
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peacekeepers remain TCCs’ organs and their national commanders are in the position to 
prevent those crimes). The TCCs/UN may also be responsible for assisting violations of 
international law performed by the parties to the conflict when they support government 
forces or smuggle arms. 
Regarding UNOSOM forces, inhuman treatment and killings committed against 
civilian population in the military compounds can be attributed to the TCCs, as it was for 
them to prevent those acts. The violations of IHL committed during UNOSOM military 
operations are most probably attributed to the UN, as it planned and commanded most of 
them. Some violations may also be attributed to the national contingents, if PSFs disobeyed 
the UN orders and acted under the orders of their national contingent commanders.  
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VII. Conclusion 
 
This thesis proved that the UN, TCCs and individuals will be responsible for the 
violations of international law committed during PSOs. This work advocates for a case-by-
case approach to the international responsibility of the UN, TCCs and peacekeepers for the 
commission of international law violations. It argues against a blanket denial of their 
responsibility because of the unique nature of PSOs and inapplicability of certain norms. For 
this purpose, the thesis proceeded with the analysis of the issues comprising international 
responsibility: attribution of the conduct, applicability of international obligations, issues of 
criminal jurisdiction and immunities. It also tests the proposed legal model of international 
responsibility in two case-studies. 
In case of attribution, the thesis argues that, despite peacekeepers being a subsidiary 
organ of the UN, under the rules of state responsibility the TCCs can also be responsible for 
the conduct of their peacekeepers, as they still remain in the national military service and 
therefore state organs. The further analysis confirms that particular conduct can be attributed 
simultaneously to states and IOs and they can be jointly responsible for it.  
The best way to delineate international responsibility between the UN and TCCs for 
the PSFs’ conduct was provided in Article 7 ARIO applicable in the situation where a state 
organ was placed at the disposal of an IO. A conduct is attributable to the TCC or UN if either 
of them have effective control. If they both have effective control over the conduct, it will be 
attributed to both of them.  
The thesis proposes a legal test to identify whether the UN or TCC has effective 
control: the TCC or the UN will be responsible for the conduct of the peacekeepers if it had 
material ability to prevent certain conduct from occurring through their organs. This test is 
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taken from the test on superiors’ liability under ICL but can be adopted in this situation, as the 
states and IOs act through their organs/agents and if their organs/agents had material ability to 
prevent certain conduct, the states and IOs were also able to prevent. Accordingly, the 
UN/TCCs will be responsible for the conduct of peacekeepers, if either the UNFC (or any 
other commanding UN organ) or national contingent commander (in case of TCCs) had a 
material ability to prevent that conduct. This depends on the factual situation on the ground.  
The thesis disagrees with the position that IHL applies only to the operations 
authorised by the UNSC and led by other states, while not applying to the operations under 
UN command and control. This is not possible simply because IHL starts to apply in the 
situations where there is an armed conflict or an occupation of the territory in fact and does 
not depend on any justification to use force lawfully or unlawfully coming from jus ad bellum. 
Accordingly, as soon as a state or IO becomes a party to the armed conflict, they are bound by 
IHL.  
The thesis concludes that, for the UN and TCCs to become a party to the conflict, the 
peacekeepers must participate in hostilities with another party to the conflict and they must do 
so collectively. One or two peacekeepers occasionally participating in hostilities will not 
suffice to render TCCs and the UN a party to the conflict. If a particular contingent 
participates in hostilities, only its respective TCC becomes a party to the conflict only for the 
period of their participation. For peacekeepers to participate in hostilities, two conditions must 
be satisfied: they performed hostile acts against an adverse party and did so with intention to 
cause harm to that party. Pure self-defence will not suffice because hostile acts done in self-
defence will not be directed with intention to harm the adverse party. Participation of 
peacekeepers in hostilities continues only for the time they have the intent to harm the party 
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and will cease when there is no such intent. Their participation in hostilities depends on the 
factual situation on the ground. 
The thesis further argues that peacekeepers participating in hostilities will become 
combatants. They cannot be considered civilians any more because their states are in conflict 
with other parties and they are members of the armed forces. To argue otherwise would lead 
to unfortunate results, as if they were not considered combatants and still participated in the 
armed conflict, they would become unlawful combatants with very arguable status under IHL. 
When they do not participate in hostilities, their states are not parties to the conflict and they 
are not considered armed forces and will be civilians of a neutral state.  
If PSFs are involved in NIAC, their participation (representing an international actor) 
may convert that conflict in an IAC if they participate in hostilities against state armed forces 
or against an armed group in the state without a government and that group may pretend to act 
on behalf of the government. This thesis argues for a gradual approach to the application of 
the law of occupation under GCIV. If protected persons fall in the hands of peacekeepers and 
the application of any provision of GCIV is triggered, they must comply with it irrespective of 
the heading under which the provision is placed in GCIV. The whole GCIV may also apply to 
the peacekeepers, even if they do not participate in the conflict provided that they exercise the 
sole authority in the country. 
In all cases whether IHL applies or not the TCCs and UN remain bound by IHRL 
obligations (the UN remains bound by customary IHRL). The thesis argues that IHRL does 
not cease to apply during the application of IHL, they apply concurrently. In any case of their 
conflict, it can be solved by interpretation of the one in the light of another. The thesis also 
contends that if the peacekeepers commit human rights violations and their conduct is 
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attributable to their respective TCCs, TCCs will be responsible for that conduct, even though 
it was committed beyond the territorial borders and territorial control is not needed.  
The argument is made that the notion of jurisdiction, provided in human rights treaties, 
is not a condition additional to the attribution of the conduct to states but, in substance, 
represents the same limitation to state responsibility for the conduct performed abroad. The 
human rights bodies use the jurisdictional requirement to find the responsibility of the state in 
the same way as the attribution of the conduct is used to find the responsibility of that state. 
Therefore, the UN or TCCs can be responsible for the human rights violations committed by 
peacekeepers during PSOs if the conduct constituting human rights violations is attributed to 
either of them.  
Regarding individual criminal responsibility of peacekeepers, the thesis argues that the 
SOFAs which the UN signs with the host states provide blanket exception from the host state 
jurisdiction for peacekeepers and may lead to the impunity of peacekeepers for the acts 
committed during PSOs. The host states signing such agreements may violate their 
obligations under the GC and CAT. Under those conventions, the host states are obliged to 
establish their jurisdiction over war crimes or crime of torture, if a perpetrator of those acts is 
present in their territory. They are also under obligation to take him into custody and 
prosecute or extradite. No such possibility is envisaged under the UN SOFAs and when a 
peacekeeper commits an international crime, the host state will be in violation of its 
obligations.  
The UN SOFA provide not only for immunities ratione materiae from jurisdiction, but 
a total exemption from host state jurisdiction, it cannot be disregarded when international 
crimes are committed and cannot be waived by the UN Secretary-General (unlike other UN 
immunities).  
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Accordingly, members of PSOs military contingents appear to be above any 
international or host state domestic law. They can become accountable only before their 
national states’ courts. However, after peacekeepers are repatriated, they may be prosecuted 
anywhere in the world. Other states (including TCCs) are obliged to prosecute or extradite 
former peacekeepers for the commission of international crimes, if those states are parties to 
the respective conventions. The UN SOFA does not preclude the jurisdiction of the ICC. The 
ICC is not a party to the UN SOFA and is not bound by it. The UN SOFAs will not fall under 
the exception provided by Article 98 on surrender of the persons to the ICC. Therefore the 
host state will be obliged to surrender a peacekeeper to the ICC, if the Court decides to 
establish jurisdiction over the conduct. 
The thesis further applies the introduced system of international responsibility to two 
case-studies: MONUC and UNOSOM. It is possible that the peacekeepers of UNOSOM and 
MONUC may have committed crimes of torture, war crimes of rape, inhuman treatment, 
wilful killing etc. Because of the obligations under the MONUC SOFA, the DRC may find 
itself violating its obligations under the GC and CAT for not establishing jurisdiction and not 
prosecuting the peacekeepers. Moreover, the ICC which is currently dealing with the situation 
in the DRC may establish its jurisdiction over any MONUC peacekeeper, if it finds that some 
crimes were committed within its jurisdiction.  
IHL applied in the situation of UNOSOM and may have applied in the situation of 
MONUC, when the peacekeepers undertook operations directed against armed opposition 
groups. Even if MONUC was participating in the armed conflict with armed groups, it is 
unlikely that this participation continued during all time when the mission was deployed in 
the DRC. It is more likely that they participated in the conflict only for the duration of those 
operations.  
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UNOSOM peacekeepers were involved continuously during a particular period of time 
in the armed conflict in Somalia. It is because they conducted offensive operations, their 
mandate was to direct force against an armed group in Somalia and they intended to cause 
harm to that group.  
Peacekeepers indeed committed violations of IHL and IHRL and at least most of them 
(if not all) can be attributed to the UN or TCCs or both. The violations committed in the 
military compounds following the tolerance or instructions from the national contingent 
commanders can be attributable to the TCCs, as it was for them and their commanders to 
prevent those violations. It is likely that breaches of IHL committed during UN-led operations, 
may be attributed to the UN (or to the TCCs too, if the peacekeepers disobeyed the UN 
orders), as it was for the UN officials planning the operations to prevent the violations of IHL 
committed by peacekeepers. 
It can be concluded that the responsibility of the UN, TCCs and peacekeepers depends 
on the factual circumstances of the commission of international law violations during PSOs. 
The TCCs hiding behind the veil of the UN and its immunities cannot avoid international 
responsibility for those crimes that they were able to prevent. The fact that the TCCs possess 
more powers than the UN (including disciplinary, prosecutorial and training powers) to 
prevent violations of international law contributes to their responsibility for those crimes. The 
UN should not bear the responsibility on its own. The UN should change its position with 
regarding the SOFAs that it signs with the host states, as by this act it may compel the host 
states to violate their obligations under international law. Although the UN tries to adopt 
certain measures and policies directed to prevent unlawful conduct of peacekeepers, it does 
not change its policy in shielding TCCs and their peacekeepers from any international 
responsibility and by that contributing to the sense of impunity among them. What should be 
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done is to recognise that the international responsibility for violations of international law 
committed during PSOs is shared between the UN, TCCs and peacekeepers and neither of 
them will avoid responsibility by reason of simple collaboration with the UN and 
authorisation by the UN Security Council.  
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